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ABSTRACT 
The reconstruotionist position may be expressed as an ideology which 
treats schools and teachers as major instrumentalities of directed cul- 
tural change. Other conceptions of education and culture emphasize the 
social force of cultural heritage, whereas reconstructionism treats the 
heritage as a resource for future social and individual growth. 
Reconstructionist thinking is conspicuous in those modern nation- 
building enterprises which seek to direct schooling by broad social policy 
objectives. Throughout the twentieth century, in England and America, 
many educational thinkers have diagnosed a contemporary cultural crisis 
and proposed large-scale remedial treatment. These proposals have come 
most notably from Fabian socialists, scientific rationalists like Wells 
and Russell, Dewey and other American experimentalists, and Mannheim. 
Their diverse proposals for cultural renewal may be organized under such 
headings as crisis, planned change, holism, and a quest for unity and 
order. Thus, reconstructionists seek to manage the change processes 
whose destructive impact on culture they have analysed. 
Reconstructionism embraces a range of educational positions, from the 
cultural autonomy of education to the assimilation of educational to other 
social and political processes. Despite the ambitious synthetic accounts 
given of these and other relationships, various tensions remain, including 
thosetiotween common core curricula and specialization, mass and minority 
institutions, and social adjustment and independence of mind. Reconstruc- 
tionism, by broadening the teacher's role, poses particular problems for 
teacher education. As a theory of planned cultural change, its focus is 
not so much the school as the institutions of teacher education, which 
are conceived as potentially culturally critical and innovative. 
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'INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose and Structure of the Study 
The subject of this study is a movement in twentieth-century English 
and American thought which conceives education as a process capable, 
under certain conditions, of profoundly changing the social and cul- 
tural order. It is a movement of thought whose parts are loosely 
and variously connected by different writers, rather than a tight 
and coherent theory. From their different standpoints, the re- 
constructionist theorists have developed a wide range of ideas on the 
possibilities education might provide for social and cultural reform. 
Thus, reconstructionism is both a theory of education and a theory of 
directed social and cultural change. 
There is no best single source o1' set of sources for reconstructionist 
thinking. There have been historical expositions and occasional apprai- 
sals-of particular aspects of the movement, mainly of its American ex- 
ponents (1). But, so far as I am aware, the writers I classify as 
reconstructionists have never been related and appraised as members 
of a single movement of thought. Inevitably, my study falls far 
short of a comprehensive account of the numerous strands of meoon- 
structionist thinking in education. My intention is not, however, 
to give a detailed exposition of a tradition or the history of a set 
of ideas, but to build a perspective and to achieve a unity of 
understandings, based on exposition, interpretation and appraisal of 
reconstructionist discussions of certain key themes and ideas. I 
have also attempted to'suggest ways in which reconstruotionist think- 
ing on some of these themes and ideas might be modified and developed. 
These suggestions are not made in the form of a systematic theory, 
- 15 - 
which is a major undertaking in its own right; rather, they ocäixr in 
the context of oriticism. of the selected key ideas, and as part of 
the-, -two overview chapters, 
Nine and Fifteen. 
For the purposes of"this study I have selected and grouped English 
and American. reconstructionists as follows: 
1. Piecemeal social and political reformers of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century in England: 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 
2. Utopian and scientific rationalists. of the same 
periods Wells and Russell. 
3" American experimentalists of the nineteen-twenties 
and thirties: Dewey, Kilpatrick, Rugg, Counts and 
Childs. 
Advocates of large-scale, central social planning 
in Britain in the nineteen-fortless Mannheim and 
Clarke. 
5. Later experimentalists, recent American reconstruc- 
tionistsi Frank, Brameld0 Raup and Stanley. 
Many of these, for example Russell, Dewey and V(ells, have dis- 
cussed a wide range of subjects and educational topics other than 
the idea that education can and should function as a participant 
r 
in directed social and cultural change.. I have not attempted to 
give a comprehensive aocount. ofktheir thinking, but have concen- 
trated-on-those aspects which appear-, most relevant to the basic 
reoonstruotionist objective. In addition to the writers I have 
mentioned, many other twentieth century thinkers have touched upon 
or examined the reconstruotionist viewpoint. I discuss some of 
this wider group of writers briefly, and refer to others. However, 
I have restricted detailed appraisal to the more limited group who 
are, I believe, the more significant, of the English and American 
reconstructionist thinkers. 
My study is divided into two parts. In the first part, taking 
- 
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the thinkers in the order listed above, I discuss and appraise their 
more general ideas on society and culture. My principal objective 
is to outline and assess, the distinctive strategies of culture 
analysis adopted by the different writers. Each thinker or group 
of thinkers is examined .n the light of three central ideas: 
methodology of culture analysis; assessment of the contemporary 
cultural situation; recommendations for substantial changes. 
In the, second part, I adopt a different system of classification. 
This is. based not on, the distinctiveness of reconstructionist 
culture analysis, but on a set of commonly recognized educational 
themes. These themes have to do with the concept of education, 
curriculum, teaching and learning, the role of the school and of 
the teacher, and teacher education. Hating identified, in Part 
I, the distinctiveness of the different reconstructionist per- 
spectives on culture, I aim in Part II to bring out the overall 
unity of reconstructionism as an educational movement, and to assess 
it within a framework familiar to educational theorists. 
In the first chapter, I give a general outline of reconstructionism, 
and in Chapters Nine and Fifteen I look back on reconstruetionist 
thinking about culture and education. These chapters together 
provide what is, I hope, a comprehensive overview of my inter- 
pretation of reconstruotionist thinking. But, since recons- 
tructionism is a term which is not in common usage, it may be helpful 
to give a very brief indication of some of the major issues and ideas 
lying behind its use. 
2. Education and Cultural Reconstruction 
At first sight, reconstructionism might be thought to refer to 
a process of retrieving and perhaps remaking something valuable from 
- 17 - 
the past, like the restoration of an ancient monument or a Greek 
vase. However, 'reconstructionism is not a golden age theory 
directed primarily towards a restoration of the past, although 
its exponents are certainly interested in retaining and restoring 
certain ideals, values and processes which they feel are threatened 
in a rapidly changing society. These elements from the past are 
treated as a valuable heritage which can only survive and be utilized 
by deliberate effort, usually collective effort in the form of 
social planning. The ideals are variously described as the 
democratic heritage, community-mindedness, rational and reflective 
inquiry, cultural unity and order, the methods of consensus and 
shared decision-taking, equality of, consideration, and personal 
growth. 
The reconstruction of culture consists in establishing these 
and other ideals and forms of experience in individuals and in 
society at large through the processes of education. In Chapter 
Three, I try to show how thisnormative use of the concept of cul- 
tur'e may be related to other normative uses'and to the more tech- 
nical uses in social science. These ideals represent the aspi- 
rations of individuals and'groups within society, but have been 
only very incompletely achieved'in any historical society. If 
educational institutions and teachers were able to universalize 
them and to create in children the appropriate dispositions, habits, 
attitudes and skills, then, it is claimed, by degrees, a very pro- 
found transformation of society and of the totality of cultural 
experience would occur. For such a transformation'to take place, 
schools and teachers must'learn in various ways to co-operate with 
and to work through other social institutions and agencies. Furthermore, 
- 18 - 
education, conceived in these very broad terms, becomes no longer 
simply a matter of schooling, but an enterprise to which many other 
institutions in society might and should contribute. The basic 
reconstructionist aim is to ensure that society becomes educative 
in outlook, and hence that the rapid social changes of our time 
are as far as possible brought under control and directed to 
educational ends. 
It is clear, then, that the reconstructionist view of education 
is not restricted to schooling but takes account of many other cul- 
tural processes upon which it depends and which it is hoped to influence 
and direct. Educationists are encouraged to develop an awareness of 
a very wide-range of cultural phenomena and to understand how edu- 
cation might become part of a directed process of social change. 
These considerations, which many educational theorists have ignored, 
or denied, point to a view of education which arouses many misgivings. 
Schooling appears as a political instrument, or a social reform move- 
ment, and the teacher it appears is being asked to assume an active 
political and social reform role (2). I discuss these issues at 
some length in different parts of this study and point out some of 
the possibilities as well as the difficulties to which they give rise. 
The emphasis in the reconstruotionist theory upon a wider con- 
text of social and political thought, and upon the idea of culture 
as an order of social and individual experience which can be sub- 
stantially modified, gives rise to questions about. Its standing 
as an educational theory. It is because of this wider context of 
social and political thou8ht, and because reconstructionism is a 
theory which prescribes or recommends various forms of social and 
political action, in addition to more particular processes of school. 
- 19 - 
based teaching and learning, that I have adopted a different frame 
of reference from that normally used in discussing educational 
theory. The frame of reference I propose to adopt is that of 
ideology. 
3. Reconstructionism as Ideology 
3.1 The analysis of educational theory 
Reconstructionism does not readily fall within any of the 
categories into which the study of education has been conventionally 
divided. It raises problems and questions which are of interest to 
philosophers, sociologists and psychologists without being primarily 
a philosophical or a sociological or a psychological theory. Because 
many reconstructionists are determined to build up a complete struc- 
ture of ideas for the guidance of educational policy, in the widest 
sense, their writings include discussion of the curriculum, institu- 
tional provision, the role of the teacher, and a wide range of factors 
affecting educational change. Reconstructionists aim to influence 
the total system and to bring about substantial changes in the direc- 
tion of policy. 
The attempt to analyse the theory as a totality requires a frame 
of reference different in several respects from those analysed in the 
well-known studies of the logic of educational theory by Hardie, Hirst, 
O'Connor and others (3). In these studies, educational theory is ana- 
lyced into discrete elements: empirical, evaluative and metaphysical, 
but little is said about the way in which theories relate and organize 
these elements into coherent programmes of action. Reconstructionism 
is essentially a prescriptive theory, designed to stimulate and encourage 
action across a broad educational front. It seems to me more akin to 
a socio-political reform movement than to the more limited or more 
r 20 - 
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precisely defined theories of education that Hardie and the others 
had in mind. The concept which seems to me most appropriate to 
such a wide ranging, action-orientated reform movement is ideo- 
logy. But, in arguing for the ideological frame of reference, I 
am conscious of two dangers which I shall try to avoid. The first 
is the Marxist-Freudian propensity for unmasking and disposing of 
ideologies by disclosing the interests, whether social or personal, 
that they serve. The second danger is that of overlooking or 
minimizing the significance of the irrational elements in ideo- 
logical thinking. There are ways of using the concept of ideology, 
for purposes of critical analysis, which avoid at least the more 
extreme forms of these two dangers. 
by wish to make use of the concept of ideology in examining 
reconstructionism arises in part from a sense of dissatisfaction 
with the influential studies in the logic of educational theory which 
I mentioned above. These studies emphasize the logical discreteness 
of elements within theories. While they indicate very clearly the 
nature of the analytic and critical tasks which philosophers, psy- 
chologists and others need to undertake in relation to a lot of loose 
talk and writing about education, they neglect aspects of educational 
theorizing which seem to me no less important than conceptual clarity 
and factual correctness. These other aspects, for which there is, 
unfortunately, no clear framework corresponding to that developed 
by Hardie and the others, refer, first, to the structure or total 
organization of educational theories, and, second, to their function 
as interprdations of and guides to action. In examining the recon- 
atructionist theories we need to keep in mind that they were written. 
and presented as wholes, as comprehensive, coherent systems of thought. 
- 21 - 
It is not only reconstructionist thinking which deserves to 
be examined with an eye to the interrelationships of the various 
elements. In the romantic view of education from Rousseau through 
Pestalozzi, Froebel and the modern progressives it is of some impor- 
tance that characterizations of. the "nature of the child" are linked 
with various prescriptions for treatment. To criticise the argu- 
mente. used, or more often not used, for, links that are made is a 
vital task, but it does not exhaust the problem of understanding 
how those links came, to be made, to persist, to develop and shift. 
Such criticism does not of Itself bring out the particular flavour 
or style of the formulation= nor does it disclose the-logical com- 
plexity of acts of application and-interpretation. Finally, it 
tells us little about the. processes involved in revising these 
theories to produce more satisfactory statements, should we wish to 
do so. 4 
As theories of practice, educational' theories attempt to make a 
difference to how people live, think and feel. At the personal level, 
Oakeshott brings out the relationship of practise to desires for im- 
provementss I 
"In practical activity then, every image is the re- 
flection of a desiring self engaged in constructing its 
world and in continuing to reconstruct it in such a manner 
as to afford it pleasure. The world here consists of 
what is good to eat and what is poisonous, what is friendly 
and what is hostile, what is amenable to control and what 
resists it. And each image is recognized as something to 
be made use of or exploited. "(4) 
In a social context where desires for'improvement are shared and 
communicated in language this attempt to"improve experience"gives rise 
to the idea of expressive style, This is a function which is intrinsic 
to theory conceived as theory of practice. It is not something external 
"22" 
to it. Thus-we need to consider style as itself a persuasive 
device in the'formulation and presentation of a particular theory. 
The selection of metaphorical names for processes (e. g. "growth", 
"initiation") is itself evocative of other things, and educational 
theorists commonly strengthen argumentstuot. ºonly by the chosen 
structural devices but also by the selection of evocative and 
emotionally charged metaphors. Except in the processes of "de- 
mythologizing", *"stripping down" and "exposing", these stylistic 
features of educational theory have been largely overlooked in 
the recent preoccupation with analysis into "elements". (5) 
These metaphors, this language, have a significance which is 
contextually conditioned. That is to say, in the analysis of 
ideas, movements are detectable in which the symbols and modes of 
expression of one field of discourse may be seen to draw upon, to 
echo, and to interrelate with those of other fields and with various 
forms of action (6). This is not quite Mannheim's thesis of the 
sociology of knowledge, which seeks to identify the social interests 
served by and the underlying social assumptions of theories in the 
human sciences. Nor is it the Marxist argument that, at any rate 
in the human sciences, all theory is ideological superstructure to 
the underlying realities of productive relationship. Icy claim is a 
more modest one, thatýen adequate analysis of practical theories depends 
in part on apprehending their total structure and understanding. both how 
they are intended to be interpreted and applied, and something of the 
cultural context of which they are an aspect. Just what this "some- 
thing" is and just how far this wider understanding is "required", are 
much more difficult problems; inquiries must terminate if they are to 
be intelligible. However, emphasis on the discrete elements of educations 
r 
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theories and sustairied-and systematic criticism of these elements 
from. pre'-defined standpoints, while fundamental, does not exhaust 
the possibilities. 
Amongst recent writers, Reid seems to have been almost alone 
in drawing attention to two of the features, noted above, that'do 
not fall within the conventional empirical-normative-metaphysical 
categorization - namely, the question of interpreting theories of 
practice, and the "synthetic", "global" quality of educational'theory 
(7). All theorizing, according to Reid, is talk about or reflection 
upon some aspect of the practical processes of education. He draws 
a rough distinction between talking or thinking about something and 
taking action to sustain or change that thing -a distinction that 
overlooks the point 'that persuasive talk about education may be a 
highly effective way of 'sustaining or changing the thing in question. 
However, the difference is in emphasis, and it may be brought out by 
conceiving levels, or points in a continuum (talk ... action), and 
allowing that in'certain circumstances the levels or points may 
move about. 
The philosopher, on Reid's analysis, is he who attempts to develop 
a general, a global theory of education. , Dewey cast the philosopher 
into a similar role (8). One problem to which this gives rise is 
that of attributing to the philosopher skills, interests and knowledge 
he may not possess or may -actually, as philosopher, wish to dissociate 
himself from. As Reid argues, the building of a global 'theory may 
not be so much a matter of developing new knowledge as of building 
up fresh perspectives of relationships, and fresh understandings of 
interconnections. However, the analytical philosopher commonly es- 
chews this part of his traditional role, to the extent that it involves 
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"enunciating basic values and formulating intermediate objectives 
for educational institutions" (9). 
The argument about whether the philosopher is best equipped 
to develop global educational theories is for my purpose of less 
significance than the fact that Reid has identified as important 
in educational theory features which are not brought out in the. 
logical categories identified by Hardie, Hirst and O'Connor. 
For example, "deep, sensitive participation, actual and imaginia- 
tive, in the concrete situations out of which the judgments arise"; 
and the, development of perspectives, judgments, or "passionate 
concern" (l0)9' These considerations suggest that the structure 
of educational theory needs to be categorized as it were vertically 
as well as horizontally: vertical categories of logical structure, 
and horizontal categories, much more difficult to define, of style, 
organization and interpretation; loosely, categories of function 
and use. 
3.2 The concept of ideology 
The analysis of educational theories into discrete empirical - 
evaluative - metaphysical elements has clarified the task of criticism 
and directed students and theorists to relevant fields of knowledge, 
e. g., philosophy and psychology. However, I have argued that there 
are important features of the more holistic educational theories, 
including reconstructionism, which are easily neglected when atten- 
tion is centred exclusively on the separate elements. The concept 
of ideology, used with caution, is an appropriate tool for the 
analysis of educational theories like reconstructionism, which seek 
to define and recommend large-scale, coherent action programmes. 
For other reasons, too, the concept of ideology is apposite 
- 25 - 
in a discussion of reconstructionism, as we shall see from a brief 
review of its emergence, in the French enlightenment. 
"Although, 'in general, it might be argued that to study the 
history of a term is to make only a limited contribution to eluci- 
dating the concept (11), there is a peculiarly close relationship 
between the earlier uses of the term ideology, and reconstructionism. 
This relationship is of such a degree of intimacy that it is not 
misleading to say that the reconstructionist theory is itself a 
modern version of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
theory of ideology. 
According to Lichtheim, the term ideology is a French revolu- 
tionary heritage, to be found first in the writings of the enligh- 
tenment savant, Antoine Destutt de Tracy (12). Destutt was one 
of the managers of the newly founded Institut do France, which sup- 
ported Napoleon's rise to power. The ideologists of'the Institut 
were liberals, espousing the cause of rationalism, and forerunners 
of positivism: the Institut became a centre of "experimental studies" 
in literature, art, religion and psychology. By thus making rationalism 
a cause, the ideologists identified certain forms of inquiry, or an 
interest in ideas, -with particular ideals. Destutt conceived 
ideology both as a "natural history of ideas" - and, echoing Locke 
and Condillac, as a critique of the notion of absolute norms. But, 
by attaching himself so enthusiastically to the belief that through 
experimental inquiry he and his colleagues could establish "the general 
laws of sociability", this critical philosophe erected a particular 
normative system. The ideologists of the Institut created a faith, 
which blended: (1) Baconian criticism of idols as a starting point 
for the reformation of consciousness; (2) Cartesian rationalism as a 
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model for inquiry and for the structural arrangement of ideas; and 
(3) the enlightenment onslaught on prejudice, via reason and educa- 
tion, as represented in the works of Condillac, Holbach, Helvetius 
and others. 
When Destutt and his associates thought of themselves as ideo- 
logists, they had in mind ideas which it may not be too misleading 
to outline as a programme: 
1. certain values and norms of conduct to which they 
subscribed not dogmatically but in a spirit of 
tentativeness and continuing self-criticism; 
2. a set of ideas which united them, providing a social 
bond or even perhaps a myth, creating a community of 
inquirers out of otherwise disparate intellectuals, 
and providing a sense of identity; 
3. a perspective of a historical or a wider social 
kind -a world view or a not of matrices which con- 
stituted a very general frame of reference, or a 
tradition of thought and action, within which sys- 
tematic inquiry could take place, and which gave to 
the inquiry a certain flavour, or coherent style; 
4. a mode of conjoint activity which constituted a 
praxis, a set of links between thought and action, 
such that thought was seen to relate to practice 
as a form of inspiration and guidance as well as 
a mode of analysis and of criticism; 
5. a concern for orderly, planned, social change, ins- 
pired by the general ideals of liberal democracy, 
as they emerged in thought in the early post- 
Revolutionary period. 
This is an idealization or a more systematic post hoc realization 
of what was undoubtedly in practice a less developed point of view. 
Nevertheless, the early thought and activities of the Institut ideo- 
logists pointed in these directions as well an in the directions of 
Hegelianism, Marxism and Freudianism. 
3.3 Criticisms of ideological thinking 
It is not necessary to trace the later vicissitudes of the concept 
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of ideology in the possession in turn-of Hegelians, Marxists, 
Comteians, romantics, psychgana] sts, and, more recently, of the 
exponents of sociology-of knowledge (13), to appreciate that what 
it generally identifies are sets of principles governing practical 
conduct. Unfortunately, pejorative-usages have tended to drive 
out all others, so that, amongst contemporary political writers, ' 
it is not uncommon to find Marxist or Freudian "therapies" being 
advocated; i. e. the "unmasking" of ideological thinking. On the 
one hand, according to Marxist pejorative use, a theory is "ideo- 
logical" if it elevates contemplation. and. isolates thought from the 
physical and material processes of production; if it emerges within 
a socially stratified situation (the rigid-separation of classes); 
if it exalts contemplation over action; if it appears to separate 
the products of human activity from the i. abour. that produces them, 
and converts these products into self-sustaining realities - the 
reified abstractions of religion, the law, bourgeois, politics, 
eta. Here ideology is the "disease" of "false consciousness", 
and those entertaining ideologies are held to be suffering from 
an affliction and in need of a cure. On the other hand, according 
to Freudian pejorative uses, a theory is held to be ideological to 
the extent that it throws, the oloak of apparent order and coherence 
and objectivity over the emotional maze of self-interest, self- 
assertion, free association and fantasy, which provide some of 
the underlying dynamics of personality. Ideology as rationalization 
is, as with Marxists, a form of false consciousness, a fiction which 
must be penetrated if truth is to be unveiled. Again, those enter- 
taining ideologies are victims of delusions from which they can be 
freed by suitable therapy (14). 
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Beyond these two major critical onslaughts on ideology, the 
sociologists of knowledge, following Weber and Uannheim, have em- 
phasized the social and contextual "determining" of knowledge, or, 
more properly, of awareness and beliefs. Weber dharacterized ideology as 
the intellectual reflex of determinate social processes. Ideas come 
to be treated as weapons which particular interest groups in society 
wield in defence of their special interests. In Mannheim's confusing 
usage (influenced by Pareto), the weapons are "ideological" to the ex- 
tent that they represent the intellectual efforts of conservative groups 
to retain power and resist change detrimental to their interests; they 
are "utopian" to the extent that they represent the intellectual struggles 
of reformers to overthrow the conservatives and to rule in their stead 
(15). In either case, the idea systems take the form of complex creeds 
designed to distort rather than disclose the truth, and to enlist sup- 
port for causes rather than for the notion of inquiry. It is one 
major task of the sociology of knowledge to unmask the "situational" 
motives of the protagonists of ideology and utopia and to disclose the 
social consequences of their credo convictions. 
The characterization of ruthless political movements as ideological 
has, again, brought the term into disrepute in liberal western demo- 
cracies in the twentieth century. Chief among4 the "ideological move- 
ments" have been fascism and communism, perceived as totalitarian, doc- 
trinaire, authoritarian, fanatical and violent. These are the movements 
that use ideology as a culture binding and bonding procedure, building 
up bonds of affect, social commitment, and unifying the particular 
community, nation or movement by providing it with a historical and 
mythical perspective and a vision of a triumphant future. Thus indi- 
viduals are provided with an identity, even if it is only an identity 
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of stereotypes, and culture is supplied with solidifying meanings, 
symbols and institutions (16). In view of the form and content 
of these ideologies and the expansionist politics of which they 
have been a part, many critics have attempted to'build up a dis- 
tinction in action theory between ideology and science, criticizing 
the former for making universalistic, non-contextual, non-testable 
claims (17)1 for presenting value judgments in the guise of facts 
(18); for projecting doctrines instead of developing structures of 
inquiry, and so forth (19)6 Ideology as a form of distortion or a 
battleground of interest groups is' characterized as irrational, while 
science and conceptual analysis, by contrast, are rational procedures 
by which we may gain objective knowledge and clear understanding (20). 
As Corbett makes clear in his systematic critique of the ideo- 
logies of American democracy, Marxism, and Catholicism, the anti- 
rational elements in ideological thinking are, however, susceptible to 
the corrective treatment of self-awareness and criticism (21). The non- 
rational elements (if subscription to certain values can be so described) 
cannot be fully dispensed with as they are an ingredient of any form of 
action. 
3.4 Resuscitation of ideological thinking 
The hostile usages made of the term ideology, arising from the later 
nineteenth century and twentieth century developments in thought and 
practice which I have reviewed, may be contrasted with the definitions 
of two contemporary philosophers, both interested in reviving the en- 
lightenment understanding of ideology as a socio-political mode of con- 
structive theorizing. 
In his paper "Democracy and ideology", Williams argued that ideo- 
logies need not be "explicit", "noisy", "openly inculcated" and 
_3p_ 
"totalitarian". By ideology he meant, broadly, "a system of politi- 
cal and social beliefs" that (a) "embodies some set of values or 
ideals, and, consequently, some principles of action" and (b) "connects 
with its values and principles of action some set of very general theo- 
retical beliefs which give the values and principles some sort:, df back- 
ing or justification". Furthermore, these general beliefs must be "about 
man, society and the state, and not merely about some aspect of man 
in society" (22). Thus there can be ideologies of liberalism, as 
well as totalitarianism, of democracy as well as absolutism. Some- 
what in the fashion of the early nineteenth century ideologues, 
Williams proceeded in his paper to sketch out the principles of a 
liberal, democratic ideology. 
More sustained in"critioism and constructive theorizing is Corbett's 
treatment of ideology. , He defined the term thus: 
"a set of beliefs about the conduct of life and the organisa- 
tion of society; aset of beliefs about man's nature and 
the world in which he lives; a claim that the two sets 
are interdependent; and a demand that those beliefs should 
bb professed, and that claim conceded, by anyone who is to 
be considered a full member of a certain social group. "(23) 
Accordingly, Catholicism, American democracy, Leninism, the myths 
of English Public Schools, or Amazonian Tribes (but not, he claimed, 
the theory of relativity) count as ideologies. Corbett went further, 
maintaining that: 
1. the word will carry no implication that what it notes is 
good, bad, or indifferent, and no implication as to the 
rationality of the beliefs referred to; 
2. there win be no restriction on the content of beliefs 
that make up the ideology: it may be moral, political, 
religious, etc., in character; 
3. the beliefs referred to will have implications for con- 
ducts to accept an ideology is to be committed to a way 
of life; 
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4. some of the beliefs referred to concern the general 
nature of man and society; 
5" the beliefs constitute a system, they support one 
another; 
6. the term will imply associating the system of be- 
liefs with some institution in such a way that hold- 
ing these beliefs is a condition of membership. 
By excluding relativity, Corbett has accepted the common dis- 
tinction between scientific rationality and the biases and distor- 
tions of cultural belief and action systems. 
It is true that, from a purely logical point of view, the theory 
of relativity, the quantum theory, Galileols and Newton's mechanics, 
Darwin's evolutionary theory and so forth are non-ideological, as Corbett 
defines the term. However, the wider cultural consequences that have 
followed on the formulation, the testing, the development and the modi- 
fication of these and other'soientific theories are by no means non- 
ideological. 'Conspicuous amongst examples of the rapid assimilation 
of-scientific theories into social ideologies are the religious and 
philosophical impact of Newtonianism in the eighteenth century, of 
Darwinism in the nineteenth century and the-persistence of Baoonianism 
since the seventeenth'century (24). Nor are the conditions - personal 
and social - which give rise'to these theories in the narrowest sense 
free'of some ideological features. "The scientific creator", in 
Russell's words, "like every other, is apt to be inspired by passions 
to which. he gives an intellectualistic expression amounting to an undemon- 
strated 'faith, without which he would probably achieve little" (25). 
Russell adds that without this "faith"'scientific work of a creative 
kind - theorizing - will itself cease. 
Similarly, as Kuhn has shown, replacing one scientific theory by 
another involves the substitution of one complex frame of reference, or 
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world view, for another (26). 
These are considerations usually described as psychological and 
sociological. They are commonly claimed to have no bearing on the 
problems of validating and testing theories, except insofar as they 
facilitate or hinder these processes. Yet when, as it appears, the 
very creation and the human consequences of theories are so intimately 
bound up with matters of faith and feeling and complex action, it is 
difficult to avoid concluding that purely logical analysis, for all 
its importance, is only a part of the story. We can be clear that 
certain types of theory are non-ideological only by severely abstract- 
ing them from a context of germination, development and use. Pro- 
vided this is how we understand theory in a. scientific sense, it is 
correct to describe it as non-ideological, but, as Polanyl has argued, 
it is by no means the case that this form of understanding is the only 
one proper even to scientific theories in the strictest and narrowest 
sense (27). 
There is a further point to notice about Corbett's definition. 
His contention that the normative and empirical constituents of the 
system are "interdependent" echoes Destutt's enlightenment confidence 
in the mutuality and interpenetration of accretive experimental science 
and social-moral progress. It is just this claim that gives ideo- 
logies their distinctive character, as thought systems, and their 
appeal as reform programmes. Yet this claim also gives rise to the 
most serious problems in criticizing and validating them. 
This latter point will be taken up later, when the reconstructionist 
theory is under critical scrutiny. Meanwhile, it is sufficient to 
emphasize the importance of open-mindedness, tolerance and scepticism 
in developing, interpreting and examining ideologies. These are 
ý 
33 i 
qualities which the "noisier" ideological theories' themselves overlook 
or deliberately omit. It is appropriate to heed°Montaigne's admoni- 
tion. ' Like, Rums after him he "warned men to beware of those who bore 
a sanctified appearance and imposed a burden of austerities"s these 
are zealots, partisans to causes (28). 
From the general outline of some of the major features and claims 
of reconstruotionist theory'that follows in the 'next chapter it will 
become apparent why the ideological frame of reference is considered 
more appropriate to a full understanding than the other schematization 
of educational theory which we have considered. 
4. Chapter Synopses 
Chapter Is General Outline of the Reconstruotionist Theory 
I raise the issue of the cultural bearings of reconstructionism 
and classify theories of culture into'value spare and value laden, a 
distinction which emphasizes that even the descriptive and explanatory 
theories of culture science embody value preferences. Reconstructionism 
is a value laden theory, `which I contrast'with two significant theories 
of education which have also used the concept of: cultixre in a normative 
way. These are the theories of classical humanism'and child interest. 
I briefly discuss the distinctive contribution of the reconstruotionists 
to problems of transmitting and transforming culture through teachers 
and schools and note some of the perfeotibilist e. ssumptions of recon- 
struotionism. 
Chapter II, A Case Study': the Report of the Indian Education Com- 
mision, 1966: Ch. 1. Education and National Obectives 
I justify the choice of this document as a recent example of recon- 
structionist thinking in a developing society. I summarize the main 
arguments of the commission insofar as they project a culturally 
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reconstructive role for education. The arguments hinge on the 
concept of'crisis. Education is treated by the commission as 
the chief instrumental means of culture re-tusking. I examine 
their claim that there is a , crisis and consider the arguments for sub- 
serving education to, the pre-defined ends of national development. 
My conclusion is that in eeveral'important"respects, the commission 
fails to make an adequate case. . But their study is a valuable re- 
constructionist document, since it raises many of the issues and 
problems relevant to a discussion of the wider movement of recon- 
structionism. 1 
Chapter III; Theories of Culture and Culture Reconstruction 
'I distinguish two broad types of culture theory - descriptive 
and prescriptive. Ifurther divide the descriptive theories of 
certain anthropologists into those which emphasize culture deter 
minism and those which emphasize individual- creativity. I contrast 
the emphasis on individual' creativity with those theories which em- 
phasize mammalian, inheritance, -'and those which. emphasize social 
faots: and education as i process of culture` transmission (Durkheim). 
I define reconstructionism as aprescriptive culture theory which 
seeks to combine culture determinism and individual creativity. 
Chapter IVs Fabian Socialism! the Webbs, 
I discuss the contribution of the Webba to the methodology of. 
social research and raise. the problem of relating their interventionism 
to historicist strands in, their thought. I examine the Webb diagnosis 
of the failings of English society and distinguish their sharp and de- 
tailed criticisia from the more holistic crisis theories. In assessing 
their contribution, I emphasize the operational utility, for reformers, 
of piecemeal, empirical inquities. I argue that their-diagnosis of 
cultural malaise is directed by an intention to engage in systematic 
reform. Piecemeal and holistic aspects of their reform proposals 
are contrasted and I suggest that their reform programme may be con- 
sidered as a series of unresolved tensions: centralized and decen- 
tralized institutions; individual freedom and collectivization; 
a managerial democracy; gradualism and revolutionary communism; 
paroohialism and internationalism. 
Chapter Vs Utopian and Scientific Rationalism: Wells and Russell 
I argue that Wells and Russell share many beliefs, as scientific 
rationalists. -I characterize Wells' diagnosis of culture as bourgeois 
man and society, in a period of crisis. The elements of this crisis are 
numerous, but what is most conspicuous is Wells' dislike of disunity and 
his belief that failure to apply science in society is chiefly respon- 
sible for the chaos he detects, I consider and assess his prescrip- 
tions for culture development, emphasizing his views on: scientific. 
utopianism, collectivization and interpersonal relations, elitism and 
democracy, creativity and the. pursuit of beauty, and the concept of 
the new man. I argue that, despite historicist tendencies, Wells is 
not a historical determinist but an imaginative prophet and prescrip- 
tiviet. I conclude, the chapter with a brief discussion of Russell's 
criticisms of contemporary civilization, hie theory-of human nature, and 
his recommendations for implementing a modern liberal ideology. 
Chapter VIt American-Experimentalists 
I briefly discuss the polarization of society and individual in 
educational theory and try to reach an understanding of the experi- 
mentalist definition of a person. I appraise the experimentalist 
contribution to a cultural understanding of education. The problem 
of culture breakdown in experimentalist theory is related both to its 
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metaphysical doctrines and to, its emphasis on the impact of science 
and technology on western culture. The crisis, according to the 
experimentalists, is peculiarly a crisis in American democracy. I 
consider this claim and examine a variety of experimentalist assess- 
ments of their cultural dilemma in, the 1930s. I examine the more 
holistic proposals for reconstruction made by Rugg, and Dewey's more 
cautious adoption, of- a method of.. reform instead of a grand design. 
Deweyle views on democracy, however, go beyond method, a point which 
may be appreciated by contrasting his theories with Max Webers. I 
conclude the chapter with an assessment of the relationship between 
social trends and interventionist planning. 
Chapter VII: Culture Crisis, Mannheim 
Mannheim's most significant contribution is to the methodology of 
culture analysis. -I discuss his theory in terms of the distinctive- 
ness of culture science, and of levels of-meaning, holism, perapectivism, 
relational truths and realms of experience beyond history. His theory 
is, In sum, inadequate and has been rightly criticized. Nevertheless 
he has-made many valuable suggestions for culture study. I examine 
bis views about the relationship of man and culture, emphasizing the 
problems raised by his aspiration to remake man. Then I criticize 
the ideological features, of his diagnosis of culture crisis. Mannheim 
ambitiously projected a total planning framework for western democracies. 
I discuss his justification of planning and in greater detail examine 
his theory of elites and point out some of its shortcomings. I con- 
clude by considering Mannheim's alleged historicism, in the light of 
Popper's critique, and argue that Mannheim is not a historicist, on 
Popper's definition. 
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Chapter VIII: 
__Later 
Experimentalists 
I consider very briefly post-war developments of reconstructionism 
and explain my limited choice of sources. These sources are Brameld, 
an exponent of holistic, crisis diagnosis and of. planning; Frank, who 
has emphasized psychological aspects of culture renewal; and the social 
foundations movement represented by Stanley, Smithy Raup and others. I 
criticize Brameld's failure to establish his claim that there is a cul- 
ture crisis and suggest that Prank has made a'significant, if partial, 
contribution by emphasizing'a neglected aspect of reconstructionism, 
namely personality. However, Frank proposes an impossibly large and 
complex method of culture study. The social foundations movement is 
examined mainly in terms of the quest for consensus and cultural unity. 
I criticize the arguments the later experimentalists advance but suggest 
that the proposed method of "practical judgment" has many uses even if 
these are more limited than those intimated by its authors. I discuss 
Stanley's careful, detailed analysis of cultural disintegration and suggest 
that his attempt to rescue the democratic heritage raises as many problems 
as it is intended to solve. I show how in the social foundations move- 
ment the school curriculum is turned into an emergent culture synthesis 
and point to some of the difficulties raised by this proposal. Finally, 
I assess the quest for cultural order and integration in Frank, Brameld 
and Stanley. 
Chapter IXs Overview and Critique of Part I 
A summary of the major themes introduced throughout Part Ones I 
examine these critically, and contrast the reconstructionist approach to 
culture change with'selected aspects of Durkheim, Marx and recent tech- 
nological change theories. 
-- 38 - 
Chapter Xi Education: Concepts, Objectives and Processes 
From a very wide range of material I'seleot-four topics for more 
detailed discussion. First, I examine the concepts of growth and ex- 
perience and the good life in Dewey'-and Kilpatrick, which provide the 
basis for later reoonstruotioniit thinking about the processes of 
education. Second, I criticize the tendency-of several reconstruotionists, 
notably Brameld, to assimilate education to enculturatiori. Third, I 
consider the problem of elitism, which is a necessary but not always 
adequately acknowledged feature of reconstructionist thinking. Fourth, 
I argue that, despite occasional pronouncements - e. g. by Counts, 
Mannheim and Clarke - reconstructionism does not subscribe to indoc- 
trination. I follow the discussion of these four topics by a brief 
review of reconstructionist proposals for reconstruction through edu- 
cation, treating theorists in the order Ifollowed in" Chapters Four 
to Eight. I conclude with an assessment of the reconstructionist 
quest for culture order through education. 
Chapter XI: Curriculum Design I: the Webbs, Wells, Dewey and Kilpatri 
I divide the substantial but nevertheless-uneven contributions of 
the reconstruotionists to curriculum theory into two,, making Chapters 
Eleven and Twelve two parts of a single extended discussion. After 
briefly reviewing selected contemporary ideas on the subject of a general 
design for the curriculum, I consider the utilitarian-studies proposal 
of the 'ebbs, and Wells' curriculum design for a new society. In view 
of Dewey's and Kilpatrick's significance as leaders of twentieth century 
educational thinking, I examine at some length their views on problem 
solving, project work and their emphasis on scientific culture. 
Chapter XII: Curriculum Design II: Rugg, Mannheim, Brameld and 
later Experimentalists 
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I discuss Rugg's conception of the curriculum as a design for 
future social living, prepared through a nation-wide effort of 
adult education. Rugg's ideas of a curriculum core of contemporary 
and future-directed social experience is given different treatment 
by Mannheim, Brameld and the later experimentalists, but the quest 
for some common, unifying body of ideas and values is similar. In 
considering Mannheim's views I draw a contrast between his perspec- 
tivism and Dewey's problem solving. I conclude by assessing reconstruo- 
tionist curriculum thinkingin the light of a number of central themes: 
the curriculum as a model of future culture trends$ the-problem of a 
common core; the role of the teacher as curriculum designer; and 
the problem of a clash between school values and those of other social 
institutions. 
Chapter XIIii Schoolas Institutional Structures for Reconstruction 
Following a brief discussion of the reconstructionist advocacy of 
a wide-ranging educational programme, I conclude that in their writing 
they gave far more attention to schools and similar institutions than 
to less orthodox educational instrumentalities. I discuss each of 
the major reconstruotionist theories according to a distinct theme, 
rather than by attempting to comprehend the full range of their insti- 
tutional prpposals. For the Webbs, the theme is building up an adminis- 
trative infrastructure; for Wells, it is the design of experimental 
institutions, in particular the "world brain", an encyclopaedic infor- 
mation storage and retrieval system; for the experimentalists of the 
Dewey era, the theme is the democratization of public educational insti- 
tutions; for Mannheim and Clarke, it is the school as a transitional 
society, in terms of past and future, primary and secondary groups; 
and for the later experimentalists it to the effort to achieve social 
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consensus in and through school education. I conclude by discussing 
the general issue. of the school as an institutional agency of change, 
together with the argument for a greater democratization of the school. 
Chapter XIV: The Teacher as Agent of Reconstruction 
I examine three topics: the qualities sought in teachers, the 
task of teaching, and teacher education. I argue that'the reconstruction- 
iota are typically'optimistic and expansive in their treatment of these 
subjects. The ultimatessouroe of directed change, it emerges, is the 
teacher education programme. This raises the question of who educates 
the teachers. Following a review of selected outlines of teacher edu- 
cation programmes, I conclude that the reconstruotionists, despite the 
weaknesses of their specifio'proposals, were right to identify teacher 
education as a critical area. Future developments of reconstructionist 
thinking should pay particular attention to the problems of developing 
and strengthening the teacher's perception of himself as a change agent, 
and to the determination of appropriate initial and'inservice programmes 
of teacher education. 
Chapter XVs Overview and Critique of'Part II 
A summary of the major themes discussed in Part Twos I make an 
assessment of the major reconstructionist arguments on education as a 
force for cultural change, 'and suggest some possible lines of develop- 
ment it the theory is'to`maintain its'vitality. 
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I 
PART ONE 
CHAPTER I 
GENERAL 'OUTLINE OF THE RECONSTRUCTIONIST THEORY 
Reconstructionist thinkers are concerned with. the broad policy 
objectives of education and with those major strategies which seem 
most suitable for achieving or operationalizing these objectives. 
Their conceptions of the directions which cultural and social de- 
velopment should follow vary considerably; reconstructionism never- 
theless may be distinguished from other educational theories through 
an analysis of the different uses educationists-make of the concept 
of culture. I shall attempt in this chapter to bring out the dis- 
tinctiveness of the reconstructionist position by contrasting it with 
two other educational theories, which I shall designate classical, 
humanism and romantic comma itarianism. 
For this purpose, I shall start by distinguishing uses of the 
concept of culture into "value spare" and "value laden", a distinc- 
tion which I develop in Chapter Three. By value spare, I mean those 
forms of inquiry and theorizing which endeavour to eliminate or to 
make very sparing and explicit use of value preferences; the so- 
called pursuit of objectivity in research and scholarship. I do 
not use the more familiar expression "value neutral" because, as I 
argue in Chapter Three, the situation or standpoint of observers, 
their choice of topics to investigate and their use of concepts and 
of instruments all presuppose value preferences, even if these are 
to some extent public and shared by other inquirers. By value 
laden, I mean the preferences, ideals and values which are an integral 
part of action theories, such as educational theories, where what is at 
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stake is the determination and justification of policies for modi- 
fying and guiding very wide areas of human experience. Thus, the 
determination, through education, to achieve an enlargement of the 
scope of rationality in human experience, or the extension of a 
sense of common community interests and aspirations, indicates the 
value laden character of these theories. 
1. Culture 
1.1 Value spare uses 
The meanings, experiences, symbolic systems, patterns of organi- 
zation of thought and behavior, and the instruments which constitute 
culture order and culture processes may be analysed through the use 
of descriptive, classificatory and functional categories. An anthro- 
pologist, a sociologist, an archaeologist, or some other social scientist, 
wishes so to describe a way of life as to present it as intelligible and 
meaningful to a third party. For this purpose he needs certain tech- 
niques of inquiry, certain instruments, certain tests for the validity 
of his insights: in short, methods for observing and for selecting 
amongst, organizing and validating his findings. In this sense, he 
"judges" his material and he may be said to exhibit preferences towards 
it - for example, in his choice of key concepts. But these are judg- 
ments and preferences usually of a wide sub-cultural circle and efforts 
are made to relate such valuations as are introduced to the norms of 
this sub-cultural circle. Furthermore, these judgments are directed 
by criteria of objectivity, descriptiveness, truth as an ideal, repeat- 
ability and replication of observations and experiments, and by reference 
to explanatory theories and Concepts - e. g., those concerning processes 
like "diffusion", "man-environment interaction", "ritual", "persistence 
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of belief", "social solidarity", etc. The primary purpose of in- 
quiries directed by this concept of culture may be said to be under- 
standing and explanations the advancement of knowledge. 
The concept of culture in this scientific use is a general 
ordering category both for experiencing and for exploring relation- 
ships amongst human actions. The cultural-sciences are those 
studies which intend to define the nature of these relationships 
through the use of pragmatically relevant structures of thought 
and instrumentalities of inquiry (1). Categories of thought in 
cultural science are designated and developed as-a conceptual system 
whose purpose it is to elucidate and to understand the phenomena, as 
expressed in the "public images" of fields of human action. Just 
how these conceptual systems should be split off from and related 
to each other, and what the most useful of the valid ordering con- 
cepts are, is as much a matter of dispute in the culture sciences 
as in educational theory, and many different approaches have been 
explored (2). 
1.2 Value laden uses 
The concept of culture has, traditionally, and in education, 
also been defined in other ways, for different purposes. These 
purposes direct the definition, and they have, to do with the selec- 
tion of experiences, patterns of thought and action to transmit to 
the young, in the effort to structure their growth and. to give cer- 
tain directions or emphases to future movements of the cultural system. 
Traditionally, this concept of culture has been designated "high" or "elite" 
culture, but this is misleading, for. different kinds of cultural patterns 
have been selected for different groups, at different times, and so- 
called "high" culture is only one of these, We might just as well 
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speak of scientific, or humanist, or pop or traditional culture. 
However, the notion of high culture points up a basic feature 
of the value laden use of the term - namely, selecting parti- 
cular meanings and ways of ordering experience, and attaching 
a definite value to them. 
Only those educational theories which aim to explain how 
and why a particular society sets out to educate its young in 
particular ways restrict themselves to culture in the value spare 
sense. Indeed, ouch writings depend in part on the efforts of 
culture scientists to devise appropriate explanatory' systems. 
Even so, they are subject to value choices in the selection of 
instruments and ordering concepts, the relationship of inquirer 
to his subject matter, and so forth. All educational theories 
which intend to recommend certain practices and to discourage others 
make implicit or explicit use of the concept of culture in the value 
laden sense. That is, they select certain elements or forms of 
experience (e. g., free inquiry) and reject others (o. g., indootri- 
nation). The attempt by recent theorists - e. g. Peters., - to 
infer a theory of practice from a particular concept of education 
(education conceived as a cognitively and critically ordered pro- 
cess) and thus to eliminate all rivals as non-education theories, 
is itself an example of the value laden approach (3)o values 
operate to govern the choice of items for the definition. Other 
theorists have thought differently, perhaps on the whole more 
loosely, about the concept of education; for example, giving 
greater stress to non-rational factors, and refusing to assimilate them 
to rational processes; or, very loosely, identifying education with 
efficient processes of enculturation. Education is variously defined 
as "growth", "experience", "cultural assimilation" and cognitively 
orientated "initiation". 
Thus, educational theories with a prescriptive intent express 
various cultural commitments, but they all fall within the range 
of value laden uses of the term culture, and it is of particular 
interest to identify the implicit and explicit cultural preferences 
they display and their deployment of strategies intended to advance 
one particular concept of culture or another We 
2. Threefold Division of Educational Theories 
As was stated above, broadly speaking, prescriptive educational 
theories may be divided into three groups, in relation to their use 
of the organizing concept of culture. We have seen that these 
theories will make greater use of value laden than of value spare 
descriptions of culture. I designated the threefold division as 
followsa 
1. classical humanism; 
2. romantic communitarianism; 
3. reconstructionism. 
We may better appreciate the character of the third by contrasting 
it with the first two. 
2.1 Classical humanism 
Classical humanism is a refinement, or a succession of refine- 
ments within the western tradition of an extremely pristine view; namely, 
that culture is a heritage, in the safekeeping of a class of guardians, 
into which each generation is to be initiated by the guardians. In 
Plato's hands this became a static concept, in that it was assumed 
that the quest for knowledge could, in principle, ultimately yield 
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truths of a transcending, permanent character which the elites of 
guardians were charged to sustain and to transmit unchanged. Ad- 
mittedly, this must be qualified in several ways. It was never 
expected in practice that truth would be finally realised; hence 
there would be a continuing quest for understanding and knowledge. 
Again "transmit" is misleading in view of the maieutic method of 
Socrates and Plato's theory of ideas. Ideas were not so much 
transmitted as re-discovered, a very important distinction for 
education. Nevertheless, in The Republic and in The Laws, Plato 
outlined with unparalleled vigor and detail the institutional frame- 
work within which a heritage was to be communicated to the masses, 
only a tiny elite, in Jesuitical fashion, being granted freedom to 
pursue inquiry untrammelled. 
However, the classical humanist concept of cultural transmission 
is not necessarily static; it has in fact changed both in content 
(e. g., the various meanings the Greeks attached to "paideia", and 
the trandbrmation of curriculum content at the Renaissance and in the 
nineteenth century) and in procedures (transmission being variously 
conceived as a process involving passive acceptance, development, and 
critical reconstruction) (5). Yet, the emphasis in this theory, as in 
all traditional doctrines, is on past achievements, on the continuity 
of experience, on established understandings and awareness, on pre- 
defined views about the nature of action and standards of performance. 
Education may be active, but is primarily an assimilative processe 
induction into institutions; adoption of norms; initiation into 
modes of thought and action (6), 
2.2 Romantic communitarianism 
The second theory, designated "romantic communitarianism", is not 
in all senses the opposite of classical humanism, but its exponents 
have emphasized other and different educational processes. There 
may well have been, in the ancient world, those who wished to educate 
children not according to the requirements of pre-existing cultural 
systems but in accordance with the romantic conceptions of children's 
unfolding nature, their interests and their developmental needs. 
But Marrou, the most authoritative of the historians of the totality 
of education in antiquity, records none in the period prior to the 
Hellenistic period when Greek thought spread and diversified itself 
in the Alexandrian empire (7). This would be as is to be expected, 
according to Hegel's contention that romanticism is a-post-Hellenic 
development. 
The child-centrism of this theory is frequently traced back to 
Rousseau. But, despite his claim to be writing only about his own 
Ideas on education, he drew extensively on earlier writers in develop- 
ing his own views (8). Even so, the emergence of the romantic move- 
ment>in eighteenth Century Germany, England and France was clearly a 
decisive factor in the popularization of the view that, in education, 
transmitting a cultural heritage must be made subservient to "discovering" 
and "following" the developing impulses of the individual child (9). 
Rousseau's is the most striking example of the iconoclastic attitude 
towards traditional cultural categories and the social institutions in 
which the traditional culture expressed itself] for example, his 
youthful contention that the progress of the arts and sciences has been 
bought too expensively, at the price of moral and political degeneration 
(10). Again, his iconoclasm is apparent in his determination in'the 
Emile to structure the mind of the pupil Emile through direct experiences. 
This process of mind making was to be performed without benefit - until. 
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late adolescence - of the forms of organised understanding repre- 
sented by literature, philosophy, history, Euclidean geometry, eta., 
and of the modes of political experience represented by the urban 
and national institutions of his time. 
Rousseau neglected the communitarian elements which have become 
predominant in more recent formulations of this position. The cul- 
tural choices made for and by Emile were made in the deliberately re- 
stricted setting of a very intimate primary group, and they were 
basically those of the tutor, an individualist and a revolutionary 
at odds with the world of his time. Converted, by Pestalozzi and 
Froebel, into a wider setting and influenced by nineteenth century 
communitarian socialism and by Idealistic philosophy, the theory has 
come to take note of the interactions of the individual with the group, 
and of the relationship of the school to society. In the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, romantic communitarianism split into'two 
broad streams: first, the kindergarten and child development and 
activity movements in the national school systems of the old and new 
world; and, second, the hundred-year old ttradition of progressive 
education in a small body of independent schools (11). 
It is in the latter group of schools that the communitarian 
ideal has been most fully developed, in a way that parallels the 
classical ideal of community running through Plato, Vittorino and into 
the English Public Schools. The communitarian ideal takes the form' 
of a conviction that the collection of children and teachers that com- 
prise the school can constitute an integrated community, more or lese 
insui4ed from wider cultural forces and institutions, self-articulating 
and self-directing through norms of conduct, social customs, and school 
rules which are developed within and for the community, tried out by it, 
and modified according to its experience and preferences. The 
relatively autonomous way of life that emerges is a complex whole, 
a blend of academic, social and emotional elements. Major tasks 
of the school are to nourish the sub-culture, to induct newcomers, 
to sustain the uniqueness and individuality of the sub-culture, and 
to organize, from time to time, criticisms of the larger society (12). 
Hence, it is not merely appropriate but of considerable functional 
importance that both the academic programme, which normally embodies 
culture in the classical humanist sense, and the system of social 
rules, should be highly idiosyncratic and represented as indigenous 
to the institution. Those schools which attempt to combine a vital 
or a more traditional academic programme with the specifically communi- 
tartan features, quoted above are hybrids (as indeed most schools are, 
with respect to these three major theoretical orientations). The - 
more "pure" form is represented best by Summerhill, and by the writings 
of Neill and of Goodman (13). In both the hybrid and the pure forms 
of romantic communitarianism we find the Owenit® belief that experi- 
mental communities can play an important part in changing culture (14). 
This belief was shared by the reconstruotioniste, to whom school was 
to become in varying degrees a trial ground for experiments in future 
social living. 
2.3 Reconstructionism 
I have already suggested that some of the distinctive features of 
reconstructionist thinking first became prominent during the enlighten- 
ment. Further examination reveals a complex network of roots. It 
would be a major study to trace all of these. However, a more limited 
inquiry may yield some worthwhile results. 
As an ideological theory, reconstructionism is prescriptive and 
reformist. Institutions, practices and ideas about education are 
treated as means - for some reconstructionists, ultimately, the 
most decisive means for bringing about wholesale changes in culture 
(15). The claims commonly made by reconstructionist writers go 
well beyond the now commonplace beliefs that education organized 
on a sufficiently large scale has ascertainable effects on society - 
e. g., selecting elites, socializing, facilitating occupational mo- 
bility, enhancing the division of labour, modifying speech patterns, 
etiquette and interpersonal relationships, strengthening national 
Solidarity, etc. (16). What is distinctive about reconstructionism 
in relation to these and similar changes is: 
1. The extent of the claims made for possible and desirable 
spheres of influence for education. 
2. The patterns and coherences imposed upon cultural changes, 
and the directionality given to social trends. Isolated 
and haphazard phenomena are thus converted from "piece- 
meal" to "holistic" elements, as part of a programme to 
achieve a unity or synthesis, a new core of principles 
and procedures. 
The claim to be moving culture in worthwhile directions 
in opposition to various forces allegedly misdirecting 
culture, especially disintegrative forces; hence the 
re-creation of a missing or lost community. 
4" The aspiration to make a new man, or at least to direct 
the experiences of children in new and different directions. 
5. A detailed apparatus of methodologies, procedures and 
institutional arrangements designed to effect these 
changes, and centering on the school curriculum. 
6. The apotheosis of the teacher or of an elite of educators 
as agents of cultural renewal. 
7. The relative neglect of difficulties and of countervailing 
forces -a characteristic feature of utopian thinking. 
Before we look at these points, it should be noted that reconstruo- 
tionism adopts as a rationale not only the traditional reformer's wish 
to better conditions as he finds them, but also what at times appears 
as a ohiliastic sense of crisis and impending social chaos (17). 
The systematic structuring of the totality of educational pro- 
cesses and institutions to achieve stipulated cultural ends owes 
its impetus in Western thought to Plato. Likewise, the sense of 
impending social chaos - the diagnosis of a cultural crisis - may 
be traced to Plato. Popper has shown that one of the boldest moves 
of the utopian social reformer is to assert a condition of crisis 
which only the most far-reaching measures can alleviate (18). 
New faotors have been introduced by modern reconstructionists, 
especially in the writings of Wells, Russell, Mannheim and Dewey. 
These writers stressed the impetus towards basic cultural change 
provided by science, technology, industrialism and democratization. 
Except for the latter these are factors which played no part in Plato's 
formulation. Furthermore, the reoonstruotionists reversed Plato's 
assessment of democracy and treated it as the chief moral and political 
inspiration for the new order they advocated. Nevertheless, the 
reconstructionists are Platonic to the extent that they project a 
total and not just a partial cultural crisis, and also, although 
less uniformly, to the extent that they give a historical, law-like 
character to the trends they pick out as the foci of change (19). 
The ends of the restructuring process are different in Plato 
and modern writers. In the former, the basic objective is to achieve 
cultural stability, a condition dependent upon the discovery of and 
systematic reverence for truth. Perfectibility is implicit in Plato 
but only in respect of the total social system and the elite of lea- 
ders. Perfectibility as a meaningful goal for the common man is 
ruled out as being against his "nature". Contemporary and recent 
reconstructionists, however, under the influence of enlightenment 
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doctrines and those of nineteenth century democratic theory, en- 
visage the progressive improvement of humanity as a whole. At 
least, this is projected as a policy objective: "perfectibility" 
as a process of human amelioration whether, as in Russell, this 
takes the form of the wide diffusion of rationality and, of the 
"constructive" impulses in human nature, or, as in Dewey, the 
emergence of a world-wide community of kindly utilitarians. 
The extent to which reconstructionists are perfectibiliSts 
in the numerous senses in which that term has been used in the 
long history of progress and developmental theory will become 
clearer in-subsequent chapters. With the exception of Clarko 
and, possibly, Mannheim they rejected one traditional belief 
which seems to set firm limits to universal progress - namely, 
original sin. Their perfectibility was not built on enlighten- 
ment confidence in inevitable progress through the limitless 
application of science to human affairs, but rather on the belief 
that a steady and indefinite amelioration could be achieved through 
the systematic attempt to plan and organize individual and social 
experience according to agreed ends. Hence, it was mane capacity 
for social and moral improvement through the deliberate cultivation 
of rationality that the reoonstruotionists emphasized (20). 
Although environmentalist explanations of human development are 
not necessarily entailed by belief in perfectibility '- except insofar 
as adverse environment prevents full realization of "potential" - the 
reconstructionists are, on the whole, environmental determinists, unlike 
Plato, who believed in the ultimate power of heredity as a determining 
factor in human nature. They are not wholly committed to the crude 
notions of Godwin and especially Owen, whb adopted the optimistic 
environmentalism which traces to ignorance all human and social 
problems, and who saw in the diffusion of understanding a quick 
and sure remedy to all problems (21). Reconstruotionists, as large- 
scale reformers, have generally argued that the changes they have in 
mind are possible (but not therefore inevitable) for two reasons. 
First, the'plasticity", the "malleability", the "potentiality" of 
human nature. Second, the fluidity of institutions, traditions, 
customs which make it possible for human intelligence to devise 
institutions and practices to its own advantage. Their views of 
human nature and culture are open to criticism on empirical grounds, 
although they can never be refuted because the range of possible 
environments in which talents might reveal themselves is infinite and, 
no matter how resistant culture has been to modification, there is 
always the possibility of finding now ways of changing it. 
The empirical criticisms and objections have been ignored by 
most reconstrdotioniata, but they have been acutely conscious of two 
other important and related issues. First, the supposed malleability 
of human nature, and the potential power of redesigned institutions and 
organized ideas to influence it, give rise to the frightening possi- 
bilities of misdirection, or the capture of the vital ground of edu- 
cation by miseducative forces - e. g., commercialism, or totalitarianism, 
or fascism (22). 'Second, a problem not so clearly recognized as such 
by many of the reoonstruotionists themselves but raised frequently by 
their critics - that of indoctrination by those claiming to be educa- 
tors. Thus, the wish of the reeconstructionists to achieve a world 
culture, the rule of rationality, or even to ensure a "victory" for 
"democracy" over "totalitarianism" has led several of them, mainly 
Counts, ßrameld, Clarke and Mannheim, at times to advocate propagandist 
- 54 - 
and even doctrinal methods, despite warnings, for example 
by Dewey, 
that such advocacy is self-defeating in a theory which claims to 
be grounded in rationality (23). 1 
The reconstructionists have an overriding desire to achieve, 
through education, major cultural changes and to achieve them as a 
matter of urgency in what is felt to be a period of cultural crisis. 
It is argued that the attempt to transmit established knowledge and 
understanding loses both feasibility and credibility when the world 
which gave rise to those forms of establishment is itself changing 
rapidly, so that the traditional categories of understanding and action 
require redefinition. The school cannot simply reflect the whole of 
culture, in the sense of mirroring all that is, there. This is because 
culture is an unimaginably complex entity and in any case reflection 
is an undiscriminating process, governed by the nature of the instru- 
ment, not by norms and standards& which "e, the concern of education. 
Nor, the reconstructionists argue, should the school attempt to reflect 
of embody selected past achievements, since,, however-defensible these 
may be in their historical setting they. have lost their stability 
and coherence. New selections and definitions are required; new 
instruments, and, for many of the reconstruotionists, a new core of 
socially unifying values-is needed. New patterns of culture will 
emerge in rapidly changing industrialized aocietiea, and the question 
asked by the reconstructioniste is whether these patterns will have a 
determinate, educative quality, as a result of the creative involve- 
ment by achoolmen in culture analysis; or whether they will be the 
educationally indifferent expressions of other social interests. 
The reeonstructionists have all embarked-upon the re-creative 
culture analysis which they claim it is a major task for the school 
and for other educational agencies to practise and to teach. As a 
consequence, a variety of models - both "content" and "process" - of 
the emerging, educationally-determined culture of the future have 
been constructed. These will be discussed in greater detail in 
the chapters that follow. In this general review they may be 
characterized as totalistic and heavily moralistic in tones visions 
or images of various ideal conditions of universal hedonism; uni- 
versal rationality; the achievement of working world government 
and the elimination of national wars; abandonment of class barriers 
and the dissolution of prejudices; active, mass involvement in pro- 
cesses of government and community manaement; the elimination of 
superstition; the enthronement of various forms of scientific humanism; 
the development of a new kind of scientific-democratic personality; 
and the institutionalizing and universalizing of modes of self and 
social renewal: a form of cultural immortality in which continuous 
change is the only assurance of the durability of culture in either 
its individual or its social aspects. Not all the reconstructionists 
subscribed to all these ideals, but they point the direction in which 
most of them moved. 
Schools and teachers are conceived, not merely as agents of uni- 
versal diffusion, spreading and establishing throughout society ideas 
and practices generated, as in the classical humanist theory, by elites 
and in highly specialized institutions. Reconstructionism is not 
primarily a diffusion but an innovatory theory of culture renewal (24). 
As a result of their commitment to various forms of democracy, the 
rooonstructionists generally impose severe burdens of creativity 
and construction on all, or at least very many, members of the systems 
they describe. That this is not uniformly so is shown by the recurrence, 
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in this movement, of the classical humanist concept of a guiding 
elite. In some writers, notably the Webbs, Wells and Mannheim, 
the problem of reconciling the respective areas of authority and 
responsibility of masses and elites is never resolved. Despite 
tendencies towards elitism, by c antrast with classical humanism 
and romantic communitarianism, reconstructionism challenges the 
ordinary teacher to act as culture analyst, critic, and, almost, 
prophet, although he is in fact well supplied with prophetic ut- 
terances by the spokesmen for the theory. Just how the teacher 
is expected to perform these roles and the manner of educating 
him for others is discussed in Chapter Fourteen. 
Curriculum content and strategies for teaching and learning 
are a detailed complex of centrally important strategies for the 
reconstructionists. By contrast with classical humanists, much 
emphasis is given to a supposed need to re-define and to re-integrate 
traditional organizations of subject matter. Science, and particuarly 
social science material, is given a predominant place, and various 
schemes of organization are proposed - most significantly the so-called 
social core curriculum, familiar as a more or less totally integrated 
programme of study which is organized around themes and issues of 
current social relevance and concern and grounded in a now set of 
social-moral values (25). This aspect of reconstructionist theorizing 
degenerated - to a considerable extent because of Kilpatrick's mis- 
handling of certain ideas - into the life adjustment programmes of 
the 1940s in the U. S. A. (which are echoed in the curriculum sections 
of the Newsom Report), whose chief purpose seems to have been to pro- 
cure acceptance by pupils of the prevailing social and political ideo- 
logies. This is the opposite of what reconstructioniom, in the hands 
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of Russell and Dewey, intended, but it illustrates, as does Counts' 
treatment of the indoctrination question, how the reconstruotionist 
position may veer into irrationalism and subservience to interest 
groups. 
By contrast, and very much in the tradition of Socrates and 
Rousseau, teaching and learning strategies advocated and examined 
by reconstructionists are those conventionally known as "problem- 
solving", "reflective thinking", "discovery", or, in Dewey's language, 
"reconstruction of experience". It is to Dewey that this whole school 
of thought is most indebted for its theories of educational procedure 
and, while much might be made of a detailed study in contrasts of 
the various ideas on "method" advanced by different reconstructionist3, 
particular attention is paid in Chapter Eleven to Dewey's treatment 
of this subject. 
It is in the examination of methodology that we shall see most 
clearly the peculiar blend of normative and empirical principles, 
classically expressed in Dewey's volume How we 'T'hink, from a perusal of which 
it is never quite certain whether what'he is describing is how thinking 
does, in fact, occur, or how we should think if we are to be good 
experimentalists. From a review of a wider selection of writings, 
by Dewey and others, it is clear that central importance is attached 
by reconstruotionists to the definition of learning processes. At 
any rate, this is true of the professional educationists, dells, 
for excmplq is much more explicit on the overall policy objectives 
of a reformed educational programme than he is on the development of 
appropriate modes of thinking in children. 
The claims made by reoonstruotionists for the efficacy of education 
as a force for cultural renewal and growth distinguishes them, not only 
w 7Ö m 
from the other two major educational theories already discussed, but 
also from a much wider range of culture-change theorists. A 
full 
discussion of these theorists would be an enormous undertaking, as 
they include all the major systematic social theorists of the nine- 
teenth century - e. g., Comte, Spencer, Mosca, Pareto, Durkheim, and 
others. It is remarkable how little attention these writers, and 
many of their more empirically-minded successors - the development 
and organizational theorists of the present day - give to the ques- 
tion of education as a culture change process. 
This may be more the result of lack of awareness of the ways in 
which educational thinkers have approached the problems arising out 
of the great cultural transitions of the past century. I do not 
wish to suggest that the reconatructionists have successfully grappled 
with these problems. However, by showing what difficulties are 
created for formal *duoation by these transitions, and by suggesting 
broad lines of response, they have laid the foundation for more 
systematic appraisals of the intricate network of relationships 
binding education to other dimensions and agencies of culture. 
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ClTAPTý'. R II 
A CAST STUDY: THE 1966 REPORT OF THE INDIAN EDUCATION 
COMMI5LION. CH. 1. EDUCATION AND NATIONAL OBJECTIVES 
The first chapter of the Report, "Education and National Objectives", 
will be treated as a specific example of reconstructionist theorizing. 
Similarities to and differences from a variety of reconstructionist 
writings will be noted, and several difficulties and weaknesses 
identified. A full appraisal of this report of the Indian Education 
Commission would require a more detailed discussion than is possible 
of problems facing India's education, in the light of wider cultural 
trends and the availability of resources needed for the achievement 
of the targets set (1). 
1. Culture Crisis and National Objectives 
The Kothari Report was prepared by a distinguished international 
committee of educationists, economists, political scientists, planners 
and development theorists under the chairmanship of Dr. Kothari, chair- 
man of the Indian University Grants Commission. The brief given the 
committee was to prepare a policy for the development of the total 
educational system. Both in the nature of membership and the scope 
of inquiry, the Kothari Report differs significantly from twentieth 
century British reports, which have all dealt with specific aspects of 
the system and have been prepared by committees containing only a sprink- 
ling of social science specialists. These differences are typically 
those that separate reconatructionist from other types of educational 
theorizing - first, the emphasis on social science expertise in policy- 
formation, an expertise which has in recent years created an international 
community of thought; second, the attempt to inter-relate the totality 
w 
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of educational ideas and practices at all institutional levels; 
and, third, the attempt to treat education as the most powerful 
agency of planned culture change (2). As we shall see, the pre- 
ference for social science expertise at the stage of policy for- 
mation, ýas distinct from implementation, posed a severe problem 
for reconatructionists like Rugg and Brameld, who also. subscribed 
to the democratic belief in maximum involvement of community in- 
terests in policy formations 
The first chapter of the Kothari committee report intimated 
the wide scope of the inquiry, conveyed a sense of the serious- 
ness and the urgency of the task in social development confronting 
Indian educators, and sought to inspire national confidence in the 
capacity of the society to rehabilitate itself through education, 
A picture of mounting crisis was drawn, a crisis not only in economic 
and political affairs but in national consciousness, which is threa- 
tened by continuing linguistic, religious and caste differentiation 
and by various other forms of communal tension. These factors, the 
committee argued, combined with the almost universally unsettling ef- 
feots of science and technology, and the legitimate "explosion of ex- 
pectations" amongst the masses, have produced a critical phase 
in. the 
development of Indian culture, to which a redesigned educational system 
should direct its interests and energies. In this crisis situation, 
the committee thought, the educational system has a decisive role to 
play. Of all cultural forces, it has the greatest opportunity and 
the greatest potential power to effect a fundamental transformation 
of the material, emotional, spiritual and intellectual conditions of 
Indian life. 
By thus underlining the forces making for instability, change and 
- 61 - 
- if not directed - for national disorder and chaos, the committee 
aligned itself with the long tradition of educational thinking which 
takes the sense of crisis as its point of departure. As we have 
Been, the crisis mentality is not confined to reconstructionist 
theorists. Of the many similarities between the classical humanism 
dating from Plato's Republic and reconstructionism, that which is most 
striking is the feeling of deep unease over contemporary cultural con- 
ditions and fear of total breakdown unless there is massive interven- 
tion to produce order and stability out of impending chaos. In this, 
Plato and Matthew Arnold of the classical humanists, and Mannheim, 
Wells, Rugg and Brameld of the reconstruotionists, are in broad agree- 
ment-W. Further, these writers are united in the belief that, of all 
social systems, a reformed schooling can be the most effective in intro- 
ducing and consolidating interventionist policies leading to culture 
unity and stability. This seems, however, a misplaced confidence. 
Schooling is admitted to have a significant effect upon culture only 
in the long term. But the crisis as diagnosed is too critical and 
urgent to be treated by, long term measures. Also, the extent of 
the postulated crisis and the inclusiveness of the proposed remedies 
raise the problems of indoctrination and possibly miseduoative use of 
educational institutions, and the limited equipment teachers have as 
prospective culture change agents. These are problems whose. signi. fi- 
canoe and difficulty the Kothari committee, like most reconstructionist 
thinkers, did not adequately appraise (4). 
The committee moved from defining the extensive cultural crisis 
in India, and from their, expression of faith in the capacity of a re- 
designed school system to resolve the crisis, to formulating educational 
and cultural objectives. These objectives were derived, in the first 
r 
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instance, not from an analysis of the concept of education in the 
context of contemporary Indian culture, nor from a consideration 
of the processes of individual development, but from "imperatives" 
and "targets" of the society. Most reconstructionists take it upon 
themselves to define these targets, whereas the Kothari committee 
adopted the modernization objectives already prepared in the political, 
economic and social spheres (5). The need for rapid and massive 
development of industry, agriculture, urban life, village communi- 
ties, democratic institutions, administrative infrastructure - these 
provide the "modern" contexts within which the new educational system 
is expected to work out its teaching and learning programmes. But 
"modernization" as the capitalist and communist development theorists 
have defined it was not the only major policy objective adopted by the 
committee. The claims of the traditional culture are, in part at 
least, accepted as valid, not simply as a necessary conditioner of any 
change but as expressing-values which should be preserved. The com- 
mittee itself wisely avoided attempting to outline in detail a new 
cultural synthesis which takes the "best" of modern and traditional 
cultures, avoiding destructive clashes and disunities. However, with 
surprisingly little. consideration for the difficulties this raised, it 
proposed the creation of cultural synthesis as another task facing the 
school system, or education in the widest sense. Just such a proposal 
has been made by other reconstructionists, notably Rugg and Brameld (6). 
The chapter ends with a stirring call for this new cultural synthesis, 
whose outlines emerge while the human and social problems of definition, 
selection, adaptation and adjustment raised by such synthetic solutions 
are kept out of eight. Two forms of knowledge and experience, those of 
modern science and of Hindu ideals, awareness and self-knowledge, are to 
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be harmonized: 
"Atom and Ahimsa (non-violence ]q or, to put it differently, 
man's knowledge and mastery of outer space and the space within 
his skull, are out of balance. It is this imbalance which 
mankind must seek to redress. Man now faces himself. He 
faces the choice of rolling down a nuclear abyss to ruin and 
annihilation or of raising himself to new heights of glory 
and fulfilment yet unimagined. India has made many glorious 
contributions to world culture, and perhaps the grandest of 
them all is the concept and ideal of non-violence and com- 
passion sought, expounded and lived by Buddha and Mahavira; 
Nanak and Kabir; Vivekananada, Banana Maharishi and Gandhi 
in our own times and which millions have striven to follow 
after them. 
"The greatest contribution of Europe doubtlessly is the 
scientific revolution. If science and ahimsa join-together 
in creative synthesis of belief and action, mankind will at- 
tain to a new level of purposefulness, prosperity and spiri- 
tual insight. Can India do something in adding a new dimen- 
sion to the scientific achievement of the West? This poses 
a great challenge and also offers a unique opportunity to the 
men and women of India, and especially to the young people 
who are the makers of the future. "(7) 
The committee made no attempt to provide a systematic rationale 
for their multi-faceted concept of development. But they did provide 
some of the groundwork needed for such a rationale. They discussed 
not only a general crisis of cultural disintegration whose main fea- 
tures are open to argument, but also more fundamental human survival 
needs about whose reasonableness there could hardly be any contro- 
versy. These needs include the provision of adequate food supplies 
to satisfy minimal nutritional targets, -the achievement of a basic 
minimum of accommodation and material goods, the establishment of 
levels of literacy and awareness appropriate to the barest mechanics 
of democratic particip, ition, and the realization of other United 
Nations-type human rights. No doubt questions of justification 
arise in relation to need statements that refer to these elemental 
standards of community life. But the committee was undoubtedly right 
to avoid the sophisticated and sometimes sophistical arguments built 
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upon these questions of justification. It is unimaginable that, 
disputes would arise over such a minimal list of social survival 
"needs", even granting the deep ideological differences which 
separate Indian sub-cultures. 
On the other hand, the operationalizing of these need state- 
ments and the efforts required to implement them in the continental 
complexity and diversity of contemporary India would without question 
give rise to clashes of value commitment and institutional interests, 
for example, between the claims of social and national integration 
on the one hand, and political participation by diverse sub-cultural 
groups on the other. The reconciliation of "nation" and "sections" 
has been one of the basic, enduring problems of modern Indian life, 
a problem which, as Gandhi rightly foresaw, independence and Congress 
government would not of themselves solve (8). 
No less difficult to imagine is reconciliation of the inherently 
unstable and dynamic values of science-based technology and the as- 
sociated commerce of mass consumption, on the one hand, and the tra- 
ditional, quiescent, anti-materialist values of orthodox Hinduism 
on the other hand. The Brahmanical culture should not be expected 
to shift very readily when, in the words of Panditji, the head of a 
traditional 8umaoni family in Lizelle Raymond's )4i Life with a Brahmin 
Fazmil s 
"On the vital plane we Hindus are like forest trees 
of different sizes and at different stages of develop- 
ment. Just as the trees are rooted to the ground, so 
are we fixed in certain essentials of our lives. We 
have no choice. It has been like this for thousands 
of years We are apt to repeat the experiences of 
past generations, since occupations, opinions, foods 
education, ritual and mantras, are all laid down by a 
tradition that allows no room for free choice. Our 
traditions bind Man to Nature as closely as the earth 
is bound to the universe" (9). 
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Reconciliation of ancient and modern could take no form other 
than an ongoing, shifting pattern of adjustments. This, as the 
committee rightly saw, could not be defined in advance. However, 
a "culture centre" comprising both a core of ideas and a group or 
class unified in its commitment to those ideas could be indicated. 
Furthermore, qualitative criteria to guide the development of prac- 
tical instruments of change could have been specified. While the 
committee gave due consideration to some of the relevant quantita- 
tive elements (e. g., the structure of the educational system and 
directions of resource allocation) they had little to offer towards 
an enhanced understanding of qualitative criteria. One perhaps 
unintended consequence of this is that, given the basic strategy 
proposals of modernization and development, the synthesis of old 
and new cultures that emerges has far more obviously the qualities 
of the modern than of the traditional culture. In the proposed 
blending of cultures, the modernist has far less accommodating to 
do than the traditionalist. This is always so when a new cultural 
synthesis, itself a modernist concept, is proposed. But the Kothari 
committee went further than this. The implicit criteria governing 
their proposed new synthesis are those of functional rationality 
and efficiency of means-ends relations embedded in the forces 
making for massive, sustained change, not those expressive of the 
far less self-conscious and inarticulate traditional culture (10). 
In this, the Kothari report may be likened to the more utopian 
and holistic aspects of the reconstructionist writings of Wells, 
Rugg and Brameld. The initial move of redefining the desired cul- 
tural synthesis, so far from facilitating the achievement of a balanced 
intermixture, pre-judges the issue. This is because the concepts and 
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strategies of cultural redefinition are themselves central features 
of reconstructionism. The very thought of redefining, and the act 
of consciously creating culture, are anathema to those who rejoice 
in the largely unconscious and undirected processes of cultural 
tranamission. (11). The over-simplification, the deliberation and 
the systematization required by the effort to analyse "cultural 
wholes" or total patterns characterize the thinking of rational- 
empirical change agents. These calculated approaches stand in 
marked contrast to the undeliberate, unselfconscious evolution of 
traditional modes of experience. I do not pretend to have an 
answer to the problem of avoiding an unbalanced synthesis when 
policies have to be evolved, plans made, instrumentalities designed, 
and resources allocated. All of these are, after all, part of the 
modern mentality and they inevitably shape the outcome of any inquiry. 
However, it would represent a substantial gain in understanding if 
these difficulties were acknowledged instead of reduced to the level 
of technical problems and "barriers to change". 
How far the organization of educational forces in the contemporary 
Indian context can reasonably be expected to achieve a new cultural 
unity is a problem which is not analysed in the Kothari report. 
Conscious that a claim of this kind might, be rejected as exaggerated, 
the committee introduced the report with these words: 
"The destiny of India is now being shaped in her class- 
room. This, we believe, is no more rhetoric. In a world 
based on science and technology, it is education that deter- 
mines the level of prosperity, welfare and security of the 
people. " 
Despite this disclaimer, it is in fact a long-established rhetorical 
device to smuggle in an ambiguity between some and all. That edu- 
cation can make some contribution to determining prosperity, eto.. 
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is not in dispute; that'it and it alone determines-this prosperity 
is manifestly false. What is at issue is how far might (and should) 
education be thus mobilized, # and the kinds of relationships which 
need to be developed with other social forces, if the ends sought 
are to be realized. 
Just as most of the alassicýj theories ofrsocial change have 
neglected or minimized the potential contribution of education to 
changing society, so the reconstructionist educational theorists 
tend to overlook or minimize the impact of the wider context of 
institutions upon educational reform and, in Durkheimla, phrase, 
the resistance of "social facts" to deliberate intervention. 
The Kothari committee certainly admitted that "education cannot 
be considered in isolation or planned in a vacuum" but, instead 
of itself undertaking to consider. education in this way, it pro- 
ceeded to assimilate educational processes to predefined national 
development goals. 
There seem to be three main lines of approach to this problem: 
first, the elevation of education into a, socially transcending reform 
agency; second, the enlistment of education as an agency of state 
policy; third, the recognition that education is a socio-cultural 
process, a party to state policy, but nevertheless in certain funda- 
mental respects autonomous. The first approach is that adopted 
by many of the romantic communitarians, to whom I referred in the 
preceding chapter. The second approach is that adopted by totali- 
tarian societies and, increasingly, by, developing societies which 
seek to effect rapid changes. The third approach is that of the 
principal exponents of reconstructionism who wrestled with the mani- 
fold problems created by the effort to be vitally engaged in directed 
cultural change, to use the public school system for this purpose, 
and yet to avoid subserving educational ends and processes to those 
already determined within the polity. 
Admittedly, the task of drawing up a national, integrated plan 
of cultural development is a formidable one beset not only with tech- 
nical problems but also with profound intellectual and ethical diffi- 
culties. It is hardly surprising that the history of reconatructionist 
theories is littered with lifeless failures. The nearest approach in 
political practice is the five year plans in the Soviet Union, but, so 
far from shaping the future of culture, education in these plans is 
reduced to an instrumentality of pre-determined political and social 
policy (12). 
2. Tasks of Culture Reconstruction 
Within the broad framework of a new cultural synthesis, the Kothari 
committee proposed a set of culturally reconstructive tasks which edu- 
cational institutions were expected to take up. These tasks are: 
2.1 Contributing to the modernization of agriculture and of 
industry 
Modernization is not precisely defined, but it may be taken to 
mean the diffusion of scientific and technical concepts; skills and 
attitudes at all levels, including that of the politician, research 
scientist and manual operative. Modernization also means the wide- 
spread diffusion and adoption of efficiency and management-science 
criteria in public and private administration. All of this entails 
the thorough institutionalizing of the ideology of the industrial 
society. Raymond Aron's analysis of the industrial society points 
to factors to which the committee at least implicitly subscribed= 
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In work organization, there is technical mastery, 
rational organization, productivity consciousness 
and high-per capita output. 
2. In family life the nuclear family replaces-the ex- 
tended family. 
3" 
4" 
In state organisation there is increased bureau- 
cracy (in the Weberian fashion - pervasive, rational 
administration). 
Processes and products of the mass media dominate 
culture. 
5" In social organization, urbanization replaces the 
peasantry, and there is increased equity in wealth 
distribution. 
In industry, a management rather than an ownership 
pattern prevails. 
In all, basic to the concept of the modern, industrialized society 
is the attempt to apply rational and-empirical thought to production 
and all forms of social organization. Thus the principle of inno- 
vation is itself institutionalized and universalized (13). 
2.2 Human resource development' 
This concept derives from development theory, and-more remotely 
from the humanist's elevation of the unique value and worth of indi- 
viduals. These two sepatate sources of, this idea underline important 
differences which are not so easily reconciled.. 
. The 1963 report of the Robbins Committee, ` on. higher education 
in Britain, brings out this contrast. Without rejeoting. the rele- 
vance of national need arguments to provision, -the Robbins Committee 
rejected the argument that it is an obligation of the=iyersities, 
in selecting students for-its different faculties, to follow a pre- 
determined scheme of manpower needs for-the different professions. 
Rejection reflected not only the technical problem of manpower 
forecasting but, more significantly, a positive view of the right of 
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the qualified individual to access to a place in the higher education 
system in general and the university in particular 
(14). In prac- 
tice this right of course is heavily qualified by faculty and de- 
partmental constraints; by re-drawing the qualification require- 
ments, it is possible very severely to modify the notion of individual 
right. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between 
(a) 
the approach to human resource development, which uses projections 
of manpower needs in different professions as a major criterion for 
admitting individuals to institutions, and, (b) that approach which 
concedes to the individual the right to develop his potentialities 
and aptitudes, even if the result is a surfeit of lawyers or arts 
graduates. Further exploration of these two approaches, the "Kothari" 
and the "Robbins", could bring out other problems. For example, de- 
veloping an individual's aptitudes regardless of the capacity of the 
economy to provide employment opportunities relevant to the kind of 
training he has had is an absurdity with which Indian educationists 
and those in many other developing countries are-all too familiar. 
What is required is that a working reconciliation of the two view- 
points should be devised and tested through models and in actual situa- 
tions. Neither the Kothari. nor the, $obbins. committee went as far as 
this, and this may be an illustration of the difficulty' economists 
and educationists encounter in trying to understand each other's 
viewpoint, or to work closely together, as Beeby has claimed (15). 
The earlier literature of reconstructionism barely got beyond the 
level of global aspiration and platitude on this topic, and there 
appear to be no examples in this earlier literature even of the 
recognition of a problem. Booby may again be right in arguing 
that the conditions governing awareness and understanding of these 
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problems have been so drastically altered by the emergence of the 
"third world" in the period following the second world war that 
many earlier discussions have been largely superseded 
(16). 
2.3 The school as a universal institution 
Of all social agencies only the schools have the capacity of 
reaching all the people. This is an argument made familiar by 
the American reconstructionists who related, the emergence of the 
common, universal school to the supposed diminution in influence 
of family, church, work groups and other agencies. It is an 
argument which is made to carry a heavy weights the universal 
or common school is, it is alleged, the best single instrument 
for directed social change. 
Sever4l questions need to be raised about this view. of the 
school, since to accept'it is to move from. the more traditional 
unique function characterisation of schooling to one which sees 
the school as a residual agency. The unique function view as- 
cribes to the school distinctively educational roles: the task, 
of the school is to "educate"; usually in a precise meaning of 
that term; other social agencies exist or can be created for 
other purposes to do with children, which are not centrally and 
directly educational. For example, a unique function theorist 
might object to the school being used as a distributing agency 
for free milk, on the grounds that this is a distraction from 
the specific educational tasks it alone can accomplish. The 
residual theorist might defend the practice on the grounds that 
free milk is beneficial, is indirectly- contributory to better 
education, and is more conveniently distributed through the uni- 
versal agency of the school than by other means. Reconstruotionist 
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writers cannot be neatly classified through the use of this dis- 
tinction, as some, like Kilpatrick, are avowedly residualists, while 
others, like Dewey, prefer to characterize schooling as an enter- 
prise which has a determinate, educational character which should 
not be lost to view because of the supposed defaulting of other 
social institutions (17). 
In arguing for the school's reconstructive potential by virtue 
of its universality, the Kothari committee failed to consider several 
relevant questions. First, is it true that of all the formative 
and influential social institutions the common school is the most 
powerful? To ask this question is to bring out the difficulty of 
wide generalization: formative for whom? formative of what? Re- 
lating these questions to the objectives of national development that 
have been specified, we may see that very extensive transformations 
of personal, inter-personal and impersonal behavior are projected. 
If we consider the formation of dispositions as vital to the adop- 
tion of the change-mindedness proposed by the committee, empirical 
evidence on the formation of dispositions suggests that a much 
earlier start than school entry age is required (18). This, in 
turn, calls for extensive adult education programmes directed at 
child-rearing practices. Reoonstruotionists, more than most 
theorists, have emphasized the need for these programmes, and the 
Webbs in their appraisal of Soviet education in the nineteen-twenties 
were particularly impressed by the attention given to child care. 
The Kothari committee neither examined the question of whether educational 
processes and institutions are the most effective, or even the proper 
ways of bringing about the desired changes, nor did they give to 
adult education related to child-rearing the emphasis that might 
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be expected. 
The question of effectiveness of educational institutions 
cannot be answereddeimply by reference to existing practices. It 
is just because these practices, and the institutions in which they 
occur, were thought to be so deficient in respect of a national 
policy of development that the committee was set up. To argue, 
therefore, that the existing system of education appears to lack 
the ideological homogeneity and the technical proficiency to carry 
the burdens being imposed upon it would be to argue in a circle. 
Yet it is reasonable to ask whether evidence from other national 
school systems attempting in the manner proposed to create a "new 
man" is encouraging. The committee, despite its ardor in pro- 
mulgating the scientific approach, cited no empirical evidence in 
support of the role it proposed for the school. Such evidence as 
there is on this point in not encouraging and it suggests that, if 
schools are to undertake the kinds of major national development tasks 
recommended by the ICothari committee, very different approaches to 
those already adopted will be required (19). 
It would be misleading to suggest that the Kothari committee 
offered no new or unusual proposals. The past orientation of Indian 
education, geared to the administrative and vocational needs of the 
imperial administrators in a semi-feudal society was contrasted with 
future requirements. The old system had been strongly influenced by 
the English boarding school. The imperial tie had been broken, but, 
the committee claimed, the imperial educational mentality had, in cer- 
tain decisive respects, lingered on. 
2.4 Tasks for education 
To initiate a socio-cultural revolution, parallel to and extending 
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the earlier political revolution, a new kind of education is re- 
quired. This educational programme, according to the committee, 
should be carried forward on three fronts: 
1. a transformation to "relevance"; 
2. the achievement and maintenance of certain standards; 
3" expansion of the base, both to satisfy national man- 
power needs and to achieve an equalization of educa- 
tional opportunity. 
I shall discuss just the first of these. 
"Relevance", since the report of the Newsom committee, Half 
our Future, has become a familiar educational slogan in Britain (20). 
Its popularity, likewise, in the United States, has prompted the 
philosopher, Scheffler, to attempt to explode its pretensions (21). 
"Relevance" in the understanding of the Kothari committee had little 
to do with the conflicting personal aspirations and perplexities of 
the self-conscious adolescent, which in wealthier societies are sub- 
jected to detailed, even anguished explorations. For the committee, 
"relevance" is primarily a curriculum objective leading to the search 
for ways of relating the content, modes and institutions of education 
to pro-defined national needs. These needs, however, must -not be 
thought external to personal expectations of reasonable life condi- 
tions and other popular aspirations. "Life", as we have seen, was 
treated by the committee as a mixture of traditional and modern 
qualities, a new synthesis for personal and social existence, with a 
strong bias towards the qualities of "development". Thus, "life" is 
equated with national development, and national development is com- 
prised of: 
1. modernized agriculture; 
2. a productivity-conscious economy; 
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social and national "integration"; 
4. socialist-democratic institutions. 
Thus, individual aspirations were systematically reorganized 
or articulated into a national needs policy, and this policy set 
the targets to which educational institutions were to relate. 
"Relevance" equates with functional adaptation of education to 
pre-defined social ends, with this important qualification that 
one of the national needs was to define a new cultural synthesis, 
and the schools were given this task. Nothing was said about the 
problem that could arise if the emerging cultural synthesis repudiated 
the other projected national needs. This would be a real possibility, 
since, the concept of education incorporates rational-critical pro- 
cesses, and a new cultural synthesis grounded in educational criteria 
would be socially critical. 
The form of education designed by the committee to achieve the 
transformation to relevance - that. -is, 
to operationalize the concept 
of a new cultural synthesis. - hardly rises in boldness and originality 
to the visionary level of the, proposed new society. This may be be- 
cause, unlike most of the earlier reconstructionists, who were able to 
project social systems of their own devising, the committee accepted 
a predefined framework for. national development., This makes their 
proposals more amenable to implementation - though sceptics would. 
point to the enormous gulf between the existing system and the pro- 
posals to change it. However, the cost to be, paid for this degree 
of practicality is, in reconetruotioniat terms, a high one. The 
more utopian reconstruetionist$, like Wells, Rugg and Mannheim, saw the 
school not as the designer of working cultural models within existing 
frameworks, but as the inventor. and creator:, of new frameworks as well 
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as models. The Kothari committee, briefed to produce a policy 
for education within predefined national. objectives, both ao- 
cepted its brief and yet saw further, if only vaguely delineated, 
possibilities for the schools, eventually, or for education in a 
broader sense, to transcend these objectives by designing new 
syntheses. 
There are four major components of the programme of education 
which the committee proposed. In condensed form these are: 
1. Literacy, including, by considerably stretching 
the term, a grounding in humanities and social 
sciences. 
2. Numeracy, including a grounding in natural science. 
3. Work experience. 
4. Social service. 
The very strong emphasis on sciences in the first two of these 
four platforms, and on active pupil learning instead of the still 
common Indian practice of recitation from textbooks, is characteristic 
of reconstructionist thinking. Virtually every major contribution to 
the theory has stressed the importance of a content of scientific 
subject matter, a teaching mode purportedly based on scientific 
inquiry, and a school atmosphere congenial to the scientific tem- 
perament. In the more extreme forms, notably Dewey's experimen- 
talism, this enthusiasm for science has taken a distinct reductionist 
direction: all modes of thought, inquiry and experience being re- 
ducible to a common scientific methodology. More recent examina- 
tions of the structures of experience and of knowledge have drawn 
attention to matters which have been, on the whole, seriously neglec- 
ted or confused in many reconstructionist writings. These should be 
set against the Kothari and other reconstruotionist proposals to 
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universalize scientific thinking through education (22). 
Points 3 and 4 of the Kothari curriculum proposal reflect in 
part the Soviet and British representation on the committee. 
Social service has become a familiar method of seeking "relevance" 
in the post-Newsom era. Work experience has had a limited impact 
on British thought but has been a recurring theme of Soviet educa- 
tion, under the guise of "polytechnical education". It has also 
been a distinctive feature of reconstructionist thinking since the 
time of Kerschensteiner and Dewey's earlier writings (23). The 
chequered history of attempts to adopt "polytechnization" in Russian 
schools illustrates two problems to which the Kothari committee gave 
insufficient attention - first, the intellectual problem, in teaching, 
of adjusting the logical structure of the physical sciences to the 
distinctly ideological requirements of a quasi-mystical element in 
Marxism (namely, the understanding of socio-political processes 
yielded by manual labour and the bond which units workers, manual 
and intellectuals second, the practical problems of making specialist 
subject teachers into multi-disciplinary ideologists of a special 
kind, and of adjusting the teaching requirements of specialists to 
the constraints of factories designed primarily for productive adult 
work. 
Beyond these four major components of schooling, the committee 
envisaged a common school on the lines of universal comprehensive 
education. The social cohesion which this institutional homogeneity 
is intended to create was to be further strengthened by a language 
policy whose details are highly specific to the frightening linguistic 
complexities of the sub-continent. But, behind the functional 
rationale of arguments for a coherent language policy, lies an 
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intriguing set of keneral propositions about language, culture and 
education. These stem from a European intellectual tradition which 
has had a profound, if indirect, impact on reconstructionism. This 
is the Idealistic tradition. Its chief exponents - apart from Ka°1t, 
whose position was more moderate than those of his successors - are 
Fichte, Ntetzche and Gentile. 
These thinkers are united in a fervent conviction that the basis 
of developed national consciousness is the national language. Hence, 
any programme which seeks to unify culture at the deeper levels must 
adopt a langniage policy which attempts to bind together members of a 
community in a common set of linguistic devices and in the metaphors, 
symbols, myths and works of literature of that language (24). 
But, for this purpose of binding together a nation into something 
approximating to a common set of imaginative experiences, a language 
policy is not, of itself, enough. Just as the Idealists proposed a 
superstructure of socially-binding nationalistic literature, and the 
reconstruotioniats of the nineteen-twenties and thirties a comparable 
superstructure of moral norms blending scientific knowledge and demo- 
cratic values, so the Kothari'committee developed a peculiar blend of 
religion and citizenship. This hybrid is avowedly moralistic and 
doctrinaire in character. The intention of the committee was that, 
through this new and common element in the curriculum, children should 
be directly imbued with the distinctive mix of traditional and modern 
values, beliefs and orientations that have already been described. 
It should provide a vehicle for the emerging synthetic culture, as 
literature provided a'vehicle for European national cultures in the 
minds of the Idealists. 
Such hybrids are very common in education and have appeared 
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variously as "character training", "core curricula", "interdisciplinary 
studies", and so forth. Theorists of almost all persuasions have ad- 
vocated them, in4luding the classical humanists who ascribed to Greek 
studies not only linguistic achievements but many different inter- 
mingled ford of cognitive awareness, ethical insight and practical 
skill. They have been particularly noticeable, hbwever, in recon- 
atruetionist writings where, as we shall see in Chapters Eleven and 
Twelve below, it is difficult to locate any curricula proposal as 
simple as a prescription to teach, say, history or French. 
All such proposals aro open to at least two objections: first, 
the inadequacy of-the intellectual rationale for the proposed inter- 
mingling; and, second, the tendency to substitute propagation of 
supposed insights and understandings for realistic inquiry into the 
nature of these understandings. 
The second, objection is particularly apposite to the Kothari 
committee's proposal for, whereas they offered reasons for wishing 
to achieve a cultural synthesis, and looked forward to long term 
culturally creative efforts within schools, in the short tern they 
intended that a newly-compounded social-moral course of studies 
should be imposed upon the schools and inculcated into teachers 
and children. This affirmation of what appears to be an inten- 
tion to indoctrinate is a consequence of the committee's initial 
acceptance of a prior set of objectives within which educational 
processes should be structured. It is the major ethical diffi- 
culty which confronts school systems that are brought under the 
control or into the service of a uniform, centrally directed state 
policy. 
What alternative had the committee? One alternative would 
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be to discuss the socio-cultural changes needed to support and 
implement a concept of education. This reverses the usual pro- 
cess of fitting in education as one of the service or support 
systems for state policy. It is usually dismissed as a piece 
of academic quaintness. It appears that only in the speculations 
of philosophic utopians, like Plato, is this approach possible, 
for it seems to elevate the educator into the role of king as 
well as philosopher. Nevertheless, it is a concept of educa- 
tional and political relations which has fascinated many recon- 
atructionists, as we shall see in the following chapters. 
The committee might reply to such a speculation in the 
language of Lenin, that omelettes are not made without breaking 
eggs: the achievement of any major change requires some sacrifice. 
The sacrifice of a degree of intellectual freedom at a certain stage 
of national development might be likened to the processes in the indi- 
vidual of habit-formation or disposition-shaping in the early educa- 
tion of children. Such an argument would have its dangers. An 
intensive renewal phase of an ancient civilization, which is what 
the committee is calling for, is not analogous to individual infancy. 
In cultural renewal, growth is more complex and uneven; those tak- 
ing part are mostly adult or near-adult; and many of the partici- 
pants in the renewal process, including teachers and students, are 
quite capable of sustaining a continuing debate about the nature of 
the proposed synthesis. 
What is required is a parallel development of a more subtle mode 
of procedure where solutions (e. g., commitments to policy objectives) 
are adopted tentatively and critically and where the imposing authority 
of the educationist with answers to give is conditioned by a sense of 
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the growing capacity of the learner to criticize the answers. 
Striking a balance between free inquiry which implies some post- 
ponement of action, and commitment to what is widely admitted to 
be an urgent, if not a desperate, task of reform and renewal is 
extremely difficult. The leisurely pursuit of consensus through 
discussion, research, speculation, critical, reflective thought: 
these are all part of the reconatruotionist theory as it has developed 
in England and the U. S. A. Much more immediate and practical 
survival tasks face India, and for these a much less sophisticated 
programme of literacy, national unity, and morale strengthening is 
needed. The committee was undoubtedly right to stress these, yet, 
if its more ambitious long-term objectives are ever to be realized, 
there must be some in the community who are encouraged to gO on in- 
quiring into the very possibility of "solutions" and "cultural syn- 
thesis". 
3. Problems for Education 
The Kothari committee, even in the single chapter selected for 
discussion, raised many more issues than those already examined. 
Five of these are particularly relevant to a wider discussion of the 
reconstructionist theory, and I shall conclude my discussion by treat- 
ing them as five problems which typify reconstruotionist thinking 
about education. 
First, is the problem of drawing lines of relationship, theoretical 
and practical, between the proposed new synthesis and the traditions 
represented in living form by existing regional and local cultures. 
In a wider form this Is the problem of showing how the transition from 
the present reality to the desired future condition is to be achieved. 
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It is only part of an answer to describe process solutions to be 
implemented in schools. The other part of the answer consists 
of a demonstration of how all that is. proposed to be changed 
would be taken, step by step, forward into the proposed new cul- 
ture. Revolutionaries Settle this problem by positing discon- 
tinuities in the form of violent attack, confiscation, liquidation, 
etc. The reconatructionists uniformly and properly as educational 
thinkers repudiate violence. They are left with the difficulty of 
gaining conviction for the view that schools and other educational 
institutions can undertake the great tasks set them. The reforms 
proposed for educational institutions seldom match the loftier as- 
pirations of those reconstructionists who-wish to introduce a now 
order and unity of culture. 
A eoond problem is more widely recognized, and that is the 
danger of producing a technocratic elite, isolated from the masses 
with whom it is intended to be integrated emotionally, socially and 
politically. This was a danger which the Kothari committee acknow- 
ledged and sought ways of avoiding. Elite theorists, in particular 
Pareto, argue that it is.. a delusion to suppose that societies can be 
made to function without such a separation occurring (25). Evidence 
concerning the operations of elites suggests that any proposal, like the 
Kothari committeets, to, integrate elites and masses must be worked out 
in full consciousness of the difficulty. Asoerting a need for a com- 
mon school system and a common core curriculum is insufficient when it 
is on the higher levels of education that elites separate from masses. 
Third, to transform culture, in the manner proposed by the Kothari 
committee imposes the most severe demands upon teachers. These de- 
mands are sufficiently strenuous in highly literate, technologically 
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advanced societies which are able tb sustain a high level of teacher 
education. Yet, as we shall see in Chapter Fourteen, the evidence 
on teachers as agents of cultural change is not encouraging. Beeby 
has argued that a national teaching force cannot be transformed quickly, 
in the manner required for implementation of the Kothari report. 
The four stages Beeby argues schools and teachers need to pass 
through are a crude first attempt to analyse this kind of change. 
It is no criticism of the committee that it did not adopt his model. 
But it is a criticism that the inspirational aspects of its plea for 
a transformation were not matched by a cautious appraisal of the 
potentiality of the existing teaching force to perform the tasks 
assigned them (26). This is the more surprising in view of criticisms 
made of the American reconstruotionists of the nineteen-thirties, who 
issued a similar challenge to the teachers but neglected to consider 
some of the relevant facts - e. g., the political attitudes of teachers, 
the social forces operating on them, their own perception of their 
role, and their levels of political and social awareness (27). 
Fourth, just as the Kothari committee underestimated the possible 
difficulties arising from teacher attitudes, attainment and status, so 
they underestimated the wider context of cultural forces which might 
militate against the changes they proposed. They appreciated that 
an unreformed school can become a hindrance to social change, but 
schools are not perhaps the major hindrance (28). The educative 
society envisaged by Clakke and other reoonstruetionists has not been 
attained. If it had, there might be no need of further reconstructionist 
theorizing. That such a condition has not been achieved indicates that 
non-educative, and possibly anti-educative, forces are actively at work 
in society. There is no need to demonstrate the latter point. Thus, 
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proposals for co-operative efforts between schools and other social 
agencies, while they rescue the school from its traditional isola- 
tion, are in danger of overlooking the actual resistances some of 
these other agencies might display to the idea of working with 
schools and educationists. The Kothari committee did not explore 
these issues and so overlooked some of the necessary conditions for 
the success of its own proposals. Even in a hypothetical monolithic 
society, it could not be assumed that major countervailing forces 
might not develop: hence the cries of "revisionism", "reaction" 
and "counter revolution" still to be heard in those contemporary 
societies which have most nearly achieved monolithic status. It 
has been until recent years a characteristic reconstrnctionist weak- 
ness to suppose that the inspirational, persuasive features of its 
proposed new cultural synthesis will not be met by vigorous resis- 
tance. If this is accepted, then there is indeed a distinctly 
rhetorical flavour to the claim that the destiny of a country is 
being shaped in her classrooms. 
Fifth, the overall significance of this document is the orien- 
tation it gives to education in the wider processes of national de- 
velopment. I have argued that severe difficulties arise in the at- 
tempt to establish this orientation and that the committee did not 
fully succeed in dealing with some of these. Nevertheless, it is 
of crucial importance for education, in the situation described, to 
develop a fresh cultural perspective and for teachers to come to 
grips with the problems of actively relating school programmes to 
wome"of the major tasks and problems of the society. The achieve- 
ment of the report is to offer a profound challenge and to show pos- 
sible directions for schools to follow in sensitizing south to some 
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of the great issues facing their society. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORIES OF CULTURE AND CULTURE RECONSTRUCTION 
In Chapter I, I contrasted the value spare uses of the con- 
cept of culture to be found in the theories of social scientists 
with the value laden uses which characterize educational theories. 
This discussion left untouched several questions which need to be 
examined if we are to understand what formal properties of culture 
the reconstructionists had in mind in their proposals to use educa- 
tion as the moans of culture regeneration and renewal. This sub- 
ject opens up far more issues than it is possible to examine here, 
so I shall select those which seem most relevant to the major cul- 
ture strategies of the reconstructionists. Then I shall discuss, 
in the framework of a set of oppositions: descriptive contrasted 
with prescriptive theories; and individual creativity contrasted with 
biological and social inheritance. Finally,. I shall characterize re- 
constructionism as a prescriptive theory of culture which encompasses 
a variety of positions, from the creativity of individuals in shaping 
their own experience to the impress upon them of the so-called super- 
organic system of values, customs, ideals and behavior patterns. 
1. Descriptive and Prescriptive Culture Theories 
Theories of culture may be reduced to two basic types: first, 
the description, categorization and explanation of ideas, values, be- 
havior, etc., to be found in the writings of anthropologists; second, 
the highly selective, value laden proposals of moralists, educationists 
and others interested in some ideal of thought and action. These 
selective, value laden proposals cover a very 'ride range. This 
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extends from the "high culture" ideala, which are expressed in the 
equation with the arts or the pursuit of some precisely defined 
standard, to the attempt to find value in many of the interests 
and activities of everyday life (1). 
Descriptive cultural theorists attempt to explain how social 
patterns of thought, articulated feeling and behavior are produced, 
how they inter-relate, change, are taught, learned, and otherwise 
disseminated. - For examples 
"Ne thihk culture is a product, is historical; in- 
cludes ideas, patterns, and values; is selctive; is 
learned; is based upon symbols; and is an abstraction 
from be'ýavior and the products of behavior. "(2) 
This definition draws attention to the common use, by theorists, of 
culture as a methodological concept, hence "patterns of culture", 
"culture diffusion", etc. Other anthropologists, critical of a 
tendency towards social moulding, or superorganic determinism, which 
they detect in this kind of definition, emphasize man's creative and 
individual role in producing culture. For them$ culture is the 
individual's organization of his experience in and out of society. 
It is not only a product but a process, and it is personally experienced: 
"Culture is primarily a mode of human behaviors acquired 
by man in the course of his experience of nature to promote 
his survival as an individual and as a member of society. 
Culture is acquired through the individual's own efforts 
and creativity as well as through communication with his 
fellow raen in society who have already acquired eorne degree 
of cultural experience. Culture as an existential attri- 
bute of actual man in society is not to be confused with 
the conceptual abstractions of the anthropologist in des- 
cribing the characteristic qualities of impersonal cultural 
products, such as traditions. Culture is a process as well 
as a product of tradition, and as a process it is inseparable 
from human behaviarr taken individually and collectively. "(3) 
Elsowhere in the book from which this passage is taken, Bidney also used 
"culture" in the sense of "the conceptual abstractions of the anthropologist", 
- 
88 
- 
thus giving the term both a methodological and an experiential 
reference. To emphasize the individual's own efforts in ac- 
quiring culture is to attempt to counteract the weight often 
given to two factors which have played a very large part in the 
sociological and scientific discussions of culture. The first 
of these is that of mammalian inheritance, and the second is 
the idea of social forces. 
2. Mammalian Inheritance and Body-liberation 
In a review of recent research by physiologists and etholo- 
gists, Court emphasized the first factor, that of mammalian in- 
heritances 
"It is already possible to present a very reasonable 
case for the supposition that man, with all his capacity 
for self-conditioning. has not escaped from an innate 
vertebrate biogram. " 4) 
Defining biogram as "characteristic way of living", he went on to 
suggest that the distinctive ways in which men act and react by 
translating environmental energies into stimuli, are dominated by 
hereditary organic mechanisms. This is a view which is supported 
by Jenson's more recent examination of the empirical literature on 
the relative effect of heredity and environment on intelligence (5). 
There are, of course, disagreements about the meaning and signi- 
ficance of the empirical data on inherited factors (6). Apart from 
these differences of opinion, quite different interpretations have 
been offered of the main outlines of species evolution and, hence, 
of the significance in human culture of traits with an ancient animal 
origin. The neo-Darwinian school is the most powerful. Its inter- 
pretations emphasize functionalist explanations of behavior and the 
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continuity of at least the primate species. One of the clearest and 
most concisely argued of recent alternative interpretations is that 
of Alsberg, who developed the argument that human cultural evolution 
is fundamentally different from animal evolution just because man is 
a product of culture (7). In the spirit of neo-Kantianism, Alsberg 
proposed the idea of "body liberation" which he used to criticize 
orthodox neo-Darwinists. The details of this idea may be passed 
over, but what is important is the way in which he argued that in 
the early period of hominid development man gradually lost his original, 
bodily-orientated adaptive outfit, and took to using tools. Alsberg 
showed how the extra-bodily dimension into which man then moved ul- 
timately widened out into language and other forms of symbolization. 
Through symbol use, man both freed himself from adaptational speciali- 
zation and achieved a vital human-cultural dependence on the scientific, 
moral, aesthetic, 'and other mental domains: Thus body-liberation 
merges into culture-assimilation. It is through culture that man 
is defined as a distinct organism in evolutionary terms (8). 
This account gives as much weight to inherited factors as'do those 
of the ethologists, physiologists, psychologists and geneticists. 
However, Alsberg's "inheritance" is the metaphorical one of trans- 
mitted ideas, concepts, meanings, systems of'thought and. so on, which, 
if they are to be significantly assimilated (i. e., made the foundation 
of organized behavior) must be learnt and taught. The preservation 
of the human line of evolution becomes a matter of conscious, complex 
decision-taking, provision and organization. These are not primarily 
acts of individual creativity so much as critical tasks for the larger 
community. Hence, the cultural inheritance and its continuous modifi- 
cation arid development in human experience is the means of determining 
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and sustaining human acts of creativity. This, as we shall see 
in the following chapters, is a point of view widely held by re- 
conatruotionist writers, especially those influenced by the Dewey- 
Mead tradition of social interaction. 
3. Social Facts and Forces: Education as Culture Transmission 
Another school of thought emphasizes the shaping force of 
Culture on individuals. This school of thought, which has in- 
fluenced a great deal of contemporary sociological theorizing, 
derives from Durkheim's concepts of representation and social 
facts. However, it gives far more emphasis to transmission and 
to the role of education as a transmitting process than to the 
reconstruotionist idea of education as itself a culturally re- 
creative force. 
A thorough examination of these concepts, including the modi- 
fications of them Durkheim himself made, would be a very large 
undertaking indeed (9). For our purposes it is sufficient to ap- 
preciate that Durkheim and his successors have attempted severely 
to delimit the scope of individual behavior and ideas by arguing 
that social facts are not susceptible to modification through the 
efforts of individuals or groups. In The Rules of Sociological 
Method, Durkheim defined social facts as those fulfilments of ob- 
ligations as brother, husband, citizen, those executions of con- 
tracts "which are defined, externally to myself and my acts, in 
law and custom ... I did not create them; I merely inherited them 
through my education". Similarly, the beliefs and practices of 
reR]. igious life; all these items "present the noteworthy property 
of existing outside the individual consciousness". Furthermore, 
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they are "endowed with coercive power" (10). Durkbhim was intent 
on establishing the independence of sociology from psychology, and 
on criticizing the individualistic tenets of utilitarianism. In 
terms of culture theory, it is important to appreciate that social 
facts, on his definition, constitute an element in culture to which 
man has to reconcile himself and find ways of adjusting. Education 
becomes, in part,, a process whereby individuals learn their limitations 
and discover the intractibility of some of the social situations which 
confront them. 
Like Marx, Durkheim objected to that kind of "psychologism" which 
reduces complex social forces and institutions to individual ideas. 
But, despite the conservatism of the social facts doctrine, he admitted 
a more substantial role for ideas in processes of social change than 
at any rate the older Marx seems to have done (11). Also, in his 
theory of representations, Durkheim gave more emphasis than Marx did 
to the role of consciousness and to-modes of. perception as factors 
of change. Indeed, it is, the mode of perception that he defined as 
the "essence" of culture. 
Durkheim's theory of representations states that what we gain 
through perception are representations, that-is, communicable images 
in a mind, or communicable categories into which a mind classifies 
data, or communicable expectations of behavior. Thus, representa- 
tions are a reflection of culture; they are culture as perceived. 
The representations are social or collective to the extent that they 
are characteristic of many persons. Culture is there to be perceived, 
or it is a mode of perception to be acquired, it is not an individual, 
imaginative invention. As they are collective, representations 
transcend individuals, or are Superordinate to individual minds. 
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Durkheim defined the mass of collective representations put together 
in a certain idiomatic way, or style, as the "conscience collective". 
Regarded as a coherent set of group perceptions and expectations, these 
are the conventional understandings, or, in Parson's language, common 
societal values (12), 
While this brief account of the formation of the "conscience col- 
lective" omits many important details, it does underline the capacity 
of pre-existing group expectation and understandings to shape indi- 
vidual experience. Indeed, such is this shaping power, in Durkhei*'s 
account, that it is difficult to see how a new idea could occur or a 
change take place in a system. The criticism made of Freud's con- 
version into universal laws of his interpretations of the psychic dis- 
order of middle class Viennese in the 1690a may apply to Durkheim. 
What is proffered as a universal account of culture is a reification, 
perhaps, of a particular static situation, or the expression of a wish 
to stabilize social change at an early period of French industriali- 
zation (13). Nonetheless, Durkheim did have a theory of cultural 
change. Insofar as this theory of change was a description, it was 
a non-ideational theory. Population pressures break down organic 
solidarity, or institutionalized norms and roles, and lead to changes 
in the division of labor. However, Durkheim was anxious to see 
solidarity re-established, so that this description of processes of 
change was by no means free of his preferences for order. Insofar 
as his theory of change was ideational it rested on assumptions about 
individual action and spontaneity which are difficult to reconcile with 
his remarks on the "conscience collective" (14). 
We can appreciate the problem of reconciling stability and idea- 
tional change in Durkheim's theory by contrasting his remarks on the 
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role of the innovating or critical individual, on the one hand, with 
the coercive power he attributed to "social facts", and the power 
to control individuals with which he invested norms and values; 
on the other hand, Durkheim allowed that in some circumstances these 
"facts" may be overcome - they may be "violated successfully" ... 
but "I am always-compelled to struggle with them" (15). However, 
the capacity of the individual to affect these "facts" is extremely 
limitedt 
"A social fact is to be recognized by the power of 
external coercion which it exercises or is capable of 
exercising over individuals, and the presence of this 
power may be recognised in its turn by the existence 
of some specific sanction or by the resistance offered 
against every individual effort that tends to violate 
it" (16). 
Various explanations are offered for this limited individual 
capacity to influence social facts. In some places, Durkheim seemed 
to suggest that it is because the facts have a social reality inde- 
pendent of any particular individual or group within society; else- 
where it iä because they represent the context of assumptions and 
expectations on which consciousness itself has been nourished through 
upbringing and education (17). In other places, it is because the 
"social facts" are the expectations and sanctions uppermost in the 
social milieu (18). 
Not aurpriaingly, Durkheim was led into confusion when considering 
problems of truth, freedom, moral discretion and, indeed, education, 
whose aim he reduced to "the socialization of the human being" (19). 
In his essay, "Individualism and the Intellectuals", he asserted that 
"the individual derives from society even the moral beliefs which deify 
him" (20). Yet he also exalted the autonomy of reason, and freedom 
of discussion. In the style of Kant, he spoke of self-realization 
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being achieved through actions performed out of a sense of duty in 
the community setting of reptblican democracy. But are there any 
occasions on which this sense of duty might lead the individual 
into rebellion? In view of the coercive, moulding power of "social 
facts" and of institutionalized norms, it is difficult to see how 
on Durkheim's account a rebellious idea could occur to an individual. 
Yet in "Individualism and the Intellectuals" he did allow the right to 
rebellion when any of three conditions are present: 
1. When the individual comprehends the reality of his 
society better than most of its members (i. e., its 
"best interests"), 
2. When the moral ideas we know are "out of date". 
3. When society as a whole loses si ht of the sacred 
quality of individual rights (21). 
However, in each set of conditions, the test'seems to be purely 
historicals that morality is rightt'which coincides with the direc- 
tion in which the society is moving. This is true of the first set 
of conditions if we assume, as Durkheim seems to intend us to do, 
that "beat interest" means "emerging character". Even if it means 
some divination of ultimate good, Durkheim offered no way of analysing 
or evaluating goods of this kind, except the unsatisfactory principle 
of a free competition of "goods". In order to avoid possible des- 
potism, Durkheim proposed a clash of competing societies, 'and especially 
competing corporations. This would presumably include the clash of 
competing institutions and societies on the international plane. 
Thus, despotism is avoided'at the cost of what it may not be unfair 
to describe as the ruthless competitiveness of large corporations and 
the imperial wars which Marx predicted and which events since Durkheim's 
time have partly borne out. 
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Durkheim's theory of culture, ostensibly a description of 
the processes whereby individuals learn the customsand morality 
of the groups and hence a sample of the first or descriptive type 
of theory, in fact is a programme of social action intended to 
stabilize change by imposing a complex of understandings and 
values on the rising generation. It is appropriate that in 
this theory educational institutions are conceived as conserving 
and transmitting agencies acting for'more powerful social forces. 
Neither the conscious, historical individual, nor a hypothesised 
pbysico-psychological inheritance, plays a determinate role in this 
theory. Instead, culture is the sphere within which operate the 
interlocking forces of social history, traditions, group outlooks 
and behaviors, and a network of institutions. The individual is a 
product of these forces. He has a legacy of moral values which, 
through the operation of an implanted moral will and in the spirit 
of democratic republicanism, he should apply critically to his cul- 
tural milieu. But, despite this gesture towards individual auto- 
nomy, Durkheim'a theory, taken as a whole, raises little confidence 
in the individual's capacity to make any impression on this milieu. 
The impact of Durkheim'a normative assumptions on sociology and 
education is a vast. but neglected topic. Transmission theories of 
education have absorbed, uncritically, the model of the powerful society 
shaping its rising generations through its educational institutions (22). 
As a single example of the persistence of the Durkheimian normative 
model in sociological theory,, one may note the work of the most in- 
fluential of modern French sociologists, Aron, whose description of 
cultural assimilation and change, and his nostalgic references to the 
loss of authnity, are reminiscent of his distinguished predecessor 
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at the Sorbonne: 
The present culture of European nations is the result 
of a kind of historical sedimentation. The layers of cul- 
ture, each belonging to a more or less recent century, are 
fused rather than superimposed in the unconscious of a 
limited group or an entire nation. The different groups 
have not all rejected, assimilated, or transformed the 
heritage of every bygone age in the same way. Here, too, 
fortunately, integration is incomplete. Creative dissatis- 
faction springs from the contradictions in values. 
"No society in history has lent itself to a complete 
assimilation of all its members. But modern societies 
increase the causes of anomy, if one may define anomy in 
the most general sense as the absence of a system of values 
or behaviour patterns which would at once impose itself 
with self-evident authority. " 23 
The grip of historical culture upon the imaginative life of the 
individual and nostalgia for authoritarian values are very apparent 
in this passage. Yet Aron recognizes a greater diversity of social 
forces and sources of authority than did Durkheim. Furthermore, he 
avoids defining consciousness and behavior merely in terms of the 
assimilation of group experiences. Thus he was not faced with the 
difficulty which Durkheim encountered in trying to explain social 
diversity and the ideational sources of change. Aron's is a con- 
servative theory no less than Durkheimrs, but a significant difference 
is that Aron acknowledges a preference for achieving stability in and 
through social institutions, whereas Durkheim often seemed to suggest 
that this stability was not a matter of preference but of recognizing 
the "facts" or "realities" of society, a technique skilfully employed 
by his American contemporary, Sumner (24). Despite very considerable 
differences of approach, it should be noticed that DuYkheinian conser- 
vatism and modern reconstructionism have in common the conviction that 
socialization and education are processes which deeply color, indeed 
transform, the lives of the young. The ideals of moral autonomy, 
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self-mastery, and rationality which lie behind Durkheim'a apparently 
inexorable system of social coercion are recognizably reconstruc- 
tionist, even though the uses made of these ideals are very different 
in the two theories (25). 
Despite wide differences between them, the "culture product" 
school of thought does not neglect processes of acquisition, dis- 
semination and change, nor does the "culture process" school neglect 
products in the form of acquired ideas, values, symbol system, forms 
of behavior and so forth. In the work of Durkheim, "process" and 
"product" are brought together in the idea of assimilation of a 
heritage, which he unobtrusively reconstructed by inserting selected 
ideals and values. What has united social science theorists since 
the days of E. B. Tylor is an interest in understandthe phenomena 
of culture, however these may be defined. Tylor, however, was by no 
means successful in keeping to descriptive uses of the term culture 
and at times fell into normative uses (26). 
I have argued that Durkheim's objective approach to social theory 
did not prevent him for coloring his explanations of cultural pheno- 
mena with his own preferences for a certain kind of society. This 
modern attempt to develop a "value free" descriptive and explanatory 
science has come increasingly under attack, partly on the grounds that 
the role of participant observer in a sharply divided world is not a 
value free role at all, nor, it is argued, can his observations and 
explanations be conceptually separated from his evaluations. Thus, 
much contemporary anthropology is said to represent an implicii: änd 
sometimes an explicit commnitment, for example to the interests of 
the international strategy of one or other of the major powers (27). 
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4. Prescriptive Culture Theories 
Criticism of the methodological biases and the influence of 
personal preferences in the works of anthropologists raises issues 
about the objective or inter-subjective quality of social science 
knowledge which are matters for controversy amongst specialists. 
Nevertheless, the pursuit of objectivity, neutrality, or inter- 
subjectivity in the interest of a scientific understanding of how 
and why people live as they do remains an aim of the first type of 
theory. Even if it could be shown to be a delusion, this quest 
distinguishes the first from the second major type of culture theory, 
at least as a matter of emphasis. The second type of theory by 
contrast explicitly commits itself normatively both to ends and 
means. This is the traditional usage of the concept of culture, 
exemplified in all its diversity in the classical and post-classical 
Greek concepts of "paideia" (28). According to the prescriptiviste, 
culture is a process of cultivation, a deliberate, sustained pursuit 
of some kind of excellence, a moral quest, a vision, an ideal of per- 
fection, a valued way of life. Its exponents include a long line of 
moralists and educationists within the Western tradition stretching 
from Plato to Matthew Arnold and it includes such varied twentieth- 
century writers as Dewey, Huizinga, Y Gassett, Shaw, Eliot, Leavis, 
Casairer, and Whitehead (29). However, as I pointed out above, the 
difference between the descriptive and the prescriptive theories of 
culture may be more a matter of emphasis and of aspiration than of 
logical distinctiveness. The descriptive theory, despite the en- 
deavours of its exponents to remain morally detached, is unable to 
restrict itself entirely to explanation and description, and by im- 
plication at least commits itself to a view on what is worthwhile in 
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culture conceived as product. Thus, Durkheim in fact recommended 
what he purported to describe in his discussion of the shaping 
force of culture on individuals. Does such recommendation 
inevitably follow from the fact that, as it has been more generally 
defined, "culture" is a valued attribute of human society? This 
question raises the problem of the objectivity of social science 
knowledge. I do not intend to enter into an analysis of this ques- 
tion, but simply to point to the difficulty of selecting and using a 
conceptual apparatus and a language for this topic which avoids a 
high degree of personal preference. Thus the term culture itself 
refers to something which is thought to be good. This may be an 
objective usage in that it expresses the preference of a wide com- 
munity of social scientists. But we could certainly not infer from 
this an objectivity in the use of the term culture by social scien- 
tists comparable to the objectivity of u$e of the concepts of physics 
by physicists. The physicist does not have any-views about the 
desirability of the concept of force, but even dispassionate obser- 
vers cannot free themselves from the values which it seems are inex- 
tricably bound into the concept of culture. This may be seen in 
the writings of two recent exponents of the "anthropological school"s 
"The great novelty, then, in the behavioural evolution 
of the primates was not simply the devoloppent of a cultural 
mode of adaptation as such. It was, rather, the psycho. 
logical reatructuralization that not only made this new mode 
of existence possible but provided the potentiality for-cul- 
tural re-adjustment and change. The psychological basis 
of culture lies not only in a capacity for highly complex 
forms of learning but in a capacity for transcending what 
is learned; a potentiality for innovation, creativity, 
reorganization and change. " (30) 
"Culture, then, represents a biological adaptation, 
, 
based on genetic changes, but transmitted non-genetically, 
that is, through the socially interactive process of learn- 
ing. Culture is man's social heredity. Within the limits 
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set by the genes every human act of organism is learned, 
acquired, through the action of the culture upon him. 
Though based on genetic factors which make it possible, 
culture is itself an extragenetio, a superorganic system 
which functions in the service of man just as any tool 
does, to enlarge and extend the satisfaction of his 
needs" (31). 
Admittedly the concept of culture is treated in a very general 
fashion by these writers. In particular field observational and 
theoretical studies, a general commendatory usage is replaced by a 
patient filling in of detail through the use of some overarching 
framework (32). Yet even these writers are unable to escape en- 
tirely the ancient tradition of treating culture as a valued attri- 
bute of human life - in their own terms, the defining quality of 
human evolution. 
However, despite these qualifications concerning the use of 
the term culture, it is still true that the second, or prescrip- 
tive type of culture theory intermingles, much more obviously than 
the first, empirical generalization and normative judgments. This 
is partly achieved by frankly normative and commendatory definitiones 
"A community is in the state of culture when the 
domination of nature in the material, moral and spiri- 
tual realms permits a state of existence which is 
hijher and better than the given natural conditions; 
and when this state of existence is furthermore charac- 
terized by a harmonious balance of material and spiri- 
tual values and is guided by an ideal (in principle 
homogeneously derived) toward which the different ac- 
tivities of the community are directed. " (33) 
Jaeger, in his masterly description and assessment of Greek contri- 
bWtions to the understanding of culture as an ideal of human life, 
made the second type of theory a standard against which the first 
type should be judgeds 
"The 'ideal of culture' (in Greek arete and paideia) 
is a specific creation of the Greek mind. The anthro- 
pological concept of culture is a modern extension of 
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this original concept; but it has made out of a concept 
of value a mere descriptive category which can be applied. 
to any nation, even to 'the culture of the primitive' 
because it has entirely lost its true obligatory sense" (34)" 
These definitions stipulate "essential" meanings which denote not 
so much a methodological crassness as a vital commitment to norms and 
ideals of civilized living. The terminological issue might be resolved 
by using different words, although the cost would be high in view of 
the long traditions of literature, inquiry and discussion relating to 
both the first and the second theories of culture (35). However, 
settling the terminological issue would still leave unsettled the 
substantive issues of what ought to be valued; and decisions about 
the criteria governing the processes of "cultivating" young and- 
es-tablished members of given communities would remain to be settled. 
Nor is there much likelihood of the two types of theory being 
brought into harmonious relationship with-each other through the 
use of a common analytic framework. The-categories of the descrip- 
tive type of theory-are based on some notionýof fundamental life ac- 
tivities of man in society, indicated by sets of terms like (1) 
economic relations, kinship patterns, taboos, mores, technology 
and tools, patterns ofýchild rearing; or (2) some hierarchy of 
elements of perception, consciousness, action and ideology; or (3) 
some more or less mentalistic taxonomy of scientific ideas, religious 
beliefs, aesthetic judgments and so on. 
The categories of the second, or prescriptive, type of theory 
overlap with those of the first, but invariably they are centred 
on some norm of central and peripheral activity, or some key con- 
cept or set of key concepts, shich yield criteria for judging any 
and all cultural activities. One of the clearest examples of this 
- 102 - 
is Jaeger's account of the various forms of paideia amongst the 
Greeks. Every form of paideia was grounded in a coherent set of 
values against which all other claims were judged - e. g., the 
rhetorician Isocrates criticized the paideia of the philosophers 
for its supposed neglect of the practical wisdom of compromise 
and accommodation. 
5. Reconstructionism and Culture 
Insofar as we can maintain a clear distinction, the recon- 
structionists, on the whole, belong-. to the second, not to the 
first, group of culture theorists. This does not mean they have 
not been profoundly influenced by social science theory. Their 
primary stated purpose in describing and analysing cultural pheno- 
mena is to lay the groundwork for a programme of change and reform 
and for criticizing alternative proposals. The most obvious ge- 
neral character for such groundwork to assume is to claim that there 
is something seriously amiss with the world - with culture in the 
widest sense of "way of life", involving both process and product, 
to return to the distinction made at the beginning of this chapter. 
If it can be shown that the whole way of life of a people is some- 
how in an unsatisfactory condition, although the particular proposals 
for reforming it may not be accepted, then the basic strategic vic- 
tory of establishing a need for action will have been achieved. 
That this victory was sought is obvious from the extremities of 
decline, degeneration and chaos to which the reconstructionists 
attempted to reduce the culture of their own time. 
These extremities generally took the form of a "crisis in 
culture"o most conspicuously in the, writings of Wella, Mannheim, 
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Rugg and Brameld. Less vivid, emotional and totalistio, but no 
less searching in their critical implications, were the studies 
oft the condition of culture instituted by the Webbs and other 
Fabians. Separation of descriptive and prescriptive elements 
in reconstrucfionist examinations of culture is extremely dif- 
ficult. As we have aeon, even in the work of descriptive 
scientists this separation`is not easily accomplished. True 
to their ideological origins and interests, the reconstruotionists 
fused facts and values, both through definition of terms and, more 
confusingly, through an intermingling of different forms of dis- 
course. Sometimes this intermingling led'them into historical 
predictions of social trends, and advice to adapt-reform to'the 
"forces of history" - to "get on the side of history". 
Like the ancient exponents of paideia, they all entertained 
an ideal of a central structure, era normative core of universally 
agreed principles, or"a methodology towards which culture reconstruc- 
tion would be directed. These structures, cores and methodologies 
provided both ends and means. This is because all of the recon- 
dtructionists, by rejecting violence, historical inevitability, and 
the belief that man is shaped by forces beyond his control, put their 
ends into service as instrumentalities for attaining the new orders 
a synthetic core curriculum becomes the means of cultivating aware- 
ness of the skills and knowledge needed to make the future consensus, 
the larger synthesis of the whole of culture; and scientific method, 
in the form of reflective thinking, becomes a general method of 
education which anticipates the universalization of scientific 
thinking throughout society. 
In general, the reconstructionists accepted the idea of an external 
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cultural reality in and through which individual experience is 
shaped. But the relationship of experience to an external cul- 
ture reality was seen as reciprocal. Although individual develop- 
ment is a function of cultural participation, the subsequent impact 
of individuals and social groups on oulture, is, in reconstructionism, 
vital for cultural growth. Dewey's theory of growth as the recon- 
struction of experiences which involved a continuing interaction 
with environments expresses the ideal of the reciprocal develop- 
ment of individual and culture. Education, in this contexts re- 
flects aspects of the wider cultures since it is a process and 
a set of institutions designed to further the interests of various 
cultural sub-groups - e. g., the economy. However, the processes 
of individual and group education can be so conducted as themselves 
to become major instrumentalities of future cultural development. 
It is this latter aspect of the relationship of education to culture, 
together with the kind of education- proposed, that gives to the re- 
constructionist theory its particular claim to interest and attention 
as a theory of culture change. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FABIAN SOCIALISM: THE WEBBS 
Fabian socialism is a complex political and social reform move- 
ment comprising not a single doctrinal orthodoxy but a variety of 
ideas. It embraces such diverse matters as criticism of specific 
social economic and political institutions and proposals for their 
piecemeal reform; an attempt to reformulate the Ricardian theory 
of'rent as a means of condemning capitalism; and projects for total 
transformation of the culture. When contrasted with other socialist 
movements (e. g., Marxism, or Guild Socialism), Fabianism does have some 
distinctive features; for example, the willingness to build upon and 
only gradually replace existing(inatitutions, the repudiation of vio- 
lence, a persistent meliorism, and the mistrust of producer control in 
industry and of the working class in general. But, even so, doctrinal 
uniformity can be overdrawn. Taken as a movement'of ideas and practical 
action from the mid 1880s to the present day, Fabianism has provided 
a rostrum not only for gradualist piecemealere but for reformers who, 
impatient with gradualism, have advocated more peremptory, ruthless 
and authoritarian measures (1). 
An appraisal of the whole Fabian movement, or even of the contri- 
butions of its early leaders, who included William Clarke, Hubert Bland, 
G. B. Shaw, Edward Pearce, Sydney Olivier, Graham Wallas, Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb, and, for a time, Annie Besant and. 11.0, Wells, is beyond 
the scope of this study. Instead, we shall concentrate ön two of its 
leading fi¬-ures, the two who are, by general consent, ýthe chief archi- 
tects of the Fabian ideology. These two are Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 
In view of their joint researches into the history of local government, 
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trade unionism and political democracy, their close co-operation in 
numerous reform projects (e. g., Poor Law reform), and their mental 
harmony, to which Beatrice's autobiographies amply testify, it is 
appropriate to treat the Webby not separately but as a partnership. 
Differences there certainly were, for example of temperament and back- 
ground, but for our purposes these are unimportant. 
1. Culture Diagnosis 
The Webb diagnosis of late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
British culture may be considered under three headings 
1. A: ethodology of social research. 
2. Historicism and interventionism. - 
3. Specific failures of capitalist civilization. 
The distinctive features of the Webb culture diagnosis derive primarily 
from their use of empirical methods for investigating selected social 
institutions and movements, and from the tactics of social ihfiltraticn 
and gradualist reform. I shall give rather more attention to these, 
therefore, than to the specific failures of capitalism that they iden- 
tified. 
1.1 Methodology of social research 
Beatrice Webb has been related, as a somewhat degenerate offshoot, 
to the tradition of scepticism and empiricism running from Locke through 
Hume and Bentham to John Stuart Mills degenerate because of the bureau- 
cratic, impersonal and authoritarian solutions she is supposed to have 
offered to the problems she diagnosed (2). Yet there is an important 
element in the empirical tradition which she and Sidney sustained and 
made positive contributions tos systematic inquiry into the living 
conditions of her fellow citizens, according to the methods of laborious, 
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painstaking collection, classification, interpretation and assessment 
of public documents and institutional practices. In Simey's words, 
the Webbs were "scientists of the truly empirical type" We Thus, 
the first point to note about the Webb analysis of culture is that 
it is empirical, piecemeal, and part of an established tradition 
of historical inquiry. That topics were selected which the Webba 
had a political interest in - e. g., trade union reform, reorganization 
of local government, and consumer co-operatives - does not affect 
their distinction as leading exponents of the empirical method. 
Similarly, the Fabian Society, from its inception in 1684, laid 
particular emphasis on the collection, discussion and dissemination of 
information and ideas about contemporary living conditions: socialists, 
as campaigners for reform, had to be supplied with facts. Appended to 
the forty-first of the Fabian Tracts is this summary statement of the 
work of the Society: 
"I. Meetings for the discussion of questions connected 
with Socialism. 
2. The further investigation of economic problems, and 
the collection of facts contributing to their eluci- 
dation. 
3" The issue of publications containing information on 
social questions, and arguments relating to Socialism. 
4" The promotion of Socialist lectures and debates in 
other societies and clubs. 
5" The representation of the Society on public conferences 
and discussions on social questions. " (4) 
In pursuit of these objectives, the Fabians, following the Webb 
example, undertook various tasks. Thus, they assiduously gathered 
and collated facts on economic, social, political, educational and 
welfare questions, and published these as Fabian tracts, an unrivalled 
source of material on the developing Fabian mentality which inextricably 
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bound together a reformer's zeal with a fact-finder's passion for 
information (5). A sample of the topics and possibilities for re- 
form investigated between 1884 and 1930 indicates both the range of 
their diagnosis and their preference for internal, administrative 
and institutional reform: poverty under capitalism; concentration 
of ownership; hours of work; communal responsibilities of parish 
and district councils; co-operative movements; wages; conditions 
of employment; housing; workers' compensation; municipal slaughter- 
houses; rural depopulation; public health; population trends; 
child labor; school nurseries; taxation; industrial reconstruction; 
school boards; and municipal pawnshopsf 
Sidney Webb adopted a simple form of hedonistic utilitarianism 
in determining the basic directions of social policy. This meant 
that the wants of the populace were to be ascertained, and satisfied, 
with this important qualification: that only those wants would be 
satisfied which were consistent with or taken to be an expression of 
the basic tenets of socialism. I shall discuss these in later aeo- 
Lions of this chapter. For the moment, I want to emphasize the im- 
portance the Webbs gave to detailed, concrete, historical studies of 
social phenomena, not only as a means of ascertaining wants and the 
barriers that frustrated want satisfaction, but also as a way of dis- 
covering the principles of socialism: 
"Socialism, to Socialists, is not a utopia which they have invented but a principle of social organization whtäh 
they assert to have been discovered by the patient investi- 
gations into socioloy whose labours have distinguished the 
present century. " (67 
The inquiry methods adopted by the Webbs were on the face of it 
a naive inductionism, facts gathered by questionnaires, interviews, and 
from documentary sources, and arranged into "natural" categories, from 
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which certain regularities were inferred. But Beatrice herself 
criticized the spurious inductionism of Herbert Spencer, whereby 
social "laws" were "proved" by the accumulation of appropriately 
supportive evidence. She claimed to have freed herself from this 
"dogmatic creed", without losing regard for "the relevance of facts" 
(7), and she noted that the decision to search for certain kinds of 
facts, and to arrange them in a äertain way, meant an end to simple 
inductionism (8). She saw that inquiry into the life and labor of 
the common people was, in late Victorian England, partly motivated 
by a fear of the newly enfranchised democracy, and this fear was 
part of what she was interested to understands 
"what impelled me to concentrate on the condition of 
the people as the immediate question for investigation [this was before she met Sidney] was the state of mind 
in the most vital centres of business enterprise, of 
political agitation and of academic reasoning. " (9) 
Later, she pointed to another, more obvious consideration in the 
Webb approach to social research, the genetic method, out of which 
was to arise, in Sidneyris'mind, the foundation;, of a historical argu- 
ment for socialisms 
"'The Webb speciality' has been a study, at once his- 
torical and analytic, of the life-history of particular 
forms of social organizations within the United Kingdom, 
such as the Trade Union and Co-operative movements, and 
English local government from the seventeenth to the end 
of the nineteenth century. " (10) 
This analytic-evolutionary method is to be distinguished on the 
one hand from abstract, theoretical economic analysis (although the 
Webbs for many years continued tb express satisfaction in their de- 
velopment of a theory of rent designed to supplant Ricardian and 
Marxist value theories); on the other hand, Beatrice distinguished 
their genetio approach from the "static" accounts given by Booth 
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and the social surveyors. 
It is important to appreciate the nature of the facts to whose 
discovery and interpretation the Webbs devoted their researches. 
The facts disclosed by the Webbs are of the kind we might designate 
social and public, having to do with institutional life and with 
topics like conditions of employment, provision of welfare services, 
and so forth. Despite Beatrice's early profession of interest in 
the personal mental and emotional lives of individuals, and her oc- 
casional diary refer. >nces to the superiority of the artist's insight, 
the Webbs never investigated the personal dimensions of experience 
under capitalism. Furthermore, they had very little to say about the 
quality of personal life and of culture in the sense of felt experience 
which socialism might be expected to facilitate and enhance. Writers 
like Matthew Arnold, Jaeger and Cassirer intended by the concept of 
culture a very different set of qualities in individual and social 
life. We may see how wide is the gap between the two approaches 
by referring to Cassirer's discussion of Rousseau's and Simmel's cri- 
ticisms of the pursuit of the arts and the sciences. According to 
these critics, the arts and the sciences encourage their exponents 
to exalt abstractions, and they bring about a divorce between the 
personal world of the individual and the processes and creations 
of the arts and sciences. These criticisms have become more familiar 
in recent years in the Marxist version of the concepts of "reification" 
and "alienation". But for Cassirer, such criticisms miss the impor- 
tance of the symbolic realms for personal awareness. He argued that 
the consolidation which life undergoes in the symbolic realms of the 
arts and sciences is not the antithesis of what the "I" requires but 
"the 
, condition 
by virtue of which it äiscovers and comes to know its 
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own being" (11). 
Allowing for the quite different traditions of expression 
within which the Fabians and Cassirer wrote, there is still an 
enormous gulf between this culture of personal experience and the 
ways in which it can be articulated in public, symbolic forms, and 
the Fabian ordering of patterns of social and political organization 
to bring about the communal concept of a national minimum of material 
well-being. Yet the gulf was recognized by Beatrice, who struggled 
to bridge it, in her diaries, if not in her analytical and polemical 
works (12). 
The contribution of the Tebbe to culture analysis was not restric- 
ted to the sustained application of empirical techniques to a selected 
range of contemporary social problems in theirrhbiatorical setting. As 
Pabians, they were no less interested in influencing others than in 
conducting their own inquiries. For this purpose, the Fabian Society 
itself as an instrument of social inquiry and criticism was felt to 
be insufficient. Both the London School of Economics and the New 
Statesman were founded as a consequenoo of the Vebbat determination 
to consolidate and institutionalize the methods of inquiry and reform 
which they advocated. 
True to his instinct for establishing institutions, and in this 
more immediately successful than Karl ? arx, his socialist forebear in 
the empirical tradition (13). Webb, when left 110,000 by a Fabian 
sympathizer, Henry Hutchinson, decided to found an institution for 
social science research. According to Graham Wallas, the Tebbe 
together decided "to found a school in London on the lines of the 
Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques in Paris". The remaining trus- 
tees were persuaded to support this plan for a school of social and 
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economic research, which wasibunded in 1895. It was to be: 
"a centre not only of lectures on special subjects, but 
an association of students who would be directed and 
supported in doing original work ... Above all we want 
the ordinary citizen to feel that reforming society 
is no light matter, and must be undertaken by experts 
specially trained for the purpose. " (14) 
Reference to the experts brings out an implication of the ffebbs' 
empirical approach never far beneath the surface: the twin tasks of 
documenting social conditions and proposing reforms require, and 
indeed call forth, an elite of experts, of whom the active Fabian 
Society membership constituted something of an example. Elitism 
is a feature of reconstruotionist thinking, but most reoonstructionists 
attempted to combine elite leadership with mass education directed at 
democratic citizenship. These attempts were not always very success- 
ful. Just how ineffective were the proposals made by the Webbs for 
uniting expert leadership and mass participation under the single 
banner of democracy we shall see in the second part of this chapter. 
For the present, something more needs to be said about their views 
on educating the experts and disseminating the findings of social 
research. 
Lord Beveridge specified four distinct purposes in the idea 
that the London School should be founded as an instrument for inquiry 
(and, by extension, reform): 
1. "The general idea of increasing, out of all proportion 
to anything attempted hitherto, the resources devoted 
to scientific study of society. " 
2. That specialists should live together in one institution. 
3" The special aim of the School was to study and investi- 
gate "the concrete facts of industrial life and the 
actual working of economic and political institutions". 
4. The School was to be properly placed in the University 
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of London, so giving London the distinction of being 
first among the British Universities to have a Faculty 
for the Social Sciences, of which the London School 
of Economics and Political Science was recognized as 
a school (15). 
The last purpose may be thought to be inconsistent with a reform 
movement which gave the attention which Fabianism did to the achieve- 
ment of a national minimum. There appears to be no evidence that the 
Webbs saw the School as the forerunner of similar institutions through- 
out the country (16). However, the empirical purpose of the School 
indicates the remarkable unity, in the Webbs' mind, of free inquiry 
and social reform. There was nothing partial or tendentious in the 
constitution of L. S. E., which was incorporated as a Company in whose 
articles Webb had included the fundamental principle of free expres- 
sion, or holding of opinions "on any subject whatsoever" (17). That 
this principle was implemented is confirmed both by the appointment 
of the political conservative, Hewins, as the first director, and 
in a retrospective view by Hewins himself (18). 
Yet there was considerably more to the Fabian method of institu- 
tionalizing inquiry than the disinterested establishment of an insti- 
tution of higher learning. By 1900, Beatrice had found much to be 
thankful for in the workings of the School - and not all of it the 
fruits of the method of research whose contours she so clearly out- 
lined. The quotation is lengthy but it brings out the-special flavour 
of the "Webb method": 
"Our little schemes with regard to the new University 
of London prosper. We have got the School recognised as 
a Faculty of Economics, we have secured a site and a build- 
ing, free of cost, and an income of £2,500 devoted to econo- 
mics and commercial science. Sidney will be a member of 
the Faculty and will probably represent the County Council 
on the Senate. Best of all he has persuaded the Royal 
Commission to recognise economics as a science and not 
merely as a subject in the Arts Faculty. The preliminary 
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studies for the economics degree will, therefore, be mathe- 
matics and biology. This divorce of economics from meta- 
p)aysica and shoddy history is a great gain. We have always 
claimed that the study of the structure and function of 
society was as much a science as the study of any other 
form of life, and ought to be pursued by the scientific 
methods used in other organic sciences. Hypothesis ought 
to be used, not as the unquestioned premise from which to 
deduce an unquestioned conclusion but as an order of thought 
to be verified by observation and experiment. Such history 
as will be taught at the School will be the history of social 
institutions discovered from documents, statistics and the 
observation of the actual structure and working of living 
organisations. This attainment of our aim - the starting 
of the School as a department of science - is the result of 
a chanter of fortunate accidents. There was the windfall 
of the Hutchinson Trust, then the selection of Uewins as 
diractor, the grant from the T. E. B. [Technical Education 
Board of the London County Council] towards commercial edu- 
cation, the coming of Creighton to London as Bishop, and the 
successful packing of the University of London Commission. - 
Then again we are humble folk whom nobody suspects of power; 
and Sidney's opinions on educational matters are considered 
moderate and sound as neither anti- nor pro-ecclesiastic. 
And we have had two very good friends helping us - Haldane 
and the Bishop of London, both of them trusting us completely 
in our own range of subjects. Of course, the School is at 
present extremely imperfecta its reputation is better than 
its performance. But we have no illusions, and we see clearly 
what we intend the School to become and we are convinced that 
the science will emerge" (19). 
It is clear from their own researches, from the emphasis they 
placed on free ranging inquiry and research in the founding of the 
L. S. E., and from the intimate relationship in their own mind between 
inquiry and reform, that the Webbs entertained another model of culture 
reform in addition to that I have already referred to as a national 
minimum of material well-being. This other model is part of what 
might be termed rationalistic naturalism,, the sustaining belief of 
the enlightenment philosophy and of the ideologues of the nineteenth 
century. It is a model of and for the expert elite, just as the 
material or environmental national minimum is a culture model for 
the masses, in whose well-being the expert elite has invested very 
powerful, if sublimated, feelings, together with a considerable 
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portion of its intellectual capital. There is an echo here of 
Disraeli's two nations paternalism. 
According to the Webb culture model, theories of social recon- 
struction arise "naturally" out of dispassionate, critical studies 
of the existing social order (20). Furthermore, the model, echoing 
the French ideologues and Marxism, requires the enlargement and im- 
provement of facilities for others to conduct such inquiries so that 
the desited, reconstructed society might be brought more quickly into 
existence (21). Hence the 1ebbal confidence in proposing the endow- 
ment of free inquiry as a means to social amelioration as they under- 
stood the concept in the eighteen-nineties. At that time, this en- 
dowment was the mental counterpart, in the Fabian scheme, to the 
amelioration of material conditions, an extension of the "national 
minimum" of tolerable conditions of life in a civilized society. 
Fort. years later, discouraged by slow reform in Britain and stimu- 
lated by the drastic upheavals in Soviet society, the Wobbs more 
seriously to entertain as a cultural model Soviet communism, whose 
implementation depended ih part on a falsification of the facts in 
which they placed so much confidence. 
1.2 Historicism and interventionism 
The Webbs were evolutionary socialists, who believed in the 
inevitable transformation of Britain from a capitalist into a 
socialist society. How far, then, is, the culture to whose study 
and reform they addressed themselves the outcome of inevitable laws 
or of trends beyond the power of individuals or groups to control? 
The association in Plato, Marx and others of inevitability doctrines 
with a holistic approach to social change has been demonstrated by 
Popper (22). At first it might appear that the active commitment 
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of the Fabians to highly specific forms of interventionism rules 
out both the deterministic aspects of Marx's laws of social move- 
ment and Platonic holistic utopianism. But there is clear, if 
limited, evidence, particularly in Sidney Webb's writings, of a 
belief in historical inevitability and in the need for total social 
reform, combined with his more obvious enthusiasm for piecemeal 
social reformism. 
First, however, I want to examine the Webb theory and practice 
of interventionism. It is apparent, both from their writings and 
from their life-long involvement in political, administrative and 
educational reform, that the \Vebbs believed it both possible and 
useful in achieving socialism for individuals and groups to inter- 
vene in the historical processes whose main features they had tried 
to identify in their genetic studies of institutions like the co- 
operative movement. The famous policy slogan of permeation expresses 
this interventionist belief. That this was a conscious technique is 
indicated by Beatrice Webb, who described permeation both in respect 
of specific legislative possibilities and as the means wheroby young 
public officials and social researchers would inevitably encounter 
the Webb-Fabian ideology: 
"Sidney much enjoyed colloquy with Sir John Gorst, 
Michael Sadler, Llewellyn Smith and others [responsible 
politicians and civil servants] about Education Bill [1902 Act]. On the whole he i8 favourable to the central 
idea of the Bills that is replacing ad hoc bodies by one 
set of representatives chosen to manage all the business 
of the locality (but doubtful whether the Bill, as it 
stands, will effect this); also, not against helping; 
voluntary or denominational schools in return for a 
measure of control, which is bound to grow. Other 
clauses, enabling public authorities to subsidise pri- 
vate venture schools, he looks upon as radically bad. 
He, however, recognises that it is no good for him to 
oppose the Bill - far better to appreciate the good in 
it and by appreciating it, get some influence in amending 
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it in our direction. And he is fortunately placed for this 
purpose. As originator and chairman of the most successful 
educational authority in London [Beatrice was referring to 
the Technical Education Board of the London County Council] 
as a friendly acquaintance of Gorst's - as a friend of 
Llewellyn smith and Sadler, and acquainted with all the 
educationalists in London, he is able to be constantly 
suE; ue:, ting amendments which are favourably considered by 
those in authority. 
"This work, and pushing the London School and the 
Political Science Library [the London School of Lconomics 
and Political Science], combine to force us more into po- 
litical society on both sides. On Monday, for instance, 
we dined at the House with Haldane and Asquith and other 
Liberals; on Tuesday, with Sir John Gorst and Lord Geore 
Hamilton, two Conservative Ministers. Becoming, too, 
ever; more connected with the superior rank of civil 
servants, such as, Sir Alfred Milner, Sir Geor6e Kekewich, 
Iienrj Cunynghame and others (Sidney's old connection with 
the Civil Service stands him in good stead " he knows the 
roper of almost every office). " (23) 
", o can now feel assured that with the School 
[London 
School of Economics] as a teaching body, the Fabian Society 
as a propabandist organization, the L. C. C. Progressives 
as an object lesson in electoral success, our books as 
the only elaborate and original work in economic fact and 
theory, [sic] n4 young man or woman who is anxious to study 
or to work in public affairs can fail to come under our 
influence. " (24) 
As we have seen, Sidney Vlebb'a influence on the 1902 Education 
Act has been amongst commentators a matter of some controversy. 
However, the procedures he adopted clearly rested on the beliefs 
that there was nothing inevitable even about the ultimate very broad 
shape or effect of the legislation, that adults, in positions of 
influence and whatever their party political affiliations, could 
be persuaded by rational means to adopt certain typos of policy 
in preference to others, and that it was part of the duty of 
Fabians to "permeate" the circles of power and influence of their 
own time. Interventionism could make a decisive difference, but 
it had to be an informed, technically adroit permeation, based on 
a careful knowledge and understanding of political and economic 
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considerations. The Webbe never assumed that the complex infra- 
structure of social organizations could be remade simply through 
criticism and the vague recommendation of socialist ideals. Few, 
if any other, reconstructionists showed the same awareness of the 
need in proposing changes to think out the problem of changing a 
network of intimately related institutional structures and roles. 
The Webbs appreciated that society has achieved a determinate character, 
over time; it is organic to the extent that past affects present 
and changes in one part are affected by changes in other parts. 
Webb accepted Marx's view that a crisis of capitalism is inevitable, 
but this crisis can be attributed to a variety of inter-connected, 
historic<, lly evolving factors, including the social critiques of 
the nineteenth century reformers of whom Marx was so contemptuous. 
Webb gave to none of these factors ultimate motive power. McBriar 
has criticized the Webb theory of change, on the grounds that multi- 
causality is inadequate for predictive purposes. But, sinee single- 
cause theories gain predictive power by discounting freedom, plurality 
of action and other significant areas of experience, and since there are 
now technical ways of analysing multi-causation change, this is not a 
serious criticism. Furthermore, by adopting multi-causation, the 
Webbs were able to harmonize their theoretical assumptions with their 
multi-faceted programme of social criticism and reform. 
The permeation period extended for some twenty years, from the 
middle of the 1880s. After the first decade of the twentieth century, 
it tailed off as Sidney turned from permeation of the Liberals and Con- 
servatives to policy-making for the Labour Party (25). Thus it might 
reasonably be argued that the permeation form of intervention was a device 
intended for a particular transient set of political circumstances. It 
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was a means whereby a tiny group of activists could hope to exert 
an influence on the larger society by identifying key fitures and 
promotinZ key legislation. In these and other ways they could 
hope, through rational persuasion, to influence events towards such 
socialist :; bjectives as a national minimum of material conditions, 
increased opportunity for education, democratization of industrial 
relations, municipal enterprise, and nationalization or regulation 
of major industries. 
It is obvious also from the Fabian, Tracts, from the. first one 
in 1884 up to the present day, that individuals and groups are ex- 
pectoci to intervene to effect small and large. scale reforms. A 
few exam, -lea will demonstrate this: 
"Teach, preach and pray to all eternity in your schools 
and churches: it will aid you nothing until you have s-vept 
away this blind idol of Competition, this misuse of, Capital 
in the hands of individuals. " (26) 
"Socialism is a plan for securing equal rights and 
opportunities for all. " (27) 
"The aim of the modern Socialist movement, I take it, is 
not to enable this or that comparatively free person to lead 
an ideal life, but to loosen thb fetters of the millions who 
toil in our factories and mines, and who cannot possibly be 
moved to Freeland or Topolobampo. " (28) 
The Fabian Society "aimed simply at. the reduction of 
Socialism to a constitutional political policy which, like 
Free Trade or Imperial Federation or any other accepted 
parliamentary movement, could be adopted either as a whole 
or by instalments by any ordinary respectable citizen without 
committing himself to any revolutionary association or de- 
taching himself in any way from the normal course of 
r: nblish life. " (29) 
The Fabian Society "seeks to promote [its policy of 
reform] by the general dissemination of kuuwlede; e as, to 
the relation between the individual and Society in its 
economic, ethical, and political aspects. " (: SU) 
The Fabian Society "works for the extinction of private 
property in land, with equitable consideration of estabLished 
expectations, and duo provision as to the tenure of the home 
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and the homestead; for the transfer to the community, by 
constitutional methods, of all such industries as can be 
conducted socially; and for the establishment, as the 
governing consideration in the regulation of production, 
distribution and service, of the common good instead of 
to provide profit" (31). 
Knowledge, in the form of organized collections of data on selected 
aspects of social and political life, played a centrally important role 
in Fabian thinking. Knowledge, in. the hands of experts, was to be the 
chief instrument of social change. The best example of expert use of 
knowledge is Sidney Webb's chairmanship of the London Technical Education 
Board, a focal point for the practical development of educational policy 
in the 1690x. A number of reports, including those of Sidney and Beatrice 
themselves, testify to the importance the Webba attached to this platform 
as a means of shaping and directing not merely London education, but in- 
fluencing national educational trends as well (32). In this work, Webb 
seems to have achieved very nearly a fusion of theory and practice and he 
was able to operationalize such Fabian concepts as the creation of a ladder 
of educational opportunity through scholarships and a more equitable 
distribution of school facilities, and the support of practical and 
scientific studies in opposition to the linguistic and literary lean- 
inge of the traditional curriculum (33). The educational ideas of the 
Fabians are discussed in Chapters XI, XII and XIII. Sidney's work 
of the London Technical Education Board was a good illustration of 
his conviction that, within a capitalist society, it is possible 
through education to promote class-consciousness and other forme of 
economic and political awareness which will subsequently serve to 
advance the movement towards socialism. 
Parallel to this achievement was the implementation over a twenty- 
year period of the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission (1909). 
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This report, adopted by the Labour Party, was one of the policy 
foundations of the welfare state in Britain and ancestral to parts 
of the Beveridge Report of 1942. It was directed against charitable 
provision in favour of state provision and organisation of frroilitioo, 
and it incorporated the characteristic Fabian concept of a minimum 
standard of esployment relief, together with a detailed reorganization 
of national and local adainistration (34). 
La with Sidney's work for the London Technical Education Board, 
his campaigning on behalf of the 1902 lot, and his practice of the 
tactics of p4rasation, the political adoption and eventual implemen- 
tati-. n of the Minority Report exemplified belief in gradual, fisoemadl 
re tars achieved through rational persuasion. The evidence thus seams 
ov. rwhelaingly to suggest that the Tebbe were, in Popper's terms, piece- 
meal reformers, adapting the nothods of the physical sciences to the 
study of social phenosena, yet recognising their historical individua- 
lity, proposing specific changes, inAhe, -esisting socio-political order, 
taring then out and being prepared to modify and adjust ideas in accor- 
dance with the experiences of such trials. The Fabian Society avoided 
firs doctrinal coocitsent and embraced people of aany different ethical, 
religious and political persuasions. Above all, the Wobbs themselvQs 
appear to hasq beaaýaodorats, open to argusent, free of doctrinaire` 
absolmtisa and fanaticism. 
Yet their reputation also suggests another character to their 
ideas, work and personalitys rtgimenter., anti-demoaratia, humorless, 
narrow, and so forth (35). For the moment, we are not concerned with 
a wider appraisal but just to ascertain whether the Webb., in particular, 
hold a view of culture which is duterministic and historicist. 
Popper has proposed that a historicist, believing in inevitable 
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historical trends and processes, may nevertheless r-O7tceive, an 
activist, interventionist role for reformers or change agents. 
Marx himself has shown how, within a single, developing theory 
of inevitable social change, the revolutionary may help to speed 
up the "inevitable" processes. There are many examples of this 
combining of determinate law and individual activism in the tra- 
dition ofýChristian activism stretching from St. Augustine to Calvin 
and his followers (36). 
Although there is no evidence of either Marxism or Augustinean 
subtlety of juxtaposition in his writings, it is clear that Sidney 
Webb, too, shared some of these ancient beliefs combining historical 
inevitability with political activism. The activism is implicit in 
his naturalistic confidence that appropriate empirical knowledge com- 
mits an individual to a programme of action intended to secure-cer- 
tain changes in the situation that knowledge discloses. The gather- 
ing of knowledge itself is an active process (as was Marx's amassing 
of data on the workings of capitalism in Victorian England) whose re- 
sults include an awareness without which - naturalistic beliefs aside 
appropriate reform programmes could not be formulated. 
-Beyond this, in not much more than an occasional turn of phrase, 
Webb disclosed a belief in the inevitability of socialism. In what 
way inevitable? I "I 1I 
ý 
"Socialism, to Socialists, is not a Utopia which they 
have inv entedg but a principle of social organization which 
they assert to have been discovered by the patient investi- 
gators into sociology whose labours have distinguished the 
present century. " (37) 
This kind of "discovery" perhaps has more in common with Miohaelangelo's 
claim to have discovered the form of David in the marble block than 
Christopher Columbus's setting foot in the new world. Just what is 
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it that the patient Fabian investigators have "discovered"? This 
Webb never made very explicit but the discovery appears to have been 
comprised of the various problems, crises, and inequities of indus- 
trial capitalism, and the fateful emergence of trands towards co- 
operation, common action; etc.: 
"In all directions, and throughout the whole civilized 
world, we may distinguish, as the dominant characteristic 
of the social movements of the past three-quarters of a 
century, an ever growing elaboration of organised common 
action. " (38) 
This elaboration of organized common action, it is further hypothesized, 
springs from a desire for popular self-government. 
Now this is just the kind of discovery which might well be dis- 
puted by other historians and commentators. At least, they would 
add to it such a diverse mass of additional discoveries as to make 
meaningless the claims to be basing proposals for future action on 
emerging trends. This problem is apparent even within the limited 
context of socialist extrapolations of supposed trends, in the con- 
trast between what-the Marxists and the Fabians discovered as "trends". 
Thus, to the Webbs, it appeared that not only is socialism inevitable 
but that a particular form of socialism is inevitable: Fabianism. 
For Marx, however, utopianism and ý, meliorism of the Fabian typo were 
destined to be e#tinguished with the-demise of bourgeois civilization. 
In the 1890s, Sidney-Webb referred to the inevitability of Socialise 
in terms of the events of the previous century: ° 
"Socialism is, -ýindeed,, nothing but the extension of 
democratic self-government from the political to the 
industrial world, and it is hard to resist the conclusion 
that it is an inevitable outcome of the joint effects of 
the economic and political revolutions of the past century. " (39) 
By the 1920s the emphasis shifted, in a manner that seems to have escaped 
notice, from the inevitability of socialism to, in the well-known phrase, 
r 
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"the inevitability of gradualness" - i. e., change will and should 
be orderly, constitutional, and slow (40). By the 1930s, a greater 
shift of emphasis had occurred, this time to a more thorough-going 
and ruthless transformation of the total culture than the YJebbs had 
previously envisaged even in their utopian scheme for a socialist 
commonwealth of Great Britain. 
This shift was reflected in the Webbs' growing enthusiasm for 
social planning in the'Soviet Union. Enthusiasm for Soviet com- 
munism meant the adoption of the other partner in the alliance that 
Popper argued historicism frequently enters into, namely holism. 
Thus, although they did develop and operationalize a model of social 
study and social change, which assumed active scientific-type inter- 
vention at the level of particular changes, the Webbs also displayed 
some of the features of historicist thinking. Does this invalidate 
their thinking? Popper's criticisms of historicism, directed primarily 
against Mannheim and not so much as mentioning the 1Pebbs, are by no 
means convincing in every respect (see Chapter VI, section 5). 
Popper notwithstanding, historical writing is not confined to the 
description and explanation of particular events; it also includes 
the identification of movements and trends (e. g., industrialism, ur- 
banization, colonization) and a description of their persistence over 
time and their influence (e. g., as imaginative ideas) k. Q1 individuals 
and societies. On the face of it, socialism of the kind described 
by the Webbe might be just such a trend whose future can be in part 
imaginatively anticipated, even though, as Popper rightly insists, 
the outcome of future knowledge cannot be predicted, so formal and 
exact prediction of future social trends is ruled out. 
The Webbs encountered no great difficulty in relating interventionism 
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to the broad historical movement of socialism, as they perceived it. 
But when they stated or implied, that Fabianism is inevitable or that 
gradualism is inevitable (instead of merely desirable and likely) then 
they certainly exceeded the warrant they held by virtue of their de- 
tailed researches into social movements and trends. Any claim they might 
have made to imaginative foresight in the 1890s seems to have been cut 
short by their adoption, in the 1930x, of a cultural model which pro- 
ceeded on other assumptions than permeation, gradualness, constitutional 
change and democratic consent. The irony of this is that, by about 1930, 
the Webb-Fabian programme of the 1890a had, at least in certain respects, 
been realized in legislation and institutional reform. 
1.3 Specific failures-of-capitalist civilization 
We have seen that in their work as historians and social critics 
the Webbs judged capitalist culture a failure overall,, despite its many 
achievements. Their recommendations for specific institutional changes 
implied many particular tailings, in terms of efficiency criteria in- 
ternal to capitalism itself and in terms of socialist values. How- 
ever, although what emerges from their appraisal is a vigorous con- 
demnation of the social, cultural and political- order of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there is little of the 
sense of crisis and impending doom which characterizes many of the 
reconatructionist writers. At least until they wrote on Soviet 
Communism they saw reform not so much a survival and salvage opera- 
tion for a society at the point of disaster, as a steady continuation 
of the "Common Rule" of Shaftesbury and other Victorian reformers who 
worked for legislation guaranteeing minimum conditions of employment, 
health, education, and so on. That this continuing reform was still 
needed, in the Webbs' estimation, was shown by Sidney's analysis of 
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conditions of labor throughout Queen Victoria's reign. In 1897, 
he said, the percentage of those falling below a "prescribed mini- 
mum" in the various departments of life was less than in 1837. 
But the total number falling below this minimum would be as high 
in 18`97 if not higher than the number in 1837: 
"The depth of the poverty is as great as it can 
ever have been, its actual breadth even is as great 
or greater; the residuum of 1837 remains, indeed, 
undiminished on our hands and our consciences. " (41) 
This may be contrasted with the optimism of many of his con- 
temporaries and it finds an echo in the "discovery" in the Britain 
of the nineteen-sixties of large pools of impoverishment. From 
their detailed chroniolings, the Webbs concluded that reform had 
been inadequate: in legislation, in the co-operative movement, 
in charity and benevolence, in the infrastructure of planning and 
administration both central and local, arid in the evolving party 
political system. But instead of concluding from this that the 
evolving methods and procedures of reform were inadequate to the 
task, like the later J. S. Mill, they proposed reform through con- 
stitutional democracy instead of adopting the more violent and 
utopian solution of most other socialist theories. 
The condition of society and of culture as it is described in 
the Webbst historical and analytical works is one of large-scale 
destitution, accompanied "b3' a sort of moral malaria and spiritual 
degradation among the destitute themselves and by a distinct lowering 
of the moral purposes of the whole community. " (42) Destitution 
they described as a preventable disease of society, characterized 
by the impairment of health and vitality and jeopardizing life itself. 
Its cure involves not only environmental change (e. g., public housing, 
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health services, unemployment insurance) but teaching the poor 
"how to live" (43). This implies both a standard or norm of 
"decency" and a develOped and inatitutionalized technology of 
learning which they feel it was part of the Fabian mission to 
provide. 
In their major indictment of capitalism, The Decay of Capi- 
talist Civilization, the Webba identified four specific "evils 
of capitalism". In addition to poverty, these were inequality 
of income, disparity of personal freedom ("the worst circumstances 
of capitalism") and failure to maximize production (44). They 
granted that in England until about 1850 capitalism "delivered the 
goods" by creating a "highly efficient machinery of ever-increasing 
production" (45). 
However, the period of initial success, for which they adduced 
no Marxian inevitable, evolutionary causes, had given way, in their 
judgment, to a condition of society whose failures had come to out- 
weigh its successes. These failures they judged-according to the 
utilitarian criteria of maximization of personal well being as defined 
through material indices. The Decay of Capitalist Civilization, coup- 
led with their earlier books The Prevention of Destitution`, constitutes 
a comprehensive indictment of the material conditions of society. 
Liberalism and laissez-faire had produced the specific failings men- 
tioned above, together with a chaos of uncoordinated, selfish, indi- 
vidual endeavors at advancement. The resulting environment of com- 
petitiveness, inequality, squalor and disorder stultified both the 
development of man as an individual whose rights they defined in the 
"national minimum" and of society as a potentially self-organizing, 
coherent community. 
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But of culture in the sense of the arts, of contemplative 
intellectual purauite, and of the texture of emotional life and 
feeling, the Webbs had practically nothing to say. Thus the 
crisis of capitalism was not, on the face of it at any rate, a 
crisis in the spiritual, emotional and moral spheres - the kind 
of breakdown used, for example by Wells, Mannheim, and Rugg as a 
basis for proposing drastic social changes. 
Perhaps this should be qualified a little, since in his con- 
tribution to Fabian Essays Sidney outlined a profound transforma- 
tion in nineteenth century England: the disintegration of an older 
cultural synthesis, succeeded by revolt and anarchy, which in turn 
was giving ground to an emerging new cultural synthesis. But, al- 
though this was a crisis in the cultural order, it was, typically, 
a gradual affair, unlike Marx's business cycle crisis, or the crises 
postulated by Mannheim and the experimentalists (see Chapter VI, 
section 1.4, and Chapter VII, section 3). 
The moral malaise that the Webbs associated with destitution 
was real enough, but their interest in it was not so much moral or 
psychological as behavioristic and institutional. That is to say, 
they gave meaning and substance to the disease by itemizing its 
symptoms in ill-health, neglect of children, -sweated 
labor, and the 
various other conditions for whose alleviation they devised the prac- 
tical content of a "national mini=um". Their solutions were in con- 
siderable part intended to achieve a degree of social hygiene and 
order (46). 
A lack of imagination and foresight shows here, as no thought 
was given to the wider cultural implications of the various changes 
they proposed. We must then ask whether the diagnosis itself was 
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adequate: perhaps a more searching appraisal of the quality of 
life of, all classes in society, not merely the "deprived", might 
have shown both that there were valuable qualities which the pri- 
marily administrative solution of the "national minimum" might 
vanquish, and that there were attributes of-the life or those above 
the "minimum" which were not so valuable. -These are problems in 
material progress which have become more prominent since the Webbe' 
time (47). 
That the diagnosis of the evilaand the problems of the, society 
of their own times was partial and limited was, itself a consequence 
of the piecemeal, empirical method the Webbs adopted in most of their 
earlier writings., In place of holistic social prophecy and indis- 
criminate diagnosis, they attempted to identify particular, remediable 
problems and deficiencies. Thus, the Fabians have the satisfaction 
of being able to &im that their level, of diagnosis has enabled reform 
programmes to be undertaken,, and to some extent assessed. Furthermore, 
the method of social analysis used by the %ebbs yielded data and incor- 
porated judgments whose value many social historians have since acknow- 
ledged. This is not to say their diagnosis was adequate even for 
their own purposes, but, simply that it has had substantial operational 
utility for scholars and administrative reformers alike. In this, 
it is unique amongst the reconstructionist forays into culture diagnosis. 
2. The Webb Programme of Social Reform and Culture Renewal 
For some twenty years from the middle of the eighties, the Fabian 
leaders were successful, in their own utilitarian and pragmatic terms, 
in bringing influential people and groups to their way of thinking. 
After the first decade of the twentieth century their impact was felt 
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increasingly through the emerging Labour Party. Sidney Webb 
turned from permeation of the Liberals to policy-making for 
Labour, and subsequently attained cabinet rank in the first 
Labour administration. 
But the early practical achievements of the Fabians, whether 
working through Liberal intellectuals or with Labour trade unionists, 
give only a partial indication of their ideas about the proposed 
new social order and the manner of bringing it into being. Two 
of the books written jointly by Sidney and Beatrice Webb show clearly 
enough the sort of society they appreciated most. One is a charac- 
teristic study of a social system, into which they inject a systematic 
arrangement of value judgments, criticism and praise. This is the 
book that appeared in 1935 as 'Soviet Communism -A New Civilization?, 
and then, when doubts had been resolved, as Soviet Communism -a New 
Civilization (1937). In their concluding remarks to the second edi- 
tion of this massive study, undertaken when both were more than eighty 
years old, the Webbs wrote with marked admiration of the transformation 
of Russia into the new civilization under communism. Despite doubts 
over its enforcement of orthodoxy (e. g., the purges of 1936 and 1937 
and opposition to its expansionist foreign policy) they valued highly 
both the community ethic of communism and the Soviet adoption of long- 
term planning. As we have seen, they had already indicted the capitalist 
civilization of the West. The Webbs were by no means alone amongst 
leading Fabians in finding other systems more attractive. On both 
economic and moral grounds, Shaw, always a close associate of the 
Webbs, chose communism in preference to capitalism. Shaw had, however, 
less distance to travel than the Webba for he had always been a severe 
critic of liberal democracy (48). Wells, for a time an active Fabian, 
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was less favorably impressed with available systems. Us would 
have Britain part of a world state, where co-operation and sharing 
were to be combined with the enlightened rule of a strain of super- 
men. R. H. Tawney, a second generation Fabian, proposed egalitarian 
co-operation on basically Christian lines as a superior moral alter- 
native to acquisitive capitalism (49). 
The other Webb book which reveals that after the first world war 
they were no longer satisfied merely to tinker slowly and carefully 
with institutions, is the political-tract, mA Constititution 
for the 
Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain (1920). This blueprint for 
systematic and radical engineering shows-that neither empirical re- 
search into past and present social life1 nor a: warm sympathy for the 
Russian experiment in social planning, was considered more important 
than an overall reconstruction of life~in'Britain. 
Social reconstruction on the grand scale-wag no mere occasional 
concern of the Fabianso but came to be in the early decadesýof the 
twentieth century a pervasive characteristic of the work of their most 
productive thinkers. Thus some revision is required of the common, 
view of Fabianism as "gas and water" socialism and of the Vebbs as 
social reformers lacking interest in largo scale social engineering 
(50). This view may have been given wide currency as a result of 
Wells' clash with the Webbs and ths,. revenge he took in The New Machiavelli. 
In this semi-biographical novel, he attacked the Webbs' socialist common- 
wealth as a managerial bureaucracy, a naive, insufficient and merely 
formal answer to the social problem. Wells found their ideas lacking 
in the breadth, comprehensiveness, imaginative vigor andrperfeeted 
emotional and spiritual life with which he amply endowed his own 
utopias. Of course, Wells was referring to the earlier period of 
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Fabianism, ' before the appearance of the Webbsl more ambitious 
schemes for socialist reconstruction of Britain and the world. 
An examination of the Webbst work on Soviet Communism shows 
that in their old age they lacked nothing by comparison with Wells 
in their enthusiasm for a new human mentality, produced in the 
course of a total transformation of a social and cultural system. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the ebbs closely related this 
transformation of man to the Soviet programme of institutional 
change. Thus they commended Leninism for finding social insti- 
tutions both the most potent way of shaping man and, a typical 
Webb view, the most easily transformed of all elements in culture. 
The Webbs had no taste for describing the transformed conditions of 
life, in the projected Socialist commonwealth of Britain, in emo- 
tional, aesthetic, religious and spiritual termst hence Margaret 
Cole's criticism of The Socialist Commonwealth as a bureaucratic, 
managerial proposal which overlooked the human problem of social 
change (51). More surprising than this was their failure, in this 
book; to analyse the means for effecting and consolidating the tran- 
sition to the projected socialist commonwealth. In discussing their 
educational policies, we shall see that they failed to relate edu- 
cational ideas to social change and thus missed the opportunity to 
explore in depth the role of the school in the projected move toward 
a socialist society. Whether this reflects canniness in relation 
to problems of indoctrination and an astute judgment of the potential 
of teachers to act as culture change agents is again a question we shall 
postpone to Chapters XI and XIII. Whatever the reasons, the Webbs 
failed to consider the question of the instrumental agency of the 
schools or of any other set of major social institutions in discussing 
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the kind of society they would like to achieve., Thus we have a very 
un-Fabian hiatus between the society of the future, whose outlines 
they sketched, and the society of their own day and the recent past, 
whose main features and' deficiencies they had expounded in great 
detail. 
There is no single work of the Webbs or of any other of their 
Fabian contemporaries in which their scheme for a future society is 
set out. From their writings over a period of some fifty years 
it is possible to piece-together an account of the major features 
of this society. Despite the Webb enthusiasm for a planned, 
organically inter-related society, consistency and coherence are 
not evident in their culture map of-the future. What emerges 
will be examined under five headings, each comprising, if not quite 
a set of opposite positions, then a range of ideas whose reconailis- 
tion and integration would be a mXumental task of sympathetic syn- 
thesis. Those who have commented on Fabian "organicism" do not 
seem to have noticed that at most this remained an aspiration (52). 
The topics I shall discuss are: 
1. Centralized and decentralized institutions and 
decisions in a planned society. 
2. The national minimum. 
3. Managerial democracy. 
4. Gradualism and revolutionary communism. 
5. Internationalism and the Socialist Commonwealth 
of Great Britain. 
'2.1 Central and decentralized institutions in a'planned society 
We have already seen something of the hostility the Webbs felt 
towards the lack of social organization and political planning in 
Victorian and Edwardian England. In The Constitution for the Socialist 
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Commonwealth of Great Britain they implicitly accepted that capitalism 
had "broken down". The process of reconstruction should include the 
democratization of industry, for which they presented a more detailed 
case in their historical study, Industrial Democracy. They argued, in 
The Socialist Commonwealth, for a full apparatus of central, regional and 
local (municipal) planning, directed to achieve organized communities of 
consumers (built on the foundations provided by the nineteenth century 
co-operative movement); of producers (built on similar foundations pro- 
vided by trade unions and professional associations); the creation of 
new national parliamentary institutions; limited nationalization; re- 
formed local government; and educational reorganization. In The Socialist 
Commonwealth and elsewhere the 'ebbs tried to develop a system of planning 
in which authority would not be centralized, but widely diffused. They 
had no confidence in the superiority of centralized institutions in re- 
gard to innovativeness or administration, and in any case were worried 
about the possibility of hierarchical and autocratic relationships de- 
veloping (53). 
The Webbs' proposalii_i for the reform of parliament included the 
introduction of a functional basis of representation. ldan's functional 
self, on this argumept, is no less important in a representative political 
system than his geographical self. This idea, which is comparable to 
Durkheim's argument for the primacy of the division of labor in deter- 
mining social roles, expectations and, indeed, social selfhood, has not 
of course been incorporated into our political system. Possibly the 
practice of appointing life peers on the basis of specialized achieve- 
ment is an exception. In general, it might be argued that the Webb 
programme anticipated in broad outline the bureaucratic-welfare state 
of the poet World War II period. Despite this assimilation of many 
ý 
- 135 - 
of their reform proposals, the Webb blueprint was static in the sense 
that social forces, operating'and interacting in society were scarcely 
identified, nor did they examine the problem of the tensions existing 
among them. This is strange, since a distinctive feature of their 
research had been the genetic method (see Note . 10). They assumed, 
as, indeed, did most of the reconstruotionists, that there is an iden- 
tifiable general will or common good of-the community which sectional 
interest groups, once they are brought to perceive it, will accept 
as a criterion for all their activities (54). Similarly, they re- 
duced problems of the moral basis of change to the crude utilitarian 
formula of identifying that which is "most advantageous" (55). Yet 
even, as between central and-local planning and organizing bodies, as 
Sidney's experience at the Technical Education Board might have sug- 
gested to him, there is ample scope for disagreement and tension. 
Furthermore, not even all relevant experts are agreed on the criteria 
for establishing the "most advantageous" administrative solutions. We 
may find evidence for this by comparing the qualitatively different 
driteria of benefit within the "cost-benefit" approach. 
It seemn that a set of criteria in addition to those outlined in 
The Socialist Commonwealth is needed to assess the value of the parti- 
cular proposals the Webbs made in that book. Also, since no sources 
of social energy are proposed, other than the interests of the social 
sub-groups of consumers#, producers, representatives, etc., in the "general 
good", something seems to be needed to get the socialist commonwealth 
moving, and to keep it active once moving. Disinterested experts and 
a rational utilitarian populace are assumed to provide all the energy 
needed. Even if "the general good" were an acceptable criterion, some 
means of gaining adherence to it - for example, educating people to its 
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acceptance - is needed, The dtebbe had an amazing confidence in the 
capacity and the desixe of intersst groups to reconcile their dif- 
ferences, a kind of consensus by the mutual agreement of rational 
men to conform their beliefs for the sake ofýaction. I shall re- 
turn to this point in Chapter VIII, when I discuss the proposal by 
the later experimentalists to reform society through the method of 
practical judgment. The 'Tebbe shared with these latter theorists 
a bland optimism about the universal adoption of communal decision- 
taking. In practice, this may very well have reduced itself to 
experts deploying strategic skills in group situations to secure 
the adoption of their own policies, a very different outcome from 
the intended democratic sharing of-responsibility'and diffusion of 
authority. 
2,2 The national minimum 
Some of the criteria by which qualitative change in people's lives 
might be assessed were provided by the infilling the Fabians gave to 
the concept of a national minimum. We have already considered this 
in outline, particularly with reference to the alleviation of desti- 
tution. In greater detail, a national minimum is a standard in social 
affairs comparable in some respects to a standard measures like the 
yard or the pound weight. Though perhaps vague and arbitrary in its 
early approximations, its exact size comes to be determined by experts, 
and all appropriate measures throughout the country are made to corres- 
pond more or less exactly to its specifications. However, at least 
in a reformed-capitalist or partially collectivist society, the national 
minimum defines a standard below which wages, for instance, or years of 
schooling, may not fall. An upper limit äormally is not sets perhaps 
the nearest Fabian equivalent to an unvarying national standard is the 
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idea of equality of income, as argued by Shaw 
(56). The two impor- 
tant conc(pts expressed in the thesis of a national minimum are: a 
lower limit of conditions of life is set by experts and enforced by 
community sanctions; and, it is a national standard that is set, 
applying equally to rich and poor areas, to privileged and under- 
privileged alike. 
The expression "a national minimum", occurs frequently in the 
Webbs' polemical writings, and, according to Lord Beveridge, "the 
conception of a national minimum of income, health, housing, leisure, 
education", is the Webbs' most important single contribution to English 
thought (57). Beatrice Webb, commenting on her investigation of 
sweated labor in the eighties, made a useful distinction between the 
great mid-Victorian empirical pursuit of parts of a national minimum 
and the ideal that she and Sidney and other Fabians came to pursues 
"It seemed to me that unless 'the capitalist system' 
was to destroy the body and soul of great masses of the 
wage-earners, it was imperative that 'free competition' 
should be controlled, not exceptionally or spasmodically, 
but universally, so as to ensure to every one a prescribed 
National Minim= of Civilized Life. This, in fact, was 
the meaning that Factory Acts, Public Education, Public 
Health and Trade Unionism had been empirically and imper- 
fectly expressing. " (58) 
For a comprehensive outline of the Fabian policy of a national 
minimum, the writings of the Webbs need to be supplemented by the 
Fabian Tracts from 1864 onwards, and by the "community-saving" edu- 
cational thought and work of the peripheral Fabians, Margaret and 
Rachel McMillan, whose main interdst was the restoration of life through 
child nurture (59). In the 1889 publication, Fabian Essays, Shaw, 
Webb, William Clarke, Sydney Olivier, `Wallas and others, laid various 
specific foundations for socialism. They argued schematically for 
the reorganization of society, in the interests of certain minimal 
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principles. In the Fabian Tracts, the concrete 
details of the 
minimum conditions of life were worked over. Specific 
demands 
included the abolition of poverty, the eight-hour day, improved 
standards of public health, a legal minimum wage, the abolition 
of child labor, the endowment of motherhood, a national medical 
service, free school meals for the needy, minimum conditions of 
housing, a national physiological minimum and a set of a andards 
of educational provision. In 1901, Sidney Webb thoudht that an 
organized campaign for the formulation and enforcement of national 
standards of the conditions of life was something for which the 
country was ripe. This readiness, he said, was related to the 
decline of Liberalism and arose from the discovery of a category 
which Liberalism could not assimilate: 
"We have become aware, almost in a flash, that we 
are not merely individuals, but members of a community, 
nay, citizens of the world ... Hence the ordinary elec- 
tor, be he workman or manufacturer, shopkeeper or mer- 
chant, has lost his interest in individual 'rights' or 
abstract 'equality', political or religious. " (60) 
A national Minimum, then, Was the basic policy for foreseeable 
reform espoused by the Fabians. -Collectivism of a special sort was 
the method proposed for achieving and enforcing a national minimum, 
and it was regarded as the way of political life most suited to a well 
ordered democracy. In supporting collectivism as a better way of life 
than individualistic, competitive business and laissez-faire relations 
between government and citizens, the Fabians found themselves on the 
side of history and within the general spirit of democracy - an appro- 
priate place for evolutionary democrats: 
"In all directions and throughout the whole civilized 
world, we may distinguish as the dominant characteristic of 
the social movements of the past three-quarters of a century, 
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an ever growing elaboration of organised common action. " (61) 
and 
"A large part of the impulse of this collective organi- 
sation, whether in Trade Unionism, or co-operation, factory 
legislation, or municipal developments, has come from that 
desire for popular self-government which is the spirit of 
democracy. " (62) 
In this passage, collective organization, the aspiration towards 
minimum conditions, and popular democracy are fused into a platform 
from which the Fabians proposed to guide the future. But, while the 
definition of a national minimum proiided some substance for a society 
of the future, it by no means resolved the question of securing equa- 
lity, which some of the Fabian, notably Shaw, and, later, Tawney, 
regarded as a necessary foundation of socialism. A national minimum, 
of itself, does nothing to remove disparities between rich and poor, 
since no formal limits are proposed for controlling levels of reward 
above the minimum. Nor are the participatory aspirations of popular 
democracy satisfied through the definition, by experts, of minimum 
conditions of life. It is a constant dilemma of reformers who es- 
pouse both particular changes and the principle of popular consent 
to show how the one relates to the others if particular changes are 
proposed by x without procuring the assent of as b and o, then only 
one plank of his platform has been achieved; if x merely tells us 
that he will seek the assent of a, b and o for any proposal, then 
his criteria becomes merely whatever the populace wants, and problems 
of how the populace knows what it wants, and the relationships of these 
wants to one another and to needs are neglected. For the Fabian, 
there appeared to be no dilemmas the national minimum, and the over- 
all structure of society, were to be as he defined them, and, presumably 
through the rationalist principle of universal assent to reasonable 
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proposals, popular assent would be given to these proposals as a 
matter of course (and time and "education"). 
This may seem a harsh-conclusion to reach in a discussion of 
two benevolent, energetie reformers who have played a decisive part 
in devising means for the creation of the modern welfare state. 
That-it is not an unfair: - ono t in relation to their theory,; may 'be 
granted if one considers more directly their proposals for a "mana- 
gerial" democracy. 
2.3 Managerial democracy 
Fabianism, as the Webbs developed and practised it, was a tran- 
sition reform theory intended to achieve an amelioration of present 
social conditions. The transition from capitalism, ultimately to 
communism, was to be effected gradually and peaceably. It was the 
movement itself more than determinate outcomes that interested the 
Fabians, and their educational proposals were almost uniformly re- 
lated to the mixed economy period of transition. Nineteenth century 
liberalism was to be transformed into a twentieth century movement 
emphasizing man's social relations and respondibilities, -collective 
ownership in place of private property, democratic control of production 
and distribution through co-operatives, universal participation by 
the ordinary citizen in political life, and a new kind of education, 
properly organized as a national system and directed towards the social 
and collective aspects of life. r 
But Fabianism itself continued to evolve, perhaps from the need 
to adapt both to the starkness of life in the thirties and to the 
awareness that "gradualism" was not-working quickly enough. In dis- 
cussing Soviet Communism we saw how, by the nineteen-thirties, a more 
revolutionary outlook was tending to overshadow the earlier optimistic 
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belief that the gradual evolution of British society would create 
the conditions in which "Fabius" could strike 
(63)" Shaw's 1908 
criticism of the revolutionary "romantic amateurs", and his defence 
of the evolutionary process, may bq contrasted with his Preface to 
the 1930 edition of Fabian Essays, where he urged the need for some- 
thing more drastic, purposive, and perhaps cataclysmic than what 
had been foreseen in 18d9t 
"Tne Fabian Society finds itself confronted with a 
task not contemplated in these essays. It must devise 
new instruments of government, designed, not to check 
governmental activity and neutralize the royal prerogative 
like our present instruments, but to organize and make 
effective the sovereignty of the community, and limit the 
usurped prerogative of private plutocratic interests. 
Until this is done all talk of reaching Socialism along 
constitutional paths is idle. The present paths simply 
do not lead there ... 
"Under such circumstances our old Plan of Campaign 
for Labour, which has now been carried out only to land 
us in a no-thoroughfare, must be replaced by a new plan 
for the political reconstitution of British society, 
eligible also as model for the reconstitution of all modern 
societies. " (64) 
The Socialist Commonwealth notwithstanding, no such plan was ever 
produced, although by inference from their enthusiasm for the Soviet 
reforms the 4ebbe may be thought to have suggested the directions 
the plan might take. Whether achieved by the evolutionary mechanisms 
of gradual adaptations of existing inatitutionst or by. some more 
d*cisive revolutionary means (violence was never envisaged, nor was 
any worked-out alternative to graduation ever offered), collectivist 
action remained in Fabian thought an uneasy blend of democratic par- 
ticipation by the masses and government by experts. Who should have 
ultimate power is difficult to determine, but the attention the Webbe 
gave to the detailed role of the expert, together with the relative 
negleot of problems and procedures of mass participation in policy- 
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making, suggests that dominance by expert elites of managers, 
planners and policy makers would be extremely difficult to avoid. 
The homogeneity of these elites was postulated, presumably on the 
model of the Fabian Society itself, which, on the whole, managed 
to avoid the splintering characteristic of socialist movements. 
Problems of power, the demarcation of authority, and hierarchies 
of relationship amongst elites, were also passed over. This the 
Webbs were able to do because they had only a limited appreciation 
of sub-culture diversity amongst elites. Whatever the origins and 
specific responsibilities of elite members, all would come to adopt 
Fabian rationalism, like working class children boing successfully 
absorbed into a Public School. 
It would be a mistake to restrict a discussion of Fabian ideas 
on democracy to institutional reform. Democracy meant both direct 
participation by the masses in their own government through co- 
operatives and other participatory institutions. There are in the 
Webbst writings occasional passages alluding to the enlar;; ement of 
personality that could be expected from the assumption by the ordinary 
man of responsibility and self direction. It was by no means merely 
a well organized society which they wished to build. Their concept 
of collectivization referred to the personal value of common action, 
and their enthusiasm for Soviet communism arose partly from the op- 
portunities which they believed that system to be providing for 
individual growth. Sidney Webb wrote of the enlightened and enlarged 
exercise of indirect soveroigntys 
"All students of society who are abreast of their time, 
Socialists as well as Individualists, realize that important 
organic changes can only be democratic and thus acceptable 
to a majority of the people and prepared for in the minds of 
all; gradual, and thus causing no dislocation, however rapid 
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may be the rate of progress; not regarded as immoral 
by the mass of the people and thus not subjectively 
demoralizing to then; and in this couhtry at any rate, 
constitutional and peaceful. " (65) 
Despite their recognition of factors in democracy other than 
the elites dispensing justice, ensuring equality and promoting free, 
inquiry, the Webbs tended to organize decision-taking through centres 
of professionally trained experts. Although these centres were not 
to be concentrated but diffused throughout society, they were to be 
united in a virtual acceptance of the Fabian culture of rationality. 
The apparent diffusion and variety of decision-taking procedures dis- 
guised a sameness of outlook which in mazy respects resembles the Refor- 
mation "church spiritual". Institutional diffusion according to 
this doctrine is quite consistent with a fundamental uniformity of 
outlook and action. The Webb elevation of expert roles has been 
accompanied by a mistrust of the ordinary man. Shaw expressed his die- 
taste for "mobocracy" and, while he would not limit the franchise for 
an assembly of critics, questioners, and proposers, he would sharply 
limit it when the choice of an assembly of legislators had to be 
made (66). Similarly, Beatrice Webb exalted the expert, displaying 
at the same time the sort of sentiment for which she was pilloried 
by Wells (a woman lacking in "muliebrity" - "her soul was bony, and 
at the base of her was a vanity gaunt and greedy" (67)): 
"We have little faith in the 'average sensual man', we do not believe that he can do much more than describe his 
grievances, we do not think that he can prescribe the re- 
medies ... "e wish to introduce into politics the profes- 
sional expert - to extend the sphere of government by add- ix4,, to its enormous advantages of wholesale and compulsory 
management, the advantage of the most skilled entrepreneur. " (68) 
The Webbs tried to reconcile elitist and mass elements in the social 
democracy of the future. In The Socialist Commonwealth they endeavored 
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to unite the maximum utilization of expert knowledge with a repre- 
sentative democracy, inwhich popular sovereity would be effec- 
tively exercised, directly as well as indirectly. They intended 
that collectivism should combine the efficiency values. of govern- 
ment by the most carefully prepared and selected experts, with 
the person-developing values-of active popular sovereignty. AAgain, 
the Webba thought that this conception was being successfully demon- 
strated in doviet Russia in, the thirties, although the important 
role they foresaw for standing committees in their proposed social 
parliament was a far remove from the passive mobilization of tech- 
nical experts under the banner of the five-year plans. Thus, try- 
tug to avoid mobocracy on the one hand, and a caste of philosopher- 
kings on the other hand, some of the leading Fabians found their 
advocacy of a national minimum and collectivism gradually leading 
then; towards a comnnunist solution. The Fabians were- nester, despite 
the sympathies of the `Webbs and Shaw, Uoacow communists. They 
enunciated their or-im version of communism (as William Morris had done 
in News from Nowhere), in preference ý to any binding allegiances with 
existing Communist Parties, national or international. Indeed, both 
from the extreme right and fxomathe extreme left, the Fabians were 
denounced; Pound's attack on Shaw and the Cobbs was no more vitriolic 
than Trotsky's acorn for bourgeois Veformmism (69)0 
It was through education that Britain should see the need for 
a collectivist-democratic or communist society; through education 
that the capacity to make the change should be developed; through 
education that the skills, understanding, and morality appropriate 
to a. transformed society should be cultivated. Yet the Fabians 
failed to produce any body of educational writings at all adequate 
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to this task, Perhaps because of this failure they seem to have 
missed an important educational distinction -a distinction which 
they did nevertheless acknowledge in their social-political thought. 
There appears in their work to be no recognition of the-differences 
between the changes needed for the partial, piecemeal reform of 
education in the "gradualist" stage of the mixed economy, and the 
more rigorous, systematic, and profound changes needed to produce 
the communist society and to make it function. I shall refer to 
this distinction again in later chapters where I discuss the con- 
cept of education as an autonomous cultural enterprise and contrast 
the subservience of education to other ends; for example, in totali- 
tarian societies. 
2.4 Gradualism and revolutionary communism 
What the Vebbs and Shaw saw in communism was a fuller and more 
systematic development of the various planks of their welfereism: 
freedom from exploitation, reduction of class differences, universal 
improvement in social conditions, freedom of personal expression, and 
so on. Furthermore, the Webbe welcomed the massive organization and 
direction of resources to help achieve policy objectives, the full scope 
apparently provided for their own blend of social inquiry and practical 
expertise, and, in more global terms, the definite concrete expression 
of new social, economic, political and moral goals, designed to achieve 
Lenin's "new Soviet man". Their account of the Soviet system was not 
uncritical but it was, on the whole, sympathetic, even enthusiastic, 
as, in Soviet Communism, they moved gradually from reporting to approving. 
They foresaw neither the ruthlessness with which these objectives came 
to be pursued, nor the inefficiency, nor the threat to the very objec- 
tives of impartial justice, tolerance and free, critical inquiry which 
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they themselves espoused. 
Despite their insistence on British, not Moscow, roads to 
collectivization, there remains some uncertainty about both the 
extent to which the Webbe proposed to take collectivization and 
the possibility of their willingness to sacrifice the principles 
of tolerance, free inquiry and criticism, in the supposed interests 
of a comprehensive and stable new social order. Reference to the 
divergent interpretations by two thinkers who knew them well brings 
out the ambiguity. First, Russells 
"Both of them'[Webbs) were fundarAentally undemocratioi 
and regarded it as the function of a statesman to bamboozle 
or terrorize the populace. " (70) 
Second, Taernoys 
"The conventional portrait of the pair as bureaucratic 
energumens, conspiring to submit every human activity to 
the centralized control of an omni-oompetent State, is a 
caricature, which the subjects chosen for their researches 
should be sufficient to refute. " (71) 
Russell, later in the same essay, moderated his criticisms and 
conceded that the Webbs had made a significant contribution to the 
Labour movement, and thereby strengthened democracy. While there is 
no evidence in their writings of any intention to terrorize the popu- 
lace, as we have seen there are elements which it would be difficult 
to reconcile with the workings of a critical democracy. Nor does 
the fact that they wrote on the activities of unions and co-operatives 
prevent the Webbs from appearing to be'obsessed in later life with the 
possibilities of central control of planning, as in the case of Soviet 
communism. Their contributions to social theory are, on these points, 
inconclusive and uncertain, containing many unresolved difficulties of 
inter-relationship of ideas, institution and movements in a society 
which they hoped to see moving towards a type of communistic structure. 
- 147 - 
2.5 Internationalism and the socialist commonwealth 
The '#Webba were not guided, as were Wells and Russell, by the 
imaginative prospect of a harmonious and unified world society. 
Rather, they. prooeeded from criticism of the consequences of 
individualism for the collective well-being of society to the 
idea of progressively wider forms of organization. These wider 
forms of organization included unions, co-operatives, professional 
associations, local government, and a division of powers at the 
centre into two parliaments% one concerned with international 
relations, and the other with the internal workings of society. 
Beyond their belief that a reconstituted British socialist 
commonwealth was part of a world-wide evolutionary movement and 
could serve as a kind of model for other societies, there is little 
in the Webbs' writings to suggest a distinctive internationalist out- 
look, except for the qudlified imperialism, adopted by the Fabian 
Society at the time of the Boer War. Qualified, in that government 
policies of the day were criticized (72), but imperialism in that the 
Fabians came out in support of a mission of the civilized to the 
uncivilized world. This is consistent with Shaw's idea of socialist 
Britain showing the world "the way". It also echoes the historicist 
belief in a necessary pattern of social evolution which is inter- 
preted as meaning that those nations (e. g., Britain) which are, as- 
it were, on the side of history, are entitled, if not destined, to 
bring order to those nations (the Boers) which appear to be moving 
in a "false" direction. Halevy has argued that Fabianism reflects 
the influence of the Prussian model of the European nation state 
achieving progress through science, militarism, industrial reform 
and state welfareism and benevolently imposing the standards in 
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the world at large. In discussing Wells, ye shall return to this 
argument. While the Webbs were troubled by the disintegration of 
liberal society, and Sidney worked very closely with the German- 
educated R. B. Haldane on the reform of the constitution of London 
University, there are enough contrary tendöncies toýshow that these 
ßermanic influences were Very partial, (73). 
Against the imperialist interpretation, is the Webbs' subsequent 
criticism of the workings of European imperialism, the commitment of 
the society during the first world war to some form of international 
government, and the participation of many of the leading Fabians in 
internationalist socialist activities in the post-war period. Fur- 
thermore, in 1923, Sidney wrote a Fabian Tract calling for greater 
emphasis, through history and economics, on education for international 
understanding in the schools and universities of ape (74). 
The Fabian proposals retained overall a very definite national, and 
even a parochial, character. This in part is the "want of visthn. " for 
which Wells criticized the Society. Until they wrote Soviet Communism, 
the Webbs were almost exclusively preoccupied with issues of internal 
politics and social reform, and this despite Sidney's period in office 
in 1929-1931 as Dominion and Colonial Minister and as Secretary of 
State for Colonies. The culture whose reconstruction they envisaged 
and participated in was British and, to a limited extent, European. 
The post-war reconstruction outlined in 1917 in the Labour Party 
document, of which Sidney was the joint author, was primarily domestic 
(75). They offered no plans or blueprints for the creation of an 
international comity. 
This interpretation is again at variance with those which attempt 
to treat the Webbs as "social organicists". A full-blown organicism 
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would include a theory of international social and political re- 
lationships far more elaborately developed than the Webbe' Boer 
War views on imperialism, their later enthusiasm for Soviet com- 
munism, and their membership of an extremely diverse, ill-organized 
international socialist community. Thus Letwin's effort to encap- 
sulate the ciebbs as social organicista fails in suggesting they had 
even the outlines of a worked out theory of world governttent. 
Their "holism", such as it was, accepted national boundaries in a 
way that separated the Webbs from most other reconstructionists. 
It lends support to an interpretation which emphasizes the mixture, 
in their thought, of piecemeal and utopian elements, and, incidentally, 
it suggests that Popper's division of social theoriett into one or 
other of these categories needs to be revised. 
CHAPTER V 
UTOPIAN AND SCIENTIFIC RATIONALISM: WELLS AND RUSSELL 
The Webbs and the Fabian Society contributed substantially to 
the development of the social sciences, through their advocacy and 
practice of the empirical study of social institutions and movements. 
Their involvement with the London Technical Education Board, the London 
School of Economics and London University resulted in a considerable 
strengthening of the institutional framework within which social in- 
quiry could expand. However, neither Sidney nor Beatrice Yfebb, nor 
the majority of the leading Fabians, was scientifically educated. 
For them, learning the techniques of empirical inquiry was largely 
a matter of brief apprenticeship in social research (e. g., for Beatrice, 
in the Booth tradition of social surveys, and for Sidney, in the civil 
service) together with on-the-job self help. Their philosophical 
ancestry lay in the empirical tradition of Locks, Bentham, James Mill, 
and John Stuart Mill. It was primarily through their interpretation 
of this tradition, supplemented by their absorption of the genetic 
approaches of Darwin and Spencer, that they acquired their confidence 
in the social utility of science. For them, science was not merely 
a tradition of thought, an outlook and a methodology; it was a 
comprehensive ideology, as Newtonianismºhad been to the enlightenment. 
Beatrice's separation of "ends" (non-scientific) and "means" (scientific) 
did not prevent her from subscribing to naturalistic doctrines which ef- 
feotively assimila$ed questions of value and purpose to that pattern of 
technical solutions which she and Sidney devised for society's problems. 
The Webbs and other leading Fabians thus adopted a scientific ideology 
without having much direct knowledge or experience of any of the sciences. 
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For Wells and Russells the. one, scientifically and the other 
mathematically trained, social azid cultural. problems appeared in 
a rather different light. They conceived their intellectual mis- 
sion to mean that society should be suffused with the experimental- 
rational outlook developed with=auch vigor and success in western 
thought since the seventeenth century.. - Significantly, they both 
found the Fabian approaches unduly bureaucratic, unimaginative, 
and insufficiently conducive to free, independent activity by 
creative individuals. - .. 
Neither Wells nor Russell was. a primitive scientific utopian, 
confident in the eighteenth century style that the mathematicizing 
of knowledge and the application of scientific methods would serve 
to resolve all serious intellectual and aooial-problems. On-, the 
contrary, they both, had grave doubts about the impact of science 
on society, Russell in later life more so than ; Fells. But they' 
both believed with passionate conviction that what is needed in 
society is the institutionalizing of scientific thought on a scale 
far beyond what had ever been contemplated except by a handful of. 
enthusiasts. Both envisaged reconstructed pocial-and cultural 
systems in which a scientifically grounded. education would play 
major'creative and sustaining parts. 
Their styles of thought and expression were, however, very 
different. Wells was the-great organizer and synthesizer of masses 
of data, historical, sociological, economic and biological; the 
vigorous contriver of numerous ideal societies; and, the troubled, 
emotive, introspective Critic of the bourgeois society of which he 
was himself a product. Russell was much more analytical but still 
interested in synthesis; a sceptical critic of utopias; and a 
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distressed but always elegantly clear interpreter of intellectual, 
political and social culture which he judged from the vantage point 
of his intellectual eminence and his aristocratic background. 
The writings and achievements of both Wella and Russell are 
profuse and varied and many of them fall outside the scope of this 
study: Russell's mathematical philosophy, logic and epistemology; 
Wells' work in literature, popular science and history. These are 
of course the contributions for which they are no well known. How- 
ever, I shall on the whole confine my discussion to their ideas on 
social change and the reconstruction of culture through education. 
1. Wells 
1.1 Culture diamosis: bourgeois man and society in a -period 
of crisis 
Wells came from a respectable, working class family which struggled 
unsuccessfully to maintain the status of shopkeepers. After some 
initial false-starts, well documented in several of his own novels 
and frankly appraised in his Experiment in Autobiography, he became 
a pupil-teacher and gained a scholarship to South Kensington School 
of Science, where, as a student of biological sciences, he came under 
T. H. Huxley's influence (1). He abandoned his family culture and 
aspired to membership of scientific and literary circles, where he 
gained success through journalism and the scientific romances that 
made him world famous. His assessments of British culture contain 
a great deal of his own experience and the sense of squalid meanness 
and wasted opportunity he felt in reflecting on this experience. 
Thus, his writings incorporate the shortcomings, as he had experienced 
them, of urban and semi-urban bourgeois life. He largely ignored 
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both the very poor and the very rich, and even the traditional 
intellectual elites, except to condemn their educational insti- 
tutions, the Public Schools and Oxford and Cambridge. 
Wells was a very alert and sensitive commentator on domes- 
tic cultural and social affairs for the first forty , rears of the 
twentieth century. His active interests extended also to current 
international movements in politica, the sciences and social thought. 
His cultural analyses thereby encompassed a very wide range`of sub- 
jeots, and his - ideas' evolved and changed-during this time. Instead 
of attempting to make a detailed appräiaal of the evolution, of his 
thought, I shall identify a few of his main ideas and, where it-seems 
important to do so, indicate significant developments'and changes 
in bis thought. ' 
Wells was primarily a , hostile critic of contemporary culture 
And of political, economic and aocial, institutions, and an advocate 
of wholesale change. - He was'not interested in making Fabian-type 
detailed appraisals of the-development of different institutions and 
their-impact on individuals and groups. Instead, he painted broad 
pictures with major evils' strongly., highlighted. He saw Western 
society, in the main, as an unstable systems disorderly, muddled, 
disunited, a chaos of, rel&tionships expressing personal ambition, 
greed and competitiveness. Unlike the more composed and cautious 
Fabian Tract writers, Wella could seldom contain his impatience with 
existing institutions long enough t_o. give a clear and detailed so- 
count of them, His large popular adult education treatises, The 
Outline of Historsr, The Science of Life and The Outline of Man's 
Work and Wealth, are exceptional in this respect. In writing these, 
he had the polemical intention of identifying mankind's achievements 
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and mistakes in order to incite his fellow citizens 
to build on 
the achievement and eradicate the mistakes. Wells' paper on 
"Locomotion and administration", read to the Fabian Society in 
1902, shows his impatience with Fabian details. He spent little 
time on the history and functioning of administrative units of : 
local government (a typically Webb quest), but quickly denounced 
both capitalist and communistic answers to property questions, and 
propounded his own scheme for relating the size of municipal units 
to forms of transportation then available and likely to develop 
in the future (2). What he emphasized in this paper was not, how- 
ever, the technocratic ideal of adjusting man to the machine, but 
the idea of scale -a scale "appropriate" to modern conditions and 
%ranacending both transportation systems and municipal units. With 
this idea of scale, he subsequently criticized the parochialism of 
the Fabian Society, and "scale" became of central importance in his 
scheme for total social reorganization. He dismissed piecemeal re- 
form as inadequate tinkering with problems whose depth and range 
demanded the reordering of the totality of cultural experience 
and institutions throughout the world. 
In the early 1900s, Wells began to turn from the'science fic- 
tion romances with which he first achieved a popular reputation to 
utopian speculation. He also curbed the doubts about technical 
progress and the beneficent consequences of social and physical 
science which he expressed in The Time Machine, The Invisible Man 
and The First Men on the Moon. However, so far from advocating a 
machine-orientated civilization, he embarked more ambitiously on 
imaginative outlines of future societies in which machine technology 
was firmly subordinated to intellectual and artistic ends. As well 
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as projecting future social states emerging from some drastic upset 
of or impingement upon the regular features of the scientific uni- 
verse, like "the hour of the green vapours" In the Days of the Comet, 
he embarked upon social prophecy by extrapolating selected trends. 
This he undertook in Anticipations (1901), where he projected the 
trends of technological civilization, growth'of land transport and 
traffic chaos, megalopilaes, emergence of a new technician class, 
middle-class opulence, the permissive society and war. Looking 
back on these predictions, although they were governed by no clear 
theoretical principle, we can appreciate their boldness, imaginative- 
ness and accuracy. On the other hand, Wells showed a boyish sense 
of adventure in anticipating the massing of armies in the coming war. - 
This shows that side of hie character which delighted in technical and 
strategic possibilities with scant regard for the-wider consequences. 
It was this that repelled- Huxley, who embarked on Brave New World as 
a parody of Wells$ Men LikeýGoda (3). 
In the second part of Anticipations, Wells entered upon the occu- 
pation in which he became almost obsessively interested for the rest 
of his lifer not merely outlining possibilities but plotting the 
Structure and relationships of the desired society of-the future. 
The obsessive quality of this interest is shown by. the'repetition, 
in one utopian romance after another, of roughly. the same set of 
proposals. These proposals were, on the whole, predic0ed on the 
failings he diagnosed-'in his own civilization. Most basic was a quasi- 
religious notion of order which Wells contrasted with the confusion and 
disorder he found all about him. Wells looked upon the search for 
order as a modern religious quest which would in time result in a new 
scientific-moral creed replacing both the old intellectual styles and 
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customary morality. In this, we-may see the germs of one of the 
major themes of the whole reconstructionist school of thought. 
At first Wells gave only highly generalized accouhts of cul- 
tural disorder. Thus, in 1906, in Socialism and the Family, he 
defined socialism ass 
"a large, and slowly elaborating conception of a sane 
and organized state and moral culture to replace our 
present chaotic gray of living ... " 
(4) 
and as: 
"something more than an empty criticism of our contem- 
porary disorder and waste of life, it is a great inti- 
mation of construction, organization, science and edu- 
cation. " (5) 
He presented a more concrete account of this "disorder" in In the Days 
of the Comet, -where the emphasis on preventable shortcomings antici- 
pates the Webbs' The Prevention of Destitution (1911). The utopia 
which followed on the passage of the comet eliminated at one blow all 
the old confusions: the disorder, disease, pain, harshness, stupidity 
and cruelty of social life; the dishonesty, ignorance, obscurity, 
conventionality of customary thought and religion; the furtive, de- 
fiant, and angular qualities of sceptical and critical reasoning; the 
strikes, lockouts and unorganized production of economic life, and 
the general institutional malaise of life in industrial Britain: 
"How higgledy-piggledy. was the whole of that jumble 
of mines and homes, collieries and potbanks, railway yards, 
canals, schools, forges and blast furnaces, churches, cha- 
pels, allotment hovels, a vast irregular agglomeration of 
ugly smoking accidents in which men lived as happy as frogs in a dustbin. Each thing jostled and daaaagdd', the 
other things about it ... Humanity choked amidst its pro- ducts, and all its energy went in increasing its die- 
order ... " (6) 
He took no aesthetic pleasure in the particularity of phenomena nor in 
unexpected juxtaposition. It was the total effect which offended and 
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irritated his passion for control, regularity and predictability, 
and stimulated his enthusiasm for the Fabian criterion of a defen- 
sible minimum, of civilized living 
(7). 
In Tono Bongay (1909), Wells criticized the possibilities for 
exploitation and commercial trickery which he thought to be characteristic 
of a: free enterprise system. The commercial success story of the patent- 
medicine racketeer, Edward Ponderevo, is complicated by the quest for 
order, clarity and rationality which his nephew George, the narrator, 
is pursuing while at the same time participating in the patent-medicine 
racket. This ambiguous or double life is perhaps intended by Wells 
to express the plight of the reformer in society: the Puritan prob- 
lem of being in but not of the world. 
The strength of capitalist institutions and their resistance to 
change was a theme Hells had developed in New Worlds for Old (1908). 
He rejected the "administrative socialism" of the Fabians as a workable 
alternative, whilst accepting the Fabian emphasis on minimum standards. 
Fabianism he felt to be lacking a theory of change adequate to meet 
the resistance and power of entrenched institutions. "Gas and water" 
socialism was, in the words of William Clissold, no coming tide but 
"just a few Fabians piddling under a locked door" (8). This may 
have been of no consequence, except that for Wells any possibility of 
Fabian success raised the spectre of a bureaucracy no less entrenched 
than the old institutions. Thus the disorder Wells struggled to 
describe was not quite the kind which the Fabians documented. At 
least, it was not susceptible to the same treatment even though, like 
the Webbe, he linked science and socialism, arguing that in both the 
fundamental principle was that of order: science seeking to impose 
an order of knowledge, and socialism criticizing and developing "a 
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general plan of social life" (9). 
The New Machiavelli (1911) is a novel of social and educational 
criticism and reform in which Wells disclaimed any autobiographical 
intent (and thus provided himself with a convenient escape route 
for any criticism of the substance of-the proposals his characters 
made). Once again, he attempted to found his'case for socialism 
on the shortcomings of contemporary culture. This tim., he pre 
seated only fragments of-criticisms' 
"A world full of restricted and undisciplined people, 
overtaken by power, by possessions and great new 
freedom, and unable to make any civilised use of 
them whatever" (10). 
Individualism under capitalism meant, not each enlightened individual 
truly and tolerantly pursuing his interests, but "a crowd of separated, 
undisciplined people all obstinately and ignorantly doing things jar- 
ringly, each one in his own way" (11). Crowds reminded Wells of, the 
power of agglomerated irrationality; the mob was to be replaced by 
an orderly community and many of Wells' proposals'for collectivization, 
political union and a world state reflected his determination, to°be rid 
of "bourgeois man", individually and in his more dangerous condition 
as a member of the mob. Wells contrasted'with, the chaos of individual, 
competitive, aggressive aspirations a highly organized scheme for se- 
leoting and training an elite of decisive, determined social leaders. 
This solution, as we shall seep brought him into-close alignment with 
the Webb cult of the expert, even though, in The New Machiavelli, in 
the characters of Oscar and Altiora Bailey he savagely satirized the 
managerial bureaucracy of Sidney and Beatrice Webb (12). 
The advent of the First World War, the ensuing disruption of 
political, economic and social life in many European countries, and 
I 
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the vain attempt to achieve a measure of supra-national sovereignty 
through the League of`Nationa, provided Wells with ample material 
to sustain his case for the decline of'European civilization into 
disorder and even chaos. In Mr. Britling (1916), which Wells him- 
self described as "a chronicle of contemporary`thought and feeling" 
(13), ho berated the British government for failing adequately to 
organize the war effort. More profoundly, in the character of Mr. 
Britling, he portrayed the state of mind of England at the outset 
of war: parochial, neglectful of European affairs, ignorant of the 
causes of international tensions, committed to a false confidence in 
the balancing mechanisms of international relations, Mr. Britling 
was, at that stage, an optimistic, rather muddled British liberal. 
This disorder of mind, according to Wells, sprang from lazy, unexamined 
beliefs and the distortions imposed by a negligent society: a false 
consciousness. It was the consciousness not of an isolated individual 
but of the ruling classes. Wells in most of his polemical works 
looked to education to eliminate this false consciousness. But in 
Mr. BritlinR the drama of events dictated other solutions. It was 
war itself which shattered the illusions, and Mr. Britling, in the 
early stages of the war, reflected "that it is only through such 
crises as these that the world can reconstruct itself" (14). In 
the course of the novel, Mr. Britling is brought to a realization 
of his inadequacies, and adopts an outlook characterized by deter- 
mination, dedication to clear ends and to organizational efficiency, 
not altogether unlike that of the German socialists of the time (15). 
Outside the novel, other means are available. It was a firm belief 
of Wells' that it is not war and other crises but the instrumentalities 
of popular, mass education that should bring about the sorely needed 
-160- 
awakening. 
In the pedagogical romance, Joan and Peter (1918), Wells re- 
turned to one of the themes of Tono Bungay: disorder was primarily 
a commercial and economic phenomenon, or, more broadly, an attribute 
of the laissez-faire system, in which the "captains of industry" each 
sat in his own works "and ran them for profit without caring a rap 
where the whole system was going" (16). Imperialism, in the eyes 
of the central figure, Oswald, had been reduced from the ideal of 
Britain acting as "working guardian" of the world, to "a scheme for 
world exploitation in the interests of Birmingham ... the most 
atrocious swamping of real issues by private interests that it was 
possible to conceive" (17). 
As in The New Machiavelli, it in very difficult in Joan and 
Peter to determine how far Wells himself accepted the "new tory" 
outlook of elitism and regenerated imperialism. his position, as 
we shall see, was less equivocal in the post-war utopian romances, 
Men Like Gods (1923), The (1924), and in his late essays in 
world Brain (1938). Ilowever, in The World of William Clissold (1926), 
a meandering, psychological study which Wells, unconvincingly, dis- 
claimed was in any way autobiographical, doubts about his own posi- 
tion again arise. Against a hazy background of European society 
in decline and confusion, William Clissold ruminates on his experience 
and proclaims the need for a structure of beliefs and institutions 
developed and operated by the kind of intellectual elite proposed in 
The New Machiavelli and Joan and Peter. Social efficiency criteria 
were given definite priority over democratic considerations (18). 
The most comprehensive of Wells' later diagnoses of culture 
were "Men Like Gods and The Dream. In both, a detailed contrast 
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is drawn between the ideal worlds of the future and the wretched 
muddle of present conditions. These conditions were summed up 
as an "Age of Confusion" from which, after prolonged ware and 
economic crises, mankind ultimately escaped. Confusion was a 
composite consisting of the adventurousness and risk-taking of 
private venture capitalism and competition; increasingly violent 
and destructive wars; organized religion; centralized, authori- 
tarian government; environmental ugliness and inefficiency; 
jealous, possessive relationships, and narrow petty private lives. 
The Dream is perhaps Wells' most graphic and imaginative critique 
of the life-denying environment of late-Victorian England. Its 
details are reminiscent of Shaw's criticism in plays like firs. 
Warren's Profession, Widowers' Houses and The Doctor's Dilemma (19). 
Wells eondE. mndd, the uncertainty, wretchedness and poverty of the 
petty-bourgeoisie; the selfish, decaying land-owners, the pheasant- 
shobtinng gentry; "universal ramshackle insecurity" ... "want, anxiety, 
and illness ill-tended and misunderstood"; "essentially a world of 
muddle-headed sophisticated children, blind to the universal catas- 
trophe of the top-heavy and Collapsing civilization in which they 
played their partd'(20). Wells caught the detail of the poverty of 
life in a perfect piece of criticism. We are in utopia, and one 
member of a small party questions the narrator, the dreamer who hair 
been recounting his dream of life of the distant pasts 
"Uhat's a hearth-rug? " asked Firefly suddenly. "What 
sort of thing was your hearth-rug? " 
"Like nothing on earth to-day. A hearth-rug was a 
sort of rug you put in front of a coal-fire, next to the 
fender, which prevented the ashes creeping into the room. 
This one my father had made out of old Clothes, trousers 
and suchlike things, bits of flannel and bits of coarse 
sacking, cut-into strips and sewn together. He had made 
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it in the winter evenings as he sat by the fireside# 
sewing industriously. " 
"Had it any sort of pattern? " 
"None. ""(21) 
Wells was a most prolific writer and his culture critique 
embraoed many different themes. We have seen that a recurrent 
criticism was the lack of order and pattern in individual lives 
and social structure. Despite many repetitive attempts, Wells 
never reduced this criticism to a set of definite and coherent 
ideas. He was profoundly dissatisfied with almost all aspects of 
contemporary cultures 
as the lack of order and unity in culture; 
b. the selfishness, inefficiency, injustices and 
authoritarianism of capitalism; 
Co the cycle of War and depression; 
d. social class divisions and uncriticized, class- 
orientated assumptions of inferiority and superiority; 
as the theology and institutional apparatus of established 
religion; 
f. conventions of authority and freedom in family life, 
especially their restrictive effect upon women; 
g. the lag between the progress of scientific knowledge, 
and morality and social organization; 
h. 'the uglinessg drabness and muddle of urban settlement; 
and i. the timid, prejudiced, insular, fettered, fearful, anxious, 
uncreative and irrational lives forced by circumstances 
on most people, irrespective of social class (22). 
From such a wide-ranging critique, it is difficult to extract a 
few leading ideas which might provide a basis for a practical reform 
programme. We should, however, note three major features of this 
criticism. First, Wells$ basic objection to bourgeois society was 
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not so much its failure to equalize opportunities as the unfairness 
of the traps it prepared for potentially vigorous and creative indi- 
viduals. Many of his most vivid passages are those in which he de- 
picts some unfortunate victim of a morally, intellectually and emo- 
tionally restricted environment struggling to achieve personal free- 
dom and a wider vision. Second, Wells subscribed, as none of the 
Fabians did, to a "crisis" theory of social change. According to 
this view, the destructive forces, as he saw them, of international 
competition, of warfare, and of general muddle would lead in a rela- 
tively short time to a total breakdown of the social system'unless 
radically checked by the adoption of alternative social and'educa- 
tional models. Third, unlike most of the American reconstruotionists, 
Wells did not claim the crisis was itself in large part a consequence 
of the institutionalizing of science. Rather, it seemed as if the 
problems of civilization arose primarily in industrial, social and 
personal relations - which science undoubtedly affected, but not so 
much as to have transformed them. It was man's natural aggressive- 
ness and unreasonableness, his selfishness and stupidity and ignorance 
that had brought him to the verge of total social collapse. Although 
Wells provided no theoretical explanation of this aggression and ir- 
rationality, he built up a social-psychological model whose inputs con- 
sist broadly of unregenerate human nature and the institutions and 
values of industrial capitalism. The outputs are virtually identical 
with the inputs, except that, by some unexplained good fortune, a few 
Courageous and clear-sighted individuals survive the turmoil and up- 
roar of the system. It was to them that Wells looked for the initiative 
and skill needed to break the cyclic processes of the system. 
The difference between Wells and the American reconstructioniets 
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who were his contemporaries was much lese marked in their common 
confidence in the future possibilities of scientific control of 
society, and the capacity of education to remove the sources of 
trouble. But, starting with a much more dismal view of man's 
nature and his social heritage than did the Americans, Wells had 
to propose much more drastic, rar-reaching proposals if this unoon-, 
genial material, man, were ever to be civilized. In thin respect, 
he was much more akin, to Shaw than ' to the ? (ebbs, since Shaw, too, 
outspokenly mistrusted the common man and human nature in its raw state. 
However, despite his occasional use of the language of racial evolution, 
Wells did not share Shaw's view that a new stage in evolution would have 
to be achieved before any real progress could occur (23). 
1.2 Proposals for the future of culture and society 
It might seem surprising that a writer of Welle' pessimism should 
continue until very late in his life believing in the possibility of 
utopian social reform. He was by no means a complete environmental 
determinist since he posited both biological and spiritual deter- 
minants of growth. He presented his own life experiences, and those 
of many of the characters in-his novels, in terms of a spark of indi- 
vidual energy, or a kernel of freedom, which could grow into something 
quite different from anything its cultural origins might suggest (24). 
Furthermore, he regarded setbacks to reform as a stimulus to further 
effort, not as an indication of the hopelessness 9f idealism. In 
The Undying Eire (1917) the hero, a Job figure with many resemblances 
to Sanderson, the headmaster of-Oundle, whom Wells greatly admired, 
suffered the most fearful adversities. But he used them as a spur. 
to formulating his own moral and educational credo and never lost 
hope. 
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Wells is known both as a science fiction and social novelist 
and as a creator of utopias. ` Russell, although by no means con- 
vinced of the virtues of utopian existence on the Wells'model or of 
the solidity of many of his proposals, respected hie'role as "a 
liberator of thought and imagination". He was'attracted to Wells' 
utopianism because it initiated a thoughtful response, avoided super- 
stition, and embraced a belief in the merits of scientific method. 
He would also have supported Wells' criticism of that type of wind 
which looks ahead blankly, and readily submits to existing constraints, 
whether they be legal, moral'or social. " However, Wellst equation 
of the modern, abundant, constructive scientific mind with Wellsian- 
type prophecy is something to which Russell was less attracted (25). 
From these more general features of Wells' utopianism, we turn 
to some of the more specific features. I shall discuss six of theses 
1. Science and rationality. 
2. Interpersonal relations and collectivization. 
3. Elitism and democracy. 
4. Creativity and the pursuit of beauty. 
5. The "new man". 
6. Social and cultural dynamics,. including socialism as 
a means of achieving utopia. 
1.2.1 Science and rationality 
In every utopian scheme that Vlells produced, comprehensive theore- 
tical science is presented as the core of the conceptual thinking of the 
utopians. Science is also their chief source of intellectual satis- 
faction; it is the chief engine of organized community life, in the 
form of technologyr; and it serves as a great spiritual harmonizer (26). 
The ideal societies are neither science fiction teohnooracies, in a 
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state of restless subservience to machinery, nor machine-reactionary 
pastoral enclaves, like Butler's Erewhon, or Fourier's communes, which 
were based on fear and rejection of the machine. But they display 
some of the qualities of each. The utopias are pastoral and quietistic 
in the sense that material life is extremely simple and unpretentious: 
landscapes of great beauty are conjured up, providing an appropriate 
setting for the scattered, small-scale, communities in which the 
utopians live and work. Despite his attacks on Owen and Owenism, 
Wells' papt-industrial, rational utopias bear many resemblances to 
the schemes of Owen and his followers for communities of scientifically- 
minded rationalists set in rural landscapes (27). Wells' ideal commu- 
nities are machine-using, in that labor is virtually eliminated and 
machines, as instruments of research, are indispensable for the ad- 
vancement of knowledge. This quest for knowledge introduces a funda- 
mental intellectual restlessness which Wells tries, not very success- 
fully, to harmonize with spiritual serenity and rationalistic resig- 
nation to as yet uncontrolled biological funationin, gs. 
Science was of interest to Wells not only in his utopian schemes 
but in many other ways as well. He attempted to document its achieve- 
ments in his popularization of biology and in his Outline of Man's Work 
and Wealth, and he adopted the hopeful and now banal Baconianiom which 
sees science as a servant carrying no inconveniences in its trains 
"The plain message physical science has for the world 
at lar6e is this, that were our political and social and 
moral devices only as well contrived to their ends as a linotype machine, an antiseptic operating plant, or an 
electric tram-car, there need now at the present moment 
be no appreciable toil in the world and only the smallest 
fraction of the pain, the fear, and the anxiety that now make 
human life so doubtful in its value. There in more than 
enough for everyone alive. Science stands, a competent 
servant, behind her wrangling, underbred masters, holding 
out resources, devices and remedies they are too stupid to use" (28). 
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Surprising as it may seem, Wells did not suppose that progress 
lies in the indiscriminate application of scientific procedures to 
social and moral problems. Nor did he subscribe to the mythology 
of science as exact and certain knowledge. His training in biology 
gage him a more historical and interpretative outlook, and led him 
to view science as a way of thinking which might be related to 
social and historical modes of thought. Anticipating Popper's inter- 
pretation, he described Darwinism as a historical method which dealt, 
not with universal regularities, but with the conditions governing 
the emergence on earth of unique units, entities and activities 
(29). 
Thus it was the undogmatic, hypothetical, experimental, critical acti- 
vity of scientific thinking in its manifest variety of forms which 
he most valued and which he wished to relate to all spheres of social 
action, although not to the exclusion of other categories of experience 
and knowledge - e. g., history, literature, and other forms of aesthetic 
awareness (30). Wells' greater openness to new experience, and his 
search for meaning in human history, and especially in religion and 
spiritual life, may be contrasted with the more rigid and materialistic 
forms which much popular scientific thinking, following Spencer, took 
in'the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (31). 
On the wider uses and applications of scientific thinking, Wells' 
views are similar to those of, the American experimentalists, except 
for his stress on the validity of religious thinking. Just as he 
shared with them the merits of the open-minded and flexible approach 
to scientific thought, so he shared with them an optimism which at 
times is naive, and a confusion of scientific with other forms of 
judgment. Thus, he placed his faith in a scientific education and 
thereby underestimated the difficulty of using self-conscious, critical 
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procedures for cutting through customs, traditions and established 
institutions which serve existing interests. Further, he failed 
to sustain a distinction between descriptive and evaluative judg- 
ments. This led him at times to assimilate all domains of human 
inquiry and action to a vague and undifferentiated scientific cul- 
ture, his concern for the vitality of other forms of experience 
notwithstanding. 
Science, for wells, was not simply the total of the sciences, 
their procedures and traditional but a way of life, a culture, a 
perspective and a net of dispositions integrally related with 
socialism, which it was the task of educational institutions to 
develop and sustain, an their principal contribution to the re- 
habilitation of the social order (32). His conviction that science 
as a way of life represented the best hope for humanity was thus 
inextricably bound together with his socialist ideals. At times 
he saw clearly that a scientific culture was only part of the wider 
world he was seeking, but there are many instances of the confusions 
to which I referred in the preceding paragraph. The reductionist view 
of human experience which they represent is one of the strands in re- 
constructionist thinking which we have already observed in the Tebbe 
and which is very obvious in the American experimentalist movement. 
Comte may have been criticized but his influence remained strong. 
1.2.2 Collectivization and interpersonal relations 
For all his dislike of her "bureaucratic socialism", Wells shared 
Beatrice 'ebb's fear of mobs and masses and her wish to curb their in- 
fluence. We shall see that Mannheim, after experiencing the mass 
political movements in central Europe following the First World War, 
felt an even greater alarm at the prospect of undirected mass democracy. 
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Wells attributed to Marx alarge share of the blame for elevating the 
principle of dominance by masses. While he was appreciative of 
Marx's achievements as a social researcher, he was extremely hostile 
to the finished appearance Marxism presented, its lack of administra- 
tive infrastructure, and to the dogmatism of many of its adherents. 
It-was in a critique of Marxism that he developed his misgivings 
about mob rule, ascribing to Marx a cryptic doctrine of "the People" 
(33)0 He had no use for the "historic destiny" of any particular 
class in society (although he shared certain other historicist be- 
liefs with Marxists), least of all for the working class. This was 
the class from which, through great persistence and with the support 
of formal education, he had extracted himself. The working class, so 
far from being a repository of worthwhile culture, whether "organic" 
or "revolutionary", was, he thought, badly organized, illiterate and 
culturally impoverished. Thus, his communitarian ideal in no way 
resembled the doctrine of the international solidarity of the working 
classes, based on their supposed unique perception of social realities 
and inciting them as a class to take-over the apparatus of state power. 
Instead, his eamsunitariani5m consisted of a more organic attempt to 
join all the classes into a classless society. All were to share in 
common symbols, ideals and experiences, and a common medium of communi- 
cation. These were to be provided initially through a common educa- 
tion and other common cultural experiences, particularly those of pri- 
mary-group relationships. But Wells agreed so far with the practical 
Iarxiste as to postpone the idyllic, classless society to a very remote 
future. In the meantime, 'transitional situations call for transitional 
arrangements, including the rise to power of a benevolent elite. Their 
role is to interpret to the masses their beet interest, and to design 
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institutions which will facilitate the eventual emergence of a true 
socialism (34). But, whereas the Marxists developed an explanatory 
framework which purported to show how class society might (indeed, 
must inevitably, according to their theory) eventually become class- 
less society, Wells lacked any single explanatory model and, at dif- 
ferent times, tried various expedients. While this strengthened 
his claims as an investigator of possible future strategies, it cer- 
tainly weakened the political impact of his proposals, and diminished 
their theoretical significance. 
Wells' ideal of eommunitarianism closely resembles Owenism and 
the ideals expressed in Morris' A -Dream of 
John Ball and News from 
No where. The aspirations they share includes the disappearance of 
a servile and exploited class at the bottom; disappearance of dis- 
tinctions and barriers arising from class and property rights; the 
emergence of a common fellowship based on informal, friendly, mutually 
respectful, and equalitarian relationships; a common subscription to 
utilitarian morals; and the absence of the massive centralized insti- 
tutions of the modern State, However, the ideal of fellowship which 
be strove to formulate in First arid Last Things and other of his later 
writings seems to suffer from the same vagueness and mysteriousness which 
Wells found in Marx's doctrine of "the people". Having given up his 
earlier faith in expert managers - recognizing that there could be no 
assurance that they would not degenerate into a freedom-stifling poli- 
tical clique - Wells was left with ideals which were. to inform the total 
life of the community. Since these ideals predicated neither particular 
social groups nor institutions, it is by no means clear that they would 
fare any better than the Fabian tactics of permeation which Wells at- 
tacked as a naive compromise with the existing system (35). 
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As transitional-short torn measures, in New Worlds for Old, 
Wells envisaged the nationalization of major industries and a 
socialization of relations of work such that exploitation would 
be supplanted by avaguely defined benevolence. His proposals 
on these matters lacked the concreteness of the Webbs' ideas for 
Industrial democracy. On the international plane, he campaigned 
ardently for comprehensive supra-national institutions, toward 
which the League of Nations was but a halting first step. How- 
ever, he made both reasoned and satirical attacks on international 
institutions and leaves the reader feeling that not any existing 
institutions but only. something more solid and sincere will do (36). 
His ideas on all of these topics remained extremely general, 
lacking in clarity or in theoretical vigor. For example, he opposed 
Fabian bureaucratization and, as he saw it, their elevation of the 
state as an all-powerful organization of control. Yet he wished to 
see established some kind of supra-sovereign system for eliminating 
war and lessening economic imperialism which would be even less sub- 
ject to chocks and individual intervention. His thought was dominated 
by his abhorrence of the existing pattern of sexual relations, family 
life, economic relations and the aggressive diplomacy which he believed 
characterized interpersonal relationships in his lifetime. For each 
element in the pattern he adduced particular causes which, collectively, 
comprised the "die-order" and "chaos" he condemned, but he could offer 
neither a systematic explanation for these relationships nor a coherent 
set of criteria against which their development might be assessed. 
kevertheless, by presenting in his imaginative accounts of possible 
societies the cutlines at least of new sets of relationships and a 
pervasive oommunitarian ideal, he, made that contribution to imaginative 
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understanding for which Russell praised him. His work serves as 
a reminder to policy makers and administrators that the doctrines 
of "works" and "functional efficiency" need to be supplemented and 
illuminated by less tangible considerations of human kindliness, 
friendship, warmth of relationships, as well as by equality and 
justice. 
1.2.3 Elitism and democracy 
Wells did not share the Whitmanish or Jacksonian enthusiasm 
for the wisdom and virtues of the common man which distinguished 
some of the nineteenth century exponents of the democratic faith, 
and their twentieth century experimentalist followers (37). His 
enthusiasm at various times, for "Open Conspirators", "New 1achiavellians", 
"Samurai" and "Modern Utopians" reveals an eighteenth century hope that 
through a unity of businessmen and intellectuals social perfection 
might be achieved. This hope, which is very marked in The World of 
William Clissold, is only one expression in Wells of a definite strain 
of elitism, which, if it does not contradict, at any rate complicates 
his communitarian ideal of a complete elimination of barriers of class. 
Leaving aside his expectations concerning life in utopia, he did not 
believe a representative, institutionally complex political and indus- 
trial democracy to be a meaningful possibility. Given man's present 
inadequacies, it could only be a sham. The mass of his contemporaries, 
he reflected, were dominated in their thoughts and attitudes by the 
culture of the Northcliffe Preas, and even the intelligentsia was 
mostly backward-looking (38). His energetic, life-long campaign to 
extend and universalize adult education was intended to lift his fellow 
citizens to the condition in which intelligent political behavior became 
a practical possibility: a democracy of discussion, reason and tolerance. 
- 173 - 
To this end, he appealed to a nelf"eonecious elite of intellectuals 
to join him in his work. This rational, classless elite echoes 
Owen and anticipates Seim and Rugg. By inference, the plea 
divides society into a needy mass and a potentially provident elite. 
At ho time did tells give the impression that he thought his own 
society sufficiently well educated and mature to function as a full 
democracy, and even in utopia the elite still had a role as guides 
and leaders and creative innovators., In Anticipations, prophecy 
and prediction merged: Wells foresaw a managerial-technocratic 
take-over, as the educated classes gradually replaced the leadership 
provided by political parties and the well-to-do. However, this 
would be no easy transition, since he foresaw first the outbreak of 
a "passionate national war" precipitated partly by inept political 
leadership, then the stalemate of World War It as great armies, again 
poorly led militarily and politically, ranged against each other, 
then authoritarian, fascist dictatorship and, only after all this, the 
replacement of nation-states by a world state under the overall direc- 
tion of educated technocratic managers (39). ' In his later utopian 
romances, these technocratic managers had been-replaced by wise leaders, 
on very close terms with their fellows, btit able to rise to higher 
levels of understanding when important decisions had to be taken. 
But was not the technocratic proposal the Webb managerial bureau- 
cracy elevated to power on a world scale? Wells, in his 1914 Preface 
to the re-issue of Anticipations, claimed that the samurai of his A 
Modern Utopia had been the product of Webb influence: "The fruit of 
this transitory and never entirely harmonious marriage of minds". 
Recovering, as he claims to have done, from this bureaucratic influence, 
dells wished to eliminate the idea of the "Nov Republic" as a type or 
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class of persons - an elite - and to substitute for it the idea of 
a "power in men's minds and in mankind" (40). This is a kind of 
collective will, or, in Rousseau's terms, it involves merging the 
will of all with the general will. This was undoubtedly Wells' 
aspiration, ae it has been of all utopian socialists, but he was 
frequently obliged to express this vaguely defined "power" in the 
concrete terms of an elite guiding the masses towards perfection. 
Wells was consequently no more successful in grappling with the 
problems of "general will" theory than was Sidney Webb, who like- 
wise had tried to marry the principles of leadership and mass par- 
ticipation through general will mythology. 
Even in his utopian schemes, there was an uneasy alliance of 
forcest world society, in Men Like Gods, was decentralized; there 
appeared to be no great conurbations; and government took the form of 
a "church spiritual" which, by virtue of the universalization of 
rationality and the elimination of vice, rendered legislation, co- 
ercion, and almost every kind of established institution unnecessary. 
Yet there were, nevertheless, in this semi-anarchy, commanding figures 
whom the utopians respected and whose culture was not entirely shared 
by all; they certainly had, a better grasp of the requirements of 
general will than most of their fellow utopians and assumed an ap- 
propriate authority over their fellows. 
Even in his utopias, Wells did not take sufficiently seriously 
the problem of creating comnmuiitarian democracy, on largely anarchist 
lines, out of a civilization in which elitism, in the form of class 
stratification, as he himself admitted, has been endemic throughout 
history. It is not sufficient to advocate; what is also required 
is an analysis of resistances and difficulties to be overcome. it 
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is one of'the most'obvious shortcomings- of Wallet utopianism, as 
perhaps it is of all forms of utopian thought, that he'virtually 
neglected counter-revolutionary'forces. In Men Like Gods the only 
resistance and opposition to utopian policy came from the visiting 
earthlings who, with one, or two exceptions, were portrayed as wretched 
specimens-of the ruling classes of twentieth century Englands arrogant, 
volatile, dogmatically opposed to all that lay before themm upholders 
of traditional religion, of political manoeuvering, and of competitive, 
exploitative capitalist production: The utopians had no difficulty 
in vanquishing them, thus symbolizing their cultural superiority. 
The relative unanimity of the utopians and their purity and firmness 
of purpose were in no way threatened by internal forces. All such 
threats had faded awayi centuries back, in the dark ages which marked 
the transition from earthly to utopian existence. Thus, Wells adopted 
a form of social developmentalism. `According-to this form of optimis- 
tic evolutionism, man in the twentieth century is still bound and 
dominated by his animal and tribal ancestry. ' He is still in his 
impulsive life a member of the ' Freudian primal horde, having'not yet 
submitted to the disciplines of civilization. His aggressiveness, 
jealousy, hatred, irrationality, and competitiveness could only'be 
sloughed off through centuries'of development sparked off, not by' 
the accident 'of a Darwinian mutation, but as a result'of the Lamarokian 
and-Platonic purposiveness and determination of an elite of his species. 
Iii this respect, Wells' ideas about elites and masses were very simi- 
lar to Shawls, 
His neo-Lamarckianism, however, unlike Shaw's, or for that mat- 
ter Freud's, does not appear to have presupposed any mysterious, 
unscientific oonneotions`between genetic material and the psyche. 
- 176 - 
Each generation would have to learn anew the destructive conse- 
quences of undirected impulsive life. Only very gradually could 
the old customs, habits and institutions which nourished the des- 
tractive impulses be replaced by a culture directing the impulsirre 
life into activities like science and the arts (41). 
This gradual progress depends on elites, but, since Wells also 
believed in socialjjustice, equality, fellowship, and the perfecti- 
bility of man, he could not accept that it would be necessary inde- 
finitely for elites to perform these roles. Eventually, responsi- 
bility for community well-being could be widely shared. For Pareto, 
by contrast, elites and their circulation are a condition of social 
movement and there will always be a wide gap between elite and mass 
culture. For Wells, elites are necessary in getting a new system 
going, but can thereafter be more or less absorbed into the culture 
fabric, as the rest of humanity moves up to their level. The elite 
are never, however, fully absorbed, and some utopians, as we have seen, 
are certainly more intelligent and more powerful than others. Em- 
bedded in this communitarian ethic is perhaps an incipient totalitarianism. 
This is a consequence of the fact that, while there are individual dif- 
ferences of intelligence and power, all subscribe to a common ideology: 
there is no real plurality of elites and of cultural purposes. Such 
plurality was a form of "confusion", long since left behind in humanity's 
development. This possibility of a subtle totalitarianism is what has 
alarmed some of Wells' critics who might in other respects appreciate 
his oommunitarian ideals and high standards of cultural attainment. 
Unfortunately, he did not take up this issue, beyond implying that 
disunity meant disorder, a very doubtful assumption even for utopia. 
Wells was contemptuous of the Fabian preoccupation with the limited, 
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specific problem of the transformation era, and of the conservatism 
and ultimate defeat for reform which, he claimed, inevitably resulted 
from the policies of permeating existing institutions. But he had 
nothing comparable toýoffer by way of showing how elite insights 
and judgments could be reconciled with the demands for political 
and culture expression which the masses had been taught to make 
by popular journalism. Nor is it clear how a commons communi- 
tarian culture could be achieved, save by force. Sustaining this 
common culture in a society whose grounding in science at once di- 
vided the scientific researchers and their cultures from the rest 
would also be a much more serious problem than Wells envisaged. 
We shall see, in Chapters X, XI and XIII, that his educational pro- 
posals hardly went so far as even to address themselves to these 
issues. 
1.2.4 Creativity and pursuit of beauty 
"About this time (early twentieth century) appears a 
note of personal distress in Wells' writing. His work is 
filled with a longing for beautiful things, for the lofty 
and noble, a longing all the more poignant as clearly the 
author himself did not believe his dream would ever come 
true. There are only treacherously tempting allusions 
to the beautiful in real life. Beauty is the stuff of 
dreams; in real life it is only a mirage" (42). 
The note of longing for beautiful and noble things certainly 
comes out in Wellet contrast between the squalor, dreariness, ugliness, 
inefficiency and misery-making complications of ordinary domestic life, 
and the splendid vistas, romantic landscapes, light and elegant struc- 
tures and the overall simplicity and purity of relationships in utopia. 
He expressed this longing, too, when reflecting on his own ideas. In 
FirstLast Things he likened his beliefs to a work of art; they 
were not a more "distillation of facts". He interpreted pragmatism to 
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mean that the validity of beliefs was as much a matter of their 
aesthetic qualities as of their workability. They had to satisfy 
his "desire for harmony and beauty" (43). 
Despairing of achieving a socialist society in his own life- 
time, Wells at times consoled himself for the defects of the pre- 
sent world by looking longingly into a glorious, distant future. 
The Webbs, by contrast, limited their visionary outpourings to ro- 
mantioizing Soviet Russia and got down to the business of patching 
up the British social and political system as they found it. Beauty 
was no elusive quality but an outcome of patient reform of ordinary, 
real life institutions. 
Wells did not divide real life and dreams quite in the manner 
suggested by Kagarlitski, who, while sympathetic towards Wells, as 
a Marxist, thought him a dualist and hopelessly utopian. Wells' 
enthusiasm for utopias was an expression of both a religious and an aesthetic 
quest for order and unity, as well as, a reflection of his criticism of 
the muddle and inefficiency of society. But religious and aesthetic, 
considerations also had some part to play in Wells' proposals for on- 
going social and cultural change. Religion, for Wells, was a quest 
for order and collective purpose, a search for meaning through scientific 
reasoning and the construction of ideal communities and a means of express- 
ing faith in humanity. I have already referred to the aesthetic quali- 
ties of order and harmony, embodied in his utopian communities. The 
aesthetic quest, for Wells, was not primarily a matter of literature 
and the fine arts, but an effort to recreate the total human environ- 
ment. Wells regarded this quest as a task for the present, not for 
the distant future. He was interested not only in utopias with the 
contours of an enlarged Owenite or pre-Raphaelite community; but, like 
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Nilliem Morris, he railed against the particular ugliness of con- 
temporary Britain. This railing was intended to awaken his fellow 
citizens to an awareness of environment and to stimulate them into 
a massive effort at tidying-up and re-making. As we shall see, 
it was through education that man was to be brought to an under- 
standing of the possibilities for creating new environments. Wells 
gave little attention to the more-disinterested pursuit of the arts 
or to aesthetic contemplation considered as worthwhile activities 
in their own right. Presumably-Wells would not wish to exclude 
these enterprises, and certainly opportunities for them were not 
precluded by the design of his utopias, but he was much more in- 
terested in the more communitarian and applied form which the 
aesthetic impulse, properly schooled, could take in environmental 
planning. His more prosaic modern equivalent in this respect is 
the landscape architect employed by a road-making authority to re- 
duce-the environmentally destructive effect of a motorway and to 
find ways of enhancing it visually. 
Wells designed his utopias to embody his-: more expansive 
aesthetic ideals, These ideals included providing opportunities 
for many different types of creative activity. It was largely 
because he found contemporary life so cramping and distorting of 
individual expression that he condemned it so vigorously., But, 
in Joan and Peter, he satirized looser forms of "expressionism", 
which lacked criteria of selection and ideas for the direotiou and 
tutoring of impulses in individuals (44). Creativity was for him 
an acquisition or a development of diverse individual capacities 
in a challenging and structured environments it required a sus- 
tained educational regimen. 
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Wells offered no proposals or predictions concerning the par- 
ticular character of art works in utopia any more than he tried to 
forecast the particular achievements of scientific thought. To 
have done no would be to commit the mistake of precluding the very 
freedom and inventiveness he wished to encourage. The most exalted 
creative workers in utopia were not unlettered visionaries and ro- 
mantic critics of the status quo, nor were they artists and poets, 
but the leading research scientists, and the older and wiser members 
of the community who offered guidance on-social policy. The highest 
form of creativity was thus-., equated, as in Plato's Republic, with a 
combination of intellectual maturity and varied experience, within 
some defined mode of inquiry. - It was not a mysterious, capricious 
force, but an accumulative element in both individuals and societies. 
Wells wished to convey the impression of a creative community of 
people who in'many different ways displayed originality, initiative, 
and deep interest in making and re-making, in inventiveness and in 
expressiveness. Indeed, these creative efforts were intended to 
yield new ideas and criteria for the future development of society, 
and so-were of central importance. We should note that Wells in 
his utopias repudiated social realism, however much he may have 
practised it in novels like Kippe and Ann Veronica. So far from 
the arts reflecting or mirroring society, they were expected to 
provide criticisms, and to make suggestions concerning future pos- 
sibilities. This critical and exploratory role reswes Wells' 
utopias from the charge of static and rigid totalitarianism. It 
also strengthens his claim to have pointed to certain forms of edu- 
cation as providing a fundamental cultural dynamic, even though his 
own contributions to elucidating the concept of a critical and creative 
181 
education were never more than fragments. 
1.2.5 The new man 
Much more sharply than the Webbs, Wells portrayed the ideal 
lineaments of the "new man". For the 'ebbs, the "new man" of Soviet 
Communism provided a rough but pretty adequate model. Wells was 
dissatisfied with all existing examples and based-his own composite 
portraits largely on the rejection of man in his present form: "Only 
the most superficial mind would assert nowadays that man is a reason- 
able creature. Man is an unreasonable creature" (45). Since much 
can be inferred from what has been said already, Wellst account of 
the "new man" may be presented quite briefly, and mainly with re- 
ference to his accounts of the "new man" in utopia. 
The "new man" was a god-like creature in utopia, possessing 
attributes, in particular a new awareness, to whichno earthly ana- 
logue, could be found. Hence Wells made no attempt to analyse this 
consciousness in any depth: he merely hinted at it, and described 
feats which implied it staggering increase in intellect and a striking 
subordination of impulse to rationality. Given that the new man was 
to be creative and inventive, -Wells wisely avoided any 'detailed account 
of the psyche that, he hypothesized, would evolve through generations 
of strife followed by further generations of'purified life (46). 
Wells ignored the problem, oreated by the hypothesized subordina- 
tion of impulse to rationality, of explaining how anyone could come, to 
wish or try to be rational, submerging all such difficulties under a 
general characterization of man as pervasively rational. Yet his 
"new man" was by no means a disembodied intellect. He was described 
as having feelings of kindliness, affection and love and enjoying a 
social and communal life. His feelings on the whole seemed to take 
- 182 - 
the form of calculated,.. pleasures, not dominating passions. Despite 
the calculating element, men retained a naturalness and simplicity 
and an overall integrity of personality. Presumably, because the 
calculated pursuit of pleasure was universal And because conscious- 
ness had reached a peak, all were aware of each other's quests, and 
they accepted them as legitimate expressions of personality in no way 
involving deceit, manipulation. or exploitation. 
I have been talking about the "new man" but Wells meant by this 
the "new woman" too., No-inequalities and only minimal differences 
of. function were proposed. Furthermore, the universalizing of the 
concept of the "new man" takes in all cultures: distinctive differences 
of heritage, nationality, creed and custom were absorbed into a single 
world culture, present and future orientated, forgetful of the past 
except as a record of human folly and aberration. A historian's and 
an anthropologist's nightmare? So the eighteenth and. nineteenth cen- 
tury'critics of enlightenment universalism might have supposed. how- 
ever, some of the critics, the early post-enlightenment exponents of 
cultural diversity, were fundamentally much less critical than they 
imagined and there are some interesting parallels between them and 
Wells, as well as some significant differences. 
Fichte, in 1807# set educationalists the task of fashioning "an 
entirely new self" and encouraged them to search out ways of penetrat- 
ing to "the roots, of vital impulses and actions" in all children, not, 
as hitherto, in a'minority only. However, his object was. not the 
Kantian (and Wellsian) ideal of a universal civilization, but the 
much more limited determination to turn military and political defeat 
by Napolenn's armies into a moral and political regeneration of Germany, 
as nation, language and culture - i. e., "the fundamental reconstruction 
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of the nation". Despite his enthusiasm for the pedagogy of 
Pestalozzi, which. has a universal, not merely a national, re- 
ference, it was but a short step from Fichte's regeneration of 
the nation through education to state absolutism (47). The step 
was taken by Regel, the more ferocious critic of the universal 
and democratic ideals of the enlightenment. Thus this effort at 
creating the "new man", which at first appeared as a determination 
to maintain variety and diversity under the guise of national iden- 
tity, lapsed into a system which aspired to monolithic and absolute 
status - the Germanization of the world. 
Another enlightenment critic, Herder, seems in the course of 
one (admittedly voluminous) work to have achieved the feat of ex- 
tolling national cultural diversity and assimilating all progress 
to the single concept of the diffusion of scientific knowledge. 
Early in his Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind 
we find him extolling the diversity and variety of man, his works and 
his culture, and castigating as stupid and Vain those who suppose 
"that all the inhabitants of the World must be European to live hap- 
pily". An idyllic picture is presented of nations blessed by Nature 
with health and well-being, susceptible to improvement in happiness ... 
"that imperturbable joy and tranquillity, which many Europeans admire 
in, ti}e colntenance and lives of foreigners",, However, while at first 
rejecting the doctrines of perfectibility through self-awareness and 
rationality,. and the notion of linear progression, Herder subsequently 
adopted as a norm the rational, liberal ideals of European culture. 
This led him to posit inevitable progress, the uniformity of the laws 
of nature and man, and, through selective treatment of historical evi- 
dence, to "demonstrate" the increase in happiness attributable to 
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cultivating the arts and sciences. Thus a selective historical 
treatment of culture is made to yield a single model of universal 
progress " essentially the European, enlightenment rationalistic 
ideology (48). 
Fichte and Herder demonstrated some of the dangers, as well 
as the inconsistencies, of the effort to sustain national variety 
within a framework of international order. For greater consis- 
tency and hostility to the imposition of universal norms we must 
turn to the poets. The concepts of the new man, and of cultural 
order, as the product of reason, have never been more devastatingly 
attacked than by Blake. Reason, he affirmed, looks back, not for- 
ward, and gives us no grounds for supposing that through its use we 
can-depict the lineaments of ideal, or future, mans "Reason, or 
the ratio of all we have already known, is not the same that it 
shall be when we know more" (49). Nor are harmony and uniformity 
in culture to be desireds "Without Contraries is no progression. 
Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Rate, are 
necessary to human existence" (50). Not only is there no pro- 
gression, but the quest for some single unifying thread in man's 
experience and his cultural world leads to the unleashing of dark 
powers. Blake anticipated some of the modern dystopianas neither 
the individual psyche, nor the communtl world of culture, can submit 
to this kind of order but must rebels 
"I have sought for a joy without pain, 
For a solid without fluctuation. 
Why will you die, 0 Eternala? 
Why live in unquenchable burnings? 
Lot I unfold ter darkness, and on 
This rock place with strong hand the Book 
Of eternal brass, written in my solitude: 
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"Lawa. of peace, of love, of unity, 
Of pity, compassion, forgiveness; 
. 
Let each chuse one habitation, 
His ancient infinite mansion, 
One command, one joy, one desire, 
One curse, one weight, one measure, 
One King, one God, one Law. 
The voice ended: they saw his pale visage 
Emerge from the darkness, his hand 
on the rock of eternity unclasping 
The Book of brass. Rage siez'd the strong, 
Rage, fury, intense indignation, 
In cataracts of fire, blood & gall, 
In whirlwinds of sulphurous smoke, 
And enormous forms of energy, 
All the seven deadly sins of the soul 
In living creations appear'd, 
In the flames of eternal fury. " (51) 
Despite the romantic revolt against "one lau", the crises of twentieth 
century economic and political nationalism and the sense of a lost core 
of socially unifying values have induced a return to the quest for a 
unifying world culture, not, only by utopians but by sociologists and 
anthropologists and many others (52). 
It should be remembered that the time-scale Wells had in mind 
was vast. The difficulties arising out of the meeting of diverse 
culture patterns had, centuries before the achievement of utopia, 
resulted in real enough crises, including universal warfare.. however, 
by implication Wells repudiated the romantic argument. The "flames 
of eternal fury" arise out of die-unity, in his reckoning, and can be 
quenched only in a new, unified cultural order.. This was in fact 
a return to the enlightenment faith and to its mediaeval confidence 
in the socially and spiritually unifying power of a single, trans- 
cending ideology (53)" 
The god-like qualities of the new man, his future-directodness, 
intellectual genius, his creativity, his enlarged consciousness, his 
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social hedonism, his self-conscious management of his emotional 
and bodily life, his mastery of the symbolic system of science 
and language, are none of them the result of a genetic accident. 
Nor, as in Wells' earlier science-fiction writings, are they the 
incredible result of some mysterious-gas, or the passage of s, comet. 
Instead, they are the cumulative effect of educational and socialistic 
policies, gradually built up and strengthened through-centuries of 
effort by an enlightened benevolent minority', the forerunners of 
future civilization. Thus there was to be & , gradual transition, 
from the miserable products of late-Victorian, urban England, through 
the semi-enlightened, half-aware, but still passion-ridden figures 
of whom Wells regarded himself as a sample, to a distant, godlike 
humanity. 
Sustained educational policies became the dynamic of the emerg- 
ing social system and the means for producing the new human race. 
Through education, man frees himself of the cultural legacy of his 
ape-ancestry and achieves "body-liberation". By projecting his new 
maiinto the distant future, Wells attempted to avoid some of the 
obvious criticism of the remarkable transformations of bodily chemistry 
and psychology which underlie the enhancement of conscious, rational 
control of body-mind processes. Wells also tried to avoid the 
criticism that educational means, in the context of a plurality of 
competing influences on human development, are- inadequate. How far, 
then, does his image of a new man satisfy Baissellrs criterion of 
imaginative stimulus to the young? No definite answer can be given 
to this question but, for all the grandeur of his conception, we may 
consider whether shadowy figures in a distant utopia, every one of 
whom is submerged in the obscurity of their author's moralistic treatises 
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and romances, have much chance against the heroes of popular mytho- 
logy: popüar entertainers and the now legendary symbolic figures 
of the revolutionary counter-culture and guerilla movements. 
Ideas, possibilities and problems of great significance for con- 
temporary thought lie deeply imbedded in a voluminous body of Wells' 
writing which'it may be safely guessed is seldom read by the present 
generation of radicals. Yet it may be doubted whether the current 
idols - Marx, Marcuse, Roheim, Goodman, Reich and others - possess 
the fertility of speculative thought whose absence in contemporary 
society the radicals so vehemently condemn (54)- 
1-3 Historicism 
We turn finally to a consideration of the peculiar blend of 
imaginative prophecy and predictive extrapolation of cultural trends 
which provide the foundations for Wells' "futurology". Russell might 
have been referring to Wells when-he wrote; 
"There are two ways of writing about the future, the 
scientific and the Utopian. The scientific way tries to 
discover which is prcbbbles the Utopian way sets out what 
the writer would like" (55). 
Wells practised both ways of writing about the future. Russell, 
even though he criticized the utopian method, in the same essay went on 
to extrapolate trends only to finish up, very much like Wells, advocat- 
ing a single world order as necessary to human social survival. Per- 
haps the two ways are not so easy to separate after all. Popper, at- 
tempted to draw a sharp distinction between piecemeal engineering, which 
is cautious, open-minded, self-critical and limited in its aspirations, 
and holistic utopian engineering, in which the predictor's preferences 
are very marked. His distinction in fact is not cloarcut, but is a 
matter of emphasis and degree (see below, Chapter VII, section 5). 
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Certainly there are differences between those (if there are any) 
who claim to be able to predict the future in detail by positing 
inevitable social development, and those who adopt a more hypo- 
thetical method of predicting particular characteristics of the 
future, using selected current practices and ideas as models. 
Also, there are differences between those who, like the contem- 
porary futurologists, try to calculate what will happen, irres- 
pective of their personal preferences, and those who adopt the pro- 
cedure of wish-fulfilling prophecy. But, amongst reformers who 
wish to influence the future in certain ways, and who believe that 
active intervention is both possible and effective, these differences 
should not be emphasized to the exclusion of similarities. One 
very marked similarity is the tendency to assimilate extrapolated 
trends to desired outcomes. The explanation for this tendency 
lies, not so much in any particular conceptual difficulty in main- 
taining a distinction, but in the motivation of the analyst. Thus, 
neither )arx, nor Russell, nor Wells, nor Orwell nor Huxley wrote 
disinterestedly about the future but used their speculations about 
the future and their interprdations of the past to assess present- 
day society. Futurology in their hands was a form of ideological 
argument, intended to persuade their readers to adopt one course of 
action on another in order to avoid possible future harm and to 
achieve desirable goals. 
Whether, as Popper alleges, this kind of speculative discus- 
sion results in a disease of sociological method depends on the 
interpretative uses that are made of it. I have already argued 
that ideological thinking sets out to encourage people to embark 
upon certain forms of action. Ideology incorporates empirical 
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generalizations which are susceptible, at any rate in principle, 
to testing. Thus the action projected is by no means entirely 
conjectural and speculative. It can and should be informed by 
knowledge. Futurology includes a number of confused propositions, 
subtle and otherwise, blending empirical and normative judgments, 
which can be extracted and analysed. Furthermore, this kind'of 
thinking includes'a large number of evaluative recommendations 
for present and future action, which are susceptible to rational 
analysis and discussion. If these arguments are accepted, then 
the ideological elements in futurology are corrupting of social 
science-only insofar as they are unrecognized and are confused 
with the empirical procedures of social- science. This still 
leaves open the question of whether social sciences can or should 
be "freed" of ideology (56). 
These points aside, Wells claimed that his analysis and, reeom- 
mendations were not intended to contribute to sociological method, 
but were one man's view - i. e., an appreisal'of the world in which 
hQ lived. -' However, he also inextricably linked prophecy with 
scientific research. At times he subscribed to a belief in the 
possibility of a theoretical history and argued that ignorance 
of the future is "curable" (57). He appearedtto mean by prophecy, 
in this context, an art of forecasting involving the extrapolation 
of trends, and personal judgment. Despite his enthusiasm for the 
scientific mentality, there is no evidence that his utopianism makes 
any provision for the testing of his own predictions concerning the 
evolution of human consciousness. Instead, the life of the utopians, 
as we should expect of an ideological theory, merely confirms these 
predictions. Indeed, it is difficult to see how he could have written 
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his utopian romances at all, except as confirmations of selected 
trends, Again, despite his enthusiasm for novelty, and creativity, 
and his many references to the remarkable discoveries of utopian 
science, he believed it possible to forecast trends of social de- 
velopsent, and, on the whole, was a very, though not completely, 
successful practitioner of that art. - Unlike the Webbs, whose 
writings were mostly in the empirical tradition, his method of 
social commentary was schematic and predictive . i. e., he inter- 
preted masses of data according to a grid which was always sug- 
gestive of some desired unity and coherence of human experience. 
Yet the trends he detected and,, by selective manipulation, 
projected into future ideal states for man, resembled the terree- 
tial regularities of the evolutionary laws or principles of biology 
rather than the hypothetical universal regularities of the laws of 
physics. These trends did not ignore initial conditions{ on the 
contrary, their direction and momentum were affected by them, nor 
were they depicted as absolute and irreversible: they were open 
to the unpredictable influence of subsequent human thought and 
lcnbwledge. 
In conclusion, then, we should judge Wells not as an empirical 
analyst of cultures, but a cultural prophet. While he loosely used 
the language of prediction and theoretical history, and was at times 
plainly historicist, he mainly emphasized the uncertainty of the 
future, and the role of future, unknowable knowledge, and the effect 
of contingent factors, like education, on future society. His task, 
as be saw it, was not to predict an inevitable future, but to encourage 
his contemporaries and later generations to strive to create a more 
attractive civilization than the one they had inherited. Thus, to 
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disentangle and to criticize the empirical generalisations and 
the social predictions in Wells' writing would by no means exhaust 
the interest and value of his thought. Rio recommendations for 
present action did not depend upon the validity of his forecasts 
sad predictions, except insofar as the bleak picture he painted 
of a race between education and catastrophe was intended to ohake 
his contemporaries out of complacency and to reverse dangerous 
political and economic policies. Despite a deepening pessimism, 
he retained a belief in the ultimate efficacy of rationality in 
human affairs, and thought through his ova writings to stimulate 
rational discussion, reflection and constructive socio-political 
action. But rationality is not achieved lightly in human ex- 
psri. noo; it can only be acquired through a struggle within the 
self, and within society at large, for the mastery of ancestral 
impulses. It was to the processes of formal and informal educa- 
tion - for all their shortcomings - that Walls looked, therefore, 
as a means of personal and social regneration. Society, in his 
judgment, had to be persuaded by its bent minds that its on our.. 
viva], depended upon the creation of a universal, educated Con- 
sciousneas. 
2. Rttý A,,, _e 
11 
I shall deal much more briefly with Ruscellis ideas than with 
walla'. This does not imply an eccentric assessment of their res- 
pective standing as theorists but rather it refers to the limited 
scope and scale or Ruaeell1s contributions to reeonstructioniat think- 
ing. Indeed, there is some doubt as to whather he subaaribed to 
this position at all. Russell has presented no substantial account 
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of a desirable future state of society. We have to rely mainly 
on essays critical of existing cultural and social trends and re- 
commending particular changes. Doubt about characterizing his 
thought as a reconstruotioniat arises from his criticism of those 
political and social theories which elevated the state or organized 
society and called for the enlargement of social infrastructures 
at the expense of individual liberty. Thus, in Education and the 
Social Orders he distinguished the creativity of the individual from 
the conformity and acquiescence of the citizen. He should have pre- 
ferred the former concept, but admitted the political need to con- 
ceive of people as citizens. This grudging admittance of social 
and political roles runs right through his more popular writings 
(5g)" 
Russell always maintained a place in his thought for the older 
idea of liberty as freedom from social constraints. Nevertheless, 
he was dissatisfied with the more extreme laissez-faire theories 
and worked out a variety of policies for international social reform. 
In Principles of Social Reconstruction he advocated typical recon- 
structioniet reform, and treated education as the principal means 
for effecting the change he sought. With some reservations, then, 
his thought may be regarded as reconstruotionist in the sense in 
which I am using the term (59)" 
In his more popiiar political, social, and ethical writings, 
Russell displayed a remarkable gift for simplification and clarity 
of exposition. This is a refreshing change after the more turgid 
of Wells' romances. But this simplicity and clarity were not at- 
tained without lose of subtlety and complexity of thought. For 
example, Russell's failure ever to reconcile his pleas on the one 
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hand for individual freedom, critical and sceptical thinking and 
hedonism with, on the other, the restraints demanded by his pro- 
posals for single, organized. *orld government. In The Impact of 
Science on Society he specified conditions for a stable scientific 
society which would certainly entail a reduction in the discretionary 
rights of individuals and national governments. These conditions 
are a single world government, to enforce peace; the general dif- 
fusion of prosperity, to forestall envy; a controlled, low birth- 
rate; and the diffusion of centralized power,, to provide for indi- 
vidual initiative (60). Similarly, the conditions which, he argued, 
should be satisfied within states it adequate-standards were to be 
enjoyed by all clearly required a higher degree of political and 
social organization than Russell normally found congenial. For 
example, the maximization of "rational" production, justice in dis- 
tribution of goods, and the achievement of something approximating 
to the Fabian national minimum, all set targets for organized poli- 
tical action which, certainly-, in periods of national difficulty, it has 
proved extremely difficult to reconcile with the liberty, scepticism 
and criticism which Russell valued. In his advocacy of individual 
and collective goals, he gave too little attention td the processes 
of reconciling these values, even though, from his own experience, he 
was very well aware of problems of free thought and speech - for example, 
on questions of sexual morality, religion and patriotism (61). 
2.1 Changeability of-human nature and social institutions 
Russell surveyed hie European contemporaries with a Voltai. rean 
mixture of compassion, cynicism and despair. He hated cruelty, injus- 
tice and intolerance and railed against the irrationalities and pre- 
judices-which he thought characteristic of the semi-educated societies 
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of the west. This is not to say that his own thought, 
for all 
its lucidity, is free of these vices. 
Human nature, was not, in his judgment, incurably evil. He 
accepted that man's impulses are aggressive and selfish, yet be- 
lieved his nature could be modified by better or worse means. He 
referred to anthropological evidence for the variability of human 
behavior and argued that by such means as education, propaganda 
and coercion we may increase variability of behavior, induce belief, 
and so forth. An human nature is not unchangeable, and as war is 
a function of the interaction of men iii society, especially their 
economic relations, the long history of warfare in human society 
is no evidence for its inevitability: 
"If political organization were ouch as to make war 
obviously unprofitable, there is nothing in human nature 
that would compel its occurrence, or make avera6e 
people unhappy because of its not occurring" (62) 
This, of course, does not resolve the problem of explaining how 
political organization comes to be as it is. Russell wrote the 
essay from which this passage comes at a time when he had come 
passionately to believe in the necessity for eliminating war from 
human affairs, if society were to survive at all. He had also, by 
this time, reverted to that type of philosophical empiricism which 
is the foundation of the liberal ideology. This takes the form 
of combining belief in the uncertainty and tentativeness of know- 
ledge with a love of liberty, toleration and opposition to absolu- 
tism. ban's nature does not preclude reform, and through upbringing 
and education, despite all the difficulties, man is ultimately capable 
of rational judgment. 
Although he castigated ideology as the new, dogmatic religion, 
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Russell blended Locksian empirical method with the spirit of demo- 
cracy, to arrive at a position very similar to Dewey's experimen- 
talism: open-minded and tentative with respect to the particular 
outcomes of inquiry, but very firmly committed to scientific forms 
of inquiry and naturalistic explanations. However, unlike 
Dewey, 
Russell wholeheartedly accepted the virtues of - traditional, indi- 
vidualistic liberalism, with the `addition of those social virtues 
taken to be necessary for survival and communal growth in a war- 
ridden, internationally competitive world. Given this liberal 
conviction, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Russell 
was giving an ideological meaning to the term ideology, and ascribing 
to his opponents doctrines whose formal properties were little dif- 
ferent from those of his own doctrines, however different their 
substance may have been (63). 
2.2 Impulse and rationality 
During the first World War Russell had adopted a somewhat 
different approach to the problem of the changeability of human nature 
and its susceptibility to modification. In Principles of Social Re- 
construction (1916), his aim was to suggest a philosophy of politics 
based on Hume's belief that man's lives are more moulded by impulse 
than governed by conscious purpose. At this time, and for some years 
afterwards, he was influenced by popularized Freudian psychology -al- 
though, characteristically, he gave this an optimistic turn and cer- 
tainly did not adopt Freud's conclusion about the degree of personal 
inhibition required for the survival of civilization (64). 
Russell divided impulses into two classes, by the device of an 
evaluative distinction, arriving at possessive and creative types. 
The possessive impulses aim at acquiring or retaining something that 
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cannot be shared (private goods); the creative impulses aim at 
values such as knowledge, and goodwill, in which there is no pri- 
vate property (public goods). By extension, the good life is 
built on creative impulses, and political institutions should be 
designed to promote creativeness at the expense of possessiveness. 
This proposal for the design of political institutions suggests a 
move away from the laissez-faire elem6ats in the liberal ideology 
towards a more direct and positive role for the state. But, by a 
curious piece of essentialist reasoning, recalling his intellectual 
ancestry, Russell included the state, with war and property, as 
embodying the possessive impulses. Little, then, might be hoped 
from the reform of state institutions since it was in their "nature" 
to suppress creativity. How far Russell was forced to abandon this 
undiscriminating view of the state was shown by his later advocacy 
of enhanced state action and supra-national government, concepts 
very far removed from the syndicalism, and the simple and amiable 
anarchism he, had advocated at an earlier stag. 
Education, marriage and religion embody, orLought to embody, 
the creative impulses, and "Liberation of creativeness ought to be 
the principle of reform both in politics and in economics" (65). But 
dust why these institutions were thought to be capable of reform while, 
leaving aside war, the state and private property ownership were not, 
Russell failed to indicate, He certainly did not believe that the 
existing conditions of any one of the three "creative" institutions 
was satisfactory, hence his books and practical efforts to reform all 
three, 
To ensure the preponderance, in human affairs, of the "creative" 
impulsos, it was not sufficient, in Russells judgment, tu introduce 
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rationalistic schemes of the type proposed by the Webbs and Wells. 
In his essay, "The recrudescence of puritanism", he set a sharp limit 
to the effectiveness of education in modifying behavior, although 
this is not a position he consistently maintained. He asserted 
that the unconscious life of impulse has a profound effect on our 
lives, and that it is not capable of direct control. He equated 
impulses with passions, as the well-spring of human action (66). 
Full reflective, rational activity, at the other extreme, was a 
goal, but a remote one for humanity as a whole, and not an adequate 
one, even for intellectuals. Hence the care he always took to 
avoid appearing a pure rationalist. In an essay on Whitehead, he 
exculpated his old mathematical tutor and associate from this charge: 
"Socially, he apl*red kindly, rationale and imper- 
turbable, but he was'not in Saat imperturbable, and was 
certainly not that inhuman monster, "the rational man"' (67). 
Between the extremes of impulse and rationality, Russell intro- 
duced a third level of activity - desiring. We can direct our de- 
sires, or, at least, they are susceptible to modification through 
circumstance, education and opportunity. Given that rationality 
is an achievement, or a disposition to behave which education can 
profoundly affect, and that desires are educable, and that we can, 
therefore, learn to desire what it is wise and good for us to have 
and to be, is not human nature plastic? 
Russell seems to have believed that the deeply rooted impulsive 
life was not plastic. But how, then, is it possible to achieve the 
better world he so ardently desired? Unmodified impulses, sustained 
and rationalized by desire and thought, might merely produce horrifying 
structures of state absolutism, universal warfare, and inhuman property 
rights. The fundamental importance of impulses is, then, on Russell's 
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theory, a means of criticizing the naive rationalists; by the 
same token it lends to rational planning of the kind he advocated 
the most unfortunate possibility for perversion into absolutism 
and tyranny. Russell could very justly have argued that just 
such outcomes occurred in his own lifetime, and he could consis- 
tently have maintained, as he did iil916, that these were the result 
of-reformers and managers of institutional life attending to super- 
structure while ignoring the substructures ofýimpulse. But there 
would be a paradox in this argument,. as there was in Russells own 
rationalistic writing, since, on his own argument, impulse is vital, 
yet controllable, not through reason but only through passion. How, 
then, are reformers of a rational persuasion ever to get anywhere? 
Russell's belief in the power of impulse derived not only from 
his study of Hume and Freud. It was also, as I remarked above, an 
outcome of his reflections on the first World War. iie saw this 
war as an outgrowth of ordinary human nature, any expression of pas- 
sion, not merely of incompatible economic and social institutions. 
That is, as far as he was concerned, the liberal could explain the 
war just as effectively as could the materialist and collectivist. 
What might control war is not merely a reasoned criticism of it, 
and a demonstration of its consequences of misery and loss. Reason 
alone Russell found "too negative, too little living". What waa needed 
was "a positive life of impulses and passions antagonistic to those 
that lead to war" (68). 
Thus we are brought back to the creative impulses, or, more pre- 
cisely, to the problems of recognizing the impulsive foundation of 
behavior and of finding ways of directing impulses towards "life and 
growth". Without quite proposing sublimation on Freudian lines, 
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Russell set against aggression three "forces on the side of life", 
which are not at all rare and might, under more propitious social 
conditions, be made quite common. These are the impulses of love, 
constructiveness, and the joy of life; and these are, or may be, 
united in man, proceeding from, or perhaps comprising, a central 
principle of growth. Unlike manyof the developmental psycholo- 
gists, but in the tradition of Froebel and the romantic school of 
educational theory, Russell recognized that the term "growth" dose 
not merely describe whatever happens to the organism, but evaluates 
and prescribes a form of experience. With Dewey, he treated growth 
as a good, and as goal-directed - not a more indiscriminate happening. 
2.3 Social, ethical and educational reform 
From this summary review, we may see from what basis Russell's 
subsequent programme of social and educational reform proceeded. He 
advocated for individuals and societies those kinds of experiences, in 
love, marriage, education, international relations, economic affairs, 
etc., which he thought might embody and further stimulate the creative 
impulses. These experiences might serve to counteract the institu- 
tionalized and traditional power of the destructive impulsest a 
limited reform, perhaps, but in the long run profoundly transforming. 
Part of this limitation arises from Russell's preoccupation with the 
institutionalized strength of the "destructive impulses", his fear 
of institutions of any large size, and his scepticism about the pos- 
sibility of rapid massive transformations in society. ' Both his 
caution and his use of the psychology of impulsive behavior speak 
for his rational scientific temper. Wells was no less cautious 
than Russell in his expectations of the immediate future, but he 
underestimated the significance of feelings and emotions and their 
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institutionalized expression in social institutions. This inclined 
him to give an unduly passive account of the mentality of the utopians, 
or at any rate to eliminate tensions and inner conflict without show- 
ing how this might be accomplished. Perhaps as a result of his own 
experience as a reformer Russell was very conscious of the power of 
institutions to resist change and of individuals to cling to existing 
mental and emotional patterns. But, despite this awareness, Russell 
lacked any theory of organizational and institutional change which 
wentibeyond specific educational reforms and a series of proposals 
affecting marriage, censorship, etc. 
In ethical terms, Russell advocated Sidgwick's hedonism: "All 
moral rules that are generally recognized can be deduced from the 
principle that we ought to aim at maximizing pleasure" (69). Without 
further analysis, he "roughly accepted" that good is pleasure, and , 
claimed a place for intelligence and aesthetic sensibilities as "goods". 
Concern for maximizing pleasure meant taking note of consequences, and 
of the interactions of individuals bent on pleasure-. of one sort o> 
another. Ethics are part of the attempt to make man more gregarious 
than he naturally is, but many of the things that are best in the human 
species are the result of individual initiative and effort. It ia. 
part of the task of moral education to ensure that the concern for 
others implied by these acts was universalized. 
"Pleasure" is an individualistic concept, °inasmach as it is the 
individual who experiences pleasure and knows when he is pleased. It 
is not reducible to any specific set of goals, but raises the possibi- 
lity of an endless quest, in individuals and for a society, over time. 
Thus, for Russell, values are not fixed, but susceptible of growth and 
development, or, rather, of enhanced awareness and appreciation over time. 
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Russell appears not to have considered any of the philosophical 
objections to hedonism, although by implication he touched on some 
of these in criticizing Kantian ethics. While disdaining any pos- 
sible philosophical oritics, he carried the attack to the guardians 
of public morality, whom he stigmatized as "puritans". These were 
the enemies of tolerance, of free inquiry, of pleasure save within 
severely circumscribed bounds. Theirs was a repressive<an&-2in 
practice. an ineffective. answer to problems of conduct. 
It is difficult to form a clear impression of the kind of con- 
duct, society and culture Russell proposed as an alternative to that 
which he condemned. There are weaknesses in his theory of passions, 
and inconsistencies in his denunciation of the state. His argument 
that impulses are of primary importance in the analysis of action is 
sound, if not of great practical significance, since he had little to 
offer by way of explaining how the impulsive life might be modified. 
To assert that impulses may be directed or led to "constructive" ends 
is to beg the question of how we are to reorganize: a level of experience 
and volition which, on Russell's own argument, cannot be reached by 
rational means. By seeking out the primary sources of behavior, 
Russell may in fact have exaggerated a difficulty. His metaphor of 
a battleground occupied by destructive and constructive impulses is, 
for an action theorist, too simplified and over-dramatiz6d-, <t. It is 
more appropriate to conceive of a complex system of action, in which 
habit, indifference, frustration, inertia, rage and many other forms 
of expression interact with one another. To reduce this complex 
psychic model to the imaginative simplicity of a mediaeval morality 
play is to leave too many questions about psychic levers of change 
unanswered. 
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We saw that Russell condemned the state as the embodiment of 
destructive impulses, and advocated severely delimited state insti- 
tutions and powers. Yet he wished to see an increase in interven- 
tionism, going beyond legal definitions of right (e. g., action to 
counteract economic injustices) and he envisaged first the inter- 
national rule of law - including the outlawing of war - and then 
the development of coercive supra-national institutions. Just how 
the power of national Interventionist agencies and a supra-national 
government was to be prevented from curtailing the scope for creative, 
individual action, he seems not to have considered at all. Further- 
more, without institutional checks to formalize and regulate the 
exercise of supra-national power, the liberal ideology would prove 
a very ineffective bulwark against the organized tyranny Russell 
himself condemned. Individual liberty for all in complex, closely 
interacting societies is impossible without an elaborate and in- 
creasingly international apparatus of rules and provision. Yet 
this apparatus in itself is no guarantee that the scope for indi- 
vidual action which Russell recommended would be achieved. For 
this, there is required a more powerful and comprehensive analysis 
of freedom in the planned society than Russell, or, for that matter, 
Wells or the Webbe, undertook, 
Despite the evident affinities of-his theory of the passions 
with Hume, and his sharing Hume's doubts about they efficacy of edu- 
cation, Russell thought the changes in man. and society that he desired 
could be brought about. His doubts about education were mitigated 
somewhat by his confidence that powerful and beneficent influences 
may be exerted on children through improved environmental provision. 
This confidence owes more to the Tooke of Some Thoughts on Education 
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and to Rousseau than it does to the sceptical tradition. Through 
controlled upbringing of children, and sustained attacks on parti- 
cular injustices and social problems, Russell believed that, in the 
long run, the rationalistic scientific temper could be made to pre- 
vail. Despite the great differences between Wells and Russell 
over structures and procedures, Russell's conclusion is not very 
different from Wells'. They shared the belief that, in the very 
long run, education can be made so effective as to eliminate or 
control the destructive forces in man and society and establish 
the rule of reason and benevolent impulse. This belief expresses 
a less naive confidence than that of Helvetius and some of the 
other eighteenth century rationalists. Russell and Wells were of 
course familiar with the history of nineteenth century reform move- 
ments, with criticisms of utopian theorizing, with the great modern 
irrationalities of war and depression, and with some aspects at least 
of depth psychology. This familiarity did not shatter their optimism 
but it gave to their thought a qualified cautiousness and led them 
both to think of the renewal of culture as a task for all the genera- 
tions, not for one or two generations of revolutionary fervour. 
Perhaps of necessity the models of culture and of conduct which 
both Wella and Russell developed were over-simplified. To sketch out 
the contours of an ideal society, and to sharpen our awareness of the 
shortcomings of present life, are tasks which require a high degree 
of selection and emphasis. Yet neither Wells nor Russell showed 
much awareness that they were operating with limited models. In 
this respect, despite the advance of their thought over eighteenth 
century rationalism, there are marked affinities between them and 
the enlightenment philosopher. The images of ideal society which 
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they project are like Plato's Republic, minus the mass of mankind: 
a haven for reflective, creative intellectuals, but not very com- 
fortable places for those whose life style is altogether different. 
Rationality as an ideal tends to be all-absorbing, in the sense 
that it seeks to conform all forms of experience to its own ideals. 
This, at least, was what lay behind the enlightenment aspiration 
to "mathematicize" all experience (70). The alternative approach, 
not surprisingly, is indicated by exponents of literary culture, 
and it is Blake's commentary on his painting of Chaucer's Canterbury 
Pilgrims that underlines the difference between the enlightenment and 
romantic ideald (71). The diverse types of humanity portrayed by 
Chaucer were reduced, by the unifying or systematic character of 
enlightenment thought, to the one model, the rational, humanist 
intellectual. 
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CHATTER VI 
A TERICAN EXPERIMENTALISTS 
The polarization of "individual" and "society" was one of the 
consequences, in American educational thought, of the mounting criti- 
cism during the 1920s and 30s of the individualistic bias of progres- 
sive education (1). Subsequently it became common amongst commen- 
tators to speak of a society-centred and an individual-centred ap- 
proach. Useful as it is denoting two widely diverging outlooks this 
is not a clear-cut distinction, for both the society-centred and the 
child-centred theorist* proceeded on the assumption of an elaborate 
network of relationships between the two. For example, the theories 
of growth and culture advanced by the society-centred experimentalists 
were intended to account for individuality and provide for its culti- 
vation within a social context of mutual interests. Dewey, the major 
theorist of this group, located the ideal of individual development 
firmly within the contemporary cultural contexts 
"Ideals, including that of a new and effective indi- 
viduality, must themselves be framed out of the possi- 
bilities of existing conditions, even if these be condi- 
tions that constitute a corporate and industrial age. 
The ideals take shape and gain a content as they operate 
in remaking conditions. " (2) 
The person, in experimentalist thought, is a nexus of cultural 
forces which shape it from birth, and of individual biological and 
psychological traits. Persons exist in and through communication 
with one another and within particular, if varied, cultural contexts. 
Their actions cannot be understood or explained without reference to 
this cultural content. Thus, understanding persons involves studying 
their behavior, past and present, in the various group situations in 
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which they function. While this approach does not deny persons a 
private, unique "life-space" it does tend to emphasize and to culti- 
vate what they have in common and their social and cultural relations 
(3). 
The polarization of individual-society is misleading in diet 
cussing experimentalist thought, but it does have the limited 
heuristic value of drawing attention, in a particular context, to 
sharp Rifferences of opinion amongst different schools of educational 
thought about the role of the school as a cultural agency with res- 
pect to individual growth, in a period of great cultural upheaval and 
anxiety. On this interpretation, it is useful to talk about the 
social perspective which the experimentalists introduced, or rather 
re-introduoed, into educational thought and practice. 
Experimentalism, in educational theory, is a term which refers 
to the generalized method of inquiry - he called it the scientific 
method, or reflective thinking - which Dewey recommended as the 
intellectual foundation of the educational process. This educa- 
tional use was a particular application of the method with which, 
in the spirit of enlightenment rationalism, Dewey hoped to see all 
cultural issues and problems examined and as far as possible solved 
(4). It is convenient to extend the term experimentalist to include 
the group of extremely active and influential educational theorists, 
principally at Teachers College, Columbia University, and, later, 
at the University of Illinois and elsewhere, who were heavily in- 
fluenced by, and in some respects developed, Dewey's thought. The 
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experimentalist movement in education was by no means confined to 
this circle, nor has its influence yet been spent. I cannot examine 
in detail the whole movement, but shall discuss selected aspects of 
the thought of Dewey, Childs, Bode, Kilpatrick, Counts and Rugg. In 
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Chapter Eighty I shall consider some of the more recent exponents 
of experimentalism. 
1. Culture Diagnosis 
1, l Experience and change 
Before considering some of the features and problems of American 
culture identified, by the experimentaliats, we should notice that it 
was chiefly this group who, amongst educational theorists, have brought 
about an awareness of the category of culture and the values and prob- 
lems of culturally-related educational study (5). The explanation for 
this lies within the experimentalist conceptions of growth, individuality, 
society and culture, From the influence of Hegelianism and Darwinism 
on his early thought and from Head, a colleague at the University of 
Chicago, Dewey acquired a basic cultural determinism to which he sub- 
sequently gave expression in his account of how originally impulsive 
and plastic human nature quickly assimilates the expressions, customs, 
values, inhibitions and meanings of the surrounding culture. He tried 
to combine with this environmental determinism a belief, which he seems 
to have acquired from a Christian upbringing and from the Froebelian 
branch of Idealism, in some vital, inner impulse by which the indi- 
vidual conceived as an "inner" force is able to impinge upon the outer 
world and, indeed, is obliged to do so, both on survival and on moral 
grounds (6). 
This is an uneasy combination, hardly consistent either with Dewey's 
vigorous attacks on all forms of dualism and on the invoking of forces 
beyond experience, or with the radical, empirical behaviorism which he 
adopted (7). Yet it is a combination with which he and his followers 
operated an elaborate conceptual structure, now veering towards a "pure 
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plasticity" account of human nature, and now affirming the inde- 
pendence of the individual in relation to his culture. Despite 
its problems, this theory drew attention to the cultural context 
of individual growth and encouraged the followers of the experi- 
mentalists to take an interest in social trends and issues and in 
school-society relationships comparatively rare amongst educationists 
until the advent of'modern empirical sociology (8). 
Dewey's active work as a philosopher and a social and educational 
theorist covered the period from the 1880s until the 1940s (9)" From 
his enormous output, during this period, I shall examine more closely 
a number of issues relating to two fundamental aspects of his thought. 
Those aspects are, first, a metaphysical doottine of universal flux, 
and, second, a theory of accelerating social change (10). Dewey's 
commitment to these sets of ideas underlies his treatment of human 
experience and the problems of twentieth century culture. 
While the experimentalists sometimes set themselves up as anti- 
metaphysicians, their theory incorporated particular beliefs and as- 
sumptions about the theoretical limits'of knowledge, the nature of 
experience, and the instrumental qualities of thought. A summary 
statement does scant justice to these, but is needed to show how they 
proceeded in defending their cultural diagnosis. 
Accepting Hegel's criticism of Kant's "reality beyond experience", 
Dewey and his experimentalist followers asserted that what we know 
and can know, including the categories and methods of thought, is 
limited and defined by human experience. Again following Hegel, Dewey 
attached great importance to the historical analysis of experience, as 
a way of knowing. Experience is analysable into a set of relation- 
ships or transactions over time between the human organism and environment, 
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in which there occurs a continual interplay of action and reaction. 
In experience there are primary and secondary elements: primary 
encounters with the qualitative world, characterized by immediate 
feelings of suffering and enjoyment; secondary reflection or in- 
quiry. Dewey's inereat lay mainly in secondary experiences and, 
since these are instrumental in the sense of resolving felt diffi- 
culties, yielding knowledge, and effecting relationships with others, 
his philosophy has also been called "instrumentalism". 
Experience, according to the experimentalist interpretations, 
yields not, as one might expect, any and all perceptions, understand- 
ings and relationships the human race has had, but a very distinctive 
and partial view of the world. This view limits valid beliefs to 
those eustained, or capable of being suatained, by the "naturalistic" 
methods of scientific reasoning. According to the doctrine of ex- 
perience, we have no warrant to entertain beliefs which are in their 
nature incapable of such verifications - e. g., beliefs about God, 
first cause, immortality, or the "truths" yielded by mystical in- 
tuitions. At least, according to experimentalism, all such beliefs 
must be operationalized and brought to the test of the empirical and 
hypothetico-deductive procedures of science. To the extent that 
evidence for them is a matter of faith or private, uncommunicable 
awareness, they cannot, or, rather, ought not to, be affirmed. 
Experience is not therefore self-validating by whatever expressions 
or modes of utterance it chooses, but must test its claims to validity 
against the criteria of the developing culture of the sciences. . 
Scien- 
tific thought is the most successful area of human experience and sets 
the standards for future experience. 
But science permits us only to hold beliefs and truths provisionally. 
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They are always subject to modification or refutation. It might 
seem than holding this, Dewey would treat scientific method, or, 
as he often called it, reflective inquiry, as a problem-raising, 
doubt-inducing enterprise. However, the opposite is the cases 
thinking is a functional, adaptive process, which operates to 
settle doubt in problematic, indeterminate situations. Doubt 
is not settled for long, though, as one problem is replaced by 
another in an endless succession. 
It is this kaleidoscopic movement of experience, the endless 
variety of events, that led the experimentalists to depict the world 
as "precarious and perilous" (11), a scene of novelty, almost of 
flux, which we can know and begin to control to the extent that we 
can, through inquiry and reflection, identify and order operations 
and events. Behavior is conceived, in, Darwinian terms, as a rest- 
less pattern of adjustment to surroundings. Thus what we know is 
behavior, actions, operations, motives; and, from a historical study 
of these and their inter-relationships, the experimentalists built up 
a picture of western culture undergoing a vast and profound trans- 
formation. 
This transformation, as described in the generalized interpre- 
tative writings of Dewey and his associates, has certain characteris- 
tics. They are not quite the same in the different experimentalist 
writings but there is sufficient similarity for it to be not too mis- 
leading to present a composite outline, at least of the general inter- 
pretation of culture in America in the 1930e. The experimentalist 
characterization of culture in transition may be divided into three 
sets of ideas: 
(i) Fundamental instability of cultures industrialization; 
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science; cultural lag. 
(ii) Failures of American democracy. 
(iii) Crisis. 
1.2 Fundamental instability of culture 
The culture to whose problems the experimentalists addressed 
ý hemselves was American, yet of the major factors which they claimed 
were leading to change and instability only the distinctive American 
heritage, combining the reality and mythology of the frontier and the 
movement of social criticism dating from the 1880s, was uniquely 
American. The remaining factors, industralization, science and 
cultural lag, which supposedly separated social and moral from tech- 
nological progress, were all phenomena of the western world generally. 
Apart from Dewey, who was well read in European thought and an active 
commentator on current world events, the experimentalists tended to 
treat their cultural predicament in a parochial manner. Consequently, 
their reform programme was on the whole, like American foreign policy 
at the time, isolationist. Despite the fact that the processes cak- 
ing for cultural upset were international, to a considerable extent 
it was assumed that the remaking of American culture could proceed 
as a separate endeavour and their proposals for collectivization were 
mostly confined to the nation state. 
1.2.1 Industrialization 
For Dewey, industrialization - the relentless expansion of a tool 
technology - and urbanization were a complex of forces which by the late 
nineteenth century had achieved their own dynamic. In his early writings, 
he treated this as socially unsettling, but not critically so. Later, 
Dewey came to regard industrialization as a major source of instability, 
requiring a major effort of readjustment in individuals and society. 
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The culture of industrialization was vastly different from that of 
the "old fuý=", still familiar to town dwellers at the turn of the 
century, and it was itself fluid and constantly developing. It 
created dislocations and challenged instituticna, including education, 
to sake radically new adaptations. IndustriAlization did not comprise 
an isolated set of institutional phenomena, but Was a complex and pro- 
found disruption of traditional customs, relationships, values and ways 
of life (12). 
Yet, unsettling as industzialization had been in American culture, 
it was not, for Dewey, an inexorable force. The best form of adap- 
tation was the systematic application of intelligence to social af- 
fairs, including the industrial culture itself. Dewey did not adopt 
a single-factor change-theory - although he attributed to western 
science the greatest power for changing the world - but instead 
characterized cultural change as a complex phenomenon. Contemporary 
culture was basically a change culture, but it did not, or rather, 
need not, carry all before it in a mindless torrent. Resistance 
to change is built into human nature in the form of habits, great 
stabilizers of action, and into social institutions (13). Further- 
more, industrialization for all its damaging side effects was at least 
in part an expression of the scientific intelligence, socially organized. 
The limited, haphazard organization of an earlier period could be re- 
placed by a systematic redirection of industrial factors to satisfy 
the needs man defined for hi4self. Other forces making for change 
were perhaps less susceptible to control. In summary, Dewey noted 
three main sources of social action and reactions habit, violent force 
and intelligence (14). He wished to eliminate violent force as a 
factor in human affairs, an aspiration of the whole reconstructionist 
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movement, and to develop a reciprocating relationship between habit 
and intelligence such that an effective division of labor, as it 
were, could occur without either the disruptions of total innova- 
tivenees or the stagnation of total stability. Industrialization, 
then, a function of rational and empirical thought, had produced 
many harmful side effects. The more systematic and organized 
application of intelligence to social affairs could, in the future, 
take advantage of the enormous social power of industrialization, 
and direct it to more humane and universally satisfying ends than 
those achieved in the earlier stages of the industrial revolution. 
The diverse cultural consequences of industrialization were 
described in some detail in Rug's polemical works where his diagnosis 
of the harmful human effects of breakdown led him to propose a large- 
scale programme of planned change (15). But this was in the 1930s, 
when the great damage that could result from the collapse of finance 
and of industrialized production and distribution were being universally 
experienced in American economic and social life. In Dewey's earlier 
writings, while industrialization was treated as a transforming factor, 
it was not aeon as potentially harmful, Indeed, Dewey taught, and 
practised in the Laboratory School of the University of Chicago, a 
policy of learning about industrialized society through practice- 
based craft and social studies (16). However, the depression shocked 
and outraged experimentalists no less than other social commentators 
by its demonstration of the frailty of many of the great institutions 
of industrial society and the precariousness of living standards. 
In his 1926 lectureeseries, Education for a Changing Civilization, 
Kilpatrick, Dewey's most influential educational disciple, gave a brief 
account of the industrial factor in cultural change, trcating it, with 
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the philosophy of prggmatism and the legacy of democratic ideals 
and institutions, as one of three basic tendencies in American 
life, Industrialization brought with it problems of bigness and 
mass servitude: "the fatalism of the multitude", the increased 
destrictiveness of ware and a greater encroachment of machine 
production on every-day life (17). , Yet, on the whole, Kilpatrick's 
approach to his subject was more descriptive than critical and he 
gave a hint of his later weakness for accommodating thought to the 
status quo by aubserving philosophy to the "changing civilization": 
"It appears that we must have a philosophy that not 
only takes positive recognition of change but one that 
includes within it change as an essential element" (18). 
Lose than ten years later, industrialization had itself been re- 
interpreted by the experimentalists to become an ominous force. A 
sinister combination of advanced technology and laissez-faire in 
business and government had led to chronic insecurity in work; a 
popular mentality of acquisitiveness and escapism; excessive, anti- 
social competitiveness; pessimism; and a distrust of intelligent 
planning (19). Rugg's earlier bright picture of progress, achieved 
through industrialization and applied democracy, was replaced, in his 
own writings by accounts of acquisitiveness, unemployment, poverty, 
inequality and the failures of collective action as the great indus- 
trial machine unbelievably sank-into depression (20). Thue, his 
1933 Wells-type study in adult. education, The Great Technology, was 
subtitled "Social chaos and the public mind", and contained an ambitious 
outline for rebuilding a semi-Fabian society in which the propulsive 
scientific and technological forces of the industrial culture would 
be directed by a collectivist morality, within a planned capitalist 
economy (21). 
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Other reconstruotionista, notably Bode and Counts, similarly 
attacked the failure, in national governmental policy-making, to 
direct to defensible ends the forces released by science and tech- 
nology in society. Bode, who had from the beginning condemned 
the "child-centred" school of progressive education for failing 
to identify worthy ends and criteria for growth, gave greater 
emphasis to the national failure to define objectives (22). 
Counts, who had been strongly critical in the 1920s of the class 
bias of schools and school boards, concentrated his criticism 
on the school, and, almost alone among the experimentalists, turned 
for a time to the Soviet Union for lessons in social reconstruction 
(23). 
The strenuousness of the experimentalist criticism of the impact 
of industrialization on American life in the 1930s compared with the 
relatively uncritical descriptions, in their earlier writings, of the 
great changes it had produced and was presaging. In the earlier period, 
the great and challenging task facing twentieth century man was adapting 
his institutions and values, indeed his very consciousness, to the 
cumulative, mounting changes introduced through industrialization, 
science and the rapid evolution of the American tradition. Later, 
this task was modified: it was not only individual man that had to 
adapt, but society through its corporate institutions had td find 
means of bringing the industrial system under some kind of control 
for a more complete satisfaction of human needs. 
1.2.2 Science 
A difference of emphasis is detectable between the thinking of 
Dewey and other experimentalists on the relationship of science to 
society. 'chile Dewey in later years was primarily interested in 
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science as understood by Bacon, Locke and the enlightenment 
philo sý es, i. e., as an outlook and a praxis which could trans- 
form the conditions of social life, he was also interested in 
philosophical questions concerning the logic of science, its netho- 
dology, the relationship of empirical and normative judgments, and 
the paradigmatic function of scientific reasoning in other realms 
of thought. Industrialization, therefore, was but one aspect of 
the uses of science in society and Dewey treated it as such. 
However, most of the other experimentalist writers concentrated 
their culture diagnoses on the applications of science in and through 
capitalist industry. Dewey argued that science is the greatest force 
for producing social change and determining human relations: 
"The true and final source of change has been, and now 
iep the corporate intelli6ence embodied in science" (24)" 
Rugg, who had traihed as an engineer before turning to pedagogy, iden- 
tified as the prime mover not science, but machine technology harnessed 
to capitalist uses: 
'Marty factors turned our fathers' quiet world of the 
1890s into the dynamic America of the 1940s, but one pro- 
vided the chief impetus for all the others. This was the 
astonishing speed and efficiency with which the engineers 
perfected machine technology, and the business and finan- 
cial men of six industrial countries built the modern cor- 
poration and organized a world wide system of efficient 
enterprise" (25). 
The difference between these two approaches was to prove important, 
since all the experimentalists advocated that the school curriculum 
should be substantially built upon an analysis of carrtemporary culture. 
An analysis that identifies the culture of science, or the sciences, 
as prime mover will yield different materials and methodologies of 
study than one which casts technology into this role. The difference 
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may be illustrated by comparing the study of pure science with the 
Soviet polytocbnical curriculum. The former has no central con- 
cern with the history, application and social uses of science, 
whereas the latter takes as its starting point a normative (Marxist) 
analysis of work culture and tries to see how the sciences bear or 
might be brought to bear upon this culture (26). The experimenta- 
lists, as indeed did moat other reoonatructionists, generally followed 
Rugg rather than the Dewey approach; hence the prevalence of "core 
curricula" in which science and mathematics are definitely subservient 
to various forms of social study including the social uses of science 
(27)" 
Dewey has been criticized for reducing knowledge to socially 
instrumental uses and for evading the problem of theoretical know- 
ledge. Yet his treatment of science as a factor in culture suggests 
that this is a misleading, or at least a onersided, criticism. He 
was certainly interested in industrialization amongst other cultural 
elements as an example of major applicative uses of science, but this 
was not the only use he had for science, nor did he reduce the structure 
of scientific thinking to; Baconian applied science. He saw science "as 
the most creative and successful of the great symbolic systems, an 
Intellectual structure in its own right. 
1.2.3 
Dewey and his fellow experimentalists were agreed that a serious 
hiatus had developed between the rapidly changing elements in society - 
science, technology, urbanization, population movements, etc, - and the 
more stable moral, political and educational norms and institutions. 
They were, on the whole, uncritical exponents of cultural-lag. This 
theory of social change, popularized by Ogburn, finds in technological 
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innovation a culturally disintegrating force. The integration 
of the various components and sub-systems of society is postulated, 
and it is argued that this hypothetical balance is disrupted primarily 
as a consequence of the rapid development, both quantitative and quali- 
tative, of scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions and their 
diffusion throughout industry. These changes precipitate a "mal- 
adjustment" between material and non-material culture. Moral and 
other ideals consequently are said to have lost their validity since 
they refer in various ways to a cultural whole which lies forever in 
the past. One major assumption of the lag theory is that the growth 
of science and industry set a pace and direction for social movement 
to which other sub-systems should adjust. The adoption of the lag 
theory by the experimentalists gave to their thought a concreteness 
and relevance to contemporary events, but at the cost of oversimpli- 
fying the inter-relationships of the parts of the social system, and of 
introducing deep uncertainties about the scope of critical thinking. 
Also, the lag theory creates ambiguities about the status of moral 
judgments - as to whether they are all relative to particular social 
contexts, or in some respects universal (28). 
In recent years, culture critics-have increasingly pointed out 
that the unimpeded growth of science and technology might be destruc- 
tive of other cultural values. The direction of "lag" has therefore 
come under doubt. These criticisms raise fresh questions about 
social progress, since it is no longer clear that making the social 
uses of industrial processes more "intelligent" will suffice, as the 
experimentalists often seemed to assume. 
The experimentalists advocated a highly generalized and often 
rather vague programme of political and social planning, including 
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the utilization of technology for the advantage of the many, not 
merely the few. However, their analysis of lag was an exceedingly 
naive one, as may be seen from the following summary of the main 
argumentei 
1. Scientific knowledge, technology, industrialization, 
etc., have progressed very rapidly by adopting rational 
empirical, problem solving, and functionalistic pro- 
cedures. 
2. Social-moral knowledge has clung to traditional cate- 
3" 
goriest and methodologies. 
Prejudice, uncertainty, bewilderment, and moral timidity 
are widespread. 
4. Science has wrongly been made the scapegoat: the indus- 
trial society is wrongly blamed for the imbalance that 
has developed. 
5" This imbalance is to be righted by putting moral-social 
affairs on a scientific, realistic, practical basis (29). 
Although Dewey, as we have seen, did not reduce culture change to 
the impact of a single factor or set of factors, his analysis of cultural 
lag and his proposals for remedying it rested on an unduly narrow ac- 
count of culture. Rugg was subsequently to recommend incorporation 
of the systematic study of theories of culture change into teacher 
education proa'rammes. The adoption of this recommendation at an 
earlier stage might have rescued the experimentalists from the con- 
fusion and ambiguities of the culture lag theory (30). 
1.3 Failure of American democracy 
From criticizing the failure to humanize and socialize the blind 
forces of industrialization, the experimentalists extended their at- 
tack and enunciated a more general failure of American democracy. 
In some ways, this was for them a sharper reversal to make than had 
been their ultimate recognition that industrialization is not a self- 
righting and self-justifying process. Industrialization was a world- 
- 220 - 
wide phenomenon to whose advancement America had contributed: 
but 
democracy, despite its European origins, had acquired a distinctly 
American patina, a power to evoke sentiment, to still criticism, and 
to effect good beyond what even science might achieve. Evidence in 
the twenties and thirties that democracy was seriously jeopardized by 
American political, economic and social movements was therefore all 
the more shocking to those who had assumed that the American system 
somehow proved or proclaimed the superiority of democracy over all 
other forms of social and political organization. 
Ducey had never been uncritical of the workings of American 
society. Indeed, for decades before the 1930s he had been one of the 
most active and critical of the country's social commentators. But 
he still managed to convey confidence in a heritage of values, ideals 
and feelings which in momenta of crisis could be effective as a spiritual 
unifier of the nation. It was as though the ideology had hidden re- 
serve powers free of institutional trappings, to which appeal could be 
made in momenta of crisis. In this sense, -democracy was to Dewey a 
perennial faith, an enduring ethical system which yielded criteria for 
the assessing of current practice as well as an ineffable inspiration 
and encouragement to action. So far as Dewey was concerned, what was 
needed was that people should (a) adopt the democratic creed as a work- 
ing philosophy of life, and (b) acquire the disposition to think scien- 
tifically. But Dewey did not suppose that these needs could be readily 
met. He over-simplified the range of problems, and the-barriers that 
confront democratic change agents without, however, minimizing the dif- 
ficulty of surmounting those problems which he did identify. 
Dewey himself seems never to have abandoned this optimistic con- 
fidence in the ultimate capacity of the ordinary man to resolve his 
- 221 - 
difficulties by acting intelligently and democraticallyt 
"Democracy is a way of life controlled by a working 
faith in the possibilities of human nature ... 
[of] in- 
telligent judgment and action if proper conditions are 
furnished" (31). 
But he was frequently moved to criticize the actual workings of so- 
called democratic government and he and other experimentalists drew 
attention to a number of specific failings which amounted to the con- 
viction that democratic institutions and relationships in America 
were profoundly threatened by avowedly anti-democratic forces. Like 
Russell, he found a natural affinity between science and democracy, to 
which were opposed a common enemy. The revolt against science, Dewey 
argued: 
"proceeds from representatives of those who have enjoyed the 
power of control and regulation of other human beings, be- 
cause of the earlier set-u in political, ecclesiastical and 
economic institutions" (32). 
Faced with what they believed was the threat of an anti-democratic 
reversion to authoritarian social and educational control, some of the 
experimentalists$ in the 1930s, embarked on a campaign of ideological 
warfare which was to lead a few of them, notably Counts and Childs, to 
the illogical advocacy of indoctrination of values which were supposed 
to include those of free inquiry (33). Dewey and most of the leading 
experimentalists, as we shall see in Chapter X, resisted this move. 
However, Counts, the most outspoken critic of old-style liberalism, 
made an impact, for thereafter the experimentalists appear to have 
taken far more seriously the problem of opposing anti-democratic trends 
in the culture. 
with the exception of Counts' studies of socio-political factors 
affecting schools, experimentalist thought lacked anything approaching 
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the detail and meticulousness of social analysis to be found in 
the work, of the Fabians. The experimentalists resorted to highly 
generalized assertions about the "failure of democracy", These 
failures were of four principal kindle 
1, A mounting authoritarianism and intolerance in 
political, social and educational relations. 
(In response, they advocated shared responsibility 
and participation, principally in education but 
also in economic affairs. ) 
2. Inequality, particularly economic and educational. 
(To this they opposed rudimentary forms of a national 
minimum of welfare, and argumenta_for a national, 
subventionist educational policy. ) 
Acquisitiveness and competitiveness in economic and 
social relations. (To this they opposed their 
basic democratic tenets of the sharing of experience 
and enlargement of interests, together with what was 
on the whole a cautious advocacy of increased state 
economic intertentionism. ) 
4. Flights from reality and avoidance of social issues. 
(The experimentaliet response was a sustained campaign 
of political enlightenment and knowledge through 
popular education. ) (34) 
To these wider trends which they found in American society in the 
thirties, the experimentalists opposed a never very clearly defined, 
but deeply felt, democratic ethic. America was a democratic society, 
by and large, but it fell short of the highest ideals, or failed to 
achieve the utopian standards of the "American dream". The experi- 
mentalists looked upon themselves, if not exactly as guardians, then 
certainly as the principal educational interpreters of the meaning 
and significance of this traditional democratic creed in the changed 
conditions of industrial and urban life. In this respect, they may 
be regarded as an elite of moralists, determined to eliminate the 
imbalances and the maladjustments which in their theory of culture 
lag they had attributed to rapid, partial social change. They were 
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confident that the democratic aspirations and values of equality, 
shared experience, freedom of thought, tolerance and so forth could 
form'both a major objective and a powerful social dynamic. Thus, 
while in their la, theory they appear as semi-Marxists, by positing 
the social primacy of changes in the production sphere, in their 
remarks on democracy, they appear as utopian and ideational change 
theorists. 
1.4 Crisis 
As the economic recession following the financial crash of 1929 
deepened into massive unemployment in America, the experimentalists 
deplored the waste of human resources and the widespread social and 
economic failure. The "American problem" emerged in the form of what 
they derided as political and economic and financial palliatives, and 
a failure to fulfill the "promise of American life". To this, in 
the later thirties, was added an awareness of the impending threat of 
nazism. Democracy was embattled, both within the nation and inter- 
nationally in a looming battle for survival with dictatorship (35). 
From all this it may be appreciated that by the mid-1930a the 
experimentalists felt deeply uneasy over what they termed a national 
crisis. Bconomic and social events had propelled them into a deepen- 
ing sense of total breakdown. However, serious as they found it, the 
reconatructionists so defined the crisis that redemptive action was 
possible and the spirit of optimism was, in spite of everything, sus- 
tained. Despite Marxist arguments adduced by some critics, despite 
the widespread national despair and apathy, despite the extent of 
economic dislocation, the experimentalists felt that capitalism, 
suitably socialized, could be restored, and that education could play 
a vital, although by no means an isolated and unaided, part in this 
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restoration (36). 
Where politicians, industrialists, and economists were unable 
to explain the depression or, prior to the second world war, to 
develop policies-for eliminating massive unemployment, - 
several-of the experimentalists were sustained by a remarkable confidence 
in their diagnostic skills. ". There is nothing, however, in their .. 
culture studies of that period which provides solid support for such 
confidence. ., First, their analyses, however sincere and concerned, 
were partial, personal and impressionistic rather than empirically 
based; and, second, no basic theoretical framework to explain the 
crisis was provided. Instead, the inherent tendencies in ideological 
theorizing to substitute wish fulfilments for empirical generalization, 
and generalized prophecies for specific predictions, were very apparent. 
. Since 
few, if any, of the theoreticians seemed able, at the time, 
to explain the cris4e)y, this-ttiticism may seem excessive. However, 
it is directed at the pretentiousness of the inflated culture diagnosis 
that Rugg, in particular, embarked upon. Dewey, by contrast, kept 
nearer to the r$quirements of the empirical method. His accounts of 
Crisis reflected the widespread anxieties of intellectuals at the time, 
and emphasized commonly admitted national problems. But, leaving 
aside his more popular journalistic forays, he attempted no grand 
overviews and embarked upon no oracular prophecies. As always, he 
affirmed the relevance of scientific inquiry to specific social prob- 
lems and pressed for the adoption,, in education and society at large, 
of the scientific culture (37). 
There are many examples of superficiality and the overhasty 
drawing of conclusions in the experimentalist diagnosis of a crisis, 
yet this diagnosis emphasized matters of great importance for educational 
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policy. Reconstructionism is essentially a future-directed theory 
which seeks to involve educational thought and practice in wider 
fields of social planning. By virtue of their environmentalist 
approach to personality formation, and their concern for education 
as a continuing process of growth, the experimentalists were deeply 
alarmed by the threat to education posed by the profound problems of 
unemployment, poverty, severe social inequality and so forth. These 
social problems, by their pervasiveness and persistence, militated 
against the successful implementation of sound educational policies. 
For example, the depression of expectations and opportunities result- 
ing from large-scale unemployment jeopardized the success of school 
reforms which were intended to enhance children's understanding of 
the opportunities and possibilities of life. Thus, while the experi- 
mentalist portrayal of culture crisis lacked the power which arises 
from detailed and penetrating analysis, it nevertheless underlined 
some of the fundamental questions in the inter-relationship of edu- 
cational and social reform. 
2. Culture Reconstruction 
With the exception of Counts, who for a time happily contemplated 
state collectivism on the Soviet model, the experimentalists were either 
extremely general or cautiously particular about the alternative system 
they would substitute for the culture they condemned. The generality 
is best illustrated by Rugg and the caution particularly by Dewey. 
2.1 Culture synthesis and individual creativity: Rugg 
Before the depression, Rugg had embarked on two programmes of in- 
quiry and reform which he was subsequently to elaborate and repeat in 
everything he wrote: first, the attempt to strengthen experimentalism 
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by incorporating within it a theory of the value of individual 
expression and creativity; second, the attempt to unify culture 
and society which, partly as a consequence of industrialization, 
had been disastrously split (38). Both concerns were intensified 
without being basically altered<by the impact of the depression. 
They may be brought together under the simple rubric of a new cul- 
tural synthesis, which the-very format of Rugg's books presages (39). 
This synthesis was to incorporate the "best" elements in the 
heritage, combined with the most exciting and valid of current achieve- 
meets. It was to be characterized. as a dynamic system of manageable 
tensions in which all could find satisfaction, and as a mutuality of 
interest. Rugg set forth the framework of this great synthesis, in 
successive studiess Culture and Education in America (1931); The 
Great Technology (1933); -Democracy and the Curriculum 
(1939); Founda- 
tions for American Education (1947) and Imagination (1963). Rugg saw 
his framework as historically limited, in time and place, and his own 
outline as liable to be rapidly superseded by other studies in a swiftly 
changing society. However, the methods, ho. proposed for achieving cul- 
tural synthesis were presumably Intended to be more enduring. These 
methods were advocated without reference to pre-existing theories of 
social and cultural changed apart from culture lag, although, in a later 
book, Rugg analysed and recommended the study of such. theories in courses 
for teachers (40)" 
Ruüg's own views on methods for achieving a. cultural synthesis can- 
not be completely separated from the substantial programme of reform 
which he advocated1, We saw in the Introduction that ideological 
theorizing is distinguished by an inextricable blending of substantive 
reform proposals and procedural rules. Rugg produced this blend in 
r 
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historico-söcid-political studies of the American culture, which 
seem to have been directed, like Wells''utopian romances, at that 
minority of adults who might form a spearhead group for social re- 
form. 
In characteristically broad outline, Rugg traced the history 
of industrialization and the rise of capitalism, with emphasis on 
both their productive- potential and their moral and economic weak- 
nesses. What was needed was a new, revitalized "great technology", 
an economy of abundance, providing a "fine standard of living for all", 
directed by technocratic managers working within the framework of 
"controlled private capitalism" (41). For all its failingay it seems 
that private enterprise and single-nation capitalist organization still 
had the, best potential for economic, social, moral and cultural growth 
(42). Since the "economic axioms" which Rugg propounded as part of 
The Great Technology had chiefly emphasized consumer needs, managerial 
efficiency, and the capacity of the economy to expand and diversify, 
he may be fairly regarded as a prophet and advocate of the general 
style of American post-World War-II capitalism. 
. Rugg proposed three major steps 'in social reconstruction in a 
democracy: first, overall design of policy objectives and institutions 
by co-operating' experts; second, consent, produced through'the per- 
suasive efforts of "the intelligent minority" (perhaps the biggest 
elite in history - some 25 millions of activists); third, democratic 
control and teohnical'operations - i. e., representatives were to be 
chosen who would subject their designs to experimental trial and turn 
their timing and sequencing, etc.,, over to experts. This curious 
mixture of mass participation, elitism, and representative government 
may be compared with the more modest means proposed by the later 
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experimentalists for initiating policy chpnges (43). 
Anxious to avoid an autocratic solution, Rugg thus proposed 
combining "a centrally controlled technology with representative 
democracy" (44). His argument was largely instrumentals such a 
combination would be more likely to achieve reconstruction without 
violence and disintegration. Unlike the Marxists, he repudiated 
violence as a means, adopting the characteristic reconstruotionist 
belief in a community of persuasion and consent. as the most desirable 
instrumentality for change (45)" 
Avoidance of tension, violence and disintegration could not be 
anhieved without a massive-programme of persuasion. The "inner 
psychology of the people", notwithstanding the-virtues conferred 
upon them by their participation in the democratic heritage, was a 
serious obstacle, since it comprised the gospel of personal success 
at the expense of others, conformity, and hypocrisy (46). This 
"inner psychology" was in turn fortified and exploited by the public 
opinion-forming agencies. To resist these powerful institutions, 
Rugg made direct appeal to his "thinking minority". To these he 
addressed his urgent pleas for "a warlike psychological program" of 
self-help and self-education -: a loosely co-ordinatad, partly volun- 
tary, partly government-sponsored national programme of adult educa- 
tion (47). 
The overall incoherence of Rugg's programme rests less on his 
failure to identify the structural regllirements of effective social 
change than on his enlistment as change agents Of a very large minority 
who, according to his own analysis, would already be hopelessly de- 
moralized and hostile to corporate action. Rugg and several others 
of the reconstruotioniets were confronted by a basic dilemma in wishing 
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both'to initiate a massive programme of specific changes and to 
institutionalize direct mass participatory democracy, whose policy 
objectives could hardly be prescribed in advance. Furthermore, 
this mass was, by virtue of-the cri$ia'and other factors, demoralized, 
unable or unwilling-to co-operate and unsure of its own best interest. 
Rugg in no way contributed to the. resolution of this dilemma. Indeed, 
it is difficult to see why he should advocate universal consent at all. 
His argument for universal consent was not in fact primarily democratic, 
but rested°on the-belief that consent meant the avoidanoe of violence. 
However, there is no more assurance that the procedures he recommended 
for achieving consent would be freer-of violence than more autocratic 
measures of policy enforcement. - If"'violence were avoided, then we may 
not unreasonably suppose that his elaborate system of policy initiation 
and 'Implementation would'be dominated by"experts and politicians, both 
working hard, post hoc, to secure consent, or rather assent, to policies 
already in operation. 
Yet Rugg made at least two-contributions whose significance may be 
lost in criticizing specific problems raised by his proposals. The 
first 'of these'was to endeavor to characterize American culture as an 
ongoing system of interacting parts, social, economic, political, in. 
tellectual. Action in one sphere, including education, is affected 
by and in turn may help to modify that in other spheres. Proposals 
for directed change need to take account of'oonsequences in spheres 
other than that within which this immediate action is to occur, and 
to recognize the limitations imposed by the beliefs and-institutions 
of these other spheres. The increasing''impact of technological 
change on the human and social environment, and the growing realization 
that specific intervention ramifies in--many directions, reveal the 
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foresight of those holistic writers who thirty and forty years ago 
and more urged the need for wider viewpoints. That neither Rugg 
nor Wells, two of the chief advocates of the wider view, succeeded 
in presenting profound analyses of their own culture hardly lessens 
the value of the example they set for further, if more tightly con- 
trolled, studies of the interactions of various parts-of the cul- 
tural system. 
Rugg's second important contribution throws up a peculiar diffi- 
culty in the experimentalist position. This is the problem of ac- 
counting for individual imaginativeness and giving its cultivation 
any place in a system directed towards sharing and communication of 
experience. Dewey's fundamental behaviorism makes it difficult to 
explain original genius, and it is significant that his social and 
educational discussions deal almost exclusively with the common man. 
Few, if any, of the experimentalists have given much attention to the 
questions of genius, originality, high intelligence or even individual 
difference, except insofar as they attacked traditional education for 
inducing conformity, and proposed individual and small group learning 
situations. There is a paradox here in that, while the traditionalists 
had an elaborate theoretical apparatus for explaining individual dif- 
ference, and tended in their educational practice to obliterate dif- 
ferences, the experimentalists were embarrassingly devoid of an ade- 
quate theory to account for the idiosyncratic and personal aspects of 
individualism, but highly successful as critics of the anti-individualism 
of traditional schooling. Rugg did not fill the theoretical lacuna, 
but he did give far more emphasis to background elements in experience, 
to non-behavioristic psychologies, and to the fundamental diversity of 
modes of experience, than did any other experimentalist. In this, he 
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may be thought to have compensated in part for the unfortunate charac- 
teristic of main-stream experimentalism, of seeming to many observers to 
provide a ready-made intellectual apparatus for inducing mediocrity and con- 
formism. Neither of these weaknesses was endemic to the theory, but "social 
adjustment" could very readily be converted into "social, acceptance". 
Rugg himself saw his contribution in emphasizing and, late in 
life, analysing, expressive and creative aspects of experience, as 
going well beyond a compensation for an undesirable emphasis in in- 
strumentalism. He wished to provide that philosophy with a "missing 
dynamic". Most critics have found instrumentalism unduly preoccupied 
withforeground activity and neglectful of both a background of con- 
templation and of personally valid-experience. Rugg found it, on 
the contrary, too passive'an outlook, in accepting which one is moved 
to interested contemplation, but not to action. Those who "move us 
to action" are not the analysts and abstract speculators but the 
artists, with their "characteristic way of knowing" (48). ý Rugg used 
a historical and comparative method to demonstrate the contribution 
of"other modes of human response than that. of the experimental:. method 
of knowing" (49). He drew attention to, a difficulty many critics have 
felt, that Dewey's use of the concept of scientific method was either 
too ihclusive or too limitieds it assimilates a diversity of scientific 
modes to a single model, and then reduces all forms of knowing to the 
schematic requirements of the model. 
2.2 Social reforms Bode, Childs, Counts and Kilpatrick 
Rugg was not alone amongst the experimentalists in expounding com- 
prehen8ive schemes of social reform. Bode, Childs, Counts and Kilpatrick, 
all were attracted in one way or another by the alluring prospect of a 
new cultural synthesis, created by-intellectuals; accepted by a public 
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disheartened by the economic and moral consequences of depression; 
and propagated primarily through the agency of educational institu- 
tions. The attempt to incorporate everything in an encapsulated de- 
finition of the proposed synthesis sometimes led to, a ludicrous 
eclecticism. Paraphrasing Dewey, Counts enjoined the progressive 
movement to create anews 
"a tradition that has roots in American soil,. is in harmony 
with the spirit of the age, recognises the facts of indus- 
trialism, appeals to the most profound impulses of our 
people and takes into account the emergence of a world 
society" (50). 
Feeling the threat of havoc in the release of the great new forces 
of science and technology in industrial and economic structures, Bode 
enjoined progressives to define educational objectives and to redefine 
the aims of society. The school was to create and exemplify a new 
culture of democracy, and social institutions and practices were called 
upon to "justify themselves on educational grounds". Government was 
to extend its role through social welfare, economic intervention in- 
cluding democratization of industry,, =4 nationally Integrated edu- 
national policies. Bode went beyond the details of educational reform, 
to commend the idea of democracy, both as the free play of intelligence 
in human affairs, and as an all-embracing creed - "a community of in- 
terests and purposes". Without wishing to adopt their specific doc- 
trines, he approved the "architectonic magnificence" of the doctrines 
of communism and nazism (51)" Thus cultural synthesis need no longer 
appear as merely a vague aspiration. Working models could be demon- 
strated to those sceptics and critics whose pluralism and individualism 
was felt to fall well short of the requirements of contemporary cultural 
awareness, 
Despite their strictures on the workings of American capitalism, 
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Rugg and Bode, and likewise Kilpatrick, limited their reform pro- 
posals to amelioration of its consequences and a re-arrangement of 
its parts. To be sure, this re-arrangement included the ideas of 
a managed economy and a half-4zearted gesture towards a set of Fabian 
minimum standards. Nevertheless, despite the architectonics of com- 
munism, the culture models they proposed were essentially an abstrac- 
tion of desired elements within the existing system. Hence Bode's 
great emphasis on the democratic heritage and Rugg's attempt to identify 
the makings of a new synthesis out of selected cultural tendencies 
which had emerged in the past hundred years or so. 
More radical proposals for new directions for reform came from 
Childs and Counts. In Dare the School- Build a New Social Order?, an 
incisive and vigorous attack on the individualism and middle class as- 
sumptions of progressive education, Counts advocated the abandonment 
of laissez-faire economics and their replacement by a state-managed 
economy, and envisaged at least the broad outlines of a socialistically 
planned society (52). Counts developed an enthusiasm for Soviet com- 
munism following his critique of the operation of social class and 
inequality in America Jiro the twenties, adopting on the way a socialized, 
science-based but specifically American alternative to capitalism. 
Childs, more exclusively interested in moral issues than any other 
experimentalist, seems in the thirties to have reached a more extreme 
position than most of them by reflecting on the deep conflicts in 
American culture. These conflicts at that time posed educationists 
with sharp alternatives - there was no neutral or middle ground. By 
the 1950x, however, Childs had moved so far from the thirties' think- 
ing that he was being chided for his "new conservatism" (53). Not 
surprisingly, Counts and Childs were the most active experimentalists 
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in advocating indoctrination for a time during the 1930a. For 
them, the choice iras between the prevalence of one ideology or 
another. Seeing no possibility'of educational neutrality they 
proposed that the schools advocate and practise that ideology which, 
to them, seemed more defensible (54). 
True to his role as chief spokesman and popularizer of the 
experimentalist outlook amongst teachers, Kilpatrick avoided the 
extremes of quasi-Marxist class war and indoctrination, and romantic 
utopianism. He combined the characteristic experimentalist glori- 
fication of the democratic heritage with Dewey's method of reflective 
thinking and the Jamesian'psychology of purpose and striving. To 
this he added a recognizably Christian concept of self, together with 
selected Christian virtues and the principle of universal hedonism. 
The resulting mixture he presented as "a philosophy of life" or "the 
life good to live". 'His model of the good life, most fully worked out 
in Philosophy of Education (1951), envisaged materially comfortable, 
healthy, moderately cultivated, outgoing, sociable and well-adjusted 
citizens, living in harmonious and equitable relationships with one 
another. His account echoed the elements of smooth individual-social 
adjustment in the utopias from Plato to Wells, but nevertheless was 
offered as being within the grasp of his contemporaries. It seemed 
as, if only a little more effort all round were required to secure 
the universal adoption of "the good life". This effort was to be 
primarily educational: direct attack on the levers of the economy 
and the society seemed not to be required, least of all of teachers, 
whose task included the study of "any crucial problems of civiliza- 
tion - but it is not for educators as such to manage the social- 
economic situations" (55). Admittedly, this did not rule out the need 
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for more direct social interventionism, but the tone of Kilpatrick's Philo- 
sophy of Education had that touch of optimistic complacency about the na- 
ture and directions of cultural change which made the effort of more cri- 
tical analysis and radical action hardly worthwhile. Things generally 
appeared much better than they had done in the 1930s. Despite problems 
like cold war tensions and the unabated inequalities of American society, 
traditional experimentalist optimism could in the end prevail over diffi- 
culties. Kilpatrick posed a number of problems concerning the role of the 
individual in a mass society, the continuing risk of war, the destructiveness 
of capitalist economics, and others. Thus, he was by no means unaware that 
beneath prosperity and a high measure of social order tensions were at work 
which might precipitate crisis. Nevertheless, Philosophy of Education is much 
less critical than Kilpatrick's social commentaries of the thirties. 
2.3 Reflective-inquiry and democracy: Dewey 
It was Dewey, not Kilpatrick, who best managed to steer a course 
between the various intellectual hazards facing the reconatruetioniste 
as they attempted to delineate the general requirements of a new cul- 
tural order. Needless to say, he did not satisfy all his critics, 
not even within the experimentalist movement, and it was alleged that 
he had failed to clarify the targets of the new society, just as he was 
supposed to have failed to define targets or even criteria for individual 
growth (56). This criticism misses the basic intention of his thinking, 
which was never to attempt to define ends either as specific outcomes of 
aotion in the empirical-Fabian style or as grand schemes in the Wells- 
Rugg style. It would be more appropriate to refer to his proposals as 
procedural principles: proposals for action according to certain criteria, 
not the specification of definite ends. Thus we find that his emphasis 
continually falls upon criteria and processes not upon aims and general 
- 236 - 
models (57)" 
Dewey therefdre made his proposals in terms of defensible general 
operations. It was not a particular planned society that was invoked, 
but the processes of planning in the form of applied social intelligence; 
not particular moral qualities (although he was not able entirely to-avoid 
invoking them) but the complex, judgmental and comparative processes of 
valuing; not-an "ideal society" conceived as defined relationships, 
but the effort to achieve community through the sharing of experience, 
and the interchange of ideas. 
Basic to all'this are'the two ideas of reflective inquiry, con- 
ceived as a second order activity vital to the survival of the species, 
and a simple universalization of the notion of individual worth. The 
ideal society, then, is not any particular version known to use it 
is to be achieved not by revolutions or violent upheavals, but by the 
infusion into actual social systems of these kinds of process criteria. 
We may illustrate this by considering Dewey's views on the favorite 
shibboleth of the American reconatructioniste, namely "democracy". 
Dewey's model'of the ideal state has none-of the vision and gran- 
deur of Uella' utopias, nor the detailed infrastructure of the Webbs' 
concept of a national minimum. -But-it was, not devoid of either roman- 
tic or institutional elements. The best state of society so far achieved 
was, in his judgment, western, liberal, constitutional democracy, because 
only this democracy gave full*seope to universal, individual growth 
and" encouraged the application of scientific' method to human affairs. 
Dewey was at his most eloquent on democracyi 
"Democracy is the belief in the ability of human ex- 
perience to generate the aims and methods by which further 
experience will grow in ordered richness. Every other form 
of moral and social faith rests upon the idea that experience 
must be subjected at some point or other to external control 
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If one asks what is meant by experience in this connection 
my reply is that it is the free interaction of individual 
human beings with surrounding conditions ... the task of 
democracy is forever that of creation of a freer and more 
humane experience in which all share and to which all con- 
tribute" (58). 
However, Dewey's advocacy of classical liberalism was conditioned 
by two important considerations. These were, first, the recognition 
that science and industrialization had fundamentally altered the 
terms of social relationships and hence the meaning of individualism; 
second, Dewey shared the un-European and peculiarly nineteenth century 
American feeling for the virtues of the common man of the frontier (59). 
Democracy therefore was conceived by Dewey not primarily as a con- 
stitutional arrangement or an institutional scheme. For him, its basic 
character was communal, not institutional, relational rather than sub- 
stantial. That social system approximated to democracy which facili- 
tated the widest sharing of interest and the emergence of an emotionally 
unified public - as distinct from stratified classes, masses and elites. 
This public he conceived as a loosely organized mutuality of interest, 
whether large or small, and unified through the joint production of and 
commitment to common policy goals. Furthermore, participation in policy 
making is a process which succeeds only to the extent that it sustains 
a momentum. The institutions of democracy must be recreated through 
the intelligent involvement of citizens (60). 
If, for a large urbanized state, this seems unduly reminiscent of 
direct government of the small-scale New England townships or of Rousseau's 
argument that individual sovereignty is inalienable and should be directly 
exercised, Dewey also gave a schematic account of the principles of 
representative government and state bureaucracy (61). He was, too, 
a moderate exponent of federal government planning during Roosevelt's 
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reconstruction era. But he was far more interested in the romantic 
ideals of shared experience, fullness and freedom of contact, and 
the communal pursuit of ends, than he was in any particular forms 
of political structure. Thus democracy in his theory referred 
not only to a social system but to a quality of experience which he 
wished to ensure in any political society. This quality was com- 
munalism. No particular structure of society guaranteed it, al- 
though he seemed to think that American constitutional, represen- 
tative government, with the addition of interventionist, welfare 
policies, came fairly close to a satisfactory system. Be was thus 
opposed to more drastic solutions, like those of Rugg, ¢ounte, Wells 
and the Webbs, but did not share Russell+s misgivings about the capa- 
city of the state to act constructively towards individuals. Again, 
he did not suppose that, because the state possessed a capacity to act 
constructively it would necessarily do so. It was a task of socially 
conscious adults to ensure that the institutions of state were guided 
by democratic considerations. 
-Davey's advocacy of democracy as a liberating communal order anti- 
cipated the preoccupation of many contemporary thinkers with the prob- 
lem of the "missing community" and harked back to more traditional forms 
of religious communal life. Indeed, his democratic creed is a good 
illustration of Edmund Burke's assertion that the newer civic culture 
is in many ways a secular version of the older, religious culture. 
This, as we have seen, was true also of Wells. 
Yet, despite an intellectual debt, Dewey and Wells were neither of 
them romantic communitarians strictly. in the Owenite and Morris tradi- 
tion,. A fundamental commitment to the values they saw in science, 
technology and industrialization led the reconstructionists to argue 
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for a new science and industry-mindedness, to which schools were 
expected to make a substantial contribution. Both wished in some 
manner to see combined, in a single, new ethos, the values of small- 
scale, communitarian living and the industrial ethic. In this 
spirit, Dewey outlined the synthetic character of Democracy and 
Educations his most important study in educational theorys 
"The philosophy stated in this book connects the growth 
of democracy with the development of the experimental method 
in the sciences, evolutionary ideas in the biological sciences, 
and the industrial reorganization, and is concerned to point 
out the changes in subject matter and method of education 
indicated by these developments" (62). 
Dewey's blend of science, of aspects of industrialism and of the 
mores of the rural township of nostalgic memory may be contrasted with 
Max Weber's nearly contemporary analysis of the emerging, mass, indus- 
trialized democratic state (63). Weber's purpose was different from 
Dewey's. He was more interested to find out how such a society could 
and did function than he was to secure for it some particular moral 
character - e. g., communality, or avoidance of anomie. Nevertheless, 
Weber was keenly interested in the relationship of politics to ethics 
and, like the experimentalists, criticized those ethical systems which, 
by ignoring consequences, seemed to undermine the basis of responsible 
action. Furthermore, Weber was, like several of the reconstructionists, 
a sombre prophet who believed that western society was confronted with 
a major crisis of order which required the exercise of the utmost 
political responsibility (64). 
Like the Webbs, Weber drew attention to an intimate connection between 
the functional efficiency of the industrialized state and the rational 
management of affairs by professionally-trained experts. This form of 
control he designated the modern bureaucracy; hence bureaucracy is, or 
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rather may be, highly functional. The principal characteristics 
of bureaucracy, particularly its grounding in rational rules and 
its striving to achieve impersonality, objectivity and abstract 
equality of treatment, ensure a close relationship between its 
functional aspirations and the ideology of mass democracy, which 
likewise seeks the abolition of personal privilege, universal 
accessibility to office, and the firm establishment of equality 
before-the law (65). These considerations, as we have seen, 
were linked to a remarkable degree in the thought of the Webbs 
and are perhaps the most significant, modern development, in social 
theory, of the ideology of Destut and his fellow ideologues at the 
Institut. 
Weber noted not only Cibas'mony of iatetest but also profound 
tensions, between mass democracy and bureaucracy considered as sys- 
tems of action, since-the former seeks, through the enhanced power 
of public opinion, to contain the power and lessen the authority of 
officialdom. This power of public opinion, with the rapid develop- 
ment of mass media, is now, of course, considerably more potent than 
when Weber was writing on bureaucracy and democracy. 
From an educational standpoint, Weber's bureaucratic-democratic 
state required a very different programme of schooling from that 
advocated by Dewey and the whole experimentalist movement. In the 
one case, there is need of highly selected, specially trained func- 
tionaries, able to cope with the hierarchial and routine demands of 
office; ready to administer rules, implement policy, and disperse 
justice impartially and impersonally; and seeking, both as a natural 
extension of their complex roles and as a consequence of pressure from 
an expanding economy, to enlarge their sphere of rational control. 
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Together with these elitist functionaries, in Weber's scheme, there 
were the breakawcy charismatic leaders, and the mass who needed 
training in acceptance of and respect for the rationality of the 
officials. Discipline, however, to a quality a modern, organized 
society demands of all its members. Other needs, too, were posited, 
but the bureaucracy could not function without a basic measure of 
self control and mass acquiescence (66). 
Dewey, on the other hand, roluctant to follow the consequences 
of his identification of the inherent restlessness and dynamism of 
the emerging rational, industrial state, gave no special attention 
to elites, whether administrative$ political or artistic. Thus, as 
a matter of emphasis, the functionality of his own analyais of socio- 
economic trends was circumscribed by a moral, and a sentimental, pro- 
ference for universalizing rewards, responsibility, and experience 
itself. Shared experience, diffused authority, conjoint activity, 
the pursuit of a common culture, these on the face of it are bureau- 
cratically dis-functional. Not all experimentalists agreed with 
Dewey in minimizing or ignoring elite roles. Rugg identified deci- 
sive roles for elites as change agents and proposed what he recog- 
nized to be, in the short run at any rate, the socially-divisive policy 
of an all-out adult education campaign for the elite. 
Yet widespread rejection in the 1960s and 1970s of the assumptions 
of the bureaucratic-industrial state indicates that the functionally 
operating system may still be unacceptable and that the oommunitarian 
ideology has to be accommodated in some form. If so, the positions 
adopted by Weber, the Webbs and Rugg on the one hand and Dewey on the 
other may be treated an, in certain respects, complementary. Weber 
virtually ignored the dimensions of diffused decision-taking, and of 
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active, participation by the masses in their own affairs. The ques- 
tion of the indiscriminate status of the individual, considered apart 
from any particular distinction or even role, is of central importance 
in the democratic ideologyr, as it has been in both ethics and religion. 
Dewey dwelt at length on this question, but minimized the role of 
expert managers and culture innovators, and failed to grasp the sig- 
nificance of authority and responsibility definitions in organized 
structures or institutions. Whether in fact these two models - the 
models, virtually, of modern industrial culture and its counter-cul-. 
tune - can be integrated into a new model or world view is a question 
for the future. 
3. . 
Inevitability and Interventionism 
We turn finally, in this chapter, to the questions of how far the 
experimentalists conceived social change as susceptible to direction, 
planning and other forms of intervention. Were Rugg, Bode, Counts 
and the others who in the 1930s bewailed the crises in industrial 
civilization merely engaged in the ritual of post-hoc prophecy, com- 
memorating the nemesis of society in the grip of forces beyond control? 
Are their calls for future action to be construed as an injunction, 
mainly to themselves, to identify with the emerging forces of the 
future, to get in step with history? 
It is not surprising that Rugg, the writer in general style and 
outlook nearest to Wells, should have shown nom evidence of belief 
in the inevitable outworking of historical forces. As with Wells, 
much of his writing was devoted to the exposition of larger cultural 
trends and forces, science, technology, social organization and the 
arts. His analysis emphasized the unity of these mo. rementa, their 
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coherence as forces with a history, a moving present, and a semi- 
contingent future. But, unlike Wells, he ventured little into 
futuristic speculation, and was content to bring his trends to 
the present and to make such proposals as he had for change, not 
by visualizing future utopias, but by seeking to reform existing 
institutions. Nevertheless, Rugg conveyed the feeling of a nation 
with a destiny: the promise of American life which had been cut short 
by the depression, like an organism laid low'before running its full 
course. American culture was "emerging" (67). This feeling, shared 
to some extent by all the experimentalists, was a reflection in another 
context of the idea of manifest destiny, used to other ends by con- 
servatives and imperialists in the latter part of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. 'Rugg proclaimed manifest destiny as the guiding spirit of 
America at the time of greatest crisis, in the 1940s: 
"when our people, committed traditionally to peace and 
to aloofness from quarreling Europe, were faced by the gi- 
gantic tasks of arming half the world and training and 
equipping youth of hitherto slipshod habits and restless 
-insecurities, they rose to the emergency successfully. 
Confronted by physical danger, Aanifest Destiny still runs 
true to form" (68). 
Bode, too, shared the belief in culture emergence, though his 
expression of it lacked Rugg's prophetic emotivism. Not only was 
there a cultural dynamic driving industry, but history is also a 
battleground for the perennial struggle between the forces of evil 
(aristocracy, vested interests, etc. ) and good (democracy, the good 
life for all). In this struggle, some inner force drives democracy 
to its inevitable victory: 
"The whole drift of things has been towards the inter- 
pretation of the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness in the sense that we are members of one another, 
with a common interest in the cultivation of a common life. 
No ones not even the humblest citizen, is to serve simply as 
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a hewer of wood and a drawer of water; but everyone is to 
be recognised as a member of a great brotherhood, and to 
share in the opportunities, the achievements, and the as- 
pirations which are our common possessions" (69). 
The inevitability of the victory of democracy - the whole drift 
of things - appeared much less certain only a few years later when 
the preservation of democratic values against counter-forces was 
treated as an urgent need of the times. 
It may seem, then, that talk of the historic forces and destiny 
of the democratic faith in American culture was only a rhetorical 
and familiar way of enlisting support for it, or perhaps a ritualistic 
exercise of mutual reassurance-about-the virtues of some sacred object 
(to). There is undoubtedly something of both of'. these5 yet the ex- 
perimentalists were interested as well in the tasks of defining likely 
trends for their culture on the basis of its history. We have seen 
that the relatively easy confidence with whichhthey first approached 
this task was shattered by the unpredicted experience of depression. 
Still, the interest remained,, for example in Dewey, Rugg and Kilpatrick, 
and it was a vital educational interest since they all subscribed to 
that educational theory which directs teachers and children to the 
analsysis of contemporary culture. They needed to have some model 
for analysing this culture. Following Hegel and Darwin, the model 
they all adopted was historical evolutionism with man and his intel- 
ligence included amongst the evolutionary elements. Recognition of a 
creative role for intelligence and of the genuine novelty of ideas 
meant that there was nothing inevitable about trends they were fac- 
tors in an evolving situation which we need to take acdount of and to 
learn how to guide to even greater advantage. It is noteworthy that 
this culture model is a transitional ones no sharp breaks with the past 
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are possible, there is a legacy of cultural experience which should 
be maintained through transmission, the future has its roots deep 
in the past. When he wrote on habits, Dewey appeared very much 
as a culture conservationists 
"The best we cah accomplish for posterity is to 
transmit unimpaired and with some increment of meaning 
the environment that makes it possible to maintain the 
habits of decent and refined life" (71). 
Because they were interested not only in the impartial analysis 
oftculture but also in the advocacy, as moral norms, of the cultiva- 
tion of certain qualities of cultural experience - particularly those 
they called "democratic" and "scientific" . the experimentalists were 
led at times into a faulty analysis of trends. They did not deny 
interventionism nor did they, on the whole, think that interventionism 
could have only a limited effect, but they did isolate trends and fac- 
tors which suited their prescriptions, science, technology and indus- 
trialization, because in the "unfreezing" phase of reform they wished to 
emphasize factors making for change rather than stability; democrati- 
zation, because they wished to promulgate the democratic faith; the role 
of deliberation and intelligence in social affairs, because intelligence 
they regarded'as the central, most important human function, and so on. 
However, a more comprehensive analysis of trends might have dis- 
closed factors and forces not merely opposed in certain respects to 
those already mentioned, but tangential to them. Presumably one way 
around the difficulties of control and prediction created by the ten- 
dency of social and educational theorists to isolate in culture those 
elements in which they have an interest, is to incorporate into the 
study pro, ramnea they recommend alternative theories. Again, they 
might adopt Mannheim's recommendation to incorporate, in ever widening 
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interpretations, a host of particular perspectives. But this, too, 
is difficult, since it is tantamount to admitting that one's own 
culture analysis is partial or faulty and this is not easy for a 
theory, which is built around-the very idea of. culture analysis, 
to admit. The experimentalists were not at all distinguished by 
such impartiality of recommendation. However, their methods of 
culture analysis were not rigid, nor did they adopt in any dogmatic 
fashion a mono-casual theory of change which would preclude open- 
mindedness towards other perspectives. The later experimentalists, 
as we shall see in Chapter VIII, went some way towards achieving 
these wider perspectives by developing a method of policy making 
which required, as a first step, the effort to reach agreement on 
objectives and this required the abandonment of partial viewpoints. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CüLTÜRE -, CRISIS: MANIMI 1 
Via saw in Chapter I. I-that the Fabians identified serious problems 
of deprivation, inequality and lack of organization in British society. 
Yet the seriousness of these issues was not taken by the Fabians to 
indicate that British culture was in a state of deep crisis or immi- 
nent collapse. wells, by contrast, became increasingly disillusioned 
with the rate of adaptive change in the democracies when confronted by 
the rise of political totalitarianism in continental Europe. Similarly, 
some of the American experimentalists, for a time at least, envisaged the 
possibility of widespread breakdown of their culture. However, it seems 
that an infusion of weighty central European thought and experience was 
needed for reconstructionist theorizing to achieve a condition approaching 
apodalyptic prevision of. an impending total disaster. 
It was Karl [anaheim, who, trained in post-Kantian romantic philo- 
sophy and political and social theory, unveiled the gloomy prospect of 
west-European civilization torn between amiable but aimless liberalism 
and the violent, mindless fury of totalitarianism (1). This prospect 
of dissension and decay was dark and unattractive, but L annheim did not 
treat the decline it betokened as inevitable. By a Aotal commitment to 
social, economic and political planning, he believed the surviving demo- 
cracies could re-establish anew social order and that man's bewildered 
and divided consciousness could be reconstituted through a reformed, 
greatly enlarged, and carefully planned national educational programme. 
Mannheim shared Plato's longing for the lost unity of a previous'cul- 
tural order, and Hegel's belief in the necessary imperfection of human 
institutions. But, although he wrote with deep misgivings about present 
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and future society, communicating a sense of impending disaster, he 
was forward looking, and did not lapse either into nihilism or into 
that kind of milennialism which sees salvation as a wonderful and 
divinely inspired intervention by some charismatic leader in the 
affairs of man. 
Mannheim's contribution to the reconstruotionist theory is not 
confined to his profound and detailed analysis of crisis symptoms, al- 
though this was to make a deep impression on Rrameld and Stanley. 
Nor is his significance limited to the production of a coherent set 
of prescriptions for social planning. To the empirical methods of 
the Webbs, the philosophical reasoning of Dewey, and the speculative 
and synthetic projections of Wells'and Rugg, he'added a distinctive 
mode of culture diagnosis. This mode has been characterized and at- 
tacked, by Popper as historicist, ` but historicism"is at most only part 
of it, and how far Mannheim's theory is historicist is open to debate. 
His method is often referred to as sociology of knowledge. This term, 
despite Mannheim's own preference for it, is inadequate because it does not 
sufficiently bring out the peculiar importance he attached to the role, 
situation and perspective of the self-conscious participant observer. 
Properly trained, this observer is capable of exercising aninterpre 
tive function in grasping the Leaning of complex cultural "wholes". 
This form of self-conscious vulture interpretation is what Mannheim him- 
self practised, in both his historical studies and in his diagnosis of 
contemporary culture. It-is the constructive counterpart to the un- 
masking procedures so characteristic of the sociology of knowledge. 
The latter seeks to show how thought and action, structures as well as 
content, express both a historical reality and the interests of some 
group. Culture interpretation, or perspeotivism, is a creative enterprise 
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of the intellectual who strives for understanding by transforming the 
particular viewpoints disclosed by sociology of knowledge into a com- 
prehensive and unified total view of a cultural movement or epoch. 
Beyond understanding, the perspectivist is`interested in guided change 
and he strives to indicate the conditions which should be satisfied if 
the situation and phenomena he has described are to be directed towards 
desirable ends. That is to say, the perspeotivist is no mere diagnos- 
tician, but a culture reformer as well. Furthermore, just as by his 
method of analysis heýstrives to unify diverse viewpoints, 'so, by his 
reformism, he endeavors to create a new culture synthesis, a new, co- 
herent. order of thought. and-aotion (2). 
The importance Mannheim himself attached to the methodology of 
Culture analysis is'shown by the fact-that he devoted to it three of 
his six major books, as welly as parts of all'of the others (3). As 
with the Webba, his proposals for a methodology of inquiry are a vital 
part, of his overall strategyýof culture analysis and regeneration. 
If, his thought has a long term significance, it is because of this 
methodology, not primarily because of"his own application of it in 
diagnosing Britain! s cultural problems in the 1940s (4). We will 
look first at his methodology, then consider his views about man-society 
relationships, his diagnosis of culture crisis, and,, finally, his pro- 
posals for a planned democratic society. 
1. Methodology of Culture Analysis 
1.1 The cultural scientist 
For Mannheim, the tasks of culture analysis are not reducible to 
specific inquiries into isolated elements, such as price movements in 
economics, elite reoruitment in sociology, or voting behavior in political 
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science. Nor need, or should all scientific analysis restrictitelf 
to the models yielded by the natural sciences. For the human studies, 
especially culture analysis# the appropriate procedure is for the in- 
quirer to strive to commune with reality, to become in some measure 
part of the events he is studying. Following Husserl in this matter, 
Mannheim argued that contemplation and theoretical analysis are insuf- 
ficient. Mannheim described contemplationas of only "margin], " im- 
portance as a source of cultural understanding 
(5). Man is the son of 
his works, in Cervantes' phrase, and can, only be understood by those 
who are prepared to immerse themselves in these works. But Mannheim, 
despite his professions, did not in fact take this ancient doctrine so 
very seriously - he remained very much the literary scholar. For him, 
perceiving relationships, seeing them as "wholes", was the foundation 
of theorizing and served as a substitute for more prosaic forms of the 
"works" doctrine, such as participant observation and field studies. 
Theorizing meant perceiving relationships amongst cultural phenomena, 
including human values and purposes, and grasping their significance. 
In culture study, things and events are perceived both as individually 
unique, -which the phenomena of natural science are not, and as components 
of complex wholes. But these wholes are meanings which derive from or 
are a function of a system of interpretations which the inquirer imposes 
upon them. Once imposed,, the meanings must be tested against further 
data, and compared with the meanings adduced by other inquirers. 
1.2, Levels of meaning 
Mannheim tried to show the difference between meaning in the natural 
and cultural sciences by classifying meanings into the three levels ofs 
(i) objective meaning; (ii) expressive meaning; and (iii) documentary 
or-evidential meaning (6). We must pursue his argument. here to see how 
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understanding in the cultural sciences is supposed to differ from 
natural science understanding. 
1,2.1 'Objective meaning 
Objective meanings are those of natural science, in which the 
object is given immediately, in experience and, in Mannheim's words, 
is taken as "nothing but itself". In understanding objective meanings, 
no reference is required to the person observing or`to'his intentions. 
But two difficulties°in Mannheim's position arise here. Pirat, he 
has already argued that natural science objects are to be understood only 
as exemplifications. of, or material=,, £or,, some generalized concept, so 
itk"ia 'not clear what it is for an object in natural science to mean 
"nothing but itself". Second, -his emphasis-on relationships and the 
interpretation of "whole situations"'tends-to reduce the individually 
unique phenomena of cultural science to counters in a 'system. of more 
general"concepts.. Ihus'°the"difference between cultural and-natural 
science, which Mannheim is'seeking-to establish, becomes blurred. 
We may perhaps better appreciate the difference by noting his views 
on the sociology of knowledge and on traditional historical methods. 
Mannheim accepted the Marxist thesis of the-sociology of knowledge, 
that `in political and social'studies the interests and preferences of 
the observer distort his interpretations, but he was not prepared to 
concede that the Marxist perspective is itself'exempt from such dis- 
tortions. `iännheim's extension of the'Marxist'thesis raises problems 
of validity°in the culture'sciences. '- These 'problems Mannheim supposed 
to be different-in kind from thoserin the physical sciences and mathe- 
matics. He was looking for ,a method which would be both distinct from 
that of the natural sciences, and yet more scientific in character than 
the traditional methods in use in the humanities. Be was not content to 
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employ. the familiar, individualist historical methodology, by which 
culture analysis would be reduced to a narrative of unique, unrepeat- 
able events. Such analysis would be useless in disclosing culture 
trends. Furthermore, as we shall see in discussing his culture pres- 
criptions, methodological individualism is too closely related to 
piecemeal reformism to suit his holistic approach to reform (7). 
Just why Mannheim wished to utilize in cultural studies some of 
the relativist conclusions of the sociology of knowledge while main- 
taining a culture-free preserve for science is not at first eight easy 
to understand. This was perhaps not so much a matter of-conscious 
preference as of the enduring impact of Scheler on his thought - an 
influence which he appears to have accepted without much self-criticism 
(8). He did not, as we shall seer finally admit that relativism is a 
tenable position, but his efforts to. extricate his own thought from re- 
lativist conclusions were unsuccessful. To overcome the problem of 
validating knowledge in the culture sciences, where observer intentions 
and. preferences color. the subject matter he is studying, Mannheim pro- 
posed combining the multiplicity of standpoints occupied by different 
social observers. This combining and transcending of particular, view- 
points he referred to as "perapectivism". Leaving aside the-claims he 
made for a privileged place for-the "perspectives" of intellectuals, 
Mannheim's perepeotivism has, much in common with certain forms of 
scientific thinking. Yet lie was not prepared to accept that perspec- 
tivism, with its emphasis on inter-subjectivity and a public community 
of knowledge, substantially reduces the differences of approach in 
natural and cultural science. From his interest in analysing culture 
wholes, notably German conservative thought in the nineteenth century, 
and from his later Ideological prescriptions for British culture, it may 
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be inferred that he needed a method free of the caution and limita- 
tions of conventional historical or natural science inquiry. 
1.2.2 Expressive meaning 
At the second stage or level of meanings, according to Mannheim's 
analysis, objects acquire a "psychic content". ' For example, pigments 
and canvas, which quite appropriately can be subjected to a natural 
science analysis, at the level of objective meaninge, are given "psychic 
content"'when brought together as a "fashioned work'ýof art". The choice 
of this example does not commit Mannheim=to an-expressive theory of art 
objects which would reduce their-analysisE(at`the'level of expressive 
meaning) to a history of psychic states in-artists. Be specifically 
irarned-againstthis reductionist approaoh"'by invoking the notion of 
"objective, visual aesthetic meaning, or form" (9). -= However, he was 
not at-all clear about the differences and relationships between'the 
artist's "stream of experience" and the more abstract realm of aes- 
thetic form. 
Mannheim not surprisingly evaded the problem of distinguishing ex- 
pressive meaning from the meanings of natüral'science. Expressive 
meaning' refers, not to the psychic state of the artist, but to a process 
of"illumination of'objects, or embodiment, or'an investment of objects 
with symbolic or ritual significance. It might have been clearer had 
Mannheim called this not psychic but symbolic content. Just why' 
theis'processes of symbol-using are n6t susceptible to a scientific 
analysis-is'not clear, unless some peculiar importance attaches to a 
personal stance which"the`observer adopts towards them, as in certain 
theories of religious-and aesthetic experience. Mannheim did in fact 
attach particular importance'to the "stance" and intention of the ob- 
server in the cultural sciences, arguing that unless he adopted an 
- 254 - 
appropriate mode of address to his material he could perceive nothing 
significant (10). 
1.2.3 Documentary meaning 
At this level, the spectator, adopting the appropriate, empathic 
stance of recgptivityM'to gestalten, "grasps" or apprehends "the elements 
that go to make up the global outlook of a creative individual or of an 
epoch" (11). Thus, documentary meaning is that type which is uniquely 
yielded by the work of the culture scientist. This act of grasping, 
although psychologically it occurs at the pre-theoretical level of direct 
experience, is not simply a visionary or an intuitive judgment, free of 
the usual labors of scholarship. On the contrary, it is available only 
to those who soak themselves in details and, so far as possible, become 
actively engaged, as participantb, in the form of the activity they are 
studying. Furthermore, for a science of culture analysis of wholes to 
be possible, the understandings achieved through a pre-theoretical grasp- 
ing of meaning must be susceptible to subsequent theoretical analysis. 
We may appreciate from his remarks on documentary meaning the am- 
bitious nature of Mannheim's culture thinking: his use of the thought 
of the neo. Kantians and the phenomonologists on processes of symboli- 
zation and expression, his emphasis in sociology of knowledge on the 
particular perspective of"the observer, his translation of Uarx's 
notion of the special insight of the proletarian into a wider theory 
of knowledge through works, and his attempts to assimilate Weber's 
arguments on behalf of an objective social science. Paradoxically, 
though, Mannheim was not satisfied to treat the documentary level of 
meaning as an achievement of the synthesizing imagination, transcending 
science. Despite his earlier separation of cultural and natural sciences, 
he proposed that cultural studies should aspire to become scientific. 
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For example, the study, of politics could become, scientific, not, as 
one might suppose, 'by adopting an individualistic empiricism but by 
the perspectivist method. '- 
Mannhelmts definition of global or documentary meanings appears 
to be circular, in the sense that the-act of grasping is defined by 
reference to what we grasp i. e., "wholes" - but, for the meaning of 
"wholes" we are referred to, the act of grasping. There is the fur- 
ther difficulty of establishing the`eourcew-of any theory by which the 
validity of documentary meanings might bi established, a difficulty 
not diminished by'Mannheim's reference to 'a further "totality" which 
embraces both documentary meanings and the theory of weltansahawung. 
"Perspectivism" becomes an. infinite progress of ever larger and more 
comprehensive interpretations, and validation becomes an endless task 
of creating these larger interpretions, for which Mannheim never pro- 
vided clear criteria of adequacy. In. Ideoloavand Utopia, Mannheim 
perceived this problem and argued that there is, in politics, for example, 
only a limited range of positions to comprehend (12). However, this 
does not fully-meet the objection; because, while the positions may 
be limited, there is: no limit to the possible interpretations of them. 
In making their interpretations, culture eoientiats, in Mannheim's view, 
should become deeply involved, personally, in the phenomena they are 
studying, and at the same time aware of the involvement. The "Pers- 
pectives" yielded by the higher interpretationi, of these particular in- 
terpretations would be highly personal and subjective. It is significant 
that, 'inatead'of-analysing truth criteria in the cultural sciences, 
Mannheim chose to examine levels of meaning and to delineate strategies 
of inquiry. It almost seems an if, providing he is working at the 
"right" level, and is using an "appropriate" strategy of inquiry, the 
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culture scientist is performing his duty. Such truth as is yielded 
by his inquiries will establish itself in the intellectual market 
place by vying for comprehensiveness and insight with the products 
of other inquiries. 
is will return to these questions in considering Mannheim's claims 
to have escaped a purely relativistic account of cultural phenomena, 
and in discussing the mystical-qualities of his theory of experience. 
1.3 Methodological priority of wholes 
Mannheim made several attempts to clarify his arguments about the 
fundamental methodological importance in culture science of grasping 
wholes. For example, while protecting himself from the criticism 
that not all modes of thought and experience need to be explored in 
terms of inter-relationships, in Ideology and Utopia he asserted the 
methodological priority of wholes to parts in his own research: 
I "The sociology of knowledge seeks to comprehend thought 
in the concrete setting of an historical-social situation 
out of which individually differentiated thought only very 
gradually emerges" (13). 
This-has at least the merit of making very clear that his own culture 
diagnosis will be strikingly different from those in the tradition of 
classical empiricism. By contrast with the Webba' dual role as ob- 
jective researchers and social reformers, Mannheim was from the be- 
ginning no, methodological dualist but a culture interpreter who incor- 
porated semi-empirical inquiry into firm proposals for far-reaching 
culture change. After a lengthy review of the Weberian attempt to 
establish non-evaluative methods in the cultural sciences, he concluded 
that there is no way of eliminating evaluation in these studies. We 
should, therefore, find ways of becoming aware of our evaluations, 
and consciously rise above them to newer, more inclusive ideals. 
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Attempts to achieve objectivity and to use piecemeal procedures were 
dismissed, as a false trail in sociology. The effort to grasp wholes, 
and empiriciam, were inextricably linked in a single process which plainly 
goes beyond intellectual analysis to a definite commitment to socio- 
political reconstruction: 
"Genuine sociological empiricism can never consist of 
piecemeal observations but must always include theoretical 
reconstruction of the nature of the whole process as well 
as an emphasis on petty details ... it is the total struc- 
ture of society alone which reveals the real function and 
meaning of the parts" (14). 
Despite the difficulty he enco nteted in spelling out the thought 
structures required for the analysis of "wholes" and in trying to find 
a way of verifying the results of such analysis, Mannheim made very 
telling criticisms of the claims of value-free, piecemeal empiricism 
to any special insights or "super-sight". Facts, he argued, "exist 
for the mind always in an intellectual and social context" (15). 
Contexts are liable to change over time. Is there, then, any way out 
of purely subjective apprehensions? Knowledge can progress, Mannheim 
argued, by becoming more comprehensive: not by expanding in the crude 
way of simple accretion of facts - the so-called "knowledge explosion" - 
but by assimilating divergent perspectives. We return, then, to the 
queatibns of what is a perspective, and in what does perspectivism 
consist? 
1.4 Perspeotivism 
In outline, perspectives are the standpoints, or the socio-historical 
intellectual situations, which students of culture form as they build up 
their understanding from the objective through the expressive to the 
level of documentary meanings. Perspectives not only progressively 
define the direction of inquiry (not, however, the limits, since interpretations 
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can be endlessly reconstructed) they also define individuals, by 
structuring awareness and behavior. Thus, perspectivism is not 
merely a scholar's method, it is of fundamental importance in 
understanding human, nature. Mannheim's contradictory v1. ews on 
culture determinism and individual freedom-are discussed. later in 
the chapter. For the moment, we should note that it was with some 
satisfaction. that he saw the sociology of knowledge eliminating "the 
fiction of the detachment of the individual from the group within 
the matrix of which the individual thinks and experiences" (16)" 
Mannheim offered three ways of reducing the subjectivism im- 
plicit in his perspectiTist standpoints first, self-awareness, which 
may be achieved by combining Baconian and Freudian recognition of the 
temptations to self-delusion with a ICantian purposiveness of will, (17); 
second, seeking "the broadest possible. extension Of our horizon of 
vision", which he sometimes said was the special task. and unique merit 
of historicist thinking (18); this included making the effort to know 
other. available perspectives;. third, by recognizing that situations 
are, as it were, subject to group occupancy - that an observer is a 
member of a community of inquirers (19). 
It is this4third feature which Mannheims most severe critic, Popper, 
seems to have overlooked. . 
It resembles in several respects Popper's 
own notion of the inter-subjectivity of scientific thought, which gave 
rise to the possibility of freedom and progress in science (20), 
Mannheim, like-Dewey, attached-great importance to the growth of under- 
standing through communication of. experience. This communication is 
indispensable both for the growth of the individual - he accepted Mead's 
account of the emergence of the self in and through social experiences - 
and for freedom of inquiry in the cultural sciences. Furthermore, he 
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accepted a plurality of values in a democratic society. These con- 
siderations, and Mannheim's rejection of absolute truth, all point 
towards the inter-subjective position. However, by his opposition 
to unity of method in the physical and cultural sciences, Mannheim 
parted company with the experimentalists, for whom progress lay, not 
through the quest for a non-scientific form of inquiry, but by apply- 
ing to all studies the outlook and procedures of the natural sciences. 
Perepectivism as Mannheim defined it does not preclude a creative 
role for individual thinking in the culture domain, any more than the 
inter-subjective requirements of a mutually intelligible community of 
discourse rule out the (possibly at first unintelligible) leap forward 
by, some theoretician in the physical sciences. How far Mannheim is 
justified, in Ideoloty and Utopia, in claiming to have "clarified the 
relations between the achievements of the individual and the group" is, 
however, a different matter. At one time he wrote of "the novel and 
uniquely personal mind of the individual who breaks beyond the bounds of 
the existing order" -a figure reminiscent of Hegel's world-historical 
individual (21). At other times, reflecting the German state-philo- 
sophy stage of Hegel's thought, be substituted "the individual partici- 
pates in thought" for "the individual thinks" and reduced unique ex- 
perience to a variant of some group norm (22). Similarly, he both 
accepted Weber's model of the charismatic break-away leader, and then 
reduced the genius of the leader to a collective impulse to which his 
achievement conformed (23). "Perspectives" would seem, th8n, to be 
both culturally determining and culturally determined, a conclusion 
which casts some doubt on Mannheim's supposition that the perspeotivists, 
the intellectuals, are capable of achieving, through knowledge, a free- 
dom denied to the ordinary individual in society. 
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1.5 Relational truth 
Mannheim denied that his sociological account of the sources of 
knowledge and his perspectivist treatment of the truth claims of various 
sub-cultural groups involved him in the contradictions of relativism. 
In correspondence with the inter-subjective element in perspectivism, 
he proposed his so-called relational theory of truth. This assumes 
that in certain fields of inquiry, ' notably history and the social 
sciences, absolute truth claims are precluded not by any universal 
metaphysical considerations, but by the nature of the subject matter. 
The values and social situation of the historian and social scientist 
do not merely impinge upon his methodology, they themselves partly con- 
stitute the problem definitions he makes and the conceptual structures 
of-his inquiry. To understand cultural phenomena the inquirer must 
seek out, in the manner recommended by Husserl, the truth that is "in" 
existence, by getting into communion with it. What confidence, then, 
can. we place in the judgments of any particular inquirer or group of 
inquirers and how can any disputes amongst them be arbitrated? 
Confidence should be proportional, Mannheim thought, to the extent 
and depth of exploration, by the inquirer, of the relations that exist 
"between certain wxental structures and the life-situations in which they 
exist" (24). This would seem to imply that no inquiry can be successfully 
terminated, a problem which Dewey also encountered; or, rather, that we 
would not know what it is Successfully to terminate an inquiry, since 
relations of the kind Mannheim has in mind are infinite. This, as we 
have seen, is unsatisfactory.. It should be realized that it is a sacerdotal 
doctrine in that it invests a certain class or group of inquirers with vir- 
tually unchallengeable intellectual power, on the grounds that they alone 
are able to pursue inquiry with sufficient depth and persistence. Later 
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in this chapter, we shall see that Mannheim, following Busserl, ascribed 
a key role to the intellectuals, not dissimilar to that accorded them 
in Platonic and Scholastic philosophy (25). Having admitted that he 
had no means of eliminating evaluative factors from inquiry, Mannheim 
should have been exceptionally cautious in examining the role of in- 
tellectuals, to ensure that their particular evaluations were not 
enshrined in a form of cultural absolutism. However, he was not at all 
cautious in this respect and in the next section of this chapter we shall 
see how from relativism he progressed to relationism, which is in fact 
the distinctive perspective of the synthesizing intellectual, thence to 
a profession of faith in visionary truth, of which the synthesizing in- 
tellectuals would serve as the custodians. Mannheim's position is stronger 
when, in Ideology and Utopia, he criticizes the tendency of certain thinkers 
to hoist "the chance situation of the moment", which represents their own 
interests, into the absolute and eternal -a tendeniywhich, despite his 
criticisms of the conservatives, his own culture diagnosis most eloquently 
displays. These weaknesses notwithstanding, Mannheim usefully reminds us 
of the need for caution and moderation arising from an awareness that no 
knowledge is free of certain presuppositions, metaphysical, ethical and 
so on, and encourages his readers to be ready to change their presupposi- 
tions. 
1.6 Beyond history 
Hiowever, the tentativeness of outlook that acceptance of this encourage- 
ment would lead to, fitted ill with Mannheim's own predilections for sweep- 
ing, holistic generalizations. Beyond the methodology of the social 
sciences, beyond empiricism and documentary level interpretation, lies 
a procedure through'which access could be gained to higher levels of 
reality. This is the realm of Hegel's Absolute Spirit, whose existence 
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Confounds all the efforts of reductionist social science to explain 
away culture and experienoet - 
"One may admit that; buman life is always something 
more than it was discovered to be in aný, one historical 
period or under any given set of social conditions# and- 
that even after these have been accounted for there 
still remains an eternal, spiritual realm beyond his- 
tory ... which putr3 meaning into history and into social 
experience" (26). 
Not that Mannheim uncritically accepted Hegelian thought. On theýcon- 
trary, he criticized its "one-sided rationality" and its neglect of 
intuitionism and of the use of gestalten, in culture diagnosis (27). 
Through the use of these procedures in inquiry, Mannheim hoped to 
penetrate to some deeper- levels of understanding,, than are available 
to empiricists or even to sociologists of-knowledge. Beyond self- 
awareness, achieved through situational analysis and reflection on 
one's methodological presuppositions, lies a more eastatic., and, 
visionary realm of knowing, which almost seems to come ass, gift to 
those receptive to it. The cultural scientist becomes, a kind of 
near who, by drawing upon the insights of religion in addition to 
the fruits of scholarly inquiry, penetrates-a realm permanently feiled 
t 
against empirical approaches. Mannheim did not try to elaborate higher 
vision as a "method" or to consider whether the truths it yielded led 
into the absolutism he-was anxious to avoid, Nor did he face the, 
proble, a this "perspective of perspectives" creates. for the different 
forms of validity he had posited for the physical and cultural sciencesi- 
Th" significance he attached to religious knowledge and to ecstatic and 
visionary experience may be appreciated from the latter parts of Diagnosis 
of our Time and Freedom, Power and Democratic-Planning, where he found 
in'the moderateness of protestant Christianity in wartime Britain a 
realm of order and truth, a "basic vision of life"s which was free of 
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the dogmatic and violent excesses of totalitarian absolutism (28). 
This order, it should be noted' already existed; it had a momentum 
of its own and the task Mannheim proposed was to refine the tradition, 
revitalize it, and lead it into the future. This is not exactly a 
task for a mystic or one undergoing ecstatic experience; rhtbsr, it 
is yet another of the tasks Mannheim set the intelligentsia. However, 
the emergent rational-religious order was to contain and provide for 
visionary and ecstatic experiences. 
The transformation in Mannheim's thought which occurred after he 
arrived in England is often remarked upon. But despite his wartime 
involvement with the Christian reconstruotionista of the Uoot, convened 
by J. H. Oldham, and its influence upon his thinking, it was not so much 
a transformation as a consolidation that occurred. The basic quest 
for order was present in Ideolo _d Utopia where Mannheim's analysis 
of modern European utopianism into (1) orgiastic Chilianism of the 
Anabaptists; (2) enlightenment liberal-humanism; (3) conservatism; 
and (4) socialism-communism provided him with just those cultural 
ingredients for the mix which emerged in his later books as the "third 
way" of holistic democratic planning (29). 
Mannheim vacillated between stringent criticism of the ideological, 
interest-based and partial truth of all existing cultural theories, and 
a groping for some realm "beyond history" which would provide inspiration 
for a transcendent ideology. His vacillation eäabled him to practise two 
forms of cultural analysis. The first of. these was comprised of critiques 
of "ideological" history and social science, leading on to well-defined 
empirical inquiries of his own, Secondly, he engaged in prophetic, and 
apocalyptic, cultural overviews - studies in "crisis" and feverish pro- 
jections of planned societies to rescue civilization from imminent 
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destruction. He always insisted that planning was a factor already 
at work in culture, and that he merely wished to refine it by making 
it more democratic and efficient. Whether this makes Mannheim a 
hietoriciet, predicting the outcome of trends in present and future 
I 
cultures and reducing these to the workings of an inexorable law of 
history, is a question that is best left until after tie have considered 
his views on human nature and his diagnosis of culture crisis. 
2. Man and Cultures Human Plasticity 
Mannheim's culture crisis theory and his reconstructionist proposals 
maybe viewed against his more general theory of the interactidns between 
human nature and culture. Like Dewey, he tried to show that man is 
neither wholly determined by culture nor a being who could be defined 
outside, a cultural context. But he went beyond Dewey by rejecting 
radical behaviorism and hypothesizing an inner, non-naturalistic essence. 
Thus, man is "plastic" but not to the degree imagined by enlightenment 
environmentalists, or contemporary fascists. However, kannheim'a pri- 
mary objection to the fascists was not that they had a false view of 
human nature, although he believed they did, but that they sought to 
create, by forces a superficial, external harmony of interest (30). 
This is an ethical objection to procedures or possibly a planner's ob- 
jection to inefficacy of means, but it does not settle the argument 
about whether, given appropriate means, human nature is indefinitely 
malleable. Instead of'establishing his case by argument, Mannheim 
simply opted for the middle grounds 
"It is just as erroneous to believe that human nature 
remains eternally the same as it is to assume that it can 
be moulded at will and is infinitely plastic" (31). 
Mannheim pointed to two sets of conditions which limit this plasticity. 
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The first of-these consists of limitations in existing social and 
psychological technology: However, these presumably could, in 
principle, be reduced to the point where behavior and consciousness 
were subject to external controls through, e. g., drugs, eloctro-therapy, 
propaganda, reflex conditioning, etc. Much more has been done, since 
uannheim'wrote, to extend the range and effectiveness of manipulative 
devices, The second factor which limits behavioristic manipulation 
is the inner, spiritual "essence" of man, which is only c4pable of 
being understood by non-scientific and non-technical means, i. e., 
perepectivism, and visionary and religious experience. Thus, -to 
know man, and how his behavior and experience can be influenced, re- 
quires both science and vision, and there can be no assurance that 
vision yields methods of influencing manle innermost being. Never- 
theless, Mannheim felt that there was an urgent need to explore the 
whole'eubjeot of social control over individual action, and his own 
works were written partly with this in mind. 
Mannheim made several-ineonelusive attempts to elucidate the scope 
of individual action within society. He criticized Marxism for treat- 
ing the individual "merely as the tool of a collective leviathan" (32), 
and he accepted Weber's view that the unpredictable, charismatic leader 
can introduce genuinely novel ideas in a culture (33). But, as we have 
seen, he also argued that individual creativity, to be socially effec- 
tive, must conform to the collective impulse of a group (34). He 
referred to consciousness as mind writ large; -"of which the individual 
minds are merely vehicles" (35). Yet he argued that, although choices 
are socially structured, they are nevertheless individual and free (36). 
At times, Mannheim visualized something very nearly approximating 
the conquest of those technological difficulties which stand in the way 
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of conditioning. Institutional manipulation in particular he singled 
out as a key instrument in "man-making", and, in common with several 
reconstructionista, he was prepared on occasion to subserve education 
to processes of indoctrination. The actual methods of "deliberately 
moulding behavior" - an odd expression in view of his belief in a 
spiritual "essence" - were provided primarily by the sciences of 
eooioloý, j and psychology. In view of his criticism, in lien and Society, 
of the superficiality of fascist behaviorism, it is odd to see him, in 
Freedom, Power and Democratic- lannings disdainfully dismissing as "ob- 
solete" and "metaphysical" the question of whether human nature can be 
changed. The "true question" has become "can human behavior be changed? " 
and this is not a matter for guesswork and speculation, but for social 
science research, which can be expected to show how we may set about 
"constructing a social environment that will foster desirable per- 
sonality traits and attitudes" (37). 
By the time Mannheim wrote Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning 
he had lost much of his earlier caution. Instead of conceding that 
this kind of question is itself, in his terms "ideological", or, more 
precisely, "utopian" (38), he attempted to enlist social science in a 
highly specific and tendentious programme of social action to "remake 
human nature", not just behavior: 
"Once material conditions are manipulated from key posi- tions# the deepest layers of the self will be influenoda"(39). 
It might be said in reply to this objection that Mannheim is at 
least oonsistent, for the social sciences, according to his theory, are 
not a comprehensive, eclectic community of discourse, but instead are 
themselves structured and articulated by certain models of human be- 
havior. ' That is, they are unavoidably perspectivist, and their perspectives 
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are homogeneous. On this argument, Mannheim could claim to 
be making. 
these perspectives clear, and drawing from them implications for action. 
A review of-other social science theories, including critiques of 
Mannheim's position (e. g., by Popper and Hayek) would show this to be 
a false claim (40). If the social sciences have a distinctive "pers- 
peotive", it is in fact more comprehensive and eclectic than 1annheim 
allowed and does not logically entail the commitment of all social scien- 
tists to Liannheia's behavior manipulation. Yet, it is as well to ap- 
preciate that, Mannheim did successfully identify some very. powerful 
environmentalist and melioristic assumptions and movements of thought 
in the social sciences, and these provided him with many of the materials 
for the model of man-society relationships which he built up. This 
model may be briefly summarized: the self is not an unfoldment of 
coded potentialities; it is a product of the individual interacting 
with culture, and its integrity or unity'ie subject to continuous, modi- 
fication through experience of a changing world. Social relationships 
in primary groups are, after infancy, the most decisive influence on the 
self and they are the means by which the self may be most successfully 
modified. Various reference groups-subsequently provide norms and 
behavior possibilities and structure role performances not merely 
social classes but also vocational groups (trade unions, professions, 
intelligentsia) and, very important, generations. (benae "youth , cul- 
ture") (41). In society, groups are Often in conflict with one 
another - competition is. a "co-determinant" of every cultural product. 
an these groups seek to make their interpretation of the world the 
universal one. Education, as a social sub-culture seeking dominance, 
is no exceptions indeed, its very subject matter is the "formation 
of man". Another example is the sub-culture of the economic system, 
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whose contribution to the formation of man'ie the criterion of success, 
or, more precisely, operationalizing the ambition to succeAd. In fur- 
ther $etail, "economic man" is adaptable, rational, ambitious, goal- 
seeking', self-confident, optimistic, and prudent. Against this 
model, 'may be set "renunciatory man", whose perception of reality will 
differ from that of economic man in correspondence with his different 
ambitions. (42)" Thus, the competition of cultural sub-groups with one 
another is not simply an inter-group phenomenon, but a powerful force 
in individual man-makings their interplay produces both a "social 
entelecby" and the materials on which individual personality feeds 
and develops (43). But the process is not a one-sided forming of 
plastic human nature, because human nature' is not in fact entirely 
plastic, Also, individuals, mainly working in groups, 'react upon 
the "social entelechy",, and test their developing perceptions of 
reality in concrete social situations which themselves change as a 
rssult of individual impact upon them., 'F`urthermore, almost com- 
pletely compartmentalized in the theory the self exists beyond be- 
havior as a spiritual entity, possessing, as we have Been, the-capacity 
to penetrate a reality which transcends` social experience. 
Mannheim hold that one "can admit the autonomous structure of 
the self and yet maintain that the conception of the individual as 
an isolated entity must lead to a distorted view" (44). However, 
his own theory seems fundamentally dualistic, not as between society 
and the individual, but as between levels of experience in individuals 
and levels of reality. Useful as this dualism was as a critical tool, 
enabling him to attack Marxists as collectivists, and sociological 
nominalists for overlooking collective situations, it was to prove a 
serious obstacle to his formation of coherent educational proposals (45). 
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In making these proposals he vacillated between group behavior, mmani- 
pulation, and providing an inviolable preserve for contemplative 
and ecstatic experience. He tried to contain these extremes 
within the idea of a new democratic man, or mop. Social reoon- 
struction, which in Mannheim's view had become an urgent imperative, 
could only proceed on the bgeis of remaking man. He was both 
thrilled 
and disquieted by the possibilities of "psychological reconstruction" 
(46)., But how to avoid the dangers of manipulation? Mannheim's 
answer is that we should strive to create individuals, insofar as 
that is a task for education and upbringing, using as guides the prin- 
ciples of regard for persons as ends, and independence ofýmind. For 
reasons which are discussed below, )Lannheitt found it difficult, -to keep 
firmly to the business of man-making along democratic lines, Ue was 
not able to"make even a functional bridge between the realms or levels 
of experience. He did not wish to follow Plato, Pareto, and other 
elite theorists who divide society-into the two classes of the mani« 
pulators, enjoying spiritual insight, and the manipulated, functioning 
at the level of group structured behavior. These two, groups repre- 
eented different levels of. experience and, for-Plato it-not for Pareto# 
different levels of reality. Mannheim wished to combine them in a 
single reconstructed democratic personality, without abandoning the 
principles either of leadership or of social order conceived as col- 
lective and cohesive discipline and control. 
3. t Culture Crisis 
By the time he came to make his diagnostic overview of the condi- 
tion of British culture in the 1940s, ? dannheim had largely dropped the 
mantle of dispassionate perepectivist inquiry. Detached, self-aware, 
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sceptical exploration of the historical 'roots of the thought of ideo- 
logical reactionaries and utopian reformers was replaced by the near 
despairing plea of a convinced social reformer to his fellow-men to 
act before it was too late. In his own words, he was an "observer 
haunted by a sense of crisis" (47). This crisis was multi-dimensional, 
permeating culture at large, and, in accordance with the interactioniat 
theory of man-society relationships, penetrating into the depths of 
personality. Mannheim not only diagnosed, he feared the consequences 
of this disintegration of personal meanings and values and of the wider 
culture. He feared the power of the mob, and the effects of the 
unsteadiness of norms of behavior, He sought a democratic "middle 
way" between the non-interventionism of classical liberalism and. the 
totality of control pursued by modern totalitarian systems (48). 
Mannheim's analysis of the crisis of-the-modern democracies was 
more than a generalized prognosis of impending chaos. Diagnosis of 
our and Freedom, Power. and Democratic Planning lacked the scholarly 
detail of his earlier methodological studies and of Man and Society. 
nevertheless, in these later books Mannheim gave a schematized ac- 
count of the factors which, in interaction with one another and in 
their impingement on consciousness, comprised the crisis. 
The crisis factors combined in Mannheim's judgment to yield total 
changer "the technical and structural foundations of modern society 
have been comple)aly transformed", and "both the social order and the 
psychology of human beings are changing through and throe" (49). 
Vannheim's emphasis here is on social and psychological transformation, 
but taking his writing as a whole it is obvious that he conceived the 
inter-war years as one of the great shifts in history. Although he 
did not make this comparison, to appreciate his conception we might 
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liken It to the decay and, rebirth of culture represented by such move- 
ments as the rise of Christianity, the decline of Roman imperialism, 
the waning of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance 9. the Reforzationj, VP, the 
Industrial Revolution. Yet the analogies are not wholly adequate, 
for the new factors, of science and technology had changed saltatory move- 
ments into an accelerating dymsizaio which, for all the diversity of cul- 
tural enterprises, channelled the different, particular changes into a 
torrent rising up the narrow banks of a downhill gorge. 
Mannheim did not locate the crisis of modern culture in a single 
factor, such as the disintegrative effect of Marx's substructure of 
productive materials and relations. His various accounts of crisis 
may be summarized in a list of those change factors whose interaction 
had produced its 
The failure of liberal-democraoiea to adapt institutions 
and socio-political processes so as to control the fissi- 
parous tendencies of a semi-educated, industrialized, 
enfranchized mass. 
2. The emer6enoe of new techniques of persuasion, propaganda 
and direct, control, making the irresponsible- minority 
manipulation of masses and whole populations a practical 
possibility. 
3" 
4" 
5" 
Political and technological changes making for the dis- 
ruption of traditional authority relations and for an 
increase in personal power and in power agglomerations* 
These changes have resulted in the unco-ordinated exer- 
cise of power, and competition in society for central 
or key positions and territories. 
Conflict between exponents of the rival organizational 
principles of competitidn and regulation. 
The breakdown of traditional groups, especially small 
neighborhood groups, and the traditional recruitment 
patterns and leadership functions of elites. 
6. The disintegration of traditional, relatively stable 
value systems and patterns of customs and mores, which 
have been replaced by striving for material success, 
acute status-consciousness, and individual competi- 
tiveness. 
"2T2- 
7 a The' -increasing impact of the scienoes and of technologyºp 
both of them sub-cultures which are characterized by 
constant innovativeness. 
A8" 
9" 
Accelerating change in thought structures in all fields - 
the emergence of new thought categories, conceptual struc- 
tures, strategies of problem-solving, etc. 
The "power of the irrational" expressed'in the economic 
depression of the thirties and the rise of fascist and 
totalitarian states. 
-10. "Imbalance" and "disproportion", represented by (i) dif- 
ferential rates of change in different spheres of cul- 
ture (e. g., "lag" between morals and science) and (ii) 
one-sided human development combining the expression of 
primitive impulse with high technical skills. 
11. Psychic chaos and a deep spiritual predicament, resulting 
from the loss of traditionally accepted ordering prin- 
ciples in morald, religion and social behavior. (50) 
The reduction of Mannheim's concrete and separate accounts of the 
cultural malaise of his age to a bald summary runs the risk of obscur- 
ing, the argumentative force with which he pressed home his diagnosis. 
Yet there was in his own writing, especially in Freedoms Pöwer and 
Democratic Planning, a distinct move towards this schematic approach. 
But, despite Mannheim's skill in defining critical change factors, we 
should notice that his sohematization is basically descriptive, not ex- 
planatory, in character. Mannheim diagnosed a crisis - though by no 
means all sociologists-at the time agreed that there was a crisis of 
the kind he described - but he did not in fact explain how the crisis 
had come about (51). It was "there", it expressed itself in many dif- 
ferent spheres, and these seemed to be connected with one another, or' 
At least a perspeotivist appraisal could connect them. Yet just how 
they were connected - that is, whether causally or reciprocally - was 
never made clear. Nor did Mannheim give consideration, as he might 
have done, following his advice to social investigators in Ideolopr 
and'Utopia, to other perspectives than his own. Had he done so, he 
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might have found that these yielded a quite different awareness, 
thus 
presenting the objective culture interpreter with'the 
further task of 
examining; the, claims made by the rival diagnoses and the evidence of- 
fered in their support. 
However, despite the great range and-diversity of the crisis fac- 
tors that Mannheim identified, he was most severely troubled by what 
he called the "moral crisis"s 
t', what we call 'the moral crisisf or the crisis in 
evaluations does not simply arise from wickedness in modern 
men but to a considerable extent is due to the failure of 
Gre'tt Society to re-establish on a larger scale the methods 
of value adjustment, value assimilation, value reconcilia- 
tion and value standardization which were always active in 
small communities, and which, owing to the limited size of 
those communities, could do their work spontaneously" (52). 
This now familiar assessment of the moral plight of mass society wasp 
as we shall see in the next chapter, to make a particularly strong 
impression on the thinking of several post-war. experimentalists. 
They took Mannheim's cue and worked out a procedure for establishing 
a democratic consensus by the method of "practical judgment". 
Mannheim's description of a culture crisis is open to the objection 
he made in Ideology andUtopia to the theories of social conservatives, 
that they were over-generalized from specific situations and converted 
into absolutes. Applying this to Mannheim's diagnosis, I suggest that 
he converted a particular set of culture attributes into a culture whole, 
thus characterizing the total situation (contemporary culture) in terms 
of one set of its elements, and thereby distorting it. Taking his 
own device of "ideological unmasking", one of the useful if dangerous 
critical techniques of the sociology of knowledge, we might ask what 
interest Mannheim served in his reification of specific events and 
particular trends into determinate cultural-forces? The answer to, 
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this question i- insofar as an answer can be given, since 
"interests" 
are ambiguous, -private psychic elements as well as publicly ascer- 
tainable dispositions to act - lies in Uannheimls prescriptions for 
a planned society. Detecting in the world about him an increasing 
momentum of change, about which most commentators would itgreeq 
Kannheim elaborated change into crisis and thought to justify the 
very drastic measures whereby a cultural steady state was to be 
achieved through planning. In Sorel's terms, "crisis" is converted 
into a myth and provides the justification for building a new moral 
order. This fundamental justification is similar to Plato's, another 
participant-observer haunted by a sense of crisis, who, to achieve 
harmony and suability, proposed an even more rigorous structure of 
cultural organization and control. Both Mannheim and'Plato invested 
this control in a sacerdotal class of culture interpreters and leaders - 
the intellectual elite. While this "unmasking" of Mannheim and Plato 
helps to reveal the strategy of- their' thinking, in particular the re- 
lationship-of-supposed factual accounts to-reform proposals, it does 
not invalidate their diagnoses. If 'w® were to'accept 1anrihoim1e 
perapegtivism, the diagnoses could only be validated by-building them 
into still more comprehensive inquiries. *Mannheim avoided this scholar's 
nightmare and moved on from diagnosing crisis to planning the now society. 
4. Planning the New SocisIX 
4.1 Democratic plannin, and cultural continuity` 
In characteristic reconstructionist=fashion, Mannheim so defined 
the options for action that he was very quickly able to move on from 
the difficulties of justification to the more congenial torritory of 
propo$als for reform. The choice lay first between planning and chaos, 
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or between order and confusion. The next choice 
lay between totali- 
tarian, and democratic planning. , Since one 
is no more likely to opt 
for totalitarian planning than, in the first, instance, for chaos, we 
are left, as a result of Mannheim! e argument, with the objectives 
and 'strategies of democratic planning,, and to these Mannheim 
devoted 
the larger part of his energies and later writings, He was typically 
ambitious in stating the requirements of adequate planning: 
"the predictive strategy which strives to bring under its 
control the as yet unco-ordinated principia media of the 
social process"; " 
"a conscious attack on the sources of maladjustment in the 
social order on the basis of a thorough knowledge of the 
whole mechanism of society and the way in which it works. 
It is not the treatment of symptoms but an attack on the 
strategic points, fully realizing the results" (53)" 
To outline the total structure and major directions of a planning 
policy for democracy expresses the kind, of theoretical. ambition which 
largely passed away with the decline of nineteenth-century German meta- 
physics and social. -theory. The crisis Mannheim, delineated appeared to 
him so-grave that nothing less than. the revival of this ambition would 
suffice, and his holism provided him with what be took to be a theore- 
tical justification for making the attempt. He admitted the partiality 
of his own work and looked forward to a future age when social scientists 
could confidently embark on such heroic projects,. fortified with exten- 
siye knowledge of human social behavior. This. may have been false 
optimism, but it represents a progression over other reconstructionists 
who postulated crisis, notably Welle and Rugg. .. 
They were rather less 
conscious than was Mannheim of the problems raised by this kind of 
undertaking. 
Mannheim's planning polißy, for a whole society incorporated not only 
a diagnosis of crisis and a set of procedural principles, but also regard 
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for cultural unity and continuity., In expressing concern for a, 
renewal or, worthy elements in existing culture 9, gave voice to 
a nostalgia for the" past which is to be observed in`the writings 
or many of the reconetructionistas. - 
"The, charm. of the original pattern can often be 
preserved by giving a new meaning to former institu- 
tions and absorbing them'in the new way'-of life. 
This is especially true of those traditions which 
are still of value to society after it has reached, 
a new stage" (54). 
It was this feature of his thought that greatlyattracted Fred 
Clarke, former Director of the London ýInstitute °of Education't- where 
Mannheim briefly occupied the chair of sociology-of education. 
The Anglo-Saxon societies might, sometime in, the future need°a . _ý- 
traditional heritage, much less easily rebuilt than destroyed. 
Similarly, in discussing educational procedures for elite recruit«" 
ment, Mannheim cautioned against "wholesale 'change"., - Weshould 
strengthen or - improve- valuable tendencies; for example, iin°sbho6ls, 
the tacit awareness bf-a common background and upbringing; ýand`we-K 
should seek to readjust this awareness°to new conditions (55). 
r. _These remarks may 
be compared with Dewey's definition of growth 
as the continuous reconstruction-of experience and with Cassirer's 
plea for the continual recreation of the great works of cultureý(56). 
Change in all three theories is perceived not as & 'succession of dis- 
continuities, but a constant reviewing, testing out, and reliving of 
ideas, beliefa customs,, etc., to decide-upon their current worthiness. 
This is-difficult to envisage as &universal process-in view ofýthe_, f 
acute self-consciousness it implies, but neither Mannheim nor Dewey, 
and nor perhaps Cassirer, proposed a total self-consciousness.  Deweyi 
for instance, ýemphasized the stabilizing role of°uncriticized habits -- 
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j. n individuals , 'while Mannheim intended to' plan for the retention of 
many institutions and customs. It should be noticed that he believed 
that `oily through planning could the heritage be preserved. In this 
planning process, the scholarly analysis-of cultural products itself 
plays a vital role in stabilizing them. 
Mannheim's seleotive, approaoh to the heritage does, however, pose 
a'problem for his diagnosis of-culture crisise°-a valuable heritage is 
just one of those orderly and ordering elements1n contemporary culture 
which-hie diagnosis of to tal crisis ignored. -, Either-the crisis is not 
total, or - the heritage is not valuable., It seems that, -having made 
the necessary strategic use of'arisis, Mannheim was prepared at this 
stage`of, planning to make'a tacit retraction in respect'of several 
aspects of the heritage. ' 
to have seen that Mannheim regarded social and individual formation 
as, oorrelative, but that he had a bias towards cultural determinism-which 
combined uneasily with a belief in an`essenoe, of personal spiritual ex- 
perience. In his discussions of planning he called for a new level of 
consciousness and for the-development of policies which could,. in turn, 
". remake man". These proposals raise a-number of issues which recon- 
structionist theorists have successively and, on the whole,, unsuccessfully 
grappled lithe there include establishing an initial impetus for change, 
the relationship of elites and masses, and the intractibility of "unen- 
lightened" human nature. 
4.2 Elites as culture change agents 
For a pgogramme which involves the remaking of manj both man-makers 
and models of the remaking process are needed. How do we break the circu- 
larity which results from the argument that men as at present constituted, 
and their models for human development, are inadequate? The answer Mannheim 
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gave is the Platonic one,, 'a small elite of intellectuals; invested 
with special properties of clarity of"ineighti vision, empirical 
knowledge, political acumen, and altruism is to be given or perhaps 
to claim responsibility for major cultural decisions. This care- 
fully,, selected and trained elite contains within it the seeds of a 
new morality, although these seeds cannot adequately-develop in ad- 
vance of'the new social order which is to nourish them. The elite 
is. a vanguard, therefore, of progress, but it. will not itself reach 
maturity, or-fully"'achieve the "new. consciousness", until the new 
society is under way. Mannheim maintained that "man making" need 
not-and should not be seen as merely anAasertion, of dominance by 
the elites over the masses. The elites themselves still have much 
to learn, and, in any case, Mannheim's "third way" of planning was 
intended to. be'direoted by various democratic considerations (e. g., 
shared responsibility). However, hie ideas on elite-mass relations 
proved to be a , strange mixture of fear of mobs, communalism, functional 
leadership and meritocrscyc°ý. 'A brief review of his elite theory-will 
help to demonstrate the balance he hoped to establish between`a mass 
democracy of participation and shared responsibility, and the par- 
ticular excellences of, -a traditional: minority culture. From this 
we shall see that, for Mannheim, the remaking of man was by no means 
simply a technical matter of working from a blueprint of the "new man" 
devised by experts and insinuated into or imposed upon the social eye- 
tent (57)" 
The principle of minority leadership and decision-taking in 
different spheres of social action is, according to Mannheim, func- 
tionally necessary for both traditional and modern societies. He had 
no intention of eliminating elites from deference to some higher order 
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principles of shared: responsibility, equality and so forth", but he 
wished to redefinite their role, including its relation to popular 
consent, "and to reform procedures for elite recruitment and education. 
This, redefinition was necessary since the "crisis" ofthe"liberal do- 
mccracies had upset the traditional patterni -of: elite recruitment- and 
authority, increased their numbers, ' broken down their exclusiveness, 
and-produced the, dangerous, extremes of a growing social distance 
between"elites and masses, together with appeals'to'the leader to 
act"as"eavior. If they'were to perform the vitally important tasks 
of inspiring and recreating the life of culture, and governing and 
organizing the social system, elites would'need to Undergo drastic 
changes (58). 
The depth of crisis and the failure of, traditioni institutions 
to copeýmightsuggest the need for a drastic revision of the whole 
elite "operation in- society. In fact, : Ma2nnheimx, proceeded far more "ý. 
cautiously than this. He was fascinated-by the'working of elites 
in"Britain, "and his'proposals for reconstructing their role, recruit- 
ment and education in many ways anticipated the meritocracy of the 
post-war periods 
"The right oourw-for the democratic forces of the 
West is not blindly to attack the old ruling groups, but 
to remodel them into a transitional group more accurately 
groups, since in Man andSoci ety he divided elites into 
six main typess political and administrative; intellectual, 
moral, artistic and religious angled towards a new type of 
leadership. This can beat be effected by enlarging their 
ranks by providing opportunities of ascent for all sections 
of the population with no lover but rather higher standards 
of selection. 
"Once admitted, newcomers will absorb valuable elements 
of upper-class traditions and skills" (59). 
This would amount to an extension of the Fabian educational ladder 
into-the very centres of cultural power. Proposals both old and recent 
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to open, the Public Schools to bright scholarship holders exemplify 
the idea of an ascending ladder. Absorption, by the ascenders, of 
the sub-culture of those about them has been one of the most widely 
discussed topics in the post-war literature on education and culture. 
I 
Efforts to improve management selection techniques are another post- 
war example of Mannheim's meritocratic plea for efficiency in elite 
recruitment. He urged politicians, administrators and educators 
to identify the functional tasks of leadership, devise appropriate 
training schemes, and select those with the best-prognosis for suc- 
cess (60). 
Mannheim sounded three warnings on elite recruitment and training. 
The first we may describe as a hearkening to, the virtues of the tra- 
ditional minority culture: do not so far-operationalize the merito- 
cratic achievement principle as to eliminate the traditional modes 
of recruitment - i. e., blood and property rights. These may not be 
functionally rational but they do preserve a vital element of continuity 
and background. The second was a sociologist's warning -, & partial 
retraction of his enthusiasm for the technical possibilities of per., 
feat selection. Prophetically, he warned against lending "a pseudo- 
psychological cloak to discrimination actually rooted in class-dis- 
tinctions rather than based on the alleged basic abilities and pre- 
ferences of the pupils"s His third warning was another reminder of 
past achiet+ementss the possible dilution of standards. Like Eliot, 
he argued that it is "more important to preserve the highest forms 
of cultural achievement than to engage in sudden expansion" (61). 
Rapid expansion would prevent the elites from performing their vital 
role, of forming tastes and maturing ideas before mediating these to 
the masses. 
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Xannheim! a elite theory 'represents a bold attempt to combine 
principles of leadership and shared responsibility, but it raises 
certain problems which Mannheim himself never satisfactorily solved. 
The exercise of leadership, as he saw, could not be restricted to 
meritocratic elites modelled to a, large extent on those of an ear- 
lier period, In a, totally planned society, democracy can only be 
preserved by diffusing leadership and power widely in therperiphery 
of society. To concentrate them in a few powerful centres would-be 
to veer towards the extreme of totalitarian control, -° Leadership, 
furthermore, is a functional necessity at all levels and in all kinds 
of institutions. In a rapidly changing urban society. a different 
type of leadership from the more or lese subtle authoritarianism and 
patronage of the past is called for. - But how this diffused leader- 
ship was to be functionally inter-related with central elite control 
Mannheim did not explain. Another difficulty, Yhich; J annhein himself 
recognized, is that meritocracies may=fail-to achieve the -vitality 
they seek through assimilation of selected able, children. and adults 
into the higher reaches of power. Assimilation oould,, be a=means of 
Vitiating or destroying the very qualities which the new recruits are 
expected to contribute and which they might display in situations of 
authority other than membership of centralized elites. 
In Essays in the Soaiolo9Y of Culture,. ýKannheim stressed the 
creative, innovative, inspirational role of elites and tried to find 
a way around the problem elite"theory, itself oreatee, of social dia 
Lance between elites and masses. The elimination aar reduction of 
this distance was important for him for reaeone other than efficient 
oomuunioation and administration, although these considerations were 
not unimportant. Upon elimination of elite-maee distance depended 
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the development of existential or psychic-distance within all indi- 
viduals. Only when the individual is seen as a person by others, 
and, not, treated merely as a member of a class or a mass, can he 
begin-to perceive himself as a person, and come to appreciate his 
existence outside the role-defined situations of social life. 
This realm of existence, "beyond history", is that which sustains 
ecstatic, contemplative, private experiences - the very experiences 
which=an efficiency-dominated democracy can, easily overlook. «For 
Mannheim, as we saw 
in section 1.6 above, this realm-of existence is 
of ultimate value (62). 1.1 
11 However, Mannheim's elite theory proscribes, -no ways ofýovercoming 
the tendency of modern'society-to create new forms of distance. He- 
assumed that, because there was a trend towards democracy in contem- 
porary culture, this would of-itself virtually negate social distance. 
But his analysis, in Freedom. Power and Democratic Planning, of the 
likely consequences of meritocratic elite recruitment and training, 
showed that this trend could in fact be'deflected. %ý Indeed, his own 
proposals for revitalized elites would very likely contribute'to this 
distantiation, especially as he envisaged a-separate education for their 
aspiring members. 
The conclusion Mannheim reached on elites was ambiguous. , Elite 
formation, he rightly argued, is an inescapable and functionally ne- 
cessary factor of modern socieites. Elites'ehould be redefined to 
inoorporate the achievement principle, on grounds of fairnese°and ef- 
ficiency. In order to maintain continuity,, ways used to be found of 
preserving connections with traditional elite values and processes. 
Mannheim's arguments on these points are perceptive and sound. How- 
ever, despite his far-ranging inquiry, he did not succeed in so defining 
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processes of elite recruitment, training and performexice as to avoid 
serious problems of cultural discontinuity, loss of vitality, the 
creation of distance between leaders and led, and possible lack of 
agreement amongst-the leaders themselves. Popper's oritioism, that 
Mannheim's perspectivism does, not answer the question as. to which 
tendencies in an age we should identify vrith,, is particularly apt 
at this point. Mannheim, in this respect like the Webbs, detected 
the-two tendencies, or "trends" of managerialism through revitalized. 
elites, and the democratic diffusion of leadership and widespread 
sharing of experience, and tried to combine them in a single theory. 
They are by no means easy to reconcile, and the result of Mannheim's 
attempt at synthesis is that an incompletely analysed theory' of meri- 
tocracy is given precedence over questions of, mais participation, shared 
decision-taking, and the validity of mass culture. 
In DMIAno s of, O r Time Mannheim. assigned''to the religious-moral 
elite the delicate task of establishing in the new society a quasi- 
religious world view, a core of consistent rallies and norms of conducts 
the-now spiritual order. Traditional Christianity could no longer suc- 
cessfully provide this, so a new secular clerisy was required to define 
this new public ethic. In every planned society, he foresaw, there- 
will be "a body somehow similar to=the priests, whose taek'it will be 
to watch that certain basic standards are established and maintained" 
(63)" Such bodies have emerged, for example, to sustain the thought- 
restricting activities of totalitarian leaderships. There is a long 
history of clerisy proposals in British cultural theory, as Williams 
has shown (64). Mannheim agonized over the problem of individual 
conscience, freedom of inquiry, and consensus, but he did not seem to 
appreciate that thoroughgoing clerisy proposals beg the question of the 
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cultural validity of, the values and the way of life of the-ordinary 
man. Industrialization and the various other crisis factors, ac- 
cording to Mannheim, have destroyed the hypothesized older social 
and psychic unity; some "vision of aims" is required to restabilize 
culture sufficiently to enable freedom itself to operate. At times 
in his thought, consensus appeared as an achievement of reconciliation 
between different viewpoints. At other times, it was clearly a, form 
of best interest or good for the community which an inspired minority 
would divine, formulate, and promulgate through educational' and propa- 
gandist means (65). 
Mannheim could only assert that the third way of democratic plann- 
ing, with its inbuilt safeguards symbolized by Liberal-Christian virtues 
of mutual help, social justice, individual liberty, etc., would establish 
a balance between laissez-faire and totalitarian tendencies, between the 
aspirations of the masses and the insights of the few. -He`was unable 
to show that this very difficult balancea. could 'Wreasonably expected 
to emerge, nor how the authoritarian possibilities inherent in his 
elitism and total planning could be forestalled. Instead, by proposing 
"'elaborate structural apparatus of planning,, with a key innovative 
and control role for elites, and a limited system of institutionalized 
checks to the highly centralized exercise of power, he'left far too much 
to the chance that those actually exercising cultural and social power 
would do so in' the liberal, tolerant spirit he envisaged (66). 
The demands Mannheim made of the elites are not easy to reconcile 
with his assessment of the psychic depths of culture crisis. Personality 
and stability of character, he argued, are required in an uncertain environ- 
ment and in unpredictable' situations;, so also are suppleness, adapta- 
bility, decisiveness and far-sightedness, as well as technical skill 
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and group-cohesiveness. Mannheim himself argued these were new 
requirements, not needed in a "static society". But how were they 
to emerge? if they were not needed in the society of the past, they 
would presumably form little or no part of the heritage which was to 
be preserved. His own theory of the cultural formation of personality 
made it unreasonable to expect that the very qualities needed to direct 
and stabilize a chaotic world could be produced by it in a manner suited 
to the. proper education of the emerging elites. Since he had no way 
of accounting for the emergence of these traits in the right people 
at the right time, it would have been more reasonable for Mannheim to 
place lose reltanee upon them, and to divest the elites of some of that 
power whose defensible exercise depended on these and a variety of 
equally, unpredictable virtues. 
Despite his argument that his form of planning expressed demo- 
cratio values, it was not so much the criteria of consideration for 
others, justice, freedom, and the sharing of experience that provided 
key concepts for Mannheim's planning strategy, as elite formation, 
the role of elites in preparing a new ideology, and their tasks in 
implgmenting and administering it (67). Central to the ideology is 
the remaking of human consciousness, whereby the elites themselves 
attain maturity of outlook through self-knowledge and devise the 
frameworks for total community growth. Mannheim's descriptions of 
the "new man" typically and obscurely combined the extremes of the 
striving, economically ambitious individual and the mystic undergoing 
ecstatic experiences in communion with a transcendent reality. An 
analogue to the obscurity of these relations within personality is to 
be-found in the social and authority relations among the elites. 
Mannheim divided them into two sets, those responsible for political 
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and organizing functions - the Marthas as it were - and the intro- 
spective, reflective, contemplative Marys (artistic, moral and re- 
ligious elites). It is of course no simple problem, as Plato ap- 
preciated, to show how these two functions of leadership may be 
combined in an organic society. 
Around this central cluster of ideas on leadership functions, 
Mannheim built an analysis of the needed forms of planning in future 
democratic societies. These forms were intended to operationalize 
the democratic ideology, the "third way" between totalitarian central 
control and laissez-faire indifference. Zones of freedom or spheres 
of individual initiative and various other checks to the indiscriminate 
exercise of power were proposed as a safeguard against arbitrary action. 
Planning was to be not merely functionally rational, producing a co- 
herent but senseless system; it was also to incorporate substantive 
rationality - i. e., individual rational judgment was to be stimulated 
and not suppressed in the impersonal procedures of building and main- 
taining social systems. Consensus was to be sought and the creative, 
emerging power of youth was to be incorporated into decision-making 
(68). 
Mannheim's emphasis on planning for freedom and rationality might 
be thought to counterbalance the possibility of dominance by dictatorially- 
inclined elites. But Mannheim undermined his own position by demonstrat- 
ing'some of the critical problems arising out of the exercise of power 
by elites. While firmly advocating the cultivation of'"living forces4' 
through planning he could give no assurance that the centrally important 
role of elites would be performed with due respect for human diversity 
and freedom. Despite the impressiveness of his ideological structure 
taken as a whole, his several critics are justified in pointing out the 
t 
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esrigus dangers of totalitarianism inherent in his position. These 
he might have avoided by making a more cautious-appraisal of the wider 
problems; of, ltberal-democratic society in the thirties and forties - 
an admittedly difficult task, given his experience of and sensitivity 
tq laissez-faire collapse and the. rise of totalitarianism. A drastic 
appraisal, however, led him to make drastic proposals for cultural re- 
ordering. Had the "facts" or the cultural situation been differently 
selected, the prescription, for change might also have taken a more 
cautious form. Total planning requires the assurance of adequacy 
of procedure and resources and general acceptability of policy objec- 
tives. Mannheim's account, for all its imaginative power and intel- 
lectual vigor, gave insufficient reasons for supposing either adequacy 
or acceptability, 
5. Historicism 
The question of Mannheim's alleged historicism was postponed, ear- 
lier in the chapter, until hie culture diagnoais, and scheme of recon-, 
atruction had been considered. The reason for this postponement is 
that Lannheim's own practice as a culture interpreter throws, light 
on. hie methodological discussions. 
Even after the review of his culture. interpretations, however, no 
definite answer can be given to the question of Mannheim' O, hiatoriciams 
There are two reasons for this. First, it is,, by no means as simple to 
make a clearcut analysis of historicist elements in theories of social 
change as Popper imagines. Second, there is sufficient ambiguity and 
vacj. llation in Mannheim's methodology and his reconstructionist proposals 
to leave the question open. Despite these difficulties, I shall, con- 
eider how far he was committed to any definite meaning we can give to 
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the idea of "historicism". 
Popper's definition presents historicism as an approach to 
the social sciences which assumes historical prediction to be their 
principal aim and that that aim is to be realized by detecting "laws" 
or "trends" which underlie the evolution of history (69). This is a 
stipulative definition which at first glance narrows down the wide 
meanings of historicism in Mannheim's own methodological writings. 
In these latter, historicism appears variously as# 
1. The epitome of the contemporary eocio-historical out- 
look (and therefore hardly a singlo thesis). 
2. An idea which is crystallized in the concept of evalua- 
tion, thus providing an organic law of change that or- 
ganizes separate motifs, forms, ideas, etc. 
3" 
4" 
A form of understanding directed at the innermost struc- 
ture and inner meaning of all-pervading change. 
An orientation towards the world by which one gets "in 
tune with what actually is working itself out in the 
turmoil of history" (70). 
These propositions fit Popper's definition. Furthermore, Mannheim's 
position is consistent with the following "anti-naturalistic" doctrines 
of historicism, as Popper has outlined theme that there can be a metho- 
dological separation of the social from the physical sciences; that 
social life is complex; that social prediction is inexact; that 
objectivity and evaluation are complicated by observer. -observed re- 
lations (he tried, unsuooessfully, to avoid Popper's corollary, that this 
leads-to relativism); that, because the group is more than the sum of 
its parts, methodological holism is warranted; and that there is a 
role for intuitive understanding. Mannheim accepted all of these, 
but, since many other social scientists who are not, according to 
Popper's definition, historicists also accept them, these doctrines 
do not of themselves commit Mannheim to a historicist position. In 
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addition, Mannheim accepted the following doctrines of historicism,: 
which Popper` has called "pro-naturalistic": that long-term predie= 
tion is possible (but he does not follow "the model of Newtonian 
astronomer'+)i and that social movement is determined by social 
(historical) -forces (but he does not accept the implication of 
"wholly determined"). 
A major difficulty of the two lists of doctrines, "pro" and "anti"- 
naturalistic, that Popper ascribes-to historicists is that many items 
in the one get cancel out those in the other. In particular, most of 
the anti-naturalistic doctrines specifically reject the notion of exact 
and precise historical prediction. Such-"laws" as they posit are in- 
, 
deed different from natural science laws and provide no grounds of as-. 
surance, for predictions. The single'term "historicism" is confusingly 
and misleadingly applied to each a very diverse and conflicting range 
of positions. 
Mannheim does not himself escape this difficulty, since he'Used 
the term historicism to cover a variety of outlooks, from a belief in, 
the workings of evolutionary laws in history to a method of inquiry 
which seeks to understand and interpret cultural phenomena historically 
and developmentally. Several of Popper's criticisms of U8nnheim's° 
theory are sustained by the latter's ambiguity and his looseness of 
expression. Also, Popper effectively attacked Mannheim'e holism as 
a methodology which cannot be verified by scientific means, and his 
utopian planning for its moral confusion. But Popper did not succeed 
in his more fundamental objective, which was to rebut Mannheim's 
(amongst others') theory as historicist. 
The reason for this failure is that Mannheim was not in fact com- 
mitted to the belief that the social sciences aim at historical prediction 
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by detecting laws. Despite his acceptance, in a very early essay, 
of the tenets of the historicist theory of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, and his strategic use of the ancient rhe- 
torical argument that his reform proposals were "on the side- of his- 
tory", he was funuamentally an interventionist. Popper appears to 
have accounted for this by arguing that the historicist admits activity 
in the form of cultural midwifery. But to reduce Mannheim's methodo- 
logical procedures of culture interpretation through "perspectivism" 
to the prediction-of laws and trends is to overlook Mannheim's own 
arguments concerning "relationism"s that many standpoints provide valid 
insights into cultural phenomena, and that the observer must try to appre- 
ciate his own assumptions and to relate different interpretations to one 
another. These intellectual activities, furthermore, have the very im- 
portant function of consolidating, stabilizing and recreating the very 
phenomena to whose understanding they are directed. This is very dif- 
ferent from adducing law-like movements, even if Mannheim himself at 
times seemed to think he was doing this - as, for example, in Essays-on 
the Sociolor of Culture, where he described the trend towards democrati- 
zation as "inevitable". Again, in Man and Society, he proposed a "predictive 
strategy" to identify the principia media and bring them under control. 
These prinoipia media, however, on Mannheim's own perspectivist theory, 
are not simply forces emerging in history, but a form of interpretation 
and hence a form of possible control. 
So much for the method of analysis. As we have seen, Mannheim's 
later work was not primarily analytic in this sense, nor predictive, 
but prescriptive. Although he predicted a culture crisis, this was 
partly a strategic device, and an unfortunate one, in certain respects, 
for justifying the elaborate apparatus of a planned society. To treat 
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this apparatus of planning as cultural midwifery is to invest the 
midwife with an even greater generative power than did Socrates, 
in his artful account in The Meno of how he attended to the birth 
of tha slave boyfo ideas. 
Thus, Popper's decisive argument against historical prediction, 
that-it takes no account of the unpredictable impact of human know- 
lodge on future events, does not apply toi annheim. He himself hoped 
to contribute and to stimulate knowledge' and understanding which 
would help to transform the trends he detected into a more eatie- 
factory social system. His knowledge was, he admitted, partial, and 
he believed that cultural studies and social sciences were still in 
their infancy. True to his role of reconstruotionist, he-believed 
that the creation of ideological programmes through the fusing of empi- 
rically grounded knowledge, values, and' various principles of organi- 
zation of ideas was one way in which the politically powerless intel- 
lectual could justifiably seek to intervene in events. Ile tried to 
relate the structures he devised to trends -in cultural and social 
affairs, but this was a form of historical interpretation, which 
Popper himself was prepared to concede has value, however much-he 
disagreed with the conclusions Mannheim reached. 
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Cii. RPTER VIII 
LATER EXPERIMENTALISTS 
Reconstructionist thinking in education, in the post-war period, 
has expanded and diversified in ways hardly imagined in the earlier 
period of the movement. Two or three examples will suffice to demon- 
strate the variety of issues which a thoroughgoing analysis of the con- 
temporary development of reconstructionism would need to examines the 
enrolment of educational institutions in the design of "counter-cul- 
tures"; arguments about the politicizing of educational theory; and 
the use of education as a major instrument of development policy in 
flew Societies. Careful studies of the educational significance of 
these-wider trends is badly needed, especially as there is a growing 
tendeny, to treat educational processes as instrumental to more exalted 
political ends (1). 
However, a much less ambitious exercise than that is more approp- 
riate here as a single chapter which terminates the first part of ray 
inquiry into the development of reconstructionist thinking in the twen- 
tieth century. Since it will be an exercise that seeks to identify some 
of the points of continuity and contrast with what has gone before, I 
shall limit my discussion to a small group of writers who consciously 
related their thinking to the experimentalist movement and who explored 
particular points that they felt their predecessors had failed to de- 
velop adequately. These writers are Brameld, Frank and the "social 
consensus" school of Bonne, Raup, Axtelle, Smith and Stanley. The 
themes I shall discuss area culture crisis; order; integration and 
world core culture; consensus; and scientific rationalism. They evoke 
ideas that are familiar in the context of earlier contributions to 
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reconstructionism, but the treatment-of them in post-war society 
brings out new emphases and a different sense of the characteristic 
reconstructionist feeling of impending- crisis. 
1. Diaagnosis of Culture Change and Crisis 
1.1 Brameld 
More than any other of the post-war reconstructionists, Brameld 
has maintained the tradition of generalized culture diagnosis developed 
by Rugg and Wells. In one of hie later works, Education for the Emerg- 
in A e, Brameld claimed that on two.. counts his theses concerning cul- 
ture. upheaval were not simply a recapitulation of the doctrines of the 
thirties. First, he said, domestic (American) and world situations 
have dramatically changed, making the parochial reconstructionism of 
the thirties inadequate as a framework for the discussion of the con- 
tribution of education to the new tasks of international development. 
Second, understanding of educational processes, their cultural poten- 
tialities and their limitations, has been greatly enhanced by the growth 
of the behavioral sciences (2). Of course, neither of these points in 
itself establishes Brameld's claim to have gone beyond his predecessors. 
The fact of rapidly changing cultures throughout the world r#quires of 
reconstructionist theorizing a different strategy and content of culture 
diagnosis, but it is doubtful whethet Brameld has provided this. His 
second point, too, sets a requirement"for reconstructioniat theory, which 
is highly relevant, but has yet to be satisfied. The growth of the 
social sciences, yielding new techniques of inquiry and models of ana- 
lysis, makes it possible to develop new educational perspectives, for 
example, on the educational control of prejudice, and on the role of 
education as a culture change agency, in relation to other social systems. 
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Büt this enhanced `underatixiding is 'only a possibility "in the situation. 
Whether Brameld has stiiificsritly developed re constructionist theorizing 
beyond ghat his predecessors achieved is 'question that can be answered 
only by considering the strategy"and the 'content of his `diagnoüii®. 
1.1.1 Stratep7 of Inquiry 
The strategy that Brameld has used-is in some respects similar to, 
and in others significantly different from; thät, of his predecessors. 
The similarities are more apparent in. Brameld's own essays in sub- 
stantive culture diagnosis, which are, however, to some extent in-' 
formed by the concepts of contemporary culture science, whereas 
the differences are more obvious in his most incisive and'thorough 
theoretical contribution to culture analysis, Cultural Foundations 
of"Edücation (3). 
Taking this latter book first, the feature that stands out most 
obviously is Brameld's skill in analysing and interpreting a very 
large amount of the literature of culture theory, primarily anthro- 
pological and, to a lesser'extent, philosophical and sociological. 
Cultural Foundations ' of Education was intended, throu ;ha review of 
literature, to provide a foundation for educational study and practice 
and not as a study in its own right in philosophical anthropology. 
however, in hit critical analysis and in his systematic exploration 
of a methodological structure for culture study$ comprising three 
categories of order, process, and goals, Brameld made a more sig- 
nificant contribution to culture theory than any of the reconatrcto- 
tionists, apart from Dewey and Mannheim. We shall return to this 
book in Part tI, where t discuss some of the educational issues that 
Brameld raises. 
Despite his familiarity with the modern literature of theoretical 
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anthropology and his own, achievement in developing a synthetic frame- 
work for inquiry, Brameld made relatively little use of this frame- 
work in his own substantive studies, of - contemporary culture in America. 
In practide, the strategy he used was the familiar one of the intuition 
of culture wholes -a process which Brameld describes in the language 
of Mannheim as providing a "culture perspective". 
The identifying of culture wholes is an element in the methodology 
Brameld outlined in Cultural Foundations of Education, but it is only 
one element, and on Brameld's own account the culture wholes approach 
is in need of considerable refinement. The need is evident from his 
own subjective and impressionistic identification of crisis and trends 
in contemporary culture. Brameld's intuition of culture wholes is 
directed towards trends and crises in world-wide contemporary culture, 
not merely American culture, as in the writings during the thirties of 
most of the experimentalists. Furthermore, it embraced the culture 
of the underdeveloped and the developing world - e. g., Puerto Rico 
axed Japan. The perspective has to be broadened, according to Brameld, 
to take in the leading ideas popularized by development theorists, 
particularly the gross idea of planetary-transformation through indus- 
trialization and urbanization. , In addition, the perspective has been 
qualitatively changed by the emergence of new factors, or the con- 
sciousness of new factors, rocketry and space exploration, population 
explosion, etc. (4). 
The intuition of culture wholes is strengthened, Brameld claimed, 
by an-awareness which was denied to his predecessors; that provided 
by social sciences developed in recent years and unavailable to 
earliqr writers. Yet it is difficult to see just how this knowledge 
has in fact transformed the typical reconstractionist strategy of inquiry. 
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Bra meld attempts to organize -a large mass of data through massive. 
generalizations in which empirical and prescriptive elements are 
entwined. Again, like Mannheim, Brameld cast his analysis of cul- 
ture within the mould of crisis and thereby made the strategic leap 
right across problems of justification and into the domain of policy 
programming. 
1.1.2 Crisis of contemporary culture 
Characteriatically, in Patterns of Educational Philosophy, Brameld 
introduced his discussion of the culture of contemporary America by 
immediately invoking crisiss 
"we propose to characterize the man-made environment 
of the present period of history as a crisis culture. By 
this is meant that our institutions, habits, symbols, be- 
liefs, faiths are almost all infected by chronic instability, 
confusion, bifurcations, and uncertainty ... our culture may 
be dia6nosed as, in grave respects, a schizophrenic cul- 
--tune, that is, a culture split by its own internal con- 
flict" (5). 
But to live in daily awareness of this acute crisis would be 
unbearable; people commonly adopt the defence mechanism of over. 
looking or deliberately ignoring many symptoms of "abnormality" in 
culture. Thus, Bremeld presents a picture of a culture in crisis 
and a population bent upon concealing from itself knowledge of this 
crisis, If America, as the leading world power, is to exercise res- 
ponsible leadership, its citizens must replace concealment by die- 
cloeure. They must'reoognize the crisis of their times and it is 
in this task of recognition that Brameid offers to guide them, even 
though, according to his own definition of crisis, awareness would 
impose heavy burdens on already overstrained personalities. 
-Ire different books, different accounts of this crisis are given. 
In Patterns of Educational Philosou y, the crisis consists of a set. gf 
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unoo-ordinated oppositions or possible clashes within contemporary 
society and thoughts self interest versus social interest, planless- 
ness versus planning, nationalism versus internationalism, absolutism 
versus experimentalism, man against himself versus can. for himself. 
To these Hrameld added a series of massive transformations or revolu- 
tions: the revolution in technology, in economics, in politics 
(the 
cash of, e. g., communism, democratic socialism and fascism), in abun- 
dance of goods, and in human power (6). 
In his later work, the new edition of Education for the Emer i. ný 
Age, Brameld asserted that fundamental change was a "basic fact", and 
he proceeded from this fact to "the great imperative confronting American 
schoolal to transform them into powerful institutions of cultural change 
toward the goal of a planet-wide democratic order". % by this imperative? 
Because - an argument Mannheim exploited - if left alone (i. e., "unrecon- 
structed"), culture will "collapse of its own frustrations and conflicts" 
(7)" 
Braxield identified the crisis of culture during the 1950s as a aeries 
of large scale transformations and imbalances which ultimately impinge 
on individual consciousness: the impact on international relations and 
industry of nuclear energy and weapons* the succession of international 
tensions and growth of violence, rocketry and space exploration and 
population explosion. These are a sample of the world-wide trans- 
forming forces of which whole populations should become more aware 
as a first step towards imposing control and order upon them. Within 
the 'United States, Brameld implicitly linked the transforming. factors 
with an unanalysed thesis of decline. Not merely was the United States 
changing, it was changing for the worse, or at any rate failing to achieve 
what it should be achieving. These domestic change factors included 
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deterioration of political relations with the world at large, uncer- 
tainty over minority rights, lack of union radicalism, acceptance 
of middle-class values of the meaner sort, and complacency 
in an era 
of prosperity. many commentators might-agree both with-the 
descrip- 
tion and the assessment of these factors without, however, sharing 
Brameld'a confidence that through the agency of a reformed system of 
public education they could be significantly altered in direction 
or intensity (8). 
In view of his strictures on American domestic trends of the 
19509, Brameld not surprisingly has come to support many of the 
more radical tendencies of the 1960s: the and of complacency over 
the values of a materialistic civilization; attacks on American- 
foreign policy, especially-in Asia; demands for greater member par- 
ticipation in institutional life; civil rights and so forth (9). 
This support underlines the essentially prescriptive character of 
his cultural diagnoses; they always appear, whatever their specific 
content, not as objective descriptions of cultural phenomena, but 
as persuasive elements in an integrated, comprehensive pro6ramme 
of action, that is, as ideologies. Thus, when Brameld refers to 
the contribution of the social sciences to cultural-awareness, he does 
not seem to have in mind a dispassionate, inter-subjective community 
of understanding; he means instead that the=social sciences have 
yielded methods and materials- which might be used as weapons of re- 
form. This may be the reason for his failure in his own cultural 
studies to make much concrete use of the eclectic framework of cul- 
tural inquiry which he discussed in Cultural Foundations of ; duaation. 
Had he worked within that framework, he would have been considerably 
constrained in his enthusiasm for specific programmes of change. In 
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view of the poverty of methodological analysis of the crisis concept, 
which he himself noted, Brameld may have been led to the awkward con- 
clusion that nothing so simple as a highly generalized condition of 
crisis and breakdown emerges from a dispassionate, comprehensive in- 
quiry into contemporary culture. 
Despite his contribution to defining a cultural content for 
educational study and practice, Brameld's diagnoses do not appear to 
have progressed significantly beyond those of Rugg, nor gone so far 
as those of Dewey, in synthetic interpretation, or the Webbs, 
in de- 
tailed empiricism. An illustration of the more prophetic and intui- 
tional character of his holism is provided by Brameld's identification 
of "probable events" in education that will accompany the impending 
revolution in the behavioral sciences. These events are: 
1. strengthened federal authority in the conduct of 
public education; 
2. better paid and better prepared teachers; 
3. a more strongly organized profession; 
4. reorganized curriculum. 
In Cultural Foundations of Education 33rameld had more prudently 
substituted "desirable" for "probable", in his discussion of the impli- 
cation of cultural theory for education. The "trends" he subsequently 
identified in Education for an Emerging coincide with his own as- 
pirations for education and they conveniently overlook more complex 
issues, such as that: 
1. strengthened federal authority has been accompanied by 
movements towards local control in American education; 
2. events 2 and 3 above are both relative and are meaning- 
less when treated in isolation from trends in other 
professions; 
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3" the reorganization of curricula did occur curing the 
late fifties and the sixties, but in part as a re- 
sult of social and intellectual forces towards which 
Brameld is hostile; for example, the U. S. -Soviet 
space race, and the intervention of university sub- 
ject specialists. 
The content of Brameld's intuition of large-scale cultural trends 
and problems was'thus different at particular points from the holistic 
intuitions of his predecessors, but the fundamental strategy remained 
the same. However, he did introduce a type of awareness which many 
of his more optimistic predecessors lacked - an-awareness of barriers 
to change. Amongst the "buttresses" needed by future reoonstructionist 
theory he included an "adequate theory of social forces" (11). ' But, 
while he criticized the lack of a theory of social forces in educational 
theorizing, he has not developed a strategy of change which explicitly 
accounts for resistance to change or endeavors to overcome such resis- 
tance. In Cultural Foundations of Education he laid the'grouhdwork for 
such a strategy, but he does not appear subsequently' to have worked it 
out in any detail (12). 
1.2 The psycho-cultural arproacho Frank 
1.2.1 Cultural change and personal gwtrh 
No explanation of resistance to change would carry conviction if 
it ignored forces and resistances within human personality. The ques- 
tion which reoonstruotionists should ask is not simply "how does imper- 
sonal culture change? " but "how does man change? ". The historical 
pursuit of one set of answers to this question forms the subject matter 
of Passmore's The Perfectibility of man. Psssmore's demonstrations of 
the duration, complexity and ingenuity of`this quest in the history of 
thought make it clear that further progress, if it occurs, will in some 
measure be the result, not of prophecy and general culture prescriptions, 
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but of close attention to the immediate cultural milieu of inter- 
personal behavior. Realization of this lies behind many of the 
more recent methodological departures in change theory; e. g., 
T-group and achievement motivation, to name but two of the more 
significant ones (13). 
However, some of the recent reconstructionists have taken a 
preliminary step, drawing together the two more extreme positions 
of macro-cultural analysis (as practised by Wells, Rugg, Mannheim and 
Brameld) and the. non-contextual schools of individual psychology 
(Freudianism, hormic psychology, laboratory behaviorism). This 
intermediate step has not been the exclusive contribution of any one 
thinker or group of thinkers. Those contributing to it, however, 
include so-called "psycho-culturists" - notably Frank. 
, 
For many of the reconstructionists, personality is an inference 
from culture. Their recognition of an element of individual crea- 
tivity-must be seen in the light of their belief in human plasticity 
and the growth-directing power of sub-cultural groups, and the sym- 
bolic, system of the wider culture. The reconstructionists, on the 
whole, have been deeply imbued with the Durkheim tradition of social 
facts and conscience collectives, by the neo-Darwinian emphasis on 
behavioral adaptation to changing environments, by Mead's theory of 
mind as cultural product, by naturalistic denials of a duality in 
human nature, and by the overall social science preoccupation with 
the externals of observed behavior. These Intellectual perspectives, 
rather than those referring to the dynamics of inner behavior, have 
provided the reoonatruotionista with their models of thought and 
action, and led them to infer human personality from culture ex- 
perience0 
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With the limited exceptions of Wells' exploration of the psychology 
Qf old and new man in his social utopian novels, and perhaps Rugg's 
studies in creativity, Frank's work is the only example, inrecon- 
etructionist theorising, of systematic analysis of the nature of the 
psychological experience which is required for - indeed, is a central 
part of - cultural renewal. 
Dewey provided the groundwork for Frank's psycho-culturalism in 
his ideas on interactions and transactions between persons and environ- 
ment and in his Work on processes, of habit formation and reformation, 
experiences and growth. Dewey's inspiration was acknowledged by 
Frank, who said that the main points and procedures of his paper 
"Culture and-personality - the psycho-cultural approach to a demo- 
cratic social order" were based on Dewey's Essays in Experimental 
Lo o (14). 
For Frank, culture renewal is-not simply an aspiration of the 
utopian mentality - one option amongst many " it is a. necessary con- 
dition of individuality and personal growth. He rejected the en- 
thusiasm--; of his predecessors, especially Counta,. for, mapping out a 
future social order which the school was expected to bring. into exis- 
tence. His method--was to specify the-interactive processes of cul- 
ture-personality relationship, although reference to democracy in the 
title of his paper made his ovrn-social preferences clear. 
Man and his social order, Frank argued, may bebest understood 
through the psycho-cultural approach, which itself is a synthesis of 
underatandinge yielded by social sciences and the arts. Frank did 
not expand the structural features of this synthesis, which sounds 
rather like the aspiration of Dilthey and. -his succesaorsýto achieve an 
integrated human sciences perspective (15). Instead-of detailed 
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analysis of the psycho-cultural approach, Frank disclosed its nature 
through use. Thus his own methodology is that of the interpretation 
and synthesis of personalist psychologies and of personal experience 
in and through the arts. We may note in passing that this is a point 
well across the methodological continuum from /ebb's empiricism and 
Mannheim's socially grounded perspectivism. For the first time in 
the social reconstructionist movement, an avowedly psychological 
humanism provides the starting point for inquiry. 
Following Mead and Dewey, Frank argued that there is a circular, 
interactive relationship between personality and culture. It is this 
relationship which merits close attentions man the product of cultural 
experience is yet able significantly to modify the environment of which 
he is a part. Indeed, it is through culture modification that he dis- 
covers himself. Man, according to Frank's analysis, is not simply an 
undifferentiated living organism in interaction with its environment. 
He is uniquely free of the coercion of organic and bodily differentia- 
tion. Man's special evolutionary solution is not organic adaptation, 
but the development of tools and ideas, "whereby he could develop 
uniquely human ways of living". From this notion of'bodily liberation, 
which echoes Dewey's discussion of tools and language, 'yet suggests the 
non-Deareyan bifurcation into "natural" and "spiritual", which I referred 
to in discussing Alaberg in Chapter III9 Frank proceeded to affirm that 
human behavior is distinggished by purposive conduat, including most 
importantly the imputing of meanings and values to the world'as ex- 
perienced. Culture arises and is sustained as man imputes meanings 
to his environment, including his society, and then transforms his 
functional processes and impulses into purposeful conduct, related 
to these imputed meanings. This is the psycho-cultural nexus of 
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experience and action, with its emphasis on the constant organizing 
and reorganizing of experience strongly reminiscent of Dewey's theory 
of growth. Growth is a never-ending process, a constant movement of 
individual-environmental relationship, yielding meanings with which man 
re-interprets this environment and modifies it to suit his purposes. 
Thinking is the process. of acting upon the environment, experiencing 
a reaction and modifying behavior in a further impingement upon en- 
vironment. Whereas Dewey emphasized language as the distinctly human 
mode of action, Frank, under the influence of Cassirer and Langer, 
emphasized the full range of symbolic meaning systems. For him, 
the human dimension of experience is characterized by the symbolic 
manipulation of meanings, and education has the task of facilitating 
and structuring this manipulation. 
1.2.2 Methods of culture study 
In Frankly view, the way to make cultural study more systematic 
is by inquiring into four sets of universal human assumptions and their 
superstructures of symbolic thought. These four ores first, those 
concerning the nature of the world and the universe; second, those 
concerning man's place in the world and his relationship to powers 
controlling events; third, those concerning his relations with 
others; and, finally, those concerning human nature and the self- 
image. Each of these four sets of assumptions may be further 
sub-divided into "eidos" or conceptions- for organizing, interpreting 
and validating experience; and "ethos", or awareness and sensitivity 
to experience and ways of responding emotionally to situations. These 
four categories of assumptionsrefer to very early occurrences in the 
history of culture and their-subsequent history in human experience. 
Thusi systematic culture study, if one were to follow Frank's arguments 
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to their conclusion, would be an undertaking of truly Germanic pro- 
portionss a total history of culture through analysis of the levels 
of organizing concepts and modes of feeling-awareness. The pro- 
posals made by Wells, by Rugg and by Urazneld for culture studies, 
vast as they were, fell short of this all-inclusive ideal. Admittedly, 
Frank did not delineate a curriculum of culture study, nor in fact 
did he even propose it, but, if these sets of assumptions are fundamental 
and if, furthermore, we are obliged to consider culture as a develop- 
ment of basic assumptions and elaborate symbolic systems for the 
manipulation of meanings, then we are committed to an impossibly 
large undertaking if we wish to "understand" culture. 
Frank clearly advocated this understanding and wished to sustain 
individual freedom by locating the free individual on one side of a 
shifting relationship with culture as understood in this very broad 
sense. The psycho-cultural approach, having promised a means of 
negotiating the element of personal experience in culture change, 
thus has the unexpected result of bringing out the inherent tendency 
in reconstructionist thinking to produce not so much impossible utopias 
of action but impossible wholes of inquiry. These tendencies are to 
be found in both of the major theorists of reconstruotionis;, Dewey 
and Mannheim. We reach the paradoxical conclusion that only the 
psycho-cultural approach enables us to understand man's development, 
that man's freedom depends on this understanding, but the psycho- 
cultural approach is itself equitable with the totality of human 
cultural experiences. This is Regelianism with a vengeance. 
Methodologically barren as this outcome is, it underlines a basic 
difficulty facing the whole reconstruotionist movement. Culture diag- 
nosis in their theory requires the analysis of wholes. But there are no 
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methodologically secure ways of examining wholes apart from: 
a. the totality of specific methods already in use, 
and 
b. personal intuitions supported by selective per- 
sonal syntheses of mused data. 
The total of specific, methods already in use does not yield a single 
account but an enormous array of partial accounts, which the recon- 
structionists are forever attempting to synthesize. Their results 
are in certain respects reminiscent of Bacon's criticism of scholas- 
tics and alchemists that there are plenty of words but no gold. 
To take the action reconstructioniats felt to be needed towards the 
"whole" requires in their judgment the synthesizing of the limited 
and partial accounts of academicss the grasping of a pattern amidst 
the diversity of shifting parts. But personal intuitions, as they 
recognized, have no special claim for consideration as a superior kind 
of grasping; hence the attempts to strengthen them by devising objec- 
tive synthetic methodologies. Such strengthening as has been attempted, 
however, has either pushed the methodology back towards a manageable but 
programmatically inadequate empiricism, or forward towards an incoherent 
holism of which Frank's idea of a grid for the totality of cultural ex- 
perience is perhaps the most extreme example. 
We can rescue Frank from this dilemma by accepting that what we are 
being invited to do is not, after all, as he says in Culture aä Personality, 
"to understand man and his social order" but to adopt a frame of reference 
appropriate to a programme of psycho-cultural reform - i. e., the proper 
education of man in contemporary society. The reforms that Frank pro- 
posed are discussed in the next section of this chapter and in Part Two 
of cy study. They are built on the assumptions that culture is a human 
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environment of action and reaction; ý it constantly changes; it em- 
bodies aspirations; it provides means, and materials for the growth 
of personality; and that personality best grows through the use, of 
culture-analysis" particularly analysis in, the scientific mode. 
This analysis cannot achieve the comprehensiveness and unity Frank 
envisaged, but it will be the better for incorporating the perspec- 
tives he identified, in particular those yielded by inquiry into 
patterns of relationship and self-image. 
1.3 Social Foundations Movement 
A third approach in post-war reconstruotionist theory to the 
problem of rapid cultural change is that of the social foundations 
movement. This was a movement to locate the study of educational 
theory in investigations into contemporary culture, its major fea- 
tures, trends and, divisions. I have selected. for discussion three 
important and influential examples of the movements first, the 
pioneering work by Raup, kxtelle, Benno and Smith, The Xmprovement 
of Practical Intelligence, in which the attempt was dads' to define 
for experimentalism a particular instrument of democratic policy 
making, namely, ': practical judgment"; second, 5tanleyvs Education 
and Social x teg; ation which, amongst other things, developed an 
extended rationale for the method of "practical judgment"j third, 
Smith, Stanley and Shores, Fundamentals of Curriculum Development, 
which argued for the'understanding and stabilizing of contemporary 
cultural crisis as the basic task facing curriculum reformers. 
In this section, I shall consider-a theme common to all three 
studies - the breakdown of unity in the fundamental moral norms 
of American culture (16). 
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1.3.1 Prýotical Judgment: Rau- nand associates 
According to'Raup and his associates, practical judgment is an 
instrument of group decision-taking or of democratic planning which 
ehoüld be used at all levels and in all spheres of community policy 
making. It comprises four major stepsi 
1. ' Formulating and projecting an ideal future state 
of affairs. 
2. Surveying existing conditions in order to prepare 
an inventory of means and agencies relevant to 
the problem under review. 
Suiting ideas employed to the claims of the situa- 
tion as a whole. 
Fusing steps 1-3 into policy; devising procedures 
of policy implementation. 
' Details of the act of practical judgment will be discussed in 
the second-part of this chapter. For the moment, we will concentrate 
on the arguments Raup and his associates offered for their proposal 
that practical judgment should be institutionalized as the basic 
policy-making procedure in American life. Their objective in de- 
vising and seeking to deploy this instrument was to build a community 
of interest and a national consensus, consisting not of uneasy and 
limited compromise between special interest groups, but a higher 
level of reconciliation and commitment to action than that achieved 
at any given point in time by any particular interest group. 
Leaving aside, for the present, the question of'the desirability 
of higher order social policy syntheses, what problem is'this synthe- 
sizing process of practical judgment intended to overcome? Essen- 
tially, it is the familiar reconstruotionist problem of deep-seated 
'conflict and confusion of social standards and human character. 
It should be noted, however, that the method of practical judgment 
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is logically separable from the hypothesis of orisie. Decisions 
on policy are inevitable in society, indeed, they constitute part 
of the meaning of"social relationships., Practical-judgment is, 
at one level, simply a decision-taking procedure. Whatever par- 
ticular, suitability, its exponents thought it had for crisis situa- 
tione, it can be extracted from that context and considered for 
adoption in non-crisis situations.. 
ßaup and his associates affirmed that widespread social con- 
flict and confusion over values are the. effect, of a century or more 
of development and diffusion of science and technology throughout 
American culture. More specifically, as a result of this diffusion 
the "common social, orientations" of traditional culture have been 
replaced by various disintegrative orientations. These now develop- 
ments include the minute division and specialization of labor leading 
to a: compartmentalizing and a fragmenting of community, and extreme 
social mobility leading to the participation of individuals in groups 
with a variety of perspectives. Following Mannheim, whose inspiration 
they aoknowled8ed, Raup and his associates treated these, as symptoms of 
a general malaise of culture. ý This malaise is embodied in language 
and other forms of communication, -in interpersonal relations and inter- 
group conflict, and in individual psychic turmoil. 
In this situation of. general stress, various escape and survival 
responses have been tried. These include irrationalism, reliance on 
the wisdom of the common man, and appeals to specialist experts. Co- 
ercion and compromise as methods of decision-taking have been widely, 
adopted, but these have created problems as acute as any they have solved; 
, in addition, they are faulty when tested against the moral-procedural 
requirements of democracy. Compromise, for example, is inadequate 
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because it presupposes. equal power, sets up conflicts, lacks con- 
tinuity, and produces no richer synthesis and mind growth. Raup 
and his associates concluded that what was needed is the develop- 
ment, not merely of an ideology of democracy, but of a procedure 
for operationalizing the, democratic heritage in modern terms. 
For this purpose they devised "practical judgment", a procedure of 
deliberation whereby, an uncoeroed consensus of all affected by a- 
decision could be achieved and implemented in social action. - 
They 
did not claim to have developed something entirely new. Examples 
of, this procedure already existed in, America in the 1940a, e. g., 
the National Resources Planning Board and the Tennessee Valley 
authority. However,, these were isolated and very particular examples. 
Many different types of practical judgment procedures should emerge 
in different institutional settings. Furthermore, an analysis of 
the structure and , 
strategy. of practical judgment was lacking and 
this Raup and hie associates attempted to develop. 
1.3.2 Crisis and the rationale ffoorpraotioal judgment: Stanley 
, 
The-Improvement of Practical Intelligence was-intended to elaborate 
the meaning of practical judgment and to show how it might serve to over- 
come cultural disintegration by developing a new sense of common interest. 
Culture diagnosis in this book was, on-the whole, limited to a re- 
state-ment of the pro-war experimentalist thesis concerning the baasicall, dis- 
rupting forces of science and technology in a large-scale society. How- 
ever, unlike the pre-war writers Raup and his associates. had no wish to 
set radicals against conservatives. Instead their "uncoerced community 
of persuasion" was intended to unify and consolidate the community in 
a. programme of peaceable reform, ý Their ideal was "common action guided 
by common persuasion", an ideal which, they claimed, was long recognized 
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and expressed in the American democratic heritage (17). Stanley, 
in Education and Social Integration, gave a much more detailed ac- 
count of crisis than had Raup and his associates. Careful, objec- 
tive, and well-documented as this analysis was, it was not carried 
out simply to disclose a situation. Stanley himself admitted that 
crisis diagnosis is an ideological weapon: "The existence of crisis 
is the necessary condition of successful revolutionary action" (18). 
It does not follow either that revolutionaries invent crisis, or that 
all crises are suitable starting points for revolutions but, as we 
have already seen in discussing Mannheim, crisis theorists are quite 
capable of making very persuasive use of their diagnoses in recom- 
mending radical reform. 
Stanley sought to disclose the main features and tendencies of 
the social context in which American education in the 19500 was being 
conducted. Beyond this, he argued for the development, largely in 
and through educational institutions and processes, of a new cultural 
synthesis to replace the disintegrating order which he diagnosed. 
This in fact was the aspiration behind the first of the four steps 
of practical judgment; - namely, formulating and projecting an ideal 
future. Stanley's study is, together with Mannheim's, the most 
carefully documented of all the reconstructionist accounts of the 
crisis in culture, although it is broadly limited, as Mannheim's 
studies are not, to social factors. 
An evidence for the crisis, Stanley adduced a wide range of 
factors operating in twentieth century life. These factors in- 
cludede scepticism and doubt about basic premises in almost every 
field of inquiry; social unrest; loss of faith in established in- 
stitutions and beliefs; moral uncertainty; the revolt of youth 
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against conventional morals; the depression of the thirties and 
the consequent loss of confidence in traditional socio-economic 
doctrines; the disaffection of the intellectuals; and others (19). 
In Stanley's book, the backdrop to contemporary crisis is, as in 
all the experimentalist writings on this theme, a more or less 
romanticized version of a stable community of intimate relation- 
ships, and of homogeneous and slowly changing values. This is 
the "old farm" environment of Dewey and Childe, similar to the 
organic community whose demise Leavia and Thompson lamented, a true 
community, so it was said, Which lingered on until late in the nine- 
teenth century, when it was rapidly eclipsed (20). Stanley argued 
that this collapse was, the consequence of four major transforming 
foroesi` industrialization, specialization, urbanization, and in- 
proved' communication. - In place of the old, organic community, 
there had emerged the modern society, dominated by organized, sec- 
tiänilized interest groups. But he was careful to point out that 
the "collapse" was not total, since a vital core of common values 
had-eürvived'the transformation. - This, as we shall see, was a 
fortunate Circumstance for Stanley's theory, as it had been for 
Mannheim's, for without this core there would be nothing but a 
memory of the old order on which°to build a new cultural'synthesis. 
Stanley also incorporated into his diagnosis a critique of his. 
torioiet, monolithic theories of change, thereby providing himself 
with the theoretical means, subsequently, for interventionist-action. 
His criticisms of the cosmic theories of Sorokin, Sumner, C, gburn, Marx 
and others were substantial but nevertheless queetion-begging, 'sinceý 
he condemned them for denying a"role to genuine novelty and human 
intervention, but was unable to offer a definite refutation. 
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Stanley attributed the cataclysmic changes of modern society 
in part to human action based in some measure on conscious purpose 
and evaluations. If man could remake culture he must have contri- 
buted to its unmaking. At least, if not the logical, then the psycho- 
logical argument for interventionism would be greatly strengthened by 
showing man's own part in creating the crisis. However, Stanley did 
not suggest that crisis in America was a consequence of wilfulness 
and the intention to create confusion. Ilan in society had committed 
himself to exploiting science and technology for his mental and material 
advantage, and from this had flowed the unexpected and morally unac- 
ceptable consequences of personal and social maladjustment. For per- 
sonal maladjustment, he turned for evidence to those social psycholo- 
gists, criminologists and sociologists who attributed' neurosis, de- 
linquency, criminality, suicide, etc., to"social conflict and cultural 
contradiction (21). To avoid the circularity of treating personal 
maladjustment is both a consequence of social conflict and cultural 
contradiction and evidence for a conflict theory, Stanley invoked the 
experimentalist thesis of individual-social interactions a culture 
crisis manifests itself no less in individual behavior than in social 
trends and relationships{ whatever affects the one will affect the 
other. However, this presupposes some factor or group of factors 
operating as key culture transformers. By attributing to science 
a fundamental disturbing role, Stanley seems to have adopted just such 
a monolithic anti-individualistic theory as he condemned in other wri- 
ters. Why should science be described as monolithic and anti-indivi- 
dualistic? Science may function initially at the level of intentionality 
and remain at that level for a few scientists and policy makers, but it 
would be odd to maintain both that the innumerable symptoms of crisis 
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were unwanted. because hurtful, painful, etc., and yet intended. This 
suggests that science at some point assumes for the mass of mankind 
the oharacter. af,, a juggernaut. Alternatively, it may be that man 
want the benefitq of institutionalized science, through material pro- 
duction, medicine, consumer goods, etc., but not many of its other con- 
sequences. Stanley seems to have adopted this latter explanation. 
While, for the sake of his interventionist proposals, he needed to 
preserve both an intact core of values and the principle of the ef- 
ficiency of human purposiveness, he nevertheless had to justify drastic 
reform by invoking cataclysmic cultural breakdown. This breakdown 
could not be complete or there would be no remaining intact core of 
values. Nor could it be entirely the consequence of human purposes, 
or we could have no confidence that purposive action would in the future 
help resplve the dilemma. But what model of cultural change would fit 
these constraints? One contender, for which Stanley was able to pro- 
vide amass of empirical data, was the "imbalance and lag" model. 
Imbalance takes two forms in his theory: first, --an imbalance between 
and among beliefs and habits, on the one hand, and the functional 
demands of specialization, urbanization, etc., on the others second, 
the imbalance between science and other areas of thought, particularly 
moral thoughtj, or, putting this slightly differently, a lack of oo- 
herenoe and-unity in socially expressed purposes. 
Those two kinds of imbalance are manifest throughout society and 
have their profoundly unsettling effects on individual outlook and 
ultimately on social morality. They can be corrected, but this is a 
supremely difficult task, involving the creation of a partial cultural 
synthesis, built upon democratic values and rationality and incorporat- 
ing the experiences of life in modern large-scale institutions. Creating 
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a cultural synthesis is a problem in part of social order which 
Stanley saw as coming to focus, 
"in four fundamental tasks which, in a peculiar way, define 
the crucial and persistent challenge of our day. First, 
the establishment of an international order capable of 
adjusting and controlling the economic and nationalistic 
ambitions of the people of the world without constantly 
resorting to war on a global scale. ocond, the develop- 
ment of an economic order capable, within the framework of 
essential human freedom, of fully releasing the productive 
capacities of modern technology and of reconciling the 
claims of the various social classes with respect to both 
the control of the productive machinery of society and 
the distribution of its fruits. Third, the building 
of a social order capable of harmonizing the just aspira- 
tions of different races and classes to share in the 
social and cultural goods of society. Fourth, the con- 
etruetion of an intellectual and moral order capable of 
defining, in away acceptable to the major social groups 
of our time, the fundamental principles, purposes, and 
values operative in the international, economic and 
social orders" (22). 
In this book, Stanley concentrated on (a) the forces and con- 
ditions responsible for confusion and conflict in American education, 
(b) problems of re-establishing social and moral order. Thus he did 
not set out to analyse the totality of culture, or to offer a Rugg- 
type model of a complete new cultural synthesis. Stanley did, how- 
ever, deduce the need for this more ambitious undertaking from his 
diagnosis of crisis. His diagnosis located the crisis ultimately 
in the intellectual and moral outlook of a whole society. The crisis 
manifested itself in personal experience and in interpersonal and im 
personal situations. It was kept active by the continuing impact of 
the prime unsettlers, science and technology as they affected the sub- 
structure of work-culture. Thus, to propose the stabilizing of ele- 
ments in the social order, without considering the larger problem of 
cultural order, was to create a serious hiatus between diagnosis and 
reform. 
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11,1.3.3 -Crisis and culture bores Smith'and associates 
In, fact, Stanley's proposals, fora moral and intellectual oon- 
sensus, -did go beyond the problem of-social order even, though he 
claimed only to be examining the requirements of social integration. 
Ishall return to this point later in the present chapter. 
In Fundamentals of Curriculum Development, Stanley, together with 
Smith and Shores, identified the critical problem of the times as being 
one äf, cultural order; and these authors gave to education a major 
ihare, of the task of guiding and shaping an emergent culture. In 
this'aetting, curriculum making itself became a form of culture analysis 
andrenewal, as in the Idealist tradition. 
Culture was defined, in Fundamentals of Curriculum Development, as 
morally-eclectic, auperorganic, and coherent. Culture iss 
"the fabric of ideas # idoals, beliefs, skills, tools, aes- 
thetic objects, methods of thinking, customs and institu- 
tions into which each member of society is born. " (23) 
t -'The basic structure of individual personality is shaped by culture, 
yet individuals and groups are able, subsequently, to, participate in 
schemes for cultural renewal, e. g., -curriculum building, which do not 
take: the form merely of a perpetuation of the past. 
ý. Smith and his associates adopted Linton's structural framework 
of' ultural analysis. -which classifies the diversity ot, cultural- mean- 
ings-objects and events into universals, specialities and alternatives. 
These factors are then grouped into (a) a core, comprising a , central 
integrated body of universals and specialities, and (b) alternatives, 
or innovations, the source of, subsequent cultural change. It"is 
interesting to note that the model of an integrated core of estab- 
lished meanings, separated from new ideas by a threshold which the 
latter seek to cross to be absorbed into a new core, almost exactly 
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parallels Herbart's theory of mental behavior. In this theory, 
ideas in individual consciousness are organized into coherent sys- 
tems which articulate action, while, across the threshold in the 
limbo of unconsciousness and semi-consciousness, are new and per- 
haps alarming ideas, struggling to cross over and to influence the 
character of the central, organizing core. The latter-day experi- 
mentalists, in their pro-occupation with the problem of a moral- 
intellectual core designed to order culture, owed much to the 
Serbartian legacy of socio-moral order. In Stanley's case, this 
legacy appears to have been mediated through the Herbartian curri- 
culum theorist, Morrison (24). 
Proceeding from Linton's sehematization, Smith and his asso- 
ciates suggested that it is only when culture is changing rapidly 
that a problem of maintaining a stable, integrated core emerges. 
When change is minimal, the core is "large" and "strong" in relation 
to alternatives, and the culture is largely taken on unconsciously by 
the individual. Change develops, however, in the Marxist manner and 
as explained by the earlier experimentalists: science and technology 
transform the work culture and this by degrees permeates and trans- 
forms the superstructure of thought and experience. The resulting 
imbalances, which Stanley had examined in greater depth in Education 
and Social Integration, reverberate and develop into a widespread but 
by no means complete disintegration, with its attendant social and 
personal discomforts$ 
"The difficulty is to be found in the partial disinte- 
gration of social consensus under the impact of changing 
conditions and institutional malfunctioning" (25). 
Sittth and his associates divided their treatment of the culture 
orieie of the 1940s and 19509 in America into two main partet macroscopic 
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social behavior, and value disorientation. At the social level, 
they found five major elements in the crisist increased speciali- 
sation, of labor, combined with greater social interdependence; 
losa, of community the breakdown of primary group relationshipsa- 
and the decline or-consensus; emergence of divisive and exclusive 
social. olasses; loss of the capacity of the family to build in its 
members a common social perspective; mobility and displacement in 
employment, hater in their study, they added the socially-dissolving 
effeota of the growth of communications and transportation. 
However, Smith and his associates noted, serious as these elements 
are in contributing to the destruction of unity of outlook, they do 
not operate at the level that, according to Pareonian social analysis, 
is moat basic to change - is,, value change. Smith and his asso- 
ciates appear not to have been influenced directly by Parsons, but, 
like him, they found value awareness the most sensitive area of cul- 
turalupheavals 
"The acids generated by these twin elements (viz., 
science and technology) have trickled down into the 
American system of values, dissolving fundamental ideals 
and leaving the entire system in a state of confusion" (26). 
Nevertheless, as in Stanley's account of the crisis, the acids 
had not completed their damage, since the American heritage of demo- 
cratic values remained sufficiently intact to provide a platform 
from which a new cultural synthesis could be developed by the schools. 
Smith and his associates were careful to point out that the schools 
could not get ahead with cultural re-making free of constraints, or 
unaided by other social institutions. We shall consider their argu- 
ments on the process of oulture remaking through education in Part II. 
On-constraints, they had more to say than merely pointing to the 
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disintegration of old principles and practices. The schools would 
have to function in an emergent, not a wholly fluid, situation. On 
the basis of their analysis of crisis, Smith and his associates pre- 
dicted certain trends in culture, within whose broad outlines schools 
would have to proceed. 
These trends provided them with a convenient framework for their 
own positive reoormiendations, just as Brameld Is' trends coincided with 
his preferences. None of these trends constituted a serious barrier 
to their type of culture reformism, though they all set problems to 
be resolved. The trends are eight in number: 
1. Increasing interdependence arisina, not from any 
desire for co-operation but "inevitably" from in- 
creasing specialization and social complexity. 
2. "positions from which the entire pattern of relation- 
ships among human activities can be perceived without 
the aid of education designed for that purpose are 
decreasing, and fewer and fewer individuals are able 
to reach these positions. " (27) 
3. Increasing regulation and integration of social pro- 
cesses by deliberate, trained human effort. 
4. Greater public concern for sharing by all in the bane- 
fits of material production. 
5. Greater militancy by suppressed races and social 
classes. 
Development of a world order, with certain sovereign 
powers retained, 
7. Thoroughgoing reconstruction of value systems in demo- 
cracies. 
8. Transformation of habits of thinking and social skills 
carried over from earlier cultural phases. 
These trends suggest an emergent social order, which Smith and 
his associates wished to "democratize". For them to describe their 
trends as "broad prognostic facts" is to overlook the element of per- 
sonal judgment involved in their prediction. We should also notice 
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the omission of other "trends'# which might less readily be accommo- 
dated to a reconstructioniat thesis. The second trend, incidentally, 
is unimaginable,, since such universal perspectives are precluded 
methodologically by the lack of any appropriate procedures, and in 
more"concreta terms by the very complexity and momentum of culture 
which Smith and his associates marked out as one of, the 
factors in 
the crisis. However, it is again worth noticing, as characteristically 
holistic - just such an aspiration as signifies the reconstruotionist 
wish, to-stabilize change by containing itsvery -diversityy and irregu- 
larity within a single vision of order, or pattern. 
- Instead of accepting this list as a sohematization of tr ends, we 
could better appreciate its significance by seeing it as yet another 
instance of a typical reconstruotionist strategy. This strategy con- 
sists of introducing ambiguity into the ascertainment of factual trends 
by cönflating'them with the prescription of key points of planned ac- 
tions not key points in the sense of elements in a morally and poli- 
tically neutral description, but as aspects of culture requiring con- 
centrated attention if the reconatructionist programme itself is to 
be realized. 
2. Prescriptions for New Cultural Order 
In this section, I intend to abandon the separate treatment of 
individuals and groups adopted in the previous section. From that. 
separate treatment we have observed overall similarities and differences 
of approach to the problem of culture change amongst the later experi- 
mentalists, Also, we have perceived the directions in which they 
would wish-to see the culture whose ills they diagnosed moving. Now 
we shall consider those directions more closely, not in full detail 
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but under the broad headings oft 
1. " Techniques of culture awareness'and renewal. 
2. The principles of order and integration. 
The role of education "'culture.; synthesizer I shall postpone to 
Chapters X and XII. 
2.1 Techniques of culture awareness and renewal 
Both by implication from their own culture diagnoses, and as a direct 
reco=endation, all of the writers discussed in this chapter advocated 
that, as a first requirement, we should become much more self-conscious 
of ourselves as beings caught up in one of the great transformations of 
history. In his appreciative essay on Cassirerte contribution to 
philosophical anthropology, Brameld paid tribute to Caseirer's power 
as a synthetic thinker, orientated to*ards the future conceived as 
an ideal for present life (28). Brameld further enjoined schools to' 
develop the kind of awareness he'display4d in his own writings in order 
to help children understand the world-wide transformations of our times 
and to form ideas of possible futures. This is a global awareness, 
not just of the physical globe, but the totality of contemporary life. 
It-encounters the same difficulties of realization that we have already 
noted: the appropriate methodologies for achieving meaningful simpli- 
fications are lacking. Despite the efforts of the synthetic theorists, 
each fresh synthetic overview adds to the already large number of par- 
ticular perspectives. Each may be criticized for-its significant omis- 
sions. Thus Caseirer, one of the greatest of the modern synthesizers, 
was criticized by Brameld for neglecting social substructure, reifying 
spiritual and subjective insights, and displaying a rationalist par- 
tiality towards the topics he examined. Brameld's own cultural aware- 
ness again is highly partial and tendentious, and lacking the philosophical 
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rigor which characterized Cassirer's thought. those kind of "cul- 
tural awareness", then, is to serve as the model? To expect school 
teachers to act as arbiters of-awareness systems and synthesizers of 
the'new culture is no solution to this difficulty. But there 'are 
xieferthelcsa various ways of°gstting, -this awareness process going, 
shortýof the exalted standard set by. "global awareness", and we shall 
discuss these in Chapters XI and XII. - 
There is, however, a further, difficulty in Brameld's proposal 
that children and youth should be encouraged to think about the kind 
of society they would like. In practice it is frequently difficult 
to persuade many of them even to think critically about the immediate 
situations they are in, For examplei liberal studies teachers in 
technical colleges, who attempt to enlarge the horizon of vision by 
discussing changes in arrangements at work, encounter indifference and 
resistance, or even a simple bewilderment concerning what is possible. 
The e-reconstructionists wish to stimulate and, as far as possible, to 
universalize logical , tabstract and speculative thought. If the con. 
ceptualizing of most children and youth is still concrete, in Piaget's 
termer and restricted by, the limited worlds of school, work and leisure 
in small town settings, more limited and precise and more personalized 
curriculum proposals are needed than those Brameld and Rugg indulged in, 
to engage individuals in critical and creative processes of thought. 
"ýrBaup and his asssociates, and Stanley, envisaged a more limited 
structure of pupil awareness than did Brameld., For then, a good 
start,, at least could be made"by attemptinsg, through education, 'to 
universalize the so-called'"social perspective". This has its 
difficulties in that much of modern Social science is itself empirical, 
lacking any coherent perspective, or; rather displaying-many perspectives. 
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Yet it is a prescription which could be brought to tealization, for 
example, through the universal introduction of social science teach- 
ing both by teaching social science subject matter in schools, and 
by incorporating within all teacher training programmes a socio- 
logical dimension which might, as a consequence, come to pervade 
the teaching of many school subjects. This recommendation may 
not be far short of realization. It is one practical change on 
which all of the reconstruotionists, back to and including the 
early Fabians, are agreed. But it is clearly insufficient even 
for the purposes for which it was intended. The reason is that, 
in the tradition of Durkheim's concept of "social facts"i the "social, 
perspective" frequently sets itself in opposition to psychological and 
other perspectives. All the reconstruotionists, and particularly those 
in the tradition of Dewey, have tried to show that rapid cultural change 
is serious and often harmful just because it results in imbalances, 
disturbances, and more destructive neurotic manifestations in indi- 
viduals, which acquire their own momentum and lose some of their social 
contingency. Realization of the consequences of social change for 
character formation and personality is a definite gain in understanding, 
over older views, and should not be lost to sight in the upsurge of in- 
terest in institutions, roles and organizational behavior. 
For this reason, Frank's explintion of the "psycho-cultural" ap- 
proach is of very great significance in the development of reconstructionist 
thought from an older society orientation to the more complex and inclusive 
culture orientation. The very powerful superorganic tradition in cul- 
tural anthropology not only raises difficulties in explaining cultural 
innovativeness and individual creativity, it also distracts attention 
from the qualities and problems of individual experience of change. 
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Lack of attention to this personal, delicate, often ineffable, area, 
is one of the great deficiencies, not-only of all totalistic and 
totalitarian theories, but also of many modern policy and managerial 
change-theories in"the democracies. ` Behavioristic models of action 
and response are reasonably posited as part of research procedures, 
but ziayybecome i poatatized in'the manner of, nineteenth century 
economic man, or twentieth century organization man. One way to 
avoid this is to emphasizä, in all social and cultural studies, the 
realms of personal and interpersonal experience in, real and imaginary 
concrete situations. - The, bilthey tradition, in its endeavor to , 
understand the meaning, of individual expression in all its variety, has 
been strengthened by Frank1s emphasis on the discernible human conse- 
quences of'cültural change,, ' The plasticity of human nature testifies 
to' the 4 possibility of the remaking of cultural the attribution of 
unique value to the individual-argues for a continuing concern for 
the morality of the procedures of culture remaking; opportunities 
for warping, distorting and destroying personality intrinsic in oer- 
tain"of'-the operations of modern-social institutions call for pares 
tioular-care in using them. 
These considerations point to the form of culture-awareness that 
Prank prescribed for an age which should; be thought, commit itself 
to°universalizing scientific thinking. While they°go beyond the 
understandings yielded by science in the narrow sense of controlled 
experimentation, they do not constitute a "correctives' to science in 
the'broadest sense. Frank accepted the' experimentalist belief in 
an integral harmony between, indeed the integration of, scientific 
method and democratic concern for individuals. But Frank's contri., - 
bution was=to emphasize what was lacking in some of the reconstructionist 
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enthusiasm for wholesale cultural renewal, namely, the perception 
of the'human consequences of change and the involvement of the whole 
person considered, as an emotional and moral being. 
Awareness of the conditions and human context of change is one 
part of the culture prescriptions of the later experimentalists. 
The other part is the methodology of consensus and practical judg- 
ment, A. detailed discussion of this is not possible. It forms 
a major. topic in its own right in the light of more recent practical 
applications, for example, the use of the architecture-devised 
"charette" method of educational policy-making for creating school 
building designs, and curriculum and management policies, Also, 
substantial use was made of these methodologies in the U. S. A. in 
the 1950s movements to increase community participation in curriculum- 
making, and this experience has thrown up many significant issues (29). 
Brameld's advocacy of reconstructionism incorporated the device 
of policy-making through a consensus of the views of as many as pos- 
Bible of those affected by policy decisions (30). Through this, he 
hoped to differentiate his proposals from all previous ones, which he 
judged were not recommendations on method so much as substantive changes 
based on linjited interpretations of particular cultural situations. 
However, since he accompanied his consensus proposals with his own 
views on desirable substantive changes in culture, a difficulty arises 
and it would be interesting to see how far Brameld, or one of his fol- 
lowers, would in a consensus-seeking group seek to impress into the 
consensus the prescriptions underlying his own culture diagnosis. 
It may be argued that Brameld's definition of consensus in no way 
precludes the presentation of utopias and trend predictions for group 
inspection. But, aince he claims that the truth of culture diagnoses 
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and goal-seeking interests is a''function'of majority agreement, 
Brameld would certainly have an interest in persuading the majority. 
Ascription of truth qualities to agreement over goals may seen an 
odd throwback to the pragmatism of William 'James. Braameld supposed 
that'he was Peirce's heir, even`thäugh Peirce's theory of 
truth was 
concerned with scientific knowledge, not'the formation of 'social 
policy goals. Brameld, like most experimentalists, at times appeared 
to think that 'judgments of valve, such as those locked into the notions 
of goal and interest, may ' be'demonstrated'trae"or'false by empirical 
methods. ' This belief would give him reason for supposing"that he 
could persuade 'fellow members of the group that his convictions were 
not merely desirable, but correct. 
IThe consensus procedure that Brameld'described envisages policy 
making at the different' levels of primary groups, communities, nations 
and the'' international community, conducted ei an open quest' for agreed 
clear-cut comritmenta to action on specific issues. Big'ier order 
agreement and r`eooncilation were sought, but majority'decisions were 
not precluded. Aocording°to Brameld, majority rule itself may be'con- 
sensual in that it assumes the best decisions oii aommon'welfare'ar'e 
aohieyed'when the widest consensus is sought: Anything short of full 
agreement is, however, less than wholly satisfactory. ` 'The quest for 
conaensue, if'it'is to'avoid tyranny'and the imposition of, mass pre- 
ferences on minorities, presupposes a high level of rationality and a 
mature society, as may be seen by reference to earlier versions of the 
consensus 'ideals 
"At the general assembly of the tribe ('folk'moot') the 
minority was , radually intimidated into acquiescence 
(the 
men signified approbation by clashing their arms, and die- 
approval by a hollow murmurs). The slave bearing no arms 
and the boy unripe for war had no place in the folk moot. 
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"Church councils, too, acted on the theory of unanimity 
until the Vatican Council of 1870, when majority rule was 
accepted" (31)" 
Prameld was aware that, for consensus procedures to work fairly 
and efficiently, people need to be appropriately educated. I have 
already argued that it is neither necessary nor desirable to subor- 
dinate all social policy decisions to the principle of unanimity. 
A higher level of participation in decision making than is now common 
would be desirable, in promoting respect for the views of all who are 
affected by policy decisions. However, the consensus method is only 
one way of achieving this. We could, for example, diffuse responsi- 
bility to individuals, in certain institutions, and restrict consensus 
procedures to very general issues. Brameld's partisan approach led 
him to neglect weaknesses in the consensus theory and to ignore alter- 
native and complementary procedures. 
Raup and his associates, and Stanley, were more cautious than Brameld 
in their advocacy of consensus. They were prepared to submit their ideas, 
not to majority judgment, in the first instance, but to the more expert 
community of discourse of which their own works were part, and to rest 
their claims for validity on argument and demonstration, not majority 
agreement. This makes them more accurate interpreters of Peirce than 
Brameld was. It may also have prompted them to prepare a much more 
carefully structured proposal for the operations of consensus and prac- 
tical judgment than did Brameld. 
We have already seen that Raup and his associates felt the lack in 
experimentalist theory of social mechanisms for seeking adjustment of 
social conflict and confusion. They postulated an increasing intensity 
of culture crises and argued for the development of a policy method ade- 
quate to the crises and responsive to the democratic tradition. Indeed, 
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their. method or practical, judgment was intended as a means of re- 
solving differences and, sorting-out confusions, within the domain 
occupied by this tradition (the domain of "practical" as distinct 
from "theoretical" knowledge in Aristotle's terminology), namely, 
preferences and judgements . of value and principles of practical con- 
duct. Democracy for. them meant, at least three things; first, 
participation - "whoever, may. be, affected by a decision on policy shall 
in-some way have a part in shaping it" (32);. seoondi, a sense of 
community, or common interest; third, a commitment to the universal 
value of individual worth and dignity.. Even, if it could be shown 
that coercion, and compromise could achieve functionally adequate 
decisions in modern society., -", and they tried to show that this, ou4ht 
not to be assumed - the very notion of functionality in a democratic 
social order should incorporate, these value preferences.. irthermoru, 
the method ofrpraotical judgment was not only intended to determine 
the. meaning of and resolvqýthe differences. between answers to unre- 
solved ýccumauni, ty situations. In Platpnic style, , 
the method was_ also 
intended, to educate,: or "reconstruct".,. individual character by build- 
ing into It a methodological dimension -a disposition and a, set of 
skills (ääa. 
, This, again, was a factor which Raup and his associates believed 
the earlierexperimentaljsta had neglected: the, effect of charaoter 
on . situations. and 
the, potential of, selected methods of social procedure 
for educating character. But. it will be recalled that Dewey showed 
very great interest in dispositions and habits of thought, and advo- 
cated the democratic,. value of shared. experience and the, reflective method 
of inquiry. It- istherefor. doubtful whether the claim of Raup and his 
associates that their emphasis on the role of character in judgments 
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of practice is a development of Dawey's thought so much' as a reitera- 
tion of it. ' What'undoübtedly is a development is the definition of a 
method for achieving-consensus in the sphere of practical judgment - 
the rules of moral procedure in society. However, even this method 
incorporates three very distinctive Deweyan ideas: the conscious re- 
construction of experience; the ideal of "common" actions guided by 
common persuasions", which is Dewey's democratic sharing of experience; 
and the quest for a consensus which should' not" be' a compromised but a 
higher order reeolttion and agreement. - 
whereas Dewöy believed that one method, that of refleotive&thinking, 
provided, a paradigm for all problematic'situations and their'reelolution, 
Raup"and his associates thought that'the differences' between theoretical 
and practical knowledge warrant at least two paradigms of inquirys' that, 
or rather those, of the empirical sciences and the fields of theoretical 
knowledge on the one hand, and'that of practical judgment in moral dis- 
course on the other. Further, they argued in'axiticipatibn of the now 
popular operational and policy-orientated'rese'arch that"there are many 
situations in which the quest for'facte' should be normatively orientated. 
This argument helped to rescue 'the later experimentalists from Dewey's 
equivocations over the empirical"demonatrability'of judgments of value. 
For Raup-and his associates'-these judgments required commitment to 
democratic ideals which were not scientifically verifiable. Yet the 
method of practical judgment does little'tö'solve difficulties of moral 
thinking, for it made no advance on existing moral theories. Instead, 
by accepting the validity of the democratic heritage, or American utili- 
tarianism, -combined with Dewey's reasoning about moral values, the ex- 
ponents of practical judgment virtually limited their contribution to 
demonstrating how this moral theory might be exemplified in social 
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decision taking. The advocates of practical judgment recognized 
the dangers of power dominance through compromise and persuasion, 
but it is difficult to see how these are to be avoided, At any 
rate, procedures of group decision taking through discussion and 
higher order agreement are not in themselves free from manipulation 
by skilled group engineers. Apart from this, there are four main 
defects in the method of deliberation recommended by Raup and his 
associates. First, to get going at all it bad to presuppose a con- 
sensus on procedures which, as Stahley's analysis of the working of 
interest groups in society was to show, can by no means be assumed. 
Perhaps this problem could be overcome by developing those situations 
inawhich there is already some agreement. Second, the theory of prac- 
tical judgment neglected to consider the role of individual, non-group 
located inspiration in the formulation of ideal solutions. While it 
did not specifically exclude them, they received very little recog- 
nition as important sources of change. Third, it was assumed that 
common persuasion is the principal desideratum of democracy. As a 
result, too little consideration was given to the institutional appara- 
tus=in society which proceeds not on the assustption of. a foreground of 
common persuasion but on procedures like majority rule, constitutionally- 
defined rights, institutionalized checks to institutional power, and on 
the creative outcome of clashes of policy. These are not just matters 
of machinery but vital safeguards of liberty in a democracy. Fourth, 
by neglecting institutional safeguards and clearly defined procedural 
rules, the proponents of practical judgment ran the risk of lapsing 
into subtle coercion. The subsequent emphasis on the art of engineering 
change through groups brings out the danger and the paradox of the whole 
movements to work well, practical judgment requires skilled group activists. 
"rý3, w 
But the crisis in moral values, on which practical judgment was 
postulated, indicates the presence in society of many individuals 
and groups"who no loner' ' understand 'or accept 'democratic values. 
For'them, "theAechnique, ofpractical judgment represents the gift 
of a reepeotable and potentially very influential instrument for 
shaping public policy (34). ' 
. 2.2 The"32rincil3les "of'order'and integration 
The quest for order appears so consistently in the reconstruo- 
tionist writings dealing with"what they designate the fundamental 
problems and trends of culture that-it might euggeet not simply 
misgivings` over particular changes-but opposition to change as such. 
However, although there is t lingering Platonism`in many of'the pro- 
poeale for wholesale reform, and echoes of the mysterious "One" of 
Parmenides in their hankering for a unified cultural core, the order 
they sought was-not a'condition'of rest. ' True°to their enlighten- 
ment ancestry, they could 'not accept as a goal a"quiescent condition 
of harmönous unity but wanted to find ways of transforming cultural 
activity from it confused eruption of mindless forees'into'ä'well- 
öontrived, orderly eipedition of-like-minded travellers. 
For Frank, the order wäs"not primarily totalistic, taking the 
form of a cultural'synthesie; ' instead, it"`consisted of personal 
organization and integration of 'experience 'thr6ugh rational thoughts 
the capacity to receive, interpret and judge ideas, including those' 
piotöundly discordant with previous experience (35). The organizing 
meChaniems for this essentially stabilizing process include purpose 
and patterned thinking. ' Frank assumed that-these deliberative, con- 
eoioue prooeseee'were-capable of directing experience; if not trans... 
cending feeling and'instinctual drives, 'then not neoesearily'undermined 
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by them, and capable of organizing them. Thus thinking is not 
reducible to rationalization of passions, but it takes the form 
of an ordering of relationships between the dynamics of the indi- 
vidual psyche, the concrete world of events, and symbolic systems. 
This organization of experience is the goal of rationality. Thought 
is susceptible to testing and validation. It is able to organize 
behavior and in this way to contribute to the renewal of culture. 
Of the symbblio systems, Frank treated science as the most sig- 
nificant, accepting the experimentalists' argument that science was 
the most powerful of all cognitive and social-influence systems. 
Hence, the quest for psycho-cultural order is sustained in indi- 
viduals by their purposive reconstruction of experience in the light 
of scientific awareness. The vitality of this quest, and its con- 
tinuous pursuit by individuals, are the guarantee of cultural renewal. 
That education which best contributes to Frank's notion of this assi- 
milation of scientific modes of thought is the most effective re-, 
maker of culture. 
I It is surprising that Frank, as a psychologist and advocate of 
the knowledge that is yielded through the arts, should have restricted 
his quest for personal order to the structures yielded-by scientific 
cognition. The only barriers he foresaw were those external to the 
psyche, viz., pressure groups in society, and teacher inadequacy (36). 
Brameld's quest for cultural order was, at the other extreme, all- 
inclusive. He abandoned the earlier experimentalist aspiration to 
achieve a planned society in America, in favor of the more inclusive 
ideal of a "world culture". His model for this world culture was an 
odd mixture of universal struggle and organic unity. History, Brameld 
noted, on the one hand discloses universal struggle, and gives us no 
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reason, on- the, other,. to suppose that atruggle-will suddenly cease. 
What is more , '°Arameld. -. galued struggle as generative of "now arrange- 
ments" (37). Yet history'has also disclosed cultural. unitiee, _e. g., 
mediaeval civilisation. '-Again, Brameld's enthusiasm for consensus 
denotes an interest: in conflict resolution and in the achievement 
of policies in which differences are absorbed and, perhaps, forgotten. 
Further, Brameld bad argued that the rate and soapevof change and the 
depth=and extent of dissension in culture had brought western society 
to the point of collapse.. Sheer surrival seemed to'demand the rapid 
development of new Cultural unities, new institutions and policy agree- 
mentej on aýworld-wide basis, since the disunities were world-wide in 
scale, A postulated "basic drive" in all men directed this world- 
wide movement towards self. determination and self governaeAt (38). 
But it is not, -at all clear just what particular forms of cultural 
reintegration Brameld. had in mind. Society should be democratic, 
planned through a plurality of institutions, and built on existing 
national cultures, but it should also transcend all. this and become 
international. It is impossible, to relater. Brameld's Tagus idea of 
a}"world organism" to the. realitiea of international relations in the 
contemporary world, Existing institutions and systems move slowly 
towards increasing integration with. the possibility of breakdown al 
ways in the background. Brameld envisaged what at-times appe.: as 
a`graes-roots operation in institutionaland-social self help, largely 
by-passing existing sources of power. 
" It is interesting in this context to see how the ideal of a world 
culture has attracted the anthropologist Margaret )Lead, who, in. her 
earlier writings, had been sceptical about the whole idea of culture 
synthesis and of education as a culture-transforming agency, Mead 
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has more recently found contemporary culture fragmentary and dis- 
cussions of it limited, contradictory and inconclusive. She has 
outlined the requirements for a shared, one-world, future cultures 
suitability for all peoples (i. e., not twisted toward the European 
tradition); freshness ("it must be such that everyone, everywhere, 
can start afresh, as a young child- does, with a mind ready to meet 
ideas uncompromised by partial learning"); built around single uni- 
versal themes and imaginitive works; incorporating a synthesis and 
reduction of all knowledge (akin to Wells$ World Brain); built on a 
new system of graphic representation and a world language (39). As 
a field worker, in New Guinea, Mead had been far more impressed by 
the'formative power of tradition and by the arguments for cultural 
uniqueness, and continuity. She offered, in her later paper, no con- 
crete proposals for achieving a new world cultural order, nor any ex- 
planation of her abandonment of her earlier beliefs about the values 
of tradition, continuity and cultural heterogeneity. Nevertheless, 
it is significant that her sense of contemporary world problems has 
led her in the direction which, as we have seen, provided one of the 
main bearings of the whole reconstructionist movement, 
Returning to Brameld, we may see that he has fallen between the 
two stools represented by the methodology of Raup and his associates, 
which does not entail any particular world order, and the utopian spe- 
culations of Wells, which, referring to events in the very distant 
future of mankind, require no particular assessment of the potentiali- 
ties and limitations of existing international institutions. As vision, 
Brameld's proposals lack imagination and vigor; and, as a method, they 
suffer from the limitations of his consensus proposals. However, as 
we shall see in Part II, his proposals for educational change are full 
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of suggestive possibilities. 
' I`shall consider, finally, the idea: of integration underlying 
Stanley'e`analyeis'of crisis culture in post-war America. Stanley, 
as we have seen, -initially set out` to restrict his analysis of crisis 
to the forces and conditions in'society that'have'been responsible 
for certain problems in educational thought and practice. But, 
because he saw'that eduoation is-itself enmeshed-in a network of 
determining relationships with culture, the diagnosis broadened out 
into -A holistic appraisal of culture trends: ' 'Piö *this appraisal, 
Stanley ' concluded that, due 'to the impact of 'science and technology, 
the 'old organic community had been replaced by -an-impersonal type of 
society, confliot"ridden, sectionalized "and compartmentalised, inco- 
herent in its aspirations-and moving into anýera of "confusion and 
odnflioVin basio-human purposes and perspectives" (40). In the 
light of his analysis he aooepted the earlier suggestion of Raup and 
bis associates, that' efforts} should be made, in'and out of 'schools, to 
systematize and`extend use°of the model of practical judgment. Fol" 
lowing'1Mannheim, Stanley-posed the alternatives of drift or plane He 
rejected drift or a piecemeal reform policy as°vhpraötioal and internally 
inaonsietentj again, under Mannheim's influence, he'"repudiated dicta- 
t'ärial and coercive' measures-'and'so concluded that the only defensible 
policy was to attempt to ý^aohievi national -eoaial'unitr'and cultural 
order"tirough'consensus (4l)- 
-: "Stanley conceived this°order'of culture ae primarily external to 
individual men, but it was not simply an institutional arrangement, 
or, in the eighteenth centuxy style, a new constitution. The order 
was tp be intelleätual-moral, or, as'I should prefer, 'in the light 
of"fly discussion, to call it, an ideological order. What Stanley 
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aspired to achieve was a consistent core, comprising commonly accep- 
table procedural principles for a democracy, and "a sense of unity 
growing out of a common 'world of experience" (42). This was not 
intended to serve as myth or hallowed law, but a set of criteria 
against which could be tested particular action programmes and re- 
forms. This core, he argued, was an essential pre-dondition of 
unity in educational policy. At the level of habit and custom, 
it was to serve as a social stabilizer, like Linton's universals. 
Principles could be achieved by analysing and refurbishing the American 
democratic heritage, in particular by translating abstract values and 
traditional imperatives for conduct and relationships into decision- 
taking proceduress the procedures of consensus achieved through the 
method of practical judgment. These procedures would serve as guide- 
lines for future action. Thus, for Stanley, order consists of a uni- 
fied methodology of decision-taking embodying procedural principles; 
it does not necessarily comprise a particular pattern of institutions 
or aýsingle substantive set of social goals. 
Since this conclusion did not differ fundamentally from-that of 
flaup and his associates, and since the methodological solution he 
adopted was broadly in line with Dewey's continuation of scientific 
method and the democratic ethic, the interest of Stanley's proposals 
lies more in his detailed defence of the crisis hypothesis and in his 
elaborations of traditional experimentalist thought than in his very 
sketchy proposals for a new cultural synthesis. 
Stanley, by wholeheartedly accepting the method of practical judg- 
ment, exposed himself to the criticisms to be made of that method. 
However, he kept clear of some of the dangerous attractions of holistic 
projections of ideal cultures. Whether he avoided them completely may 
- 337- 
be - doubted, for the, propdsals he made for a unified and unifying core 
of experience, sound, very"like anew Creed to be, expressed in symbols, 
myths, rituals, and works,. and in more theoretical etpositions. 
The"sohool, as an agent of . culture, would be forced to choose either 
to', oin'this expressive movement, and thereby to some extent indoo- 
trinate, or to act as culture critic. 
, .. We should also ask whether the translation of the idea of unity 
of outlook, belief, custom and habit characteristic of a real or imagi- 
nary organic community of the past, into the very massive, complex in- 
dustrial societies of the present, constitutes an adequate solution to 
the problem of cultural order. In the first place, such a proposal 
overlooks the actual diversities and disunities within the organic cul- 
tures of the past, and invests them with an order which they may have 
possessed but not to the exclusion of disordering tendencies. For 
example, the organic culture praised by Leavis and Thompson was a post 
hoc interpretation of a particular subculture. Within even so circum- 
scribed an entity as a village, what they described was by no means 
the whole of that village culture. Secondly, order and integration 
can mean many different things, not simply a unity of outlook or a 
sharing of idealst there can be an order of different but reciprocal 
functions,, or a hierarchical order, and neither of these requires a 
large core of shared values. Indeed, differences in value and out- 
look may be greater than similarities, in, for example, the order of 
a functionally integrated industry where all may share a common com- 
mitment to the industrial process, but may be very different in other 
respects. Thirdly, the importance the experimentalists attached to 
sciences and industry as social transformers suggests that a much more 
radical step is needed in re-creating order than simply invoking a 
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past value system and looking for ways to operationalize it in 
contemporary society. Total cultural order, even if we were to 
accept that it is needed, must be achieved by a creative attack 
on present and future problems, and, in the process of renewal, 
values themselves will change, if not in their schematic outlines, 
then, much more significantly, in content and experiential sig- 
nificance. 
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CHAPTER IX 
OVERVIEW-AND CRITIQUE OF PART ONE 
"New, thingS, eucoeed, as former things grow old" (Herrick). 
I have now completed the review of"the ideas of individual recon- 
structioniste about cultural and social changes 'and of their methods 
of culture analysis. , Before proceeding to examine their views about 
the cultural role of education I shall summarize and compare these ideas. 
I shall also consider some of the more general difficulties and contri- 
butions-, of the reconatructionist position. First, I shall review the 
argument which led-me to approach reconstructionism as an ideological 
theory. Then I shall summarize and contrast the culture critiques, 
the proposals for change and the methods, of analysis employed. Fol- 
lowing this, I-shall-raise some more general problems and weaknesses 
in-the reoonstructionist positions contrasting it with certain other 
change theories. I shall conclude with a review of the issues raised 
and-attempt to show why we need to turn to the specific educational 
ideas: of the reconstructionists in order to see how they thought cul- 
ture might and should be developed in the future. 
1. °Education, Ideology and Culture Theory 
1.1 Educational theory Y 
"ÄI-, maintained in the Introduction that theories of education are 
more or less systematic prescriptions for certain kinds of practice 
concerning human growth. By exploring the arguments for these pres- 
criptions, the assumptions on which they rest, and the wider institu- 
tional, social and cultural contexts to which the prescriptions refer, 
we may see that educational theorizing implicitly or explicitly advances 
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a wide range of moral and social ideals. For the purposes of the pre- 
sent study I argued that it is useful to introduce the concept of ideo- 
logy in considering the wider issues raised by reconstructionist thought. 
In doing so, I suggested that the term ideology could with advantage 
be restored to currency in educational thought, since ideological 
thinking appears to act as a powerful stimulus to action, in addition 
to providing a coherent theoretical structure. For these very reasons, 
of course, ideology is a form of thought which is particularly prone to 
mis-use. Dogmatism, lack of critical self-awareness, self-deception, 
appeal to irrationality and readiness to adopt the pervasive devices of 
propaganda, indoctrination and rr&th-making for purposes of exploitation 
point to the more obvious dangers. 
It may well be argued that a great deal of specific and limited 
theorizing is and should be carried on in education in what I , have 
termed a value-spare framework; or, at least, that the wider frame 
of reference can be taken for granted without recourse to debate over 
ends and purposes. Hence the determination of O'Connor, for example, 
to direct attention to the empirical issues in educational theory and 
his argument that we should concentrate on research and on forming 
sound empirical generalizations. It would be time-wasting and tedious 
to enunciate and reflect upon, say, the democratic ideology every time 
one tried to reach decisions about teaching specific types of subject 
matter, or home-school relationships, or many of the specific ques- 
tions requiring attention in the ordinary life of the school. Where 
empiricism is constantly referred to some justifying creed, dogmatism 
and authoritarianism are also commonly found. Yet, the assumptions 
and preferences underlying practice, research and policy-making at 
some point need to be examined if only to bring out confusion, uncertainties 
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and limitations of thinking. Also, many action proposals tacitly 
assume a: asi®nt to highly controversial assumptions about the interests 
and needs of pupils and teachers. 
1.2 Reconstructionism as ideology 
But whatever arguments there may be concerning the extent of cul- 
tural assumptions underlying the more specific and detailed forms of 
action, toward which a great deal of contemporary educational theoriz- 
ing is directed, the theory of reconstructionism is one of those larger 
syntheses in educational thought which quite explicitly raises questions 
about the ende of human action. We have seen some of the ways'in which 
political, social, moral, and personal dimensions'of experience have been 
explored by the reconstructionists, very öften inadequately, but none- 
theless guided by a determination to develop and make interpretative use 
of general principles of action. Because reconstructionism is a theory 
or 'a movement in'thought which not only criticizes contemporary Was but 
plainly prescribes group action for the re-making of institutions and 
other elements of culture, l suggested that the ideological framework 
may be very appositely applied in attempting to understand its particular 
features and claims. 
However, a'complete ideological' analysis of theory calls for a 
psychological exploration of motives, or of inner meanings, and for a 
sooio-historical account of the origins of ideas and the interests they 
s®rve. Instead of embarking on these sorts of Freudian and Mirxiaii 
enterprises, I have attempted to analyse the ways ih which the recon- 
etructioniste have interpreted their key concept, that of culture 
transformation. 
1.3 Culture theory 
In order to examine reoonstruotionist thought on culture change, Y 
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classified the variety and complexity of usages of the concept of 
culture into the two categories of value spare and value laden. 
This classification is useful in distinguishing qualitative judg- 
ments about how culture should develop, from explanations of how 
cultures do in fact change. Nevertheless, too sharp a distinction 
would oversimplify the issue, because the apparent value neutrality 
of empirical studies of culture disguises significant, if not always 
very explicit, culture preferences. By discussing one or two examples, 
I tried to show that differences between the classical, prescriptive 
use of the term culture and the modern descriptive use are matters of 
degree and emphasis, not of sharp conceptual distinction. 
To the distinction between value spare and value laden uses of the 
. 
term culture, I added a further distinction. This is the distinction 
between those super-organic theories of culture which are directed to- 
wards analysis of pre-existing patterns of meaning, behavior and expec- 
tation into which the individual is to be inducted, and those which draw 
attention to the role of the individual as an active, creative being 
making his way into these wider systems of action, and, in the process, 
contributing to the remaking of the culture pattern. In the super- 
organic theories there is an emphasis on transmission, induction and 
acquisitions what Ausubel calls receptive learning. In'the individual- 
creative theories, emphasis is on the change that meanings undergo in 
communication, and on the concepts of growth and inquiry, what Ausubel 
calls discovery learning (1). 
1.4 Reconstructioniat strategy of development 
The concept of culture, whatever position is taken with respect to 
these distinctions, has played an important, if not always adequately 
recognized, part in educational theory. I argued that a broad grouping 
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of`historical theories of education into those directed by the notions 
of (a) assimilating a heritage of culture, and (b) exploring children's 
interests within schools that form, as it were, culture islands, pro- 
vided-away of bringing out the distinctive cultural claims of the 
reconatructionist theory. - To refer back to the two-fold classifica- 
tion of theories of culture, all three types of educational theory are 
value laden, not value spare. The culture heritage theory features, - 
the, receptive element of super-organiciem, while not denying to indi- 
viduals a creative role in learning. The child-interest theory of 
education emphasizes the process of discovery and individual creativity 
in culture-acquisition and! in some instances, its exponents have de- 
liberately isolated themselves from : the wider society in an effort to 
buildup, their own sub-oultiral identity. Reconstructionism, while not 
falling, neatly between these two, has something-1n. common with both. 
It does not ignore the cultural heritage, but treats it as a legacy 
of human experience which is susceptible to re-interpretation, in urgent 
nand of reappraisal, and incapable of transmission except by being 
modified in the process. Determined individual or, more often, group 
action can be effective in reconstituting cultural experience through the 
mapping out of fresh areas of policy in all the major institutions of 
society. Culture adaptation, on this view, -is a critical, re-adjua- 
tine process, not merely an assimilation of the given, or the passive 
acöeptanoe by the populace of what its leaders decide. The reconstruc- 
tionists share with the individual interest theorists the view that 
pioneering groups and individuals -a new type of elite - are needed to 
try out new ideas. On the whole, the reconstruotionists separated this 
elite from the legislative and executive branches of the state. We shall 
see, in the following chapters, that the teachers were cast into thin 
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role and the schools committed to the task of leading, or at 
least 
actively sharing in, culture transformation. 
I discussed the Report of the Kothari committee as an example of 
the deliberate attempt to shape a country's cultural future in, and pri- 
marily through, its schools. The Kothari committee pointed to an urgent 
and critical culture crisis in India, due primarily to the growing and 
unsettling social impact of science and technology. They examined the 
problem of reconciling the claims of modernization with the continuing 
vitality of a traditional culture. This report is a striking manifes- 
tation of one strand of reconstructionist thought - that which sees in 
education the chief lever of planned change. I raised certain diffi- 
culties in discussing this conception, notably: the problems of the re- 
lationship of processes of individual education to possibly miseducative 
elements in the national drive towards modernization; the difficulties 
of teacher inadequacy and institutional deficiency; and the problems 
of indoctrination which arise out of the proposal to develop through 
schooling a new civic culture. 
I argued that the Kothari committee, despite, or perhaps because 
of, the imaginative boldness and vigor of its proposals, had not reached 
adequate solutions to many of the problems to which its own proposals 
give rise. Whatever social, political and economic barriers may 
exist in India itself, and these I did not attempt to discuss, the 
Kothari proposals revived many of the enduring problems and weaknesses 
in the reconstructionist theory. 
One of the most obvious of these problems arises from the difficulty 
of reducing the massive institutional and ideational complexities of 
modern culture to simple generalizations and to models for action. We 
lack adequate conceptual structures and procedures for generating data 
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for this purpose, with the result that generalizations and slogans' 
and broad policy objectives are frequently substituted for more 
detailed analysis. IIn this situation, the larger concepts of eul-' 
ture, -eooiety and. development have acquired an inspirational sig- 
nifiosnce which-often masks the'poverty of infrastruotural analysis. 
Thus- talk of re-making a culture, or of developing a new society and 
of employing the agencies of education-to° those ends, fails very often 
tobring out our lack, of knowledge, even of-the necessary tools of know- 
ledge;. to undertake these tasks. serous practical difficulties are 
well, reoognized, but-this. is not at all the same as. recognising that we 
lack theoretical ttodels adequate for the range of phenomena encompassed 
by the all-inclusive concepts of culture and. society. To illustrate 
this. point, we may consider the inspirational concept ot'cons ensus. ' 
' The proposal to-govean through consensus needs to be- examined very 
closely indeed, sine, while it expresses an aspiration of the demo- 
cratic faith, the forms the aspiration- might take-will vary-considerably 
in different situations. "Thess'forms'will be-affeoted by the influence 
of educational provision, the decision preferoneas and requirements of 
an-expert-dominated economy and polity, the'voice of the masses, the 
existing apparatus of participation, representation and"decision-taking, 
, acid, the ; heritage , of assumptions and preferancas concerning 'mass involve- 
ment in corporate social action. Thus it°-is by*'no`means clear just 
how, in a proposed new cultural synthesis, even the single objective 
of consensus is to be interpreted and how it might express itself. 
Thus, when reconstructionists, invoke consensus ideals, we cannot be 
sure just what these mean. When particular meaning is-given to them, - 
this is inevitably partial, -as, for example, in the writings of thee` 
later experimentalists. 
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Reconstructionist thinking has typically been incorporated into 
the development planning of many new nations. This may be regarded 
as a demonstration of the foresight of its exponents, earlier in the 
century. The problems are real, and the thinking, for all its inade- 
quacies, is directed towards solving them. This is the optimistic 
interpretation of reconstructionism, and it suggests that further 
analysis of the models of social action underlying reconstructionist 
ideology would be worthwhile. However, there are some commentators 
who prophesying the end of ideology, would maintain that reconstruc- 
tionism is a theory without a future, a movement which has exhausted 
itself without achieving any very profound or satisfactory resolution 
of its own inner tensions. The fallacy of a similar prediction made 
of the future of theories of socialism and communism only a few years 
before the appearance of The Communist Manifesto should at least induce 
caution, even if the analogy is far from exact (2). Instead of indulg- 
ing in these types of predictions we could more fruitfully seek an under- 
standing of the reoonstruotionist approach by perceiving it as an expres- 
sion of the ancient and continuing quest for cultural reform which will 
enable man to organize his experience and feel at ease with the world. 
The reconstructionists are heirs to the Platonic and enlightenment tra- 
ditional, in which cultural order is a perennial quest for forms of 
public thought and social institutions that sublimate impulse and struc- 
ture experience. 
1.5 Win 
Despite considerable variation in emphasis and interpretation, cer- 
tain common themes stand out in the reconstruotionist analyses of culture. 
Conspicuous amongst these common features is cultural holism, meaning 
the effort to conceptualize culture as a totality of interconnected 
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elements and not merely an aggregate of separate systems. Reason, 
ae. in the enlightenment, is conceived an a synthesising, unifying 
forces the doctrine of Idontesquieu, that thought brings about the order 
of the-things which it conceives. 
Many of the reconstructionists felt justified in referring not 
merely to specific sets of problems but to the oriole of the age, 
or-the threatening breakdown of civilization which thought, at DCannheim's 
level-of planning, could avert. They did not necessarily envisage total 
collapse, although Wells, Rugg, Mannheim$ Brameld and Stanley argued 
that, unless drastic forestalling measures were taken, there would be 
complete, but not very clearly specified, -chaoo. More often, the 
totality of collapse was seen in termarof; key. institutions and central 
areas; or cores, of common experience.. Xannheim and the later experi- 
mentalists, although they outlined a. large°aumber-of factors making 
for breakdown, pointed, to social and moral= values as comprising the 
most critical culture realm. 
It was the belief of-, Dewey, Mannheim and others of the later re- 
constructionists that the emergence of the modern, mass, industrial 
society had been accompaniedýby breakdown of the traditional communal 
assumptions, norms, expectations and beliefs. The central core of 
culture values, on this view, had been shattered and was in need of 
rebuilding, to provide-a framework for agreed action in a democracy. 
The Webbe, by contrast, gave greater emphasis-to specific deprivation 
and to. the inadequacy of institutional structure, mainly political and 
industrial, to sustain the demands of an expert-managed democracy. 
In later life they, too, -sought a wider vision and turned to the 
unities of Soviet Communism to provide it. Dewey and Rusell, although 
more cautious in their use of crisis language than most, thought that 
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the most serious, problem was failure to spread throughout society the 
values and techniques, of scientific humanism, and thereby to achieve 
at least a common methodology .a unity of rational thought. For 
them, the cultural short-comings. of their times were bound up with 
ignorance and prejudice, andthese could best be dispelled by the 
universal cultivation through schooling of. more, critical, -reflective 
forms of thinking. Society was seen to be largely irrational and 
only the diffusion of rationality as represented in scientific method 
would correct its mal-functioning. 
Wells shared this confidence in the ultimate efficacy of scientific 
culture, but added to it outraged descriptions of the-miseries, meanness 
and missed opportunities of bourgeois culture. Unlike the experimen- 
talists who retained a faith in the values, the common sense and the 
practical shrewdness of the common nano Wells looked upon him as the 
bruised and dogged survival of a brutal past, who had to be educated 
out of existence. This attitude towards the average representative 
of humanity in the industrial society reflected a fear of, and hostility 
towards, mob power and potential mob rule under demagogic leaders. 
The masses were an unfortunate consequence of industrialization and 
had to be diffused, as in the decentralized utopias Wells described, 
or,, in the shorter term, extracted from their intellectually and 
spiritually impoverished sub-culture and trained into rational humanists. 
Mannheim shared this dislike of the-masses. Without adopting Wells' 
ambivalences about elitism, he proposed schemes for the nluar division 
of responsibility in society which would ensure elite dominance of the 
central areas of cultural development within a system which expressed 
the democratic criteria of shared experience, widespread participation 
in policy formation, and high standards'of common education. Although 
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several of the re constructionists made free use of the minority- 
mass culture distinction, the task they proposed was not-simply 
the dominance of masses by minorities, in any of the common forms 
taken by mass-minority culture theories. The reconstruetlonist 
determination to build a democratic social order which included 
roles of innovation and leadership for minorities may be contrasted 
with traditional elitismt Plato's combining of 'political authority 
with intellectual prowess in a rigidly divided class systei; the 
Eliot-Bantock solution of ascribing unique value to mass culture 
while ensuring that its bearers are excluded from centres of power; 
the Marxist investment of the proletarian mass with qualities and 
virtues destined to supersede those expressed in the culture of 
exploiting minorities; and the counter-culture generations thesis 
of, the young, creative, ascendent minority working towards the trans- 
formation of a commercial mass society. 
The reconstructionists were by no means unanimous in their pro- 
posals for extricating man from the dangerous and evil situations in 
which they found him. They were unable to resolve the dilemmas pro- 
duced by seeking to combine into a single prescription for social action 
the various ingredients oft technical expertise, large-scale planning, 
individual liberty, participation in corporate decision-taking, inno- 
vation, 'stability, diversity, and common core values. ; These ingre. 
diente were variously combined to'produce programmes which ranged from 
the %79bbs' managerial bureaucracy, to Dewey's mildly anarchic theory of 
the wisdom of the common man, to the arguments by Wells and Brameld for 
a world state. However, the holism of the more extreme reconstructioniate 
should be distinguished from totalitarianism. This distinction is not 
adequately maintained by Hopper, who, intent on demolishing holistic theory, 
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used all possible weapons including the charge of totalitarianism. 
Aron has identified five main elements in totalitarianism which on. 
visage a r019-for the state quite at variance.. with the. cultural 
pluralism-of the majority of the reconstructionists - even of Mannheim, 
who came nearest of them all to. centralizing power in the elites. 
Aroma elements area "L ' 
1. "The totalltarianýphenomenon occurs in a regime which 
ives to one party monopoly`of political activity. " lope 
reconstictionist support of multi-party systems. ) 
structionisto' rejection of-coercive-pover. modele 
of change. ) 
state. " (cp. reconstruotionist critiques of abso- 
lutism in thought. ) 
"To. impose this ofiioial truth, the state reserves 
for itself in turn a double monopoly, the monopoly 
of the means of coercion and those-[sic] of the 
means of persuasion. The means of communication, 
radio, television, press, are directed and commanded 
by the state and its representatives. " (op. reoon- 
"The monopolistic party i*, animated or armed with an 
ideology on which it confers absolute authority and 
which consequentlybecomes the. official truth of the 
As all activity is state activity, and subject to 
ideology an error in economic or professional ac. tivity is by the same token an ideological fault (3). 
"Most economic and professional activities are sub- ject to the state and become, in a way, part of the 
state itself ... " (op. autonomy of education in 
reconstruetionism. ) 
Turning from the distinction that-needs to be drawn between holism 
and totalitarianism, to the problem of achieving a common culture, a 
more apt distinction for my-purposes than that, between mass and 
minority, culture p is that which, Hoggart, - has drawn between "prooessed 
and. "living" culture, The former is audience directed; it never 
imagines individuals, only masses, typical audiences, and status groups. 
The, latter., "speaks to individuals or to genuine communities"t "has its 
eye on the subject, the material"' and, ie concerned particularly with 
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the diversity of experience (4). There are certainly difficulties 
about this distinction. The same cultural phenomena could appear as 
"living" or as "processed", depending on onus standpoint - i. e. o as 
producer or perhaps entrepreneur, and consumer; and a single ex- 
perience may be judged "living", for example by the members of a pop 
concert audience who have the experience, and "processed", by a critical 
observer. Nevertheless, the tendency of "living" culture is to involve 
individuals and communities in explorations, challenges and critiques, 
and it is in these kinds of enterprises that the reconstruotionists 
intend to find ways of involving not just a minority but whole popu- 
lations. This means eliminating the massifying characteristics of 
mass society and replacing them with much more discriminating, diverse, 
and creative functions for individuals and groups. 
. 1.6 Universal change 
The reconstruotionists were united in the belief that the most 
basin characteristic of modern western culture is universal change 
brought about, sustained and intensified by what they took to be the 
closely related sub-systems of science, technology and industrialization. 
They differed from the classical and Christian theorists, who both dis- 
dained the particular, unlawlike character of historical events Wand pro- 
posed grand developmental theories of cycles of generation and decay 
(5). Despite their many affinities with the philosophea of the-'enlighten- 
ment, in particular on the relationship of science and, social progresjj, 
the reconatructionists did not accept the inevitability of progress. 
They did, however, take from the enlightenment the idea of the pos- 
sibility of progress, which depends on a rejection of inevitable decay 
or inveterate corruptibility (6). Again, the reoonstructionists were 
influenced by the nineteenth century evolutionary theories of Comte, 
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Spencer, Mark-and others, but not to the extent of accepting the 
doctrines of predictable., directions and uniform causes of cultural 
movement. They were tempted by. the historicist theory of inevita- 
bility, -but, on the whole, abandoned this in favor of the belief that 
the effects of unpredictable knowledge on events'and, of the complex 
interactions of innovations are such as, to preclude=exact predic- 
tions. Wella is a major exception, but it should be noted that his 
very. aocurate forecasts did not lead him to advance purely, historicist 
explanations of social-changes 
The reconstructionists adopted the Marxian argument of the primary 
importance in social change of modifications in the substructure of 
industrial and technical processes. Unlike Marx, -none of them fully 
subscribed to a single cause theory, although there is evidence-of 
uncritical acceptance of the technological theory of cultural lag 
amongst the experimentalists (7)'. They were. far more impressed-by 
evidence of universal and rapid changethan by evidence-which indicated 
the strength and endurance of stabilizing, factors. But by conceding 
the persistenceýof institutions, traditions, customary beliefs. and.... 
behavior, they'admitted that cultural change is not, a unitary, -and 
all-pervasive phenomenon. --. However, none of the reconstructioniete was 
able-to explain how differing rates of change impinge upon one another 
or, indeed, why there should be these. differences. .. They were more 
interested-in so defining change processes as-to make them susceptible 
to a form of human intervention which might make. change purposive. 
This was not to be-purposive in arty non-naturalistic sense, but change 
wat to be harnessed to the combined, preferably the consensual, purposes, 
however these were defined, of. mankind. Thus the reconstructionists 
adopted a non-ideational explanation for the origins of the crisis in, 
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culture and proposed a set of ideational controls to stabilize and 
direct future change. As a consequence of adopting the more ex- 
treme form of the ideational theory which attributes to ideas the 
greatest importance as directors of change, the reconstruotionists 
tended to minimize barriers and difficulties. The virtue of an idea, 
in change theoxyý is that it is not limited in space or time by exist- 
ing institutions or previous experience. The idea can project any 
and all possibilities, thus converting a determinate, historically- 
rooted situation into an indeterminate, historically-free situation. 
But to convert imaginative possibility into specific proposals, as is 
required to make the situation determinate in the fashion desired, 
the actual and possible impingements, the deflections and resistances 
of other idea systems and of other cultural phenomena must be considered. 
For example, business-men may resist or try to circumvent the require- 
ments of a government credit policy. For the policy to work, it, is 
necessary, if not sufficient, to control these circumventions, and 
the idea of a credit policy needs to be enlarged accordingly. Ideational 
theories achieve their imaginative vigor and optimistic tone by minimizing 
the force of these sorts of resistance and constraint. The reconstructionist 
theorists, on the wholes were preoccupied with what almost-all modern 
change theorists have come to accept as a centrally transforming dynamic 
process, namely industrialization (8). Although they outlined various 
schemes for directing the process of industrialization, they persistently 
minimized the strength and flexibility of countervailing forces, es- 
pecially existing institutional arrangements, entrenched customs, and 
habitual expectations. 
1.7 Social control and the future 
The crisis of culture diagnosed by the reconstructionists *ought 
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out the need for purposive control. -'There was indeed &crisis just 
because mental structures and social'systems commensurate with the 
scale and rate of social change had not been'developed. Of all 
the reconstructiönists, Mannheim was the most conscious of the dangers 
of a reaction into either totalitarianism or calculated"indifference. 
He argued compellingly, if not logically, that if the crisis is total 
then total measures are needed to control it. I pointed out that'in 
fact the reconstructionists could not consistently diagnose a total 
collapse, and that they used the idea-of total breakdown as a polemical 
device to justify or to give urgency to the strategy of interventionism. 
But these total measures, according to Mannheim and to the other crisis 
theorists, need not'and should not entail the loss of the traditional 
liberal and democratic values of liberty, 'tolerance, equality of con- 
sideration, opportunity for individual development, and so'forth. ` I 
suggested that Mannheim's proposal for planning for freedom in the form 
of an elite-directed democracy is far from satisfaotoryi, but that he 
was nevertheless conscious of and troubled by the problem of reconciling 
expert planning and individual liberty. All the reconatructionists 
agreed on the desirability of social planning', although few of them 
gave any attention at all to the traditional liberal objections to 
wholesale planning. Instead, like Dewey, they tended to'"reconstruct" 
traditional liberalism-and its values into a modern theory of social 
planning. 
Russell, more than any of the others, wished to sustain the tradi- 
tional liberal tenets of individualism against what he took to be col- 
leotivist pressures for joint action, conformity, policy agreement and 
obedience. But, since he also advooäted'oolleotive action`to achieve 
the basic policy objectives of universalizing rationality, and since-he 
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advocated various forms of quite elaborate communal relationship, 
extending to world government, his individualism might be thought to 
depend rather less on the younger John Stuart Mill's defence of 
freedom from various restrictions and more on the nineteenth 
century socialist theories which looked for ways of universalizing and 
equalizing opportunities in a collective setting. The experimentalists 
virtually identified the democratic heritage not with individual liber- 
ties but with communal and communitarian valueal for example Dewey's 
sharing of experience. They did not, on the whole, protest against 
the absence of freedom in contemporary society; for example, intolerance 
and repression. however, they did find inequalities, lack of oppor- 
tunity for individual expression; and, most frequently, they noted 
the loss of traditional cohesiveness and unanimity of outlook. 
Primary communities had been supplanted by a confusing array of imper- 
sonal groups, each demanding allegiance and competing for influence 
in society. To remedy the breakdown of community, there were various 
proposals ranging from Wells' advocacy of perfect harmony in deoentra- 
lized, semi-anarchic, world communities, to the development, by the later 
experimentalists, of the community-binding and character-building instru- 
ment of practical judgment. Through this technique of policy making 
by the organized quest for consensus it was hoped to restore the miss- 
ing community and to enlarge the shrinking core of basic agreements 
and value commitments. 
Despite the innumerable problems they found in contemporary civi- 
lization, the reconatructionists remained optimistic about the future. 
The Fabians sustained and nourished their optimism by drawing up specific 
practical reform proposals to alleviate or eliminate the many problems 
which their researches into the workings of capitalism disclosed. Wells 
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felt that the crisis of civilization was far more serious than the 
Fabians' reform proposals signified; not merely were man's insti- 
tutions inadequate, but his thought and experience were in a condi- 
tion of intellectual and moral chaos. ' However, neither he, nor any 
of the Fabians accepted traditional religious ideas, about incorrigible 
human weakness or the redeeming power of grace,, Man, if not quite, 
either as a species or individually, perfectible, is nevertheless 
capable, himself, of re-organizing his experience and his culture to 
achieve rationality and happiness in sufficient measure. Nothing 
short of a massive, organized effort could achieve this, but whether A 
through altruistic elites, or by more widely participatory procedures, 
the reconstructionists supposed that the desired changes cöuld come, 
about. 
This confidence in man's capacity by deliberate thought and action 
to redirect the main lines of his own future development means that, on 
the whole, the reconstruotionists were not methodological historicists, 
in Popper's meaning of that term. There are, ho! ever, sufficient, 
evidences of historicist influences in their thinking to make it an 
interesting question how far theymanaged to combine historicist forecasts 
of social trends with a belief in the powers, of unpredictable human know- 
ledge. It is sometimes argued, with logical impeccability but in defiance 
of the evidence from history, that moral effort depends on our believing 
that something that is possible will only be realized, or. more quickly 
realized, by our efforts. If we thought something either inevitable 
or impossible our efforts would be "imbecile" (9). This makes both 
Calvinism and Marxism, or at. least the more deterministic interpretations 
of them, imbecile. But action theorists, and their followers, seem quite 
well able to combine a belief in inevitable historical processes with a 
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much more strenuous commitment to intervention than is to be found in 
many who entertain non"deterministio views. There is in the feeling 
of inevitability itself, especially the inevitability of a massive 
transformation, an incitement to its prophets to involve themselves 
as agents in the very process whose future they have predicted 
(10). 
While there is little evidence of this belief in. inevitable historical 
forces in reconstructionist thought, where it does occasionally occur 
it in no way leads to an attitude of resigned acceptance of what must 
be. The reconstruotionists found no adequate reason for believing 
in inevitable collapse or an inevitable future golden age. They 
thought the former (but not the latter) a possibility, unless very 
active counter-measures were taken. Of these counter"measures, 'what 
they uniformly believed to be the most significant was the universali- 
zation of certain kinds of education. Thus the measured optimism of 
the reconstructionists rests not on any confidence about the inevitable 
outworkings of history, nor on any expectations of a supernatural kind, 
nor on any theories hypothesizing innate human goodness, but on the 
possibilities of individual control and social development through 
education. 
Few of them went so far as Wells in sketching the outlines of a 
reconstructed human nature in utopia. The "new`man"j on the whole, 
remained a shadowy figure, or, as in Mannheim, zan, uncertain bland of 
assertive and renunciatory qualities. But there can be no question 
about the commitment of all of the reconstruotionists to what might 
be called a renovatory theory of human experience. All took the view 
that experience is susceptible to improvement; hence they were all in 
a sense progress theorists. Dewey's equation of growth with the re. 
construction of experience, and the reconstruction of experience with 
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processes of reflective inquiry implied an emergent rationality. 
Most of the reconstructionists, even including some of the experi- 
mentalists, separated humanity into that minority from whom much 
could be expected, and quickly, from this reconstructive process, 
and the mass or majority from and for whom only much longer term 
results could be expected. Thus there was no suggestion of a mi- 
lennial transformations education is a slow process in individuals, 
and only slowly permeates a whole culture. But nor naa`there any 
admission that the difficulties of the task envisaged were so great 
as to jeopardize the whole enterprise. ` Man and cultures could be 
remade, initially through the enhancement of self-awareness, in the 
manner outlined by Frank, and, over time, through the mounting impact 
of a reformed, universal education. 
2. Assessment 
it is sometimes said that attempts to'assees'ideologies, especially 
those whose full realization is projected into the distant future, are 
confounded by their ethical ambiguities and the impossibility"of'empirical 
testing. Be this as it may, there are a'number of'questions that can be 
raised, and which it is important to consider, the more so now that re- 
construotionism is being revived as'part of developmental or modernization 
theory in the newer nations of the world. Several of these questions I 
have already raised, in relation to the proposals of individual writers. 
At this stage, before we have considered the educational claims of the 
reconstructionists, more general questions can only be partial and any 
answers given must be treated as tentative. 
I have selected for discussion what "I take to be the more important 
of these questions. These I shall raise under three main headingst 
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if How adequate is the reconetruotionist analysis of 
the culture whose problems they set out to diagnose? 
2. Are they justified in claiming that human nature has 
the degree and type of malleability presupposed by 
the doctrine of the new man? 
3" How effective are their arguments for a model of cul- 
ture of which directed change is the central feature? 
2.1 Diagnosis of culture 
The question of adequacy of diagnosis is by no means straight- 
forward. Specific weaknesses abound, and I have commented on many of 
these. But there are no general criteria of adequacy apart from all 
the particular sets of criteria embodied in different traditions of 
inquiry. These traditions are not themselves homogenous, and in the 
literature of change theory alone there is no agreement, for example, 
about the relationship of ideational to non-ideational factors. This 
relationship is particularly important, and in a later section of this 
chapter we shall consider some alternative theories of culture change. 
From this there will emerge at least an indication of the complexity of 
the problem of evaluation. Prior to that, it can be said that two 
major weaknesses are apparent in most of the reconstruotionist theorizing 
about contemporary culture. The first of them is the lack of an ade- 
quate methodology of analysis, and the second is the relative neglect 
of-barriers and resistances to change. 
2.1.1 Method of analysis 
I have already discussed in particular instances the methodological 
weaknesses of reconstructionism. They all arise from over-ambitious 
attempts to establish synthetic, holistic overviews of the totality 
of culture movement and experience. These attempts are not an ex- 
traneous consideration; they are integral to the theory and have been 
used to demonstrate not only the extent of the crisis but also the possibility 
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of embarking upon total planning. Such attempts necessarily depend 
upon echematization and simplification. But schematization and eim- 
plification, in situations where detailed, factual knowledge is ex- 
tremely patchy and. there is no established tradition of inquiry within 
which to work but only a mixture of reformist and particular empirical 
trm. ditions, inevitably involve' a high degree of personal intuition 
and impressionistic judgment. Of these limitations, the absence of 
a developed tradition of inquiry is the more serious, since upon it 
alone depends, the amassing and interpretation of data relevant to the 
problems under review. It is indeed an important contribution of 
ideological theory, that it provides a direction and a sense of reie- 
vanes in the gathering and use of data, which is needed if we are ever 
to succeed in relating policy-making, practice and research as parts 
of a single system. In education, the practitioner commonly asks 
about, the relevance of research, and is advised to learn to interpret 
it and apply its findings an best he may. This is for the most part 
useless advice, the more so as much educational research takes the form 
not of replication of experiments but of plotting some new territory. 
Only the researchers, and perhaps not even they, are able to appreciate 
the significance of fresh inquiry in any given area. Ideological theory 
runs the very grave risk of using or. distorting research to, confirm 
hypotheses, especially those hypotheses agreeable to its own preferences 
and expectations. If this risk can be avoided, the constructions ela- 
boration and public discussion of defensible ideologies - for example, 
of rationality, or of democracy - could help to identify issues and 
questions about which more empirical knowledge is needed if we are to 
proceed with understanding. This gives to empiricism not only its 
traditional critical roles of scepticism and refutation but also the 
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role of illuminator of issues upon which we have committed ourselves 
to action. 
A proposal of this kind is of course potentially dangerous. 
Wherever culture diagnosis is avowedly motivated by a wish to modify 
and change in gtite substantial ways the material being studied, a 
very powerful set of interests operates selectively on that material. 
Thus, the reconstruotionists'extract "trends" which bear very close 
resemblance to future directions in which the theorist would like-to 
see culture moving, and counter-trends and movements are given much 
less notice. In this situation, the sirategio importance of the 
assertion of a crisis-is so very great in justifying far-reaching 
changes that we must ask whether these changes would be justified at 
all, were there no crisis.. Many of the reoonstruotionists gave, at 
least by implication, a negative answer to this questions if there 
were no crisis, the changes would not be-justified. There are some 
significant exceptions to this, notably Dewey, Prank, 'the Webbe and 
Baup and his associates. All of these gave other reasons than crisis 
for culture reconstruction. ' However, even with these writers there 
is an emphasis and an urgency in their` proposals which derives from 
their feeling that very profound changes are occurring in western 
societies and that we need to intervene far more directly and massively 
than'heretofore in order to prevent these changes from becoming des- 
tructive in their effects. Thus interventionism is justified not by 
actual crisis but by the possibility of future crisis. 
The concept of crisis is normative in that crisis denotes a con- 
dition which one finds troublesome, threatening and unsatisfactory - 
a condition which one wishes to modify. But, in society, not every- 
one who studies the problem agrees about what is troublesome, threatening, 
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eta. This is not merely because everyone is not equally threatened 
by it, since there exist some objective. indices (e. g., stockmarket 
prices) which might be accepted as an objective measure. The prob- 
lem is rather the lack of an agreed set of indices and interpretative 
models to show how serious and far-reaching any crisis may be. For 
example, given that a culture seldom completely disintegrates except 
by violent invasion, what sets of indices and models are there to 
enable us to agree about degrees of overall breakdown? Of course, 
none of the reconstruotioniats denied these disagreements. Further, 
they could reasonably Claim to be refining our understanding of the 
nature of indices, for example, by exploring the relationships in 
children and youth between material deprivation and subsequent availa- 
bility for political participation, or the socially repercussive ef- 
fects of a succession of economic arises. This brings out the point 
that, Just because it is normative and-is deployed in a pluralistic 
culture, the concept of crisis embodies values which are not universally 
shared. Thus there could only be single models or agreed sets of in- 
dicea-under pure totalitarianism. We are brought back to the problem; 
of different sets of criteria and the impossibility of eliminating all 
but one set. 
The reoonstruationists assumed, and attributed to one another, a 
power of diagnosis altogether beyond the capability of their instruments. 
They thought that-there was very widespread agreement amongst the whole 
community of those interested in questions of culture development about 
the reality of crisis. But, as we have seen, there is and can be no 
such widespread agreement at the level of, diagnosis; consequently there 
must be lack of agreement amongst commentators about what should be done. 
This is a situation in which methodological exactitude and caution are 
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extremely important, and those writers, like Mannheim and Stanley, 
who carefully try to relate their diagnosis to a wider and more 
diverse community'of culture study carry more conviction than the 
more impressionistic, if more imaginative'and comprehensive, writers 
like Wells, Rugg and Brameld. Two things are very clearly needed; 
first, the use of more comparative materials, particularly those yielded 
by other frames of references for example, systematic comparison of one 
change theory with another (as recommennded*and, 'indeed, in a limited 
way, undertaken by Rugg and Brameld); the use of'historical materials 
which'show how "crisis" has been understood and reacted to in other 
circumstances; and the effort to rebut rather than confirm one's 
crisis diagnosis, by the search for contrary indications; second, 
and as a consequence of the first suggestion, more analytic methods 
are required; for example, those recommended by Brameld, but not, 
unfortunately, used by him, except when he studied other cultures than 
American. These methods cannot be purely empirical, for the reasons 
l have given. They will involve the use of skills of synthesis and 
interpretation as well as incorporating' the morally judgmental element 
which, I have suggested, the very definition of terms in this field 
requires. 
2.1.2 Barriers to chime 
The second major question I wish to raise about the reconstruotionist 
diagnosis of culture iss did they observe any barriers and obstacles to 
change in the culture whose problems they diagnosed? The answer to 
this has been partly given already, in that, by interesting themselves 
in trends which pointed towards the outcomes and results they desired, 
the reconstruotionists tended to overlook or to minimize the power of 
countervailing forces. This was'a general tended of their thought but 
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it must be qualified in certain respects. The Fabians, at least in 
the earlier stages of permeation, were very well aware of political 
and social opposition and indifference. Dewey was always very con. 
scious of a variety of authoritarian tendencies in American life which 
militated against the realization of his ideals of a sharing of ex- 
perience and the elimination of class barriers. , Russell's theory 
of impulses recognized some of the psychological barriers to the changes 
be desired. Wells railed constantly against the ignorance and stupidity, 
which he had to propose ways of eliminating or controlling in order to 
achieve the utopian society. 
Many such exceptions can be cited, yet the overall optimism of the 
reconstructionista, and their concentration on what they supposed were 
remediable factors, led them to minimize or ignore other factors not so 
amenable to control by their methods. These fact©rs, to mention some 
of those widely discussed in contemporary culture change literature, 
includes population increase and movement; nationalism; alternative 
ideologies such as Christianity, and communism; unconscious and unreason- 
ing factors within the psyche; institutionalized interest groups, such 
as trade unions, management associations, professional groups; the 
infrastructure of governmental administration, including the civil 
service; the force of habit and tradition; and alternative theories 
of social change. 
I can find no evidence of these and similar factors being seriously 
assessed as sets of major structural and methodological barriers standing 
in the way of implementation of reconstructionist proposals. For example, 
population change was admitted as a factor of change in culture, but just 
how far the structure and mobility of a population might complicate the 
implementation of reconatructiontat proposals was overlooked, unless we 
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count Mannheim's generational theory of the innovative power of 
youth as an adequate recognition of the population factor. Bramold 
has drawn attention to the problem of barriers to change, but, as yet, 
the reoonstructionist theory has not been suffused with the new aware- 
noes and it may be justly criticized for proposing system-wide changes 
without adequately considering system-wide resistance to change. 
Recent developments in organizational theory and the theory of inno- 
vations are beginning to yield the necessary understandings, so that 
any future formulations of reconstructionism should be able to offer a 
far, more systematic account than in the pant of those cultural factors 
which predictably will inhibit specified change processes. 
2.2 Claims about the malleability--of-human nature 
The second set of questions I wish to raise concerns the degree 
of malleability presupposed in the doctrine of the "new man". These 
questions could be pursued indefinitely and inconclusively. I shall 
restrict myself to a few specific objections, which I shall preface 
with a passage of passionate criticisms 
"'above all, when I hear people speak of reshaping life it 
makes me lose my self-control and I fall into despair. 
'Reshaping life! People who can say that have never 
understood a thing about life - they have never felt its 
breath, its heart - however much they have seen or done, 
They look on it as a lump of raw material which needs to 
be processed by them, to be ennobled by their touch. But 
life is never a material, a substance to be moulded. If 
you want to know, life is the principle of self-renewal, 
it is constantly renewing and remaking and changing and transforming itself, it is infinitely beyond your or my 
inept theories about it. " (11) 
Three limiting factors which the reconstruotioniste neglected in 
their assumptions about malleability area individual heredity, the ef- 
fect on adulthood behavior of early childhood experience, and the 
emotional and institutional strength of traditions, both sub-cultural 
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and national, They have good reasons for wishing to minimize the 
significance of these factors, since to admit them as significant in 
determining, human performance and beliefs is thus far to restrict the 
claims of reconstructionism to, make a significant difference to culture 
through educational reform. If it were the case that-all forms of 
intelligence were wholly inherited and incapable of significant modi- 
fications through the environmental manipulation of one or several 
generations, then a change agent would be prudent to restrict his claims 
about human malleability to factors other than intelligence. In Brave 
Nerve ºmarld style he might begin to take a great interest in possible ways 
of intervening in the processes by which inherited characteristics are 
transmit, ýed. Since, after the fashion of Godwin, they generally believed 
that intelligence is largely an environmental function, the reconstruo- 
tioniats were neither prudent in the manner suggested, nor did they suc- 
cumb tQ, any temptations to take a more direct route to their desired 
goals by interesting themselves in biological engineering. Shaw is a 
possible exception to the latter point, but he is the only one, and even 
he failed to adopt those manipulations for which totalitarian behaviorists 
have. been savagely satirized by Huxley and Orwell. 
However, the more optimistic reoonstruotioniets failed to show how 
their arguments about malleability were affected by the findings of the 
emerging sciences of genetic psychology and cultural anthropology. While 
their proposals were, on the whole, either so general or pitched so far 
into the future as to be unaffected by any, particular empirical findings 
on biological and cultural inheritance, a theory which claimed to be 
naturalistic and laid so much stress pn. the universal application of the 
scientific method too readily discounted or ignored highly relevant evi- 
dence. Just how far even those who were engaged in the frontiers of the 
science of human behavior were constrained by their findings is another 
matter. Freud, for example, argued that cathartic experience in 
the individual is necessary for him to use his cognitive and amoral 
faculties to assess himself calmly and objectively - to acquire 
rational control over himself. His own therapeutic practice was built 
on this idea, and through it the analyst provided opportunity for cathar- 
sis. This therapy was long drawn out and arduous and of necessity it 
could reach only a fraction of those who needed it, not as a cure for 
neurosis, but as a form of self-knowledge. It might seem, then, that 
rationality was a faint light in society which could hardly be sustained 
under the pressure of all the irrational forces of the psyche and of civi- 
lization. Yet, so far from despairing, Freud believed that the scientific 
culture is not an illusion and that through science we can gain objective 
knowledge of ourselves and of the world. Thus the enormous scope which 
in Proud's thought the unconscious and the irrational achieve is yet- 
limited by the power of rational thought and the culture of aoienoe. 
By contrast, other writers, like Nietzsche, Sorel and Pareto, who laid 
stress on the permanent role of unconscious and unreasoning elements in 
society, placed little confidence in schemes for rational social recon- 
struction. From a very different starting point, Freud reached a con 
clusion similar to Russell's and Dewey'ss man is capable of dispelling 
illusions and controlling irrational forces in the psyche, and science 
provides him with a model (12). 
- The reconstructionists operated with a much less complex model of 
human behavior than was to be found in the psychological schools. First, 
they tended to reduce the diversity of experience to the single mode of 
cognitive self- and society-awareness. This was not so much a matter 
of definite exclusion as of emphasis. Not even all forms of cognition 
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or symbolizing were emphasized. On the whole, it was a scientific 
or, more broadly, a rationalistic mode-of cognition that most interes- 
ted the rooonstructionists. Again, there were exceptions, notably 
Wells and Rugg, and, not altogether consistently, Uannheim. Second, 
the reconstruotionists tended to assimilate individual differences to 
one of two models. For Dewey, individual difference was overlaid by 
the cultural blanket of the common man, a peculiar mix of a homely 
frontiersman and a rational humanist. For Maannheim$ individual dif- 
ferences were frequently reduced to mass-ideatity and elite-identity. 
At least, these were discernible tendencies in the thought of these 
writers. Both explicitly argued for educational programmes which 
would encourage individual initiative and creativity. They rejected 
traditional theories of individualism because, they claimed, these theories 
posited an unreal distinction between individual essence and the external 
world and thus failed to explain how character interacts with surroundings. 
But"the new individualism they proposed runs the risk of assimilating dif- 
ferences and variety to homogeneity of experience. The texture of 
diverse experience, the idiosyncratic qualities of personality, the 
realm'of personal awareness, taste, and value are not discounted but, 
because of the attention given to larger culture features and processes, 
they fade into a very distant background. When this fading takes place, 
it becomes easier to assume that human experience is contingent on those 
environmental factors which are susceptible to manipulation. There is 
in some of the reconstructioniste a tendency to break experience into 
manageable elements, e. g., concepts and sensations, and to neglect the 
totality and integrity of the self in experience. This atomization is 
in marked contrast to the-reconetruotionists' emphasis on the inter- 
relatedness of elements in culture. Also, it may seem a strange comment 
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to make in view of Dewey's very powerful formulation of the inter- 
actioniat theory of experience. However, Dewey's interactionism, 
while it does not preclude intea-psychio interaction, addresses 
itself mainly to the individual's cognitive relationship with 
outer events; hence his argument that practice rather than contem- 
plation provides us with the right conditions for testing ideas. 
2.3 , 
Directed culture ohange 
The process of assimilating diversity of experience to a single 
mode is most marked in those writers whose quest is for cultural 
unity, -namely, dells, Mannheim and 
Stanley. In these writers, 
malleability of human nature is linked with malleability of culture, 
and both are directed by the ideals of harmony and unity. 
It may be admitted that the concepts of integrity of personality 
and of the social system presuppose some harmony and unity. However, 
the Concepts of personal and social systems do not presuppose the 
elimination of tensions and disunity. Apart from the tensions in- 
volved in'appetites and their satisfaction, there are ineluctable ten- 
sions in cognitive experience. These may be'inferred from the symbolic 
systems which presuppose in individuals some kind of mental disunity. 
For example, moral reasoning, as distinct from the unthoughtful ap- 
plication of rules, includes the reconciliation of conflicting or 
disparate preferences and values. Thus the quest for order and unity 
In experience and society cannot proceed at all without acknowledging 
the social and personal significance of disunity. Dewey's moral theory 
acknowledges this by giving central importance to uncertainty, reflec- 
tiveness, and moral appraisal, although, as we have seen, his quest 
is for reconciliation of differences and it involves the ultimate 
absorption of all the reflective processes into a single thought system. 
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The reconstructioniet quest for order and for the effective 
dominance by rationalistic science of all other modes of experience 
raises problems which conservative theorists have been quick to seize 
upon. however, the reconstruetioniets had no difficulty in demons- 
trating that the conservative attitudes towards cultural change them- 
selves cannot be sustained without strong interventionist action. 
The supposed "common life" of the past, the slow maturing of tradi- 
tions of thought, these have already been seriously disrupted, if not 
undermined, by the impact of technology, by urbanization, mass oul- 
ture, 'snd the catastrophic events of war and, economic depressions. 
Thus the reoonstructionists rightly argued 'that the preservation of' 
a traditional culture could no longer be taken for granted. Preser- 
vation itself becomes a matter of active intervention and the argument 
shifts from the desirability of change at such to questions about the 
re-direction and tempo which night be given to changes that are occurring. 
It is difficult to understand whyý, some of the reconetruotionists should 
have sought, not merely to`participate'at certain"'key points in the pro- 
ceases of culture renewal, but to engage-in'what in retrospect appear as 
futile and even absurd efforts to design a 'new ctilturel 'synthesis. -I 
have already suggested that the speculative reeonstruotionists have played 
a valuable pact in projecting images of a possible future, and it may be 
that for their images to appear as recognizable cultural entities some 
grand, unified visi6n-of the future had to be presented, 
Those thinkers, like Mannheim, Stanley and Brameld, who did Tbt pro- 
ject grand images of the future, but argued for a method for establishing 
the unity of values and of modes of-thought, were reacting sharply to 
the ambiguities, uncertainties, and confusions of their own societies. 
The personal and social problems created by'these disunities are serious, 
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but do not of, -themselves establish the need for either a substantial 
unified core of cultural values and aepiratione or for total planning. 
Beyond the minimal procedural virtues of a democracy - for example g 
tolerance, freedom from various constraints, and rationality - there 
is in a pluralist society room for much disagreement about desirable 
forma of experience. Methods of reconciling differences are needed, 
but, for united action to occur, shared assumptions are perhaps required, 
but not unanimity at the level of social-moral values. This has been 
demonstrated in education by Maritain, who strongly disagreed with 
Derey's naturalistic metaphysics, and the foundations of his epis- 
temology and ethics (13). - Yet Maritain was able to show how, despite 
this disagreement over matters of theory,.. he shared many of Dewey's 
educational ideas. This could mean, as is sometimes asserted, that 
there is no clear entailment of educational by philosophical beliefs. 
What is more probable is that Maritain shares with Dewey many assump- 
tions and values which are-never-formally stated as philosophical 
propositions. It is perhaps from these that agreement on educational 
matters stems, and this is the strength of the Mannheim-Stanley case 
for attempting- to rebuild at any rate a limited common core of pro- 
cedural principles and values. 
The selection, simplification and comparison required, if a synthetic 
overview is to be intelligible, is difficult to achieve without lapsing 
into abstractness, a thinness of analysis, and eattreme partiality. The 
more obvious problems of the present and immediate past are likely to 
receive attention at the expense of more subtle, deeply rooted and less 
tangible considerations. There is, as conservationists remind us, a 
tacit element in a tradition - for example, a local craft technique 
such as that of the dry stone wall construction which, in Gloucestershire, 
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appears to have been in continuous use since the Megalithic period. 
It has been transmitted informally, and only occasionally, until 
recently, given foreground status as a self-contained, deliberate 
and prized activity. A more explicit and tool-affected set of crafts 
are those involving the utilitarian use of wood. Leavis and Thompson, 
unlike more romantically-minded preservationists, correctly grasped 
the principle of continuity in woodcrafts, by proposing that aesthe- 
tic, technical, communal and other ideals embodied in particular forms 
of wood use (the wheslwright's shop) are values which should be expressed 
in new forms as tools, materials and social contexts change. Within 
the innovative traditions of science, technology, industrialization 
and mass communications, a different set of problems arises, since 
what is old and established is forever being challenged or simply by- 
passed by the new and the hypothetical, thus requiring a very explicit, 
conscious and rational control as a governing condition of the continuity 
and, indeed, survival of these traditions. 
These three aspects of the problem of culture continuity and re- 
newal have enough in common for us to talk as the reconstructionists 
have done, about the problem of cultural change; but the differences 
between them, while no less important, are easily overlooked in proposals 
to synthesize a new culture. They express different degrees and forms 
of cultural continuity and plasticity. The task of ensuring continuity 
amidst change demands different sets of procedures for different sub- 
cultures, a point which the holistic overviews of culture renewal have 
unduly neglected. 
These problems of culture change, it is important to note, if they 
have not been solved, have not been created by the reconstructionists. 
The common life, that Oakeshott extols, has been disrupted; many of the 
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tacit elements in culture are threatnned; once-stable institutions 
are in upheaval andiwith the emergence of mass and pop (as distinct 
from the Aog6art type of popular) culture, older forms of culture ex- 
perience have been disrupted and challenged, (14). 
We may be living, as the reconstruotionists claim, in an era of 
unparalleled oomplexity, and confusion of thought and action. There 
are undoubtedly many contenders for dominance of what might-be termed 
the cultural heartland in modern societies. These contenders include 
the totalitarian state, with its ambition to politicize culture; the 
commercial beneficiaries of popular and mass culture with their ambi- 
tion to dominate consumer markets; various schools of traditional and 
preservationist thought wishing to stabilize and contain change; and 
the exponents of, various forms of high culture, scientific, humanistic, 
literary and so forth. The reconstructionists are themselves one such 
contending group and they, no lese than the others, must be confronted 
by the challenge to substantiate their authority and demonstrate their 
responsibility. As we have seen, the reconatruotionists have repudiated 
as sources of authority the doctrines of supernaturalism, so-called laws 
of historical inevitability, the consciousness of the working classes, 
and any form of moral and political absolutism. The sole, ultimate 
source of authority in Dewey and Russell is a rational method of inquiry 
from which they claimed to be able to deduce minimal moral values. 
Stanley, Rugg and the other advocates of praotioal judgment oparationalized 
this method and argued for its universalization at the level of social 
policy-making. But most of the reconstructionists built more elaborate, 
and less defensible authority structures, converting what is essentially 
a critical, sceptical, exploratory method into a set of doctrines ascrib- 
ing to intellectual elites, of whom they themselves are members, special 
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virtues of knowledge and understanding. The American advocates of 
the authority of the instrumental procedures of reflective inquiry 
claimed that to these procedures should be added the authority of 
the democratic heritage. This heritage could not have survived 
unaltered into a present society so drastically disrupted as to be 
in a condition of crisis. In some measure, this heritage had to 
be reconstituted and assessed before it could provide suitable myths 
and concrete values to serve as guides to future action. Such uses 
of the past or of a heritage amount to mystifications what is being 
appealed to is the sentiment of nostalgia, and what is obscured by this 
appeal is that the authority no longer resides in the heritage but has 
been effectively assumed by those who re-interpret and use the heritage; 
in other words, the elite of culture critics and synthesizers. I do 
not see any alternative to this re-interpretative use of the past, in 
periods of rapid and widespread change, but it is surely better to ac- 
knowledge that we are re-interpreting and remaking rather than to claim 
authority as guardians of a substantially intact heritage. 
The more constructive and speculative reconstructionists-encountered 
another difficulty in projecting the outline and some of the aubstanoe. of 
the ideal society. There is no scientific way of testing these struc- 
tures save by implementation, and we should need to have very strong 
reasons indeed for embarking on them since th6. changes required are 
virtually irreversible. This does not mean accepting Durkheim's ad- 
monition, to intervene only when "everything is not all it ought to be", 
correcting, partially improving, but never replacing. Nor are Popper's 
piecemeal reformism and methodological individualism adequate to prob- 
lems which by their nature are complex and far-reaching - e. g., deci- 
sions about major roads, housing subsidies, or the structure of tertiary 
- 375 - 
education. The reconstructioniata are right to maintain that tinker- 
ing and unco-ordinated effort solve limited problems, oreate'öthers 
in doing so, and make no significant impact on, orý contribution to 
the resolution, of wider problems. Thus, decisions on road routes, 
if taken by a spicial'interest group (e. g., a'highway department) 
are likely to produce roads at the cost of a variety of other amenity 
considerations no'less socially significant, than efficient transport. 
Some net of procedures between the piecemeal and the holistic seems 
to be'reauired. If these are to satisfy the criteria of participa- 
tion by interested parties, responsibility for policy decisions must 
be neither fully centralized nor fully decentralized, and certainly 
not wholly vested in technical elites and political representatives, 
since these provide no assurance that all the relevant interests will 
be spoken for. One warning provided by experionce of twentieth century 
totalitarianism is that, once in process of implementation, new structures 
are protected from cxitioism'and critics are branded heretics, or diag- 
nozed as dieeaeed, 'to be'either imprisoned or subjected to a cure. 
An additional point is'that unintended consequences are likely to ao- 
company'any change, so long as we'are unable to control all the factors 
in the situation. The more speculative reconstructioniets, while bent 
on demonstrating the evil, and often unintended, consequences of the 
system of actions they opposed, gave too'little attention to the aseess- 
ment, as distinct from the promulgation,, of their-culture models. But 
we should not concentrate exclusively on the dangers of centralized power 
and neglect the problems otlocal initiative. Desegregation of racially 
separated school systems wee not achieved in the United Mates without 
Supreme Court and national government'intervention. Local community 
control in education is now being ardently supported by critics of 
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of monolithic central government, but local option would certainly 
mean, in-many areas, inoreased-racial segregation. Thus neither 
concentration of deoision-taking power, nor diffusion, of themselves 
solve these problems. In both cases, more general sets of criteria 
are required. The reconstruotionists who: proposed using the schools 
as means of building up new cultural syntheses, at least by implica- 
tion, have committed themselves to the, risky, enterprise of cultural 
canvas-cleaning and repainting. Beyond a certain. point of unanimity 
of outlook and policy agreement there is danger of excessive confor- 
mity. Yet, without some general acceptance of procedural principles, 
neither social life nor the community, pursuit of various forms of ex- 
cellence is possible. Continuous and intelligent adjustment is re- 
quired to maintain a balance between co-ordination of, effort and diversity 
of experience. 
`2.4 Alternative theories 
The reconstructioniat theory, taken as a whole, provides no definite 
and agreed solutions to the problems of defining forms of worthwhile com- 
munity effort which avoid the extremes of conformity-and chaos. But the 
theory raises many of the relevant issues and it has successfully identi- 
fied some of the major factors of which the continuing search for solu- 
tions should take account. Have other culture change theorists been any 
more successful? I can attempt only a very sketchy reply to this ques- 
tion, and in doing so I shall refer to some of the issues raised in 
Chapter III. 
2.4.1 Durkheim and Marx 
In Chapter III we saw that Durkheim, in his attempt to establish a 
logical distinction between psychological individualism and sociology, 
tended to elevate "social facts" into a realm virtually beyond human 
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intervention. Ilan was reduced as an object of sociological analysis 
to a performer of roles, and morality converted into the disciplined 
observance of the rules and prescriptions of the social group. 
While this theory may account for the existence of social order and 
solidarity, it is difficult to see how it avoids relativism or pro- 
vides significant scope for individual action. In Parsons' inter- 
pretation, Durkheim is resuscitated and praised for grasping the social 
quality of constraint and for conceiving the socials 
"as consisting essentially in a common system of rules of 
moral obligation, of institutions, governing the actions 
of men in a community" (15). 
This theme, of the unifying, constraining and directing power of funda- 
mental social-moral rules, was explored by the reconstructioniets, and 
hai, continued to appear, most recently in Mannheim's and Stanley's writ- 
inge. Durkheim'a perception of the problem of transmitting and develop- 
ing these basic rules was, however, very different from that of the re- 
constructionists. For him, there was, it appears, hardly any problem 
of cultural continuity: the fundamental rules, together with the insti- 
tutions and traditions enshrining them, and the roles in which they are 
expressed, -define the structure of social action. In this kind of 
theory, the problem is not to show how continuity may be maintained, 
but to explain the possibility of innovation and individuality, ýand 
to justify the moral authority which society exercises. Those who 
conceive the individual, in Frank's terms as a remaker of culture, 
are dismissed as "victims of the illusion of having ourselves created 
that which actually forced itself from without"-(16). 
Marx and the Marxists have been the most vehement critics of 
capitalist society for separating man from his work, and his ideas 
and thoughts from his productive processes (17). The fashidnabls 
- 378 - 
currency of the concepts of reification and alienation is attribu- 
table` to other sources in addition to Marxism, but it is not rele- 
vant to my argument to pursue these sources. By drawing attention 
to the forces and means of material production processes, their 
shaping power over individual thought and experience and their im- 
pact on the class struätures of society, Marx dealt what he thought 
was a decisive blow at the traditions of rationalistic optimism and 
atomic, individualism. `Durkheim followed, up this attack with his 
own onslaught on both traditional individualism and on utopianism. 
Thus,; twentieth century social thought has been presented, by two 
of its most influential precursors, with orientations which minimize 
the freedom of creative individuals, limit the scope of rational 
planning, and deride visionary and speculative thought. It is 
against these powerful systems of thought that we should consider the 
utopian-rationalism of reoonstruotioniat theory. 
According to Marx, whatever may be expected of man's spiritual 
development'when the-' proletariat finally seizes power and inaugurates 
the era ofs true history, for the foreseeable future, man as a spiritual 
and free individual is submerged in class struggles, the "therapy" of 
violent confrontationsy and the onward momentum of vast technological 
forces, which shape his thought and action. Marx's theory does not 
entirely exclude intellectual freedom in the transitional era, but 
restricts it to'the-economically educated intellectual and those of, the 
working class he is able to retrieve from the confusion, like Plato's 
luminaries dragging one or two of the chained figures from the cave. 
Much play is made by certain commentators on the younger Marxlts argu- 
ment for a human capacity to intervene to affect the transition-., -' 
of society from one stage to the next, and of the-older Marx's eventual 
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acknowledgment that the "inevitable" laws of development are specific 
to particular times and places. Nevertheless, in addition to seeking 
interstices in the theory into which we can insert rational initiatives 
by individuals and groups, we should recall that those who advocated 
transitional forms of constitutional socialism were savagely attacked 
by Marx and Engels, and that the method of intervention which Marx 
conceded was not that of rational argument and constitutional reform, 
but violence and subterfuge. The vehemence of Marxto criticism of 
his predecessors and his socialist contemporaries does not prevent us 
from appreciating the continuity of his thought with earlier socialist 
theory (e. g:, St. Simon, Fourier, Proudhon) and the subsequent assimi- 
lation of certain"of his ideas by non-revolutionary theories, especially 
those ideas which concern industrial change, and the historical and 
practical significance of thought. In mainstream Marxism, man is re- 
duced to the level of consciousness appropriate to and consequent on 
material productive processes and to a level of political activity in 
which revolutionary violence is the only appropriate instrument (18). 
Purthermore, by reducing ideologies to the expression of material in- 
terest, Marx reduced thought in all save its Marxist form to a common 
measure of illusion and error. 
Classical Marxist theory is one kind of evolutionary theory of 
social changes a theory of historically determined instability for 
which Marx prophesied an eventual termination in a classless utopia. 
The dialectical processes of history express themselves in the evolution 
of productive processes, the disruption of productive relations and a con- 
tinuing struggle of the classes, in which the capitalist is no less a 
victim than the proletarian. Within these productive processes, highly 
significant innovations occur. Thus, work is a source not only of 
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economic value, but of cultural innovation. We may detect in this 
emphasis on the culturally generative power of the industrial pro- 
cesses one source of the reconstructionist arguments about the 
transforming influence of industrialization. But Marx treated even 
those who innovated in work processes as instruments of wider histori- 
cal processes, spiritually, morally and intellectually unfree in any 
condition of society short of a classless utopia. For the recon- 
structionists, the scientists and technologists were not instruments 
of inexorable historical trends, but engineers of the future, rather 
as, for a short time, they appeared to be under Lenin. Marx briefly 
toyed with the idea of an elite of disinterested, benevolent leaders 
who would guide the revolution and educate the proletariat, but he 
subsequently abandoned this idea on the grounds that the elite would 
be powerless in the face of a hostile regular army and an untrained, 
supine proletariat, an insight which later change theorists might have 
taken more to heart. The proletariat themselves would have to become 
aware of their mission, but it appears that this could only occur as a 
consequence of historical evolution. They would ultimately perceive 
the truth of their situation. This they have not succeeded in doing, 
to the despair of their intellectual mentors, who, even-today, are 
still hoping for a realization by the proletariat of their historic 
mission. 
Undoubtedly Marx had a keener sense and a profounder knowledge of 
the difficulties confronting change agents than had the reoonstructionists. 
He rejected the composite, knowledge-based elite as a significant agency 
for change, but in appealing to the practical intelligence of the pro- 
]. etariat, and by stressing the revolutionary significance of a knowledge 
of historical processes, he was not so opposed to educational solutions 
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as might appear at first glance. We may note other similarities 
between Marxism and reconstructionism. Dewey believed in the 
special insights into history yielded by labor and incorporated 
what looks like a Marxist interpretation of labor-understanding 
into the system of occupations developed by the German-Idealist, 
Froebel, for the education of young children (19). There are other 
similarities and points of contact arising from the common origin of 
large parts of the two theories in nineteenth century German Idealism 
and socialism (20). Despite Marx's criticism of the optimistic en- 
lightenment dootrine, that ideas decisively influence history, his 
own theory has contributed to this end. The reconstruotionists in 
varying degrees shared his hostility'to capitalist society, but, 
except for the Webbe, they did not-share his remarkably detailed 
knowledge of its workings. They'uniformly-repudiated violence and 
attributed to education the long-term impact on thought and action 
that Marx attributed to the inevitable, historically-determined 
succession of capitalism by socialism. 
The reoonatruotionists rejected the more grotesque vulgaritiations 
of Marxism in Soviet propaganda, which sees history'as a morality play 
acted by the wicked bourgeois and the virtuous proletariat. They 
condemned dogmatism$ violence, and, with occasional exceptions, deli- 
berate incitements to class-based antagonism. But, of'all the dif- 
ferences between the two positions, that which is most significant is 
the role each ascribes to the educated individual and community as re- 
makers of their own culture. In this respect, we may link Marx and 
')urkheim as nineteenth century critics of utilitarianism, ethical - 
individualism and individual rationality. By contrast, the recon- 
atruotionists attempted to rebuild the enlightenment and' individualist 
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philosophies in part on the basis of the social awareness provided 
by the Darkheimian and Marxist critiques. Thus, the very real and 
important differences notwithstanding, there are fundamental con- 
tinuities between these starkly deterministic nineteenth century 
theories and the benevolent. rationalism of the reconstruotionists. 
Parallels and contrasts might be drawn with other macro- 
socio-logical theories. In Chapter VI, I drew a contrast between Dewey's 
and Weber's dews on democracy. There are interesting parallels 
between Weborts ideas on the innovative role of the charismatic 
leader and the elitism of Wells, Rugg and Mannheim. Similarly, 
the elite theory of Pareto was a powerful influence on Mannheim's 
thoughts-as were the discussions of irrationality in Sorelta Reflec- 
tions on Violence and Preud's later cultural writings. The American 
reoonstruotionists have been strongly influenced in their views on 
"culture lag" by Ogburn. Their inchoate economic thought derives 
partly from 'William George and from Veblen. In proposing a direct- 
ing role for organized intelligence in human affairs, they were re- 
jecting the highly influential teachings of Sumner. However, in con- 
cluding this discussion of alternative approaches to the problem of 
culture changes instead of attempting to explore further parallels 
and contrasts with macro-theory, I shall make a brief reference to 
some of the more recent empirically-grounded change thinking. 
2.4.2 Samples from recent change theory 
, 
Some of the recent empirical thought on change processes has in 
part developed from the work of the later experimentalists, as efforts 
hays, been made to reduce general ideas about group participation to 
the particular strategies of group dynamics (21). This is part of 
the larger movement in the social sciences away from primarily normative 
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and toward primarily empirical inquiries. There is a close resem- 
blance between many of: the current models in system theor, ' and organi- 
zational theory and Dewey's outline of the stages-of reflective think- 
ing. For example, in Planned Organizational Change, a content analysis 
of some two hundred research studies on-organizational change, Jones 
proposed six major interacting elements in the change proceess change 
agent; client system;, goals; strategies and tactics; structuring 
of change; evaluation, The tasks he set change agents are similar 
to those proposed in Mannheim's analysis of planning-and by Raup and 
his associates in their discussion of practical judgment (22). 
Another influential study of innovation researrch, Rogers' The 
Diffusion of Innovations, sharpens a distinction of which the recon- 
atruotioniste might have made more uses the distinction between change 
that is new to a system and that which consists in the wide diffusion 
of what is already there (23). In cultural terms, an innovative change 
occurs when, for example, a new kind of institution, like the London 
School of Economics, is first established in a society; a non- 
innovative diffusion occurs when the values and procedures the insti- 
tution was established to promote are diffused through all relevant 
parts of the culture. The distinction is by no means clearcut, but 
it is a useful one for reformers who, in order to effect large-scale 
changes, need to consider the problems of suffusing a total system 
with whatever changes they have in mind. This emphasis on innovation, 
as Rogers shows, owes much to the growth of advertizing in a mass society 
and to the application of science in industry and agriculture. These 
developments have rapidly accelerated since the earlier years of the 
reconatruationist movement, as have the now numerous studies of the 
processes of political modernization and political socialization which 
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have followed the end of the colonial era. We should not be sur- 
prised, therefore, that, by contrast with these developments, the 
reconstruotionists seem to have touched very lightly indeed on prob- 
lems of innovation, diffusion, and the infrastruotural problems of 
political development. The basic argument of reconstructionism in 
relation to empirical inquiry and specific policy proposals is that which 
is common to all ideological theorizings action always occurs in a 
cultural contexts it presupposes preferences and embodies judgments 
of value. Assumption about this context, these preferences of judg- 
ments from time to time need to be made explicit and justified. What- 
ever their particular weaknesses, the reconstructionists have effectively 
challenged educational thinkers to make their own position clear. 
How well they have succeeded in developing an educational-theory of 
their own is a question which we shall oonsider, in the following chap- 
ters. 
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PART TWO 
CRAPTtR X 
FDUCATION: Cbly'CF'PTS, ORJECTI? t'S An PROCLSSES 
The reconstructionists looked to'the agency of schooling'and the 
processes of education as the chief means for achieving the renewal of 
culture. In trying to see what they meant by what on the face of it 
appears to be an absurd claim for a single cultural sub-system to make 
about the whole of culture, I shall consider the answers given by the 
reconstructioni3ts to three questions. First, is education defined by 
and through whatever takes place in schools? Second, if it is not to 
be defined simply by -reference to schooling, to what 'does the recon- 
structionist concept of education refer? Third, is cultural renewal 
a procese'governed by clear objectives and, if so, who determines these= 
or'does it refer to procedural principles not necessarily related to a 
clear goal and, if so, how are these principles or criteria validated? 
The reconstruotioniste unanimously rejected the equation of school- 
ing and education. Their rejection took two forms. First, and most 
obviously, they defined education normatively: for them the term educa- 
tion refers to certain desirable processes, many of which are not as 
yet to be found in schools. Second, other agencies than schools edu- 
cate, and some of them are'of greater strategic significance, for cultural 
renewal than is the school system alone. 
1. Kilpatrick and Dewey on the Good Life, Growth and Experience 
Whatever processes it embraces, and I shall discuss these below in 
greater detail, education for the ' reconstruotionists is a good whose 
pursuit ought to be one of the highest aspirations of culture. Education, 
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as they usually defined it, refers to fundamentally important and . 
valuable human activities; it, is life-enhancing, not life-destroy. 
ing; it ministers to the "good life"; -it is a qualitatively defined 
growth process, a development.. of valuable dispositions; it sets stan- 
dards for judging other activities; it is an achievement of under- 
standings and of values which are worth possessing and aspiring towards. 
To be educated in better than to be uneducated. The reconstruotionista 
agreed with John Stuart Mills Socrates may be troubled by his knowledge 
of the dangerous world in which be lives, but his state of. awareness 
is'nevertheless preferable to and more to be sought after than the 
pig's unawareness, however pleasurable the pig-may find, his ignorance. 
Not that education is to be precisely equated with acquiring formal 
knowledge, or even cognition, although,.. these do feature-prominently 
in most reconstruotionist definitions. There are other worthwhile 
forms of experience, such that-the more typical of the reeonetruetionist 
accounts refer. to a comprehensive ideal of; excellence, an attempt to 
embraoe"a wide range of modes of experience and forms'of knowledge 
in°a unified culture-ideal. 
1.1 Kilpatricks, the good life 
Kilpatrick saw, educationyass the attaining of freedom to be one's 
"best self", which is-not the same thing as ,a hypothetical-natural self: 
.. "Education must aim at develpping in the individual the 
best possible insights into life's problems as they successively 
present themselves before him; at helping him to make ever finer distinctions in what he does, to take more and more 
considerations ever better into account, and finally to bring the best social-moral attitudes to bear on each decision as 
made or enacted. For the only proper aim of education is 
fulness of living through fully developed character" (1). 
What Kilpatrick meant by this expansive but rather vague ideal of per- 
sonal fulfilment he outlined in his concept-of the "good-life". This 
"387 - 
is an eclectic ideal, combining all the major forms of symbolic ex- 
pression with personal, adjustment and satisfying inter-personal re- 
lations. Furthermore, it is an ideal not merely of individual but 
of social "best self". Kilpatrick,: however, failed to consider 
either the problem of opposition of parts and of priorities, created 
by his method of eclectic combinations, orýthe. social question of 
alternative theories of "beat self".. -He did not attempt to-provide 
arguments to justify his aim, nor did. he seek, to identify process 
criteria with which we could test any given claim to be pursuing 
the good life. Still, the overall intention of his reconstructioniet 
strategy is clear: it is not by direct, political actioninor by the 
contriving of models of a future society, that the school is to make 
an impact. Rather it is through the creation of-communities of children 
who are brought to experience in their school 11ves,. the forms of aware- 
ness, knowledge and aotion-whioh they will be expected-to display as 
adult citizens. Education into be "through living" and "for living" 
in the sense that schooling is not:, oonfined to cognitive development 
but provides opportunities for the critical exploration of a wide 
range of common human activities. - 
, 1.2 Dewey: growth and experience 
Dewey's concept of growthb. upon which Kilpatrick built his notion 
ofa life good to live,, gives rise to-problems similar, to those I have 
mentioned above. However, the difficulties in Dewey's theory are not 
a consequence of failure to grapple with the-issue of qualitative deter- 
mination of the constituents of satisfactory growth. 
-In his many efforts to explain what he intended by the term education, 
Dewey gave central place to a set of inter-related conceptsr experience, 
reconstruction of experience, interest, growth, and community. For him, 
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unlike some of the other re constructionists, education used serve 
no ends nor satisfy any criteria other than those which are internal 
to the concept of education itself, in order to act as a great trans- 
forming force in society. It is the continuous reconstruction of 
experience, within "embryo communities", which ensures individual 
growth and a constant criticism, and reconstruction of all the domains 
of culture. For this purpose, no blueprints or models of. cultural 
synthesis are needed. -A successful education is. one which develops 
the dispositions to act in, such a way that reflective inquiry becomes 
second nature. To universalize reflective inquiry, ýwhich was Dewey's 
ambition for education, is revolution enough, without turning the 
school into a missionary reform agency (2). 
Dewey defined experience as an interactive process (3). Individuals 
and groups act upon the world, habitually or reflectively. They undergo 
various consequences of their actions in the world. These consequences 
are perceived and felt and perhaps-reflected upon. The awareness yielded 
by these responses provides a , basis for. fresh -ideas and plans for future 
action and there develops a continuous cyclic process of acting, being 
acted upon, reconstituting ideas and reacting on environment. On this 
account, experience in a process which unifies contemplation, critical 
thinking, habitual response, various-forms of pbysical, activity, and 
the perceived environment. There arena completely separate realms, 
e. g., of contemplations or perception, but each is intelligible only by 
reference to the others" Consequently, there is no separate and distinct 
human experience which we could call- contemplation; or, at least, we 
won't understand or secure the advantages of the contemplative act 
without considering the issues and questions of practice to which con- 
templation, according to Dewey, -always-refers. With characteristic, 
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ambiguity, in discussing his theory of experience, Dewey vacillates 
between description and analysis of the acts of experiencing, and 
recommendations for the improvement of these acts. 
Experience always involves an, environment and the distinctive 
human environment is culture, itself- a. product of previous experience. 
For Dewey, what is distinctive about a cultural environment is that 
it-is shared; it may be uniquely perceived, but its meanings and 
values are not the unique possession of any individual. Thus, to 
experience culture is to experience other people; in some sense or 
other it is to enter into a common, public life. The process of 
experience itself is thereby socially reconstructive, a process of 
trying out and responding, in group situations. The reconstruction 
of experience on this interpretation is not a remaking merely of 
material objects; it is a reconstituting of human relationships and 
a constant renewal of the self., 
Experiencing is the distinctive human mode of action. But Dewey 
was not interested merely in trying to explain what happens. Ex- 
perience is susceptible to improvement and improvement, he argues, 
is a consequence of reflective inquiry. It is through reflection 
that we can adjudicate amongst our conflicting wants, make, rational 
choices, and achieve primary satisfactions at the level of feelings. 
We are encouraged by this theory to become more self-aware, more cog- 
nitively orientated, more critical. Reflection is capable of being 
taught, in schools, through the utilization of subjects, which in 
Dewey's terms are the fruits of previous, inquiry; that is, they are 
traditions of controlled experience. There is thus a great educational 
task of connecting children's limited experiences and modes of experienc- 
ing with the content and the strategies of inquiry embedded in subject- 
i 
- 390 - 
matter (4)" 
The principal task of the teacher is to build a programme for 
growth based in partron a study of the child's life history of ex- 
perience. This growth programme is not reducible to individual 
acts of cognition. Culture' experience is experience of others, 
and traditions of inquiry embody group experiences. Growth as 
the directed control of experience therefore involves an awareness 
of other people, and a contrasting of oneself with others. One of 
Dewey's criticisms of the ohild"oentred school, stemming from Rousseau, 
Pestalozzi and Froebel, was that the importance of common, shared and 
socially interactive qualities of experience was diminished in thet 
preoccupation with patterns of individual, inner, unfoldment (5). 
Despite'these criticisms, he acknowledged the continuity of many of 
his own ideas with theirs. His characteristic method of thinking 
was reconstructive'in -the manner, he recommended, the sensing of 
difficulties in existing ideas or formulations of belief on some 
subject; a review of the ideas of his predecessors; the identifi- 
cation and analysis of weaknesses] and the-attempt to reformulate 
valuable features in-terms of modern conditions, specifically those 
of the industrial society. - Thus he set out, to reconstruct the 
concept of growth by showing both the inadequacy of the unfoldment 
thesis and'the value of the emphasis on the individualls activity 
in his own self-development, ' and rephrasing the concept as a oul- 
turally-interactive process involving group experience (6). 
Dewey has been criticized for elevating child interests into 
criteria for determining curriculum: content'and for failing to give 
a clear specification of the criteria which governk satisfactory or 
desirable growth (7), 'The first criticism is mistaken, since in 
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The Child and the Curriculum and The School and Society he clearly 
stated that for purposes of involving the child his interests should 
be understood 'and used by the teacher, but that present interest 
does not of itself provide a guide to future possibilities or 
directions. The child, just because he does not unfold according 
to some pro-programmed plan, because of his capacity to change, 
because his character is not fixed but may be modified by sub- 
sequent experience, because his interests are volatile, and reflect 
past. and present environments, would be badly served by any eduoa- 
tional provision which simply reflected something as ephemeral, 
partial and backward-looking as present interest. Dewey criticized 
the Herbartian doctrine which seemed to him to treat interest as 
extrinsic to a child's vital energies and experience, but he so far 
agreed with the Herbartians as to argue that interests may themselves 
be stimulated and re-built and that the criteria for judging the 
educational worth of interests are not located wholly within the 
childle own experience (6). 
. By defining the aim of education as "growth leading to further 
growth" Dewey appeared, not only to his critics but also to some of 
his supporters, to be offering a formal definition which yielded no 
ý 
substantive criteriSc'fvr distinguishing between educative and mis- 
educative experience. This would be a serious omission for a recon- 
etruotionist who must have ways of distinguishing between the actual 
growth of culture - hence of experience - and the improvements he 
postulates. In Experience and Education Dewey tried to most the charge 
that his theory of growth was no more than uncritical teacher acceptance 
of any interest or activity of the child. He rejected the approach 
which seeks to specify definite, comprehensive ends in view, both as a 
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false model of education and as iinduly limiting for a general theory, 
whilst accepting that in any particular educational scheme some spe- 
cifio objectives would have to be set. ge offered two general cri- 
teria of growth, not as targets but an principles of procedure: the 
sharing of experience, and continuity in development. The traditional 
classroom, by emphasizing individual attainments in a competitive 
setting, provided too few opportunities for sharing and, by Dewey's 
definition of democracy, was thus far undemocratic. The progressive 
classroom, by emphasizing spontaneity and following present interests, 
failed to recognize the importance of habits for'character formation, 
and the need in intellectual development not for dieebntinuitieabut 
for systematic, even routine, `learnin,. This last point in effect 
introduces a third criterion for growth. Dewey's account of the im- 
provement of experience referred to reflection. He wished to build 
reflectiveness into individual character and into , society as the prime 
responsive disposition for all problematic situations. Thus, 'growth 
for him was very lamely gro*th into rationality, or ' into the reflec- 
tive, 'oritical mode. 
Unlike those in the Aristotelian rational tradition, bewey be- 
lieved all children, in however small a degree, to be capable of growth 
conceived as the reflective, critical reconstruction of experience. 
In curriculum terms, this meant making extensive use of existing bodies 
of subject matter. Dewey recognized that the subjects are, in their 
conceptual structures and modes of inquiry, our chief Intellectual 
resource, and there can be no continuity of growth into reflective- 
ness which does not involve systematic subject-matter learning. Again, 
Dewey has frequently been criticized for overlooking the claims of 
subject teaching, but this criticism seems to me to be based on a 
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limited view of how subjects might be taught 
(9). Dewey's treat- 
ment of subject matter as a resource for learning does not, of course, 
entail the traditional separate-subject curriculum. But we can ac- 
cept the value of subjeot-matter learning without adopting that par- 
ticular form of organization. From the claim that the logically 
discrete forms of knowledge and the traditions of inquiry and ex- 
perience constitute the major resource in learning, nothing follows 
for the particular organization of subject matter into separate-subject, 
correlated, or integrated curricula (10). 
Dewey thus, in his analysis of growth, sought to avoid that extreme 
of teaching which depends upon children's expression of their interest 
and that which proceeds from the belief that the most significant chal- 
lenge in education is to find ways of transmitting the content and 
methods of separate subject disciplines. "Growth leading to further 
growth" does possess the qualities of reflectiveness and continuity 
which characterize the best teaching of subject matter, but Dewey's 
emphasis is on the relationship of the child's changing experience 
to the values and procedures of the subjects, not on the techniques 
of organization and transmission of predefined bodies of content. 
Dewey proposed that the teacher take up four principal tasks in 
relation to children's growth conceived as the systematic reconstruc- 
tion of experiences 
1. to find ways of enriching, balancing and clarifying the 
child's present experience; 
2. to simplify experience by reducing the undifferentiated 
mass of cultural phenomena and of the child's own ex- 
perioncea to mahdgeable ideas; 
3. to refine experience - that is, to induce reflective- 
neas by making the child aware of the grossness and 
inadequacy of the categories with which he operates; 
to guide his inquiries by building up increasingly 
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4. 
sophisticated conceptual structures= 
to find ways of systematically connecting the child's 
experience with the diverse ways of life and modes of 
experience of his culture, including its heritage. 
These are all processes of mediation, through which the teacher 
interprets the world to the child and encourages him to interpret 
the world reflectively and critically. The mind, on this account, 
in not "given" but "emergent". Meanings and patterns of behavior 
develop through guided experience in group settings, and they are 
mediated through language. Growth is participatory, aotive, and 
interactive. In growing, in the normative sense (that is, in becoming 
educated) the individual acquires the capacity to restructure experience 
through reflective awareness, and it is this, basically, that results in 
culture reconstruction, since culture itself lives and has significance 
only in experience. Hence Dewey's claim that education itself, apart 
from any particular programme of social action to which the educated 
commit themselves, is potentially a culture reconstructive process. 
Whether the potential is realized depends upon the opportunities avail- 
able in society at large, and on all kinds of institutional considera- 
tions. As an educational reformer, Dewey gave particular attention 
to the latter: the conversion of schools from custodial, and at times 
miseducative, institutions into centres of education; universalizing 
education; preparing teachers as educators and not as functionaries 
in bureaucratic systems; securing political and administrative sup- 
port, for educative proarammen, to nitro but a few. In the chapters 
that follow we shall see that Dewey did not rest content with a formal 
definition which demonstrated the theoretical relationship between 
education and the reconstruction of experience, and of culture. 
Specific programmes were required to ensure that reflectiveness was 
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directed towards the problems of society and the issues dividing 
contemporary culture. These programmes, moreover, should be 
directed towards improving the futures and not towards the as- 
similation of the cultural values of a remote past. 
Dewey has sometimes been criticized for eliminating personal 
and idiosyncratic qualities from growth and experience by giving 
an account of them which stresses only that which is shared, com- 
municable and public (11). However, in Experience and N ture, 
where he most fully develops his ideas on this subject, Dewey dis- 
tinguished between instrumental activities, in the form of the 
secondary experience of reflection and public inquiry, and consummatory 
acts, in the form of the primary experience of personally-felt satis- 
faction. Reflective experience is thus instrumental in that it is 
directed to the promotion of enjoyable primary experience, 'or con- 
summations (12). Nevertheless, in his educational writings, Dewey 
gave considerable prominence to the instrumental forms of experience. 
Since it is these instrumental forms that schools and teachers have 
direct access to and ways of influencing, we should not be'surprised 
at the emphasis. As we have seen, it does not follow from this 
emphasis that Dewey9e theory excludes the notion of private domains. 
It was not only in his educational thought, however, that Dewey em- 
phasized what might be termed the public domain of experience. Dewey's 
concept of democracy identifies shared, communicable experience; and 
education, in promoting democracy, would be directed towards inquiry 
into forms of experience which are in this sense instrumental - e. g., 
knowledge of the workings of democratic and other types of society - 
and into the processes of participation in democratic institutions 
within a school. 
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Authority in this context is, intrinsioýto the processes of 
inquiry and reflection. By this I mean that Dewey believed that 
reflective, critical inquiry itself discloses canons of evidence, 
principles of verification, the nature of truth claims, and forms 
of valid reasoning. There is no valid source of authority of any 
kind, other than inquiry itself. Teachers, as experienced inquirers, 
by degrees disclose the criteria of inquiry to pupils - who are not 
thought to be capable of discovering them by their own unaided 
explorations. But teachers no less than pupils are subject to this 
authority. By the same token, they are not subject to the authority 
of a tradition, as tradition, or indeed of any form of authority which 
cannot rationally justify itself in the face of sustained, open criti- 
cism. It is this feature of intelligence as controller of experience 
(i. e., experience brought under the direction of reflective inquiry) 
that makes of Dewey's theory a far more radical proposal for the re- 
constitution of culture thaxi the apparently more comprehensive schemes 
of, say, Rugg and Brameld. Casting aside all ofýthe great security 
systems invoked in the history of thought, from Plato's myths to, 
Pascall's religion, Dewey confronted teachers with the almost unbearable 
challenge to abandon all certainties and to accept only the authority 
of thought itself. 
2. Education and Enculturation 
Dewey and Kilpatrick contrasted prevailing practices in schools 
with the possibilities for universal-growth, the good life and enhatloe- 
ment, of the child's, present living which-a true education would provide. 
The miseducative character of much schooling is not, for-the reconstruc- 
tionists, simply a remediable problem , of schools, 
for various practical 
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reasons falling short of attaining their own adequate ideals. In 
Stanley's words, confusion penetrates to "the fundamental purposes 
of education" (13). 1 
- The reconstruotionists were in general outspokenly critical of 
schooling, because they fouhd it directed by inadequate or harmful con- 
ceptions of the educative process. The Webbe, though relatively devoid 
of interest in the processes of teaching and learning, were strongly dis- 
satisfied with the neglect of scientific studies, especially social 
sciences in higher education, and with the dominance of the classical 
curriculum. Wells, Rugg and Brameld almost totally condemned not only 
schoolina but rival theories of education. Mannheim supported the ex- 
perimentalist criticism that typically the content of education was back- 
ward-looking and die-functional in a rapidly changing society, whose 
basic norms were in turmoil. Dewey was perhaps the most sustained and 
consistent critic, basing his objections not on the failure of the schools 
to achieve a new cultural synthesis but on their neglect of critical think- 
ing and of children's personal uniqueness and worthiness. 
Although they were clear that education could not be precisely equated 
with schooling, not all of the reoonstructioniets succeeded in distinguish- 
ing it from other forms of cultural induction, assimilation and re-creation. 
Certain difficulties, as we shall see, -arise out of their olaims that school- 
ing reflects and is in some sense an agent of the wider culture, and that 
education is a form of enculturation (14). 
2.1 Bramelds cultural role of the school 
The confusion of education and enculturation arises from the attempt 
to make the term education serve too many-uses - or rather in the failure 
to distinguish these uses, Brameld has rightly criticized many eduoa- 
tionists and others for ignoring the actual and possible cultural roles 
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of schools and teachers, and he has shown how agencies other than 
schools contribute to cultural renewal. But in doing so he has not 
always adequately distinguished two uses which he himself wishes to make 
of the term education. Several passages bring out the difficulty: 
"School systems and college policies always reflect 
the milieu to which they are bound" (15). 
"Because education is always an agent of the wider 
culture that creates and provides it, the conflicts, 
confusions, pressures, and aounterpressures that per- 
meate that wider culture are bound to appear also in 
education" (16). 
". lducation is the agent of culture ... its policies 
and functions are fashioned and sanctioned by the culture ... 
education is just as strong or weak, independent, or depen- 
dent, effective or ineffective, as the culture itself per- 
mits" (17). 
"Emculturation is the inclusive way through which every 
culture engages in the task of transmitting and modifying 
its beli, -fs, cuetocas, and institutions, lithout it, no 
culture could have arisen in the first place and no culture 
could have survived ... To perceive learning; and teaching 
in the indigenous sense of enculturation is thus ... to put 
the educational enterprise back where it belongs - that is, 
at the very centre of the 'complex whole'" (18}. 
Smith and his associates used the metaphor of reflection: 
"The curriculum is always, in every society, a, reflec- 
tion of what the people think, feel, believe and do. " 
Stanley adopted the Durkheim image of mouldings 
"The contours of education are inevitably moulded by 
the culture of the community which it serves; its philo- 
sophy and objectives are invariably framed with reference 
*o the ideals, the aspirations, and the needs embedded in 
the culture" (19). 
The reconstructionista were guided by several purposes who3e value 
we can accept in talking of school in the language of enculturation, 
culture agency end reflection. They wished to disclose the wider 
cultural sources of educational ideas, the network of social influences 
impinging on schools, the need for schools interested in problems of 
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cultural renewal to become aware of and develop their relationships 
with other social institutions', and to sensitize teachers to opposi- 
tion they may encounter from other elements in the social system. 
These points represent a clear gain in understanding over the more 
simple-minded proposals'to=use. schools in an all-out crusade against 
other hostile social forces - for example,. the frequently-recommended 
educational mission against "commercialism" or "materialism! ". 
2.2 Criticism of education-enoulturation confusion , 
However, these advantages are, "gained at the cost of a confusion 
of processes and an apparently insoluble-problem for those adopting 
the reconstructionistýposition. The confusion consists in the failure 
to distinguish educative from non-educative forms of enculturation. 
The experimentaliate, clearly want us to maintain this distinction, but 
often fail to do so in their. -own writings. Conceiving education in 
the "indigenous sense of enculturation" as Brameld enjoins us toy may 
put the educational enterprise at the centre, but, it prevents us from 
distinguishing between those processes within that enterprise which 
are educative and those which are not. To suppose or imply that all 
forms of eneulturation are educative can hardly be what Bramold intended 
since it is trivial, if true-in the Aiidest senses and would leave him 
only efficiency criteria for distinguishing good from bad schooling. 
Similarly, Stanley's claim that the "contours of education" are culturally 
moulded is also trivial, though true in the widest sense that the ideas 
and materials out of which educational pro, rrammae are built will be drawn 
from some culture or other. But culture is a composite, comprising many 
and often conflicting sub-cultures, including the sub-culture of educa- 
tion conceived as a way of life or a form of excellence which can be 
critically directed against certain undesirable ways of life. This is 
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the Socratic idea of education, and it is an idea which the recon- 
structionists need to use. This is because, despite the confusing 
references they sometimes make to an indiscriminate process of encul- 
turation and to the school reflecting society+s requirements, they 
wish to set one sub-culture, the reconstruotionist educational ideo- 
logy - in combination with like-minded sub-cultures - against all 
others. Brameld, for example, extensively criticized alternative 
educational sub-cultures (the theories of progressive education, the 
essentialists, the perennialists and others) and not merely on grounds 
of "inefficiency". Furthermore, many reconstruotionists explicitly 
attacked the educational enterprises of alternative sooio-cultural 
systems, such as laissez-faire liberalism, communism, state capitalism, 
and fascism, on quite definite moral grounds. Yet of each of these 
systems, except for liberalism, it could be claimed that education was 
so organized as to "reflect society's requirements". The difficulty 
lies in the ambiguity of these "requirements". For the reconstruc- 
tionist to accept enculturation as equivalent to education would mean 
accepting the determination of these requirements by other social 
interests, and this would be inconsistent with their reform role. 
Thus the concepts of "the culture moulding the educational system" 
and of "the school reflecting culture" are altogether too undiscriminat- 
ing for the reconstructionists themselves to use consistently. If it 
were the case that the policies of schools and colleges reflect the 
milieu to which they are bound, and only that'milieu, 'it would only be 
possible for them to participate in that very reconstruction of the 
milieu which Brameld and others proposed, if the culture reconstruction 
were already well under way. The curriculum, in any case, never reflects 
all of what "the people" think, feel, believe and do, but only certain 
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selections and representations of these ideas and activities. As 
Smith and his associates themselves argued, the curriculum may be 
used as an instrument for modifying these ideas and activities. 
For these reasons, then, the metaphors of "the culture moulding" 
and "the schools reflecting" are unsatisfactory, and, would be beat 
dropped altogether from reconstructionist vocabulary. This is not 
merely a question of words, for behind the terminology lies the issue 
of the relationship of educational thought to politics and of the in- 
stitutions of education to the apparatus of the state. In affirming 
a fundamentally selective, critical and creative role in, relation, to the 
transmission of culture, education avoids absorption into other systems. 
A considerable measure of autonomy and a recognized critical role are 
essential for major cultural sub-systems, especially education, if 
monolithic and totalitarian forms of social control are-to be avoided. 
Is any situation conceivable in which education could be consis- 
tently, equated with enculturation? Leaving aside the practical and 
linguistic problems unnecessarily raised by the absorption of more, 
particular processes (education) into more comprehensive. ones (encul- 
turation), there is one situation in which the reconstructionists could 
consistently speak as Brameld does. This is the situation that could 
be anticipated if the kind of sooio-cultural system the reconatzuotionists 
envisage were to come into existence, In. Wellsf utopia, where anti- 
educational-forces have been eliminated, , 
the process of enculturation 
is equivalent to induction into the good society, by educationally de- 
fensible means. Even in utopia, however, it might be thought that an 
'educational system not in all respects in. perfeot. harmony with the wider 
culture would be worth having. The tension between the ideal and the 
real 18 a 11e0ee0ar7 Condition in all ideational theories of change. The 
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educational pursuit of moral and social perfection should, in utopia 
as well as in more familiar situations, contribute a steady flow of 
ideas for the ideal aide of the equation, and hence contribute to 
cultural dynamism. 
In non-utopian situations, a distinction must be maintained be- 
tween, on the one hand, the critical, discriminating processes of edu- 
cation, and the institutions in which this occurs and, on the other, 
the normatively and conceptually undifferentiated processes of cultural 
transmission and change to which the term enculturation refers. It is 
only by maintaining the distinction that the reoonstruotionists can claim 
to have any definite theory of education at all. 
ý. The Dilemma of Elite Education 
Of course, certain difficulties arise for the reconstructionists from 
the effort to sustain the distinction between education and enculturation. 
A normatively defined sub-culture of educational ideas is in social terms the 
sub-culture of a particular group. This group must be differentiated from 
the total society and from other groups if its distinctive educational 
mission is to be fulfilled. Any critical and moralistic ideology, such 
as reconstructionism, depends for its survival and for any ultimate ef- 
fect it may have on educational processes and institutions upon a group 
whose numerical smallness, ideological homogeneity and sense of community, 
and opposition to at any rate some mass normeb make it into an elite. 
This is an uncomfortable position for democratic ideologists to be in, 
although by no means an untenable one. However, Dewey in particular 
made the position unnecessarily uncomfortable by constantly railing 
against conceptual distinctions and social separatism. 
The kind of society towards which the experimentalists aspired 
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incorporates purged and purified democratic values and, although 
elitism is not inconsistent with democracy, its tendency towards 
exclusiveness and separatism and its assertion of moral superiority 
set up tensions with these values. For some of the reconstructionists - 
for example the Webbe - these values were mostly pretty abstract, having 
to doswith justice and fairness, and the elimination of class barriers. 
When particularized these values' appear, as both collective and individual 
rights and freedoms. ' The Debts could consistently argue that Fabianism 
was democratic in that it attempted to institutionalize'various demo- 
cratic values in reform programmes, devised by benevolent experts who 
seemed to etist on a different plane from the masses, ' without, however, 
being morally superior to them (20). Most of the reoonstruotionists 
adopted a more sociable, participatory and oommunitarian ideal of demo- 
cracy, defining democracy as a communal society of shared exparienoe, easy 
and equable social relationships, aommon-purposia-ana objectives. Wells' 
utopians were described as classless end'non-elitist; 'Dewey preached 
oommunitarian and classless ideals°of'fellowshipj Mannheim, despite 
his wish to strengthen elite sub-cultures, envisaged acommunity-uniting 
spiritual order; ' Stanley, Raup and other of"the later experimentalists 
proposed means of achieving social consensus in the form of'a fundamental 
unity of moral conviction. Elitism was not precluded by these communi- 
tarian aspirations but it certainly, ' played a subdued role. Yet the re- 
constructionists made it very clear that the culture, including the edu- 
cational system, whose ills they all diagnosed, °does"not at preeent+dis-- 
play these desirable features. ' Indeed, the more serious the crisis the 
farther were these democratic ideals from realization. One`of the re 
current criticisms made by the reoonstruetionists is that democracy itself 
is threatened by the foroes-of scientific and industrial change and by 
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rival political movements, A less acute crisis would, presumably, 
have meant a larger group of people, perhaps even a majority, who 
could effectively participate-in developing ideas and programmes for 
the future renewal of culture. The severity of the crisis and the 
strength of the opposition were such that the culture renewers appear 
and. are seen by others as an expert minority, or elite, and their edu- 
cational schemes as involving minorities of pioneers. So long as 
the. crisis persists, even Dewey, the most sociable and egalitarian of 
the reconetructionists, must conceive educational change as a sus- 
tained effort by a minority to bring the majority to its point of view. 
Unfortunately, his theory of the universal reconstruction of experience 
obscures the inevitable qualitative differences between different groups 
and sections of the population. 
Just as the true culture is qualitatively different from the culture 
of ordinary experience, so is the true education qualitatively different 
from indiscriminate forms of enculturation. The diviners and guardians 
of the ideals of true culture are a minority, altruistically determined 
to keep alight ideals of reform, Since these ideals are to be realized 
through an educational system which is as yet unreconstructed, the true 
educators are a minority, sharply distinguished by the quality of their 
ideas from the mass. These are implications of reconstructionism which 
any of its exponents, especially the experimentalists, were reluctant to 
acknowledge. 
The procedures which the reconstructionists advocated to effect the 
transformation of a majority from obliviousness, unawareness, false-oon- 
eoioueness, resistance and hostility varied from a benevolent but imposed 
rule by Fabian experts to the more shadowy doctrines of consensus. Con- 
sensus was proposed by Braneld as a procedure for taking educational and 
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other'social decisions which avoided coercion and arbitrariness. It 
required a subtle balance between-rule by a majority whose lack of en- 
lightenment was both a condition and a-consequence of crisis and the ex- 
pertise of the already enlightened minority.. This balance was- not at 
all clearly delineated by the exponents of consensus. Dewey, on the 
other hand, by avoiding the more drastic doctrines of the crisis theory, 
and by professing a profound faith`in the sense and wisdom of the common 
man, sought to effect a reconciliation between mass participation and 
minority leadership, There werei in his judgment, critical. problems, 
in contemporary society, but they had not reached the point where the 
common understanding had been undermined, nor did he have such firm, and 
clear views as to desirable future culture patterns that he-felt the Platonic 
need to impress them on his fellow men. -, However, as I suggested above, 
Dewey tended td, evade some of-the problems, of-leadership in a democracy. 
His optimistic confidence-in human readiness to adopt the detached, 
reflective procedures of rational problem-solving prevented him from ap- 
preciating the true dilemma, that created by the minori'ty, -reoonstruc- 
tionist determination to reconcile the universalization of rationality 
with majority self-determination: 
This dilemma is most apparent in Rugg, Mannheim, Stanley and Brameld. 
All wished to combine the insights and prescriptionsýof their own culture 
diagnoses with some form of-majbrity decision-taking,., They criticized 
educational institutions for failing' to- teach children in a manner that 
might yield the dispositions, attitudes and skills needed to participate 
in a democracy. Not only schools, they maintained, but almost all other 
social institutions failed, or were-inadequate in this respect. Partly 
this was because these other--institutions had failed to change, and had 
kept to the traditional, 
. more authoritarian ways. Whatever the cause, 
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the alleged failures of schools and of other social institutions 
results in a sharp separation of the mass of social institutions 
and ideologies from the tiny minority of reformers. Thus the re- 
constructionists, emerge as an elite movement, whose exclusiveness 
in present culture is not diminished.. r their proposals for a future 
democracy of shared experience. Elitism in some form appears to be 
necessary for directed, radical culture change, but the reconstructionists 
had, on. the whole, no wish to be regarded as elitists and, Mannheim apart, 
little interest in justifying elitism. , Instead of unequivocally pro- 
claiming themselves a distinct minority, group determined to rebuild cul- 
ture by rebuilding education they proclaimed theirs a democratic educa- 
tional theory which incorporated as central elements the principles of 
consensus, mass participation and shared decision taking. Thus many 
issues concerning the relationship of-"education for leadership" with 
"education for participation" are obscured or-submerged instead of being 
clearly examined. 
Since the majority, in a state of society which is unreconstructed, 
is not by definition-ready to participate in the prescribed manner, edu- 
cation must do much more than cultivate a dispassionate, reflective 
growth of rationality. At least, it must perceive this task in terms 
of a very determined programme to modify attitudes and behaviors hence 
the argument by Bode, Brameld, Rugg and other experimentalists that a 
more determinate character must be given to the educational process if 
more definite cultural ideals are to be achieved. These educationists 
recognized what Dewey appears to have overlooked, at least in his later 
Writings, that a more determinate policy of character education in needed 
for young children than is provided by the more abstract ideals of demo- 
cracy and reflective inquiry,, 
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4. Democratic Charika ter and- Indoctrination 
4,1 A determinate character for education 
Giving education a determinate character is necessary if one is 
to say anything particular about how the educational enterprise should 
be carried on. However, as Dewey was aware, it is difficult both to 
profess an open-minded rationality and belief in the wisdom of the 
majority and to prescribe very particular designs for the future of 
society. More precisely, if, through education, society is to be, made 
more democratic in. various defined ways, open-minded rationality will 
have to be guided by certain moral principles and directed towards 
certain possibilities of concrete social action. In any case, the 
reconstruotionists, even the most utopian among them, were not only 
theorizing about bypothetical future societies but analysing particular 
cultural situations whose problems they sought to resolve. Without ex- 
ception, but with varying degrees of precise commitment, the reconstrue- 
tionists argued that the determinate character in individuals and society 
which education must strive to achieve should be intimately related to 
wider culture ideals, Thus education becomes not just any conceivable 
process of critical inquiry and rationality but a series of moral-political 
enterprises in which certain kinds of dispositions and skills are established, 
namely, those thought to be required in western democratic societies at a 
particular phase of their development. Does this then mean that we adopt 
a simple means-ends model, with the ends prescribed by moral-political 
designs for culture, and education reduced to the moot effective means 
for achieving these ends? With varying degrees of success the recon- 
atructionists tried to avoid the difficulties raised by means-ends 
models, 
These difficulties are essentially those of failing to recognize that 
- 408 - 
means presuppose ends and that ends are unintelligible unless some 
idea of means is predicated. What is required is not means-ends 
models, but criteria for assessing processes. To adopt a means-ends 
model is unfortunate for another reason, in that it subsumes education 
to other forms of activity, instead of recognizing that education com- 
prises activities that are themselves worthwhile. For reconstruc- 
tionists to adopt means-ends models is to beg the question which I raised 
in section 2 above - that of the culturally critical role of education. 
Subservience of means to ends runs the risk of forgetting that the ends 
include critical thought and tolerance and respect for the moral worth 
of persons. These are qualities which govern the conduct, not merely 
the consequences, of educational procedures. Unless appropriate means 
are adopted, or, more precisely, unless the objectives of criticism and 
so forth are operationalized and converted into procedural principles, 
the exercise will be self defeating. 
Just such a criticism as this was in fact directed by Dewey at some 
of his fellow experimentalists. The issue arose when, in the 1930s, 
the problem of indoctrination was raised. Counts argued that schools 
always communicate a value system, and that at that time anti-democratic 
value systems were being actively promulgated, in schools and in other 
social institutions. Should not schools, Counts asked, in Dare the School 
Build a New Social Order? and, subsequently, from the editorial chair of 
the journal The 'Social Frontier, use every means in their paver to impress 
upon pupils the rightness of the democratic creed? (21). In reply Dewey, 
Bode and others argued that democracy was not a fixed system of values and 
beliefs but an open-minded, critical way of life. It would be contra- 
dictory to attempt to indoctrinate the spirit of criticism or to anti- 
cipate the outcome of reflective inquiry. This would be to pre-empt 
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growth, not to further it. 
Thus Dewey's belief that children should be encouraged to develop 
and reflect upon their own values led him to condemn Counts' proposal 
as a form of indoctrination. But this rejoinder did not satisfy many 
reconstruotionists at that time. It seemed too optimistically rational. 
Also it appeared, from Dewey's apparent lack of any definite beliefs, that 
there was a wide gulf between his thought and the very profound conviction 
held by most reconstructioniste, the conviction that only a highly struc- 
tured, value-laden educational programme would be adequate to the task of 
reconstruction in an era of crisis. This difference seems never to have 
been brought out, but it is an important one. If education, even in co- 
operation with other social agencies, is to be capable of significantly 
affecting the future of culture, then the more sceptical, critical and 
individualistic approaches need to be replaced by more positive, concrete 
and articulated ideas. Bode's criticisms of progressive education as 
aimless and socially irresponsible, and of Dewey's theory of growth as 
undirected by any clear criteria, was a later version of Counts' chal- 
lenge (22). Bode argued that educational policies at. all levels, from 
the nation-wide system of public schooling to the indiyidual classroom, 
should be consciously directed by clear social objectives. The objec- 
tives which Bode in fact proposed, however, appear to be no different from 
the two fundamental principles in which Dewey grounded his educational theory - 
namely, universalizing critical thinking, or reflective inquiry, and judging 
social institutions and relationships by democratic values. Bode occasionally 
spoke of democracy as a creed of specific beliefs,, commitments and forms of 
action, but for the most part he adopted Dewey's more general criteria, and 
thus appeared to vacillate between the very aimlessness be criticized in 
Dewey and a feeling that firm commitment was. needed. As to what it is we 
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are expected to commit ourselves, Bodes highly generalized prescrip- 
tions give inadequate guidance. The "democratic school" is a shadowy 
ideal which Bode did little to elucidate. 
4.2 Reconstructionism and indoctrination 
Shadowy as the democratic school ideal is in Bode's discussions, 
the intention that he and, indeed, all the experimentalists announced, to 
promulgate it, raises the question as to whether an education which ex- 
presses the beliefs and values they held and recommended amounts to in- 
doctrination. It is commonly thought that'ideologies inevitably seek 
to implant themselves by any methods short of violence and not always 
excluding violence. Thus there would be nothing strange about'°an ideo- 
logy'adopting indoctrination as a way of commanding support. There oust, 
however, be at least one exception to this, 'if we count reconstructionism 
as an ideology and if we accept some distinctions between` education and 
indoctrination. try reasons for wishing to consider reconstructionism 
as an ideology were given, in the Introduction. But what of the distinc- 
tions between education and indoctrination? -'These are distinctions which 
are not always adequately acknowledged by some of the reconstruotioniats. 
As'we have seen, several of them wished to make democracy militant and to 
have aset of beliefs taught in schools as a'-creed to'which"children should 
be committed by persuasion and subtler forme-'of influence - e. g., by 
means of myths, rituals and background institutional assumptions. 
However, it is only in weaker senses of the term indoctrination 
that we can regard even reconstruotionists who advocated militant demo- 
cracy as indootrinators. Those who advocated'a militant democracy had 
in mind some kind of creed or system of inter-related beliefs about the 
conduct of life which they wished to see taught in schools. More than 
this, they wished the ethos of the creed to permeate the school on the 
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grounds that, as atmosphere rather than as creed, it would be more 
influential on conduct and the formationýof dispositions (23). So 
far, we might suppose that some form of indoctrination is being pro- 
posed. Furthermore, the hypothesized militant democratic school 
was not to be an occasional pioneering institution. It was intended 
that in the long run the whole public school system should adopt the 
doctrines of democracy and not those of alternative socio-political 
systems. At first glance, then, 1t might appear that-Counts' "militant 
democracy" and Brameld's "defensible partiality". constitute a form of 
indoctrination. However, as'Dewey pointed out, the experimentalist 
theory from which this militant democracy sprang provides no support 
for those who engage in the promulgation of propositions or sets'of 
propositions for which no evidence, or supporting argument, or rels 
vant criticism is'provided. -For older children these critical enter- 
prises would be directed4at all forme'of. belief system, democratic and 
anti-democratic. There was to be no-foreclosing of discussion and 
argument by invoking the authority of-one-system-or another (24). Even 
for the education of very young children, the experimentalists proposed 
methods of joint action, discussion of consequences, -and interchange of 
ideas ehich were intended to break down or forestall fixity of belief 
and conviction of righteousness: Dewey placed, great emphasis-on the 
formation of habits and dispositions through directed experience as the 
basis of moral education, and so seemed to associate himself with the 
Aristotelian idea of habituation to goodness. However, a gradual tran- 
sition to rationality in all children was to accompany the processes 
of habit formation. Thus habits, attitudes and dispositions to act were, 
in the very process of formation, to be scrutinized, discussed, argued about 
even in the early stages of moral education. This is not indoctrination, 
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although it may be criticized perhaps-on other grounds as uncompromisingly 
rationalistic. and insufficiently-responsive to the different styles of 
perceiving and thinking in the growing child. None of the other recon- 
atructioniats gave so-, much-attention'to the reflective processes in the 
early education of children as did Dewey, but nor did any of them pro- 
pose-that any kinds of beliefs should be taught and held uncritically. 
Dewey and Kilpatrick both advocated a critical approach to values 
and specific forms of conduct in a rapidly changing society. But was 
this critical approach intended to hold of, the particular values of 
democracy, or of the methodology of inquiry, or of the structures of 
culture analysis, and the designs for culture renewal? The recon- 
structioniete had no important contributions to make to the problem 
of justifying moral values. - With--the exception of-Xanaheim and Clarke, 
their ethical systems were naturalistic". intbese two senses, that: 
1. they identified non-eupernaturalistio sources of moral 
authority, and criticized all claims to derive and vali- 
date values, by reference to supernatural-authorities; 
2. they advooated the incorporation: of empirioal tindin s from psychology and sociology into ethical theories (25)" 
Did they not, then, indoctrinate their naturalistic ethics, at, least 
by refusing to consider, or simply . oierlooking, alternatives? The answer 
to this question is that their recommendations for more sophisticated moral 
education were on the whole recommendations for an understanding and ap- 
praisal of moral theories, including the moral theories of non-western 
cultures. A further question we might ask is whether rationality, or, 
in. Dewey's terms, reflective inquiry, did not function as a subtle form of 
indoctrination, itself always assessing, and begging the question of the 
suitability of its own procedures in relation to certain forms of ex- 
perience? There is a problem here, certainly for Dewey, who seldom gave 
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much consideration to ton-, reflective processes in experience (26).. 
But there is also a paradox, since to question rationality is itself 
a form of rationality. 
Perhaps the 'solution to this difficulty list not in the question- 
begging processes of conscious questioning and further deliberation but 
in adopting other forms of action "a form of stipulative definition of 
modes of experience significantly different in form and substance from 
reflection and deliberation on'. the enlightenment model (e. g., engage- 
ment in the arts, reverie, and various body-involving activities, like 
gymnastics and modern dance). Despite his concern to see a more prac- 
tical approach adopted in schools, Dewey gave relatively little atten- 
tion to these kinds of`activity. Other reoonstructionista, notably Rugg, 
in their curriculum proposals advocated a shift in the balance of educa- 
tion from the more rational-reflective to different modes of experience. 
These' proposals, if implemented, would yield time experience which might 
provide alternative frames of reference to experimentalist cognition. 
Like any other theory articulated through the symbols of language 
and according to the conventions of. ratiocination, it could be said of 
reconstructionism that it presupposes and'asserts the cultural importance 
of cognition. In this very weak sense it could be said, I suppose, that 
reconsttuctionism sets out to indoctrinate. However, there are enough 
safeguards in the theory to justify our saying that the practical imple- 
mentation of the full range of its educational reoommendatione would not 
amount to indoctrination even in a very weak sense of that term. The 
particular designs for cultural renewal, those of Wells, Rugg, Mannheim 
arid Brameld, for example, were all argued for sincerely. They were not 
proffered as one possible design amongst many for the free-ranging intel- 
lect to take or leave. But nor were they treated, as would be necessar 
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in stringent forms of indoctrinating a system of ideas, as complete, 
unassailable systems to be taught and propagated as such. On the 
contrary, as we saw in Chapter VII, -Mannheim pointed out how limited 
and tentative were. his proposals, given the immature and confused con-- 
dition of the social sciences and human studies. Brameld and Wella 
were engaged, in their different ways,. on a quest for order, for a new 
cultural synthesis. But Brameld has-. never given more than a highly 
schematic outline of this syntbesis. x When he has related it"to formal 
curriculum proposals, these 1, ave, taken"the form of an exploratory and 
critical quest by groups of students for desirable and defensible cul- 
ture systems, and this is very different-from the absorption of some 
predefined system of ideas (27)" I 
Wells gave detailed and concrete accounts of utopia but in his spe- 
cific proposals, for example on adult education, he-made it Clear that 
not any particular solution was important, only, the building up of under- 
standing of cultural processes and the'commitment to achieving a control 
over, them# insofar as this is-possible. Thus it is only in a very loose 
and misleading way that the reconstructioniets could be described as in- 
doctrinators. Such an ascription would be based on their advocacy of 
schemes for reform and theýenthusiasm, of that advocacy. But-: there was 
only a very occasional suggestion by any of them that teaching should 
ever proceed in such a manner as to preclude a questioning critical res- 
ponse. The explanation for this lies both in the diagnosis of cultural 
change and uncertainty, for which adaptable and. flexible thinking is more 
useful than fixed outlooks, and in the nature of the reform proposals 
they advocated. The experimentalists, for example, hoped to cultivate 
through education qualities which the indoctrinator discourages. These 
qualities includes an understanding of cultural phenomena and their inter. 
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relatednosn; habits and dispositions of reflective inquirf, tolerance, 
sociability, sympathy, creativity and so forth; willingness to parti- 
cipate as a constructive critic in social and political affairs; en- 
thusiasm for reform and some relevant skills; and various forms of know- 
ledge both symbolic and practical. Although highly ambitious, this was 
a minimal list. If we add . to it the aspiration 
to communicate various 
perspectives, visions, and ideals of a more holistic kind, we night ap- 
pear to be approaching one of the most exalted ambitions of the indoc- 
trinator: to provide his subjects with a complete frame of reference, so 
complete and so integral to personality that all future experience and 
judgment can be accommodated within it, without any awareness that this 
experience is not critical but assimilative, dependent and parasitical. 
When proposals are made for anew man-in utopia, a new spiritual order, 
a social-moral order of fundamental principles,, we are in danger of laps- 
ing into the single vision of this°totaliatio, perapeotive. That danger 
does underlie the more-holistic versions of reconstructionism, and the 
propagators of these, ideals were not sufficiently aware-of this danger. 
Nevertheless, it was one of those, holistio proposals that incorporated a 
kind of defence against this very danger. This is-Mannheim's perspec- 
tivism, regarded as a cognitive process rather than an achieved cognitive map 
or orientation. By this1 mean that theýprocesa of building up a pers- 
pective, as Mannheim described it, is the intellectually and socially- 
liberating process of analysing and comparing and assessing ideas like 
the new man, or a new spiritual order, or particular theories and pars-, 
digms, like Marxism and Newtonianism. Admittedly there is a danger in 
restricting membership of the community of perspectivista to a clerisy, 
as Mannheim at times seemed to be advocating. In a common school system, 
we can avert this danger, for example, by taking care to maintain a variety 
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of institutional arrangements, a variety of forms of initial and 
ineervice education, and considerable autonomy in curriculum making. 
These are some of the ways of preventing single thought systems and 
models of behavior from assuming an ascendancy over all others. An 
education which at every level adopts the more analytical, comparative 
and critical processes of considering alternative viewpoints and variant 
explanations, and which seriously explores other modes of experience in 
addition to cognition, is unlikely to succumb to the more subtle indoc- 
trination of an uncritical assimilation into a single orientation and 
perspective. 
5. Educational Processes of Reconstruction 
; So far in this chapter we have been considering proposals for edu- 
cation, initially defined as a reconstructive process. We have seen 
that by education the reconstruotionists had in mind forms of experience 
which need not and, indeed, should not be confined to schooling, although 
few of-them, apart from Clarke, Mannheim and Dewey, showed much awareness 
of the wider implications of their ideas. If it is education that is 
potentially reconstructive of culture, then the question of the role of 
schooling is a secondary one, and it may well be that other institutions 
can, more effectively than schools, challenge existing patterns of culture 
and engage in the design and criticism of new ones, while still performing 
an educative role. From the reconstructionist'standpoint, it would be 
more exact to say that other institutions, by being educative, could par- 
ticipate in the kind of reconstruction they advocate. We shall consider 
the question of institutions, schools and others, in Chapter XIII. But 
we still have not seen just how the reconstruotioniatc, with the exception 
of Dewey, came to select education of all the activities and institutions 
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available to man in society for the role of rebuilding and renewing 
culture. 
5.1 The Webbe 
Different writers gave rather different answers to this question 
of the role of education in culture change. For the Webbs, educational 
processes and institutions are only one means of affecting desirable 
changes, and they should share with other forces, notably political 
ones, the building of a socialist society (28). Educators should 
undertake a variety of tasks. They should universalize a minimum oft 
child nurture, literacy, social skill and political awareness; provide 
a fully articulated system of public education at all levels; educate 
a highly skilled force of modern-minded, expert administrators and con- 
tribute to the development of service industry; provide facilities for 
the advancement of scientificknowledge, through research; and contribute 
by their actions as educators and citizens to the evolution of that social- 
political culture of which Fabianism is an example. The definition of 
socialism itself includes provision for growth and, tranaaission of new 
ways of thinking and it is to education that the Fabians looked to pre- 
pare socialist consciousness, -equip its leaders, and consolidate its 
reforms in the minds of the populßoe. This makes education no less 
important than nationalization, the, national minimum, and administra- 
tI. ve efficiency, as a transitional factor. Indeed, education is not 
only a single transitional factor; it is constitutive of all transi- 
tional factors, 
5.2 Wells 
Wells envisaged a very much more ambitious structure of educational 
ideas and institutions than the Fabians (29), lie aimed to produce news 
gregarious, tough-minded individuals who would in time. preoipitate a new- 
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order of society. ' Through many generations of a reconstructed edu- 
cation, expressed in integrated patterns of scientific, technical, 
historical and'sociological studies; man could hope to free himself 
from ignorance, stupidity and aggression, replacing this ancient 
destructive inheritance by an unprecedented depth and organization 
of knowledge, by universäl'love, and a new scientific humanism (30). 
Thus a higher moral-rational order, the fruit of education', would sup- 
plant, tho present "muddle". ' In the short run, dells thought adult 
education the most strategic point of`attack, and his own utopian 
romances, social and scientific treatises and political tracts exem- 
plify'the content of that education. `Like the Fabians, he believed 
it necessary to universalize education, instead of exclusively con- 
centrating resources, in the Platonic fashion, on a transforming elite, 
although there certainly was a leadership role for the pioneers of the 
new culture. The broader changes-in culture would well up, as it were, 
from the whole society, assuming that a cadre of enlightened Wellsians 
could accept the slow and'painful task of leading the masses into the 
forecourt of modern studies. Now this was to occur, given the very 
low Opinion he had of the teaching profession, is difficult to envisage. 
Wells seemed to think that the conventional apparatus of schools and 
other institutions would be by-passed in an'educational exploitation 
of the mass media, an enterprise in which he himself enjoyed great 
success, opening up new possibilities to'his successors. Again, like 
the Webbs, Wells so defined socialism as to make education its insepar- 
able ally and sustainer -a proper education is education in socialism: 
"building up the collective ideal and organization of humanity" (31). 
Re'repudiated violence and force and rejected the doctrine of inevitable 
transition. Despite'a lingering interest, Wells discarded the idea that 
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the new society could be realized through a highly trained elite 
imposing its will on the majority. Universal education, enlisting 
other social agencies as rationality gradually spread, would itself 
bring enlightenment, and this mould be, sufficient, over a long period 
of time, to counteract the anti-educational forces in man himself and 
in society. Lest this, should appear merely a restatement of enlighten- 
ment optimistic rationalisra, Wells was aware of psychological theories of 
the-unconscious and of the limits they appear to set to rationality. 
It is worth recalling that Freud himself, for all his scepticism about 
reform, introduced the concepts of self-awareness and understanding as 
the most decisive factors in the cure of neurosis., 
5.3 s ll 
Russell had a simpler and more direct faith than Wells in the capa- 
city of an enlightened elite of teachers and other reformers to identify 
and develop the constructive elements-in human nature and society, al- 
though he, too, was familiar with research and theorizing about the re- 
sistance of irrational factors in personality and society (52). Social 
and political awareness were for him less a matter of apprehending the 
contours of utopia and associating them with an emergent spiritual order 
than of critically appraising existing institutions. The individual 
function of education is to develop the person through systematic train- 
ing"in rational inquiry, strengthened by balanced knowledge and experience 
of the symbolic systems. Its social function is primarily critical, not 
cohesive, with the expectation that criticism would be accompanied by 
dispositions and skills appropriate to social renewal - e. g., the con- 
struction of an international political and cultural order. Russell's 
position is, in these respects, similar to Dewey's except that he at- 
tached more importance than did Dewey to systematic training in the 
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disciplines of knowledge. Education is for both of them a form of 
individual renewal, even rebirth. But individual experience isýalways 
part of a network of Group and social experiences. The liberation 
of the individual through education guarantees no particular future 
pattern of culture; indeed, such a guarantee would be inconsistent 
with belief in individual freedom of choice and creativity. However, 
a rational education, supported by a grounding in defined moral vir- 
tues, was, for Russell, despite the many hazards of contemporary civi- 
lization, the surest way of achieving a better future. 
5.4 Experimentalists and classical humanism 
Earlier in this chapter, I discussed several aspects of the experi- 
mentalist concept of education, as a form of reconstructionist thinking. 
Of all the roconstructioniats, Dewey and his followers made the most 
systematic attempts to explore the possibilities of effecting cultural 
change through education. In this respect they are sometimes set in 
opposition to those who conceive of education as initiation into the 
established traditions of thought and inquiry and to those who treasure 
the uniqueness and primacy of the individual. I have already discussed 
the latter points on the former, I remarked'in Chapter III on the many 
resemblances between classical humanism and reconstructionism. Both 
positions are utopian in that, if realized in practice, they would result 
in a transformation of the culture of any society ever known to history. 
We may take Peters as a recent exponent of the-classical humanist posi- 
tions 
"Educational processes are those by means of which public 
modes of thought and awareness, which are mainly enshrined in 
language, take root in the consciousness of the individual and 
provide avenues of access to a public world" (33). 
Of the educated man, Peters wrote: 
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"His experience is not only transformed by all that he 
has mastered, learnt, and understood, but is alwsys exem- 
plifying the processes by means of which such mastery, know- 
ledge, and understanding has been acquired. The achieve- 
ments constantly generate new tasks" (34). 
We see revealed in these passages an ideal of the structuring and re- 
structuring of personality through experience of the symbolic systems 
of culture which, if universalized, would effect the cultural renewal 
described by Dewey and Frank. Admittedly Peters has more reserva- 
tions about the possibility of universal education than they had 
(35). 
Peters' greater emphasis on language also contrasts with the experi- 
mentalist advocacy for formal education of a very wide range of experience 
and symbolization. But even on this point Peters also refers to the 
W. 
achievement of other forms of thought and awareness through conversa- 
tion (a reminder of Oakeehott's essay on this subject L36) rather than 
through formal modes of teaching. The reference to access to a public 
world is very similar to Dewey's concern for the public testability and 
interchange of ideas, and the implicit notion of a child undeveloped 
until he has gained access to these modes: eohoes, not only the views on 
the immaturity and incompleteness of the child hold by the pre-Hellenistic 
Greeks but also the experimentalist theory of the formation and education 
of the self through selected culture experience (37). 
We paused in reviewing the different reconstructionist conceptions 
of education to observe an affinity between Dewey and Peters. Not all 
experimentalists agreed with Dewey's preference for spelling out proce- 
dural principles rather than defined ends of the reconstruction process. 
Counts and Bode, as we have seen, at times proposed the policy adoption, 
by schools, of a credal affirmation of American democracy. Rugg's posi- 
tion was even further towards the extreme of an educationally conscious, 
Militant democracy. In the 19308, he cast the school into the role of 
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prophetic leader, inspirer, and artificer of the near cultural synthesis. 
Rugg never quite lost his faith in teachers as a potential cadre of 
culture-revolutionaries, unifying the industrial technologyr, the arts, 
and a variety of creative movements of the American mind in a "mental 
and emotional synthesis" which was to be embodied in the school curri- 
culum (38). However, like Wella, he looked to adult education as a 
more direct cleans of appealing to the more educated of the masses to 
partake in a truly herculean labor of discussion, debate, policy making, 
Institution building: the creation of a new ideology and a near social 
infra-structure. In view of his leanings towards socialism, inter- 
nationalism and_a spiritual, in preference to a political, order, it 
was prudent of Rugg to propose that reform be achieved by largely, al- 
though not entirely, by-passing the existing machinery of government, 
and administration. Like Wella, and later Brameld, Rugg designed and 
advocated an integrated "core" of knowledge as the heartland of the 
school pro6ramne. I shall discuss this core in greater detail in 
Chapter XII. His utopia, taking the form of a now mental culture 
' 
functioning within the social system of a reconstructed capitalism, 
was, like Wells' utopias, but unlike the modern dyatopias, conceived 
as an educative society. Through education the ordinary man could be 
brought to a realization of the superiority of the educated over the 
uneducated life, and would wish to structure his interests and acti- 
vities, including his leisure and recreation, by educative criteria. 
Except for Dewey, none of the reconstructionists paid much attention 
to the difficult and somewhat abstruse problem of justifying the superio- 
rity of the educated life, or, in recent parlance, of finding criteria 
for distinguishing worthwhile from un-worthwhile activities. Rugg 
exemplified lack of philosophic doubt and optimism about what education 
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would yield by way of understanding, and he very willingly suspended 
disbelief concerning the excellence of the now intellectual and ar- 
tistic frontiers created in America by the heroes of his Foundations 
for American Education (39). Rugg identified himself with the com- 
fortable educationists' belief, stemming from Plato, that it is inoon- 
eeivable'that anyone really tasting the pleasure and satisfaction of 
the educated life will wish to do other than strive for the realiza- 
tion on earth of an educational utopia. The difficulty, of course, 
is to create those conditions in which the experience can take root. 
5.5 Mannheim and Clarke 
Mannheim, and his chief English educational disciple, Clarke, 
shared an enthusiasm to create the educative society as a successor 
to all the non-educative or mis-educative societies we have so far 
had. But each, in his own way, was acutely conscious of problems of 
achievement, and both entertained serious doubts about the possibility 
of suffusing society with educational values. Clarke was very aware 
of the factors in English traditions and customs which militated against 
fundamental change in and through education. Furthermore, he argued, 
we should respect these factors by developing a national policy for 
education that maintains continuity (40). He thought education could 
beet fulfil ins social purpose by recreating the "English tradition" 
and by transmitting the beat of the presents 
"The fora of the task is to re-think and re-interpret 
what we have, rather than to think out something entirely 
new" (41). 
This rethinking and reinterpretation, however, posed educators with 
great challenges. Essentially, the tasks of education were to as- 
sess and criticize the prevailing values of materialism, secularism and 
eoientisn, and to seek to substitute for them a Christian view of man. 
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But this Christian view was to be a reinterpretation of traditional 
Christianity, in the light of changed social conditions. For his 
understanding of the latter Clarke turned to Mannheim, and largely 
accepted his diagnosis. Through the work and planning of educa- 
tioniote, not only 'in schools but in society at large, Clarke hoped 
to, see develop a common, democratic culture, unifying life and work 
and binding together past and present 
(42). 
Clarke accepted the doctrine of original sin which he interpreted 
to mean that no naturalistic devices, including education, could suc- 
ceed in finally eliminating man's propensities for self and social des- 
truction. Sin, furthermore, calls for a severe discipline* Perfect- 
ibility is excluded in principle. This is the only example in recon- 
structionist thinking, so far as I am aware, 'of'admission that there is 
an insuperable barrier to progress in and through education. Apart 
from this limitation, Clarke accepted the thesis that through'education 
it is possible to universalize, although not to equalize, intellectual 
and'moral virtues, and, by degrees, to achieve, or, as he believed, to 
recreate, a social unity which he termed aý"Community of Persuasion". 
Although his remarks on this subject were extremely sketchy, Clarke seems 
to have had in mind a fundamental social consensus, or an ongoing debate 
about policy within the confines of agreed values and agreed rules. 
This is the educative society, which has no necessary relations with 
particular political constitutions or social arrangements, 'ilthough it 
will be a planned society, built firmly on an evolving English tradition. 
Clarke's educative society is an ideal of community within which 
there are tensions whose force he seems not to have fully`appreoiated. 
Re'wanted a common culture, but not unanimity of values and outlook. 
This culture, as we have seen, was to be based on a reinterpretation of 
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Christian values and "the English tradition", but Clarke provided 
little guidance on the form that this interpretation might take. 
The educative society was to be free, but also disciplined; in the 
words of Hocking, the American Idealist philosopher, it was both to 
"reproduce the type" and to "go beyond the type". There was to be 
a national policy for education but not a state system. Education was 
seen as a spiritual enhancement, but also as a process orientated by 
the demands of work and vocation. A more systematic analysis than 
Clarke ever engaged upon is required to organize these and other ten- 
sions in his thought into a comprehensive cultural ideal. Thus the 
concept of the educative society provided Clarke's thought with a 
direction, but he did not adequately discuss the issues arising from 
the attempt tO move in the direction he indicated. 
Mannheim's proposals for cultural renewal, as we saw in Chapter 
VII, involved far more than a reform of education, since he envisaged 
an elaborate, centralized system of democratically controlled state 
planning for economic and social affairs. The principal tasks of 
education were to develop a new kind of consciousness, that which 
apprehends diverse cultural forces as formative factors in experience, 
which is sensitive to the deep turbulences, crises and transformations 
of our time, and has the capacity and will to engage in the democratic 
planning of the "third way". Clarke shared with Mannheim the Mead- 
Dewey sooio-oultural interpretation of the formation of personality 
and of fields of human action. Whereas Clarke treated original sin 
as a factor which limits the effect of environmental change, Mannheim 
identified the crisis of culture as the major factor limiting what we 
might hope to achieve through a reformed education. The crisis was a 
profound movement in culture, expressing powerful but not inexorable 
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human and social tendencies towards irrationality, totalitarianism 
and annihilation. The seriousness of the crisis provides the jus- 
tification for strenuous efforts to rebuild man through his upbring- 
ing, but it also provides a warning about the possible limits to 
what we might expect to achieve in this way. Mannheim's commitment 
to education, like that of Wells as he grew older, appears as almost 
an act of desperation: he was prepared to use propagandist, even at 
times indoctrinating, methods to ensure social control, and to streng- 
then elites as agencies of control. Formal education should, he 
argued, provide experience of and training in small group behavior. 
Through this training, he hoped to avert the tendency of mass society 
to degenerate into unstable mobocracy. As part of the process of 
securing social order and control in a period of great upheaval, 
Mannheim envisaged a new moral-spiritual order. This was to comprise 
a national community of persuasion, to use Clarke's phrase, or a con- 
sensus on norms and values, and it was to be subtly led and organized 
by a clerisy of socio-spiritual leaders. However, the community was 
not to be blind and led, like Platonic sheep, by all-seeing shepherds. 
Mannheim believed it possible through education to suffuse the whole 
community with awareness of and responsiveness to contemporary cultural 
situations and trends. Knowledge of the world, and of the self, was 
to be cultivated in all forms of education by methods appropriate to 
the wide spread of differences that characterize public schooling$ 
"Public education will need to emphasize the experimental 
nature of all living. It must devise techniques for inter- 
preting fundamental issues to various levels of intelligence 
and educational background" (43). 
The basic intention behind Mannheim's, as behind Clarke'a, educational 
proposals was the restoration of a missing community. No actual past 
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community could provide an adequate model, because of the enormous 
changes in modern, industrial societies, but, as we saw in Chapter 
VII, many specific features of the liberal democratic tradition could 
be reconstructed to provide a foundation for the new society. Man 
himself had similarly to be reconstructed, a task which Mannheim be- 
lieved could be accomplished through an education directed by modern 
scientific understanding of human behavior. These tasks - the res- 
toration of community and the recreation of man - express the funda- 
mental aims of reconstructionist theory, but they also point to very 
serious difficulties. The broader tasks of education which Mannheim 
set are indistinguishable from directed enculturation; thus he had no 
qualms about recommending full use of efficient techniques of communi- 
cation and social control, even though these involved propaganda and 
indoctrination. As I pointed out in Chapter VII, Mannheim's deter- 
mination to establish a unified social order and his investment of 
central elites with great power and a decisive leadership role provide 
too few safeguards in a democracy for the maintenance of plural values 
and interests, and inadequate provision for the sharing of responsi- 
bilities and experiences. On the other hand, Mannheim's conception 
of education as a set of processes which intimately relate to the in- 
stitutions, values and aspirations of society has greatly enhanced our 
understanding of possibilities for directed policy change. He under- 
stood better than almost any other Commentator of his time that edu- 
cational processes, content and methods must all be thought out anew in 
the light of the changes that have occurred in society and of the choices 
we wish to make for future social and Cultural policy. This is an 
understanding whose full significance has yet to be grasped by the main 
body of those engaged in English education. 
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5.6 Later experimentalists 
The effort to achieve a new human type, one which is spiritually 
regenerated, morally strengthened and intellectually trained through 
education, seems largely to have been replaced, in the post-war period, 
by a more modest and behavioristic preference for achieving change 
through manipulative instruments. At least, there has been a move 
towards a greater concern for instrumental procedures, especially 
procedures of group decision-taking. Of the writers I have discussed, 
Frank is an exception to this since his psycho-cultural theory refers 
to the growth of personality. However, he too showed a preference 
for group engineering in recommending that personality be directed 
and self-directed through the continuous appraisal of experience in 
democratic groups. Education, conceived as the chief deliberate 
agency and process for shaping growth, is regarded, in this position, 
as a man-making enterprise. If it succeeds, or "takes", education 
transforms personality; it becomes, in effect, another name for man's 
new and growing cognitive perspective. Since society, for Frank, exists 
only in and through the experiences and inter-relationships of individuals, 
to succeed in educating all people is to succeed in recreating or remaking 
society (44), The remaking of the individual and the reconstruction of 
society are continuous, reciprocal processes. Man remakes himself and 
society, not by the utopian designs, which Frank thought were one of 
the false trails of the thirties, but by engaging in a critical scru- 
tiny of laws, customs, institutions, and revising them in the light of 
his increasing understanding and sensitivity. These are all, for Frank, 
educative tasks. 
As we saw in Chapter VIII, Frank thought of culture in terms of de- 
signs, inventions and plans for living, Following Cassirer, he said, 
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"Every culture is a product of creative imaginations 
what the poets, artiste, prophets, and, more recently, 
scientists have formulated artistically and conceptually 
as patterns for perceiving the world and for transform- 
ing nature and organic existence into aeymbolic world 
for human living and purposive striving towards the endur- 
ing goals which people cherisht' (45)" 
The processes of renewing and recreating culture in a democracy 
depend upon the universalizing of the symbolic systems through edu- 
cation. But it is not knowledge in the form of information that is 
so important as the insights, understandings and skills which enable 
us to use and develop knowledge. Hence Frank outlined a programme for 
schooling which gave prominence to: "Cognitive self-awareness" in 
pupils, concept learning, learning to learn; and, for teachers, com- 
munication theory and the Dewey-Bentley theory of knowledge as a trans- 
action between the knower and the known$ in which concepts serve as 
"patterns for perceiving and relating to the world" (46). 
Frank's treatment of educational processes reflects the debt to 
Dewey, which he freely acknowledged. There are parallels between his 
intellectual relationship to Dewey and that between Clarke and Mannheim a 
both owed much, yet introduced factors to which the more systematic' thinkers 
gave inadequate attention. Frank laid particular emphasis an learning 
processes in small group situations, thus informing Dewey's more com- 
prehensive and abstract theory with an awareness of the social psycho- 
logy of interpersonal relationships. But, like Dewey, Frank had a 
remarkably optimistic confidence in what schools can do to educate all 
youth. Also following Dewey, be tended to reduce the diverse modes 
of the symbolic systems to the single mode of natural-science thinking. 
For education to serve for all children and youth in the way Frank re- 
commended, we should need to extend very considerably the range of class- 
room procedures to include use of very diverse forms of pupil experience. 
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The difficulties are not simply those of finding ways of developing 
cognitive awareness and of communicating the values of discursive 
thought, but of maintaining a sense of the meaningfulness and worth- 
whileness of whatever the school stands for. 
The school can be an agency of renewal, in the manner Frank des- 
cribes, for those children and youth who are interested in and able to 
appreciate the sophisticated modes of understanding which he discusses. 
It is by no means clear, however, that these modes, at least as we 
have developed them for educational purposes, provide teachers with 
means of access to the experiences and aspirations of all who are in 
school. Thus, although he intended his theory of teaching to be uni- 
versal in the sense that it could be applied throughout the whole edu- 
cational system, Frank's thought is more relevant to the education of 
cultural leaders and innovators than to the education of the average 
citizen. He would perhaps repudiate this distinction, again on Deweyan 
lines, as a form of elitism or an unnecessary and mischievous class divi- 
sion. I have argued that reconstructionism is a concept of education 
which depends for its realization upon the'actions of cultural pioneers. 
It would be better for its exponents to recognize this and to give more 
attention than they have done to the actual content and form of experience 
in everyday life, instead of concentrating so heavily on higher order 
mental processes. 
There seems to have been, amongst Frank's reconstructionist contem- 
poraries, a more limited aspiration than that of their predecessors to 
reconstruct culture through education (47). Not that the basic Deweyan 
framework of growth as a reconstruction of experience in a democratic 
Society was abandoned: on the contrary, it is implicitly accepted by all 
of the later experimentalists and quite explicitly by some. Stanley, 
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for example, acknowledged that his reconstruotionist perception of 
the role of education was derived from Dewey's Democracy and Education. 
We may also detect the ihfluence of Mannheim on both his content and 
styles 
"in a transitional era the integrating principle in education 
must be found, not in the inculcation of an organized body 
of doctrine, but in an intensive program of study, inquiry, 
and discussion designed to aid the students, as individuals 
and so a group, to find their way through the confusion and 
conflicts of our time to a viable and consistent social 
philosophy capable of ordering and rationalizing the pre- 
sently chaotic conditions of modern life ... the school 
[should] 
help its students achieve order and clarity through such de- 
liberate and intelligent reconstruction of the values and prin- 
ciples inherent in the democratic tradition as will clarify 
their meaning and restore their integrative power in the modern 
world" '(47). 
The determination of the later experimentalists to reduce the grander 
and more speculative formulations of their predecessors to operational 
procedures resulted in proposals to develop manipulative instruments to 
guide change, or even to reduce the complexity of human personality to 
a hypothetical model of the group-orientated decision-taker. Thus, 
democracy as shared experience and participation in decision-taking 
expresses itself in the ideas of consensus, practical-judgment and a 
set of basic social-moral norms which serve as a goal for group inquiry. 
The principal task facing the citizen of a democracy is to learn how to 
use the instruments of group participation (48). 
Brameld's society of the future is an educative societys 
"Education becomes increasingly a term for the co-opera- 
tive methods and objectives by which the widest majority of the 
people, young and old, actively unite in behalf of the domestic 
and world order they can agree on" (49)" 
The social-moral pattern of norms which Stanley prescribed is to 
be defined and adopted as part of an educational quest. Raup's prac- 
tical judgment is to be used in educational policy-making, while the 
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understanding, knowledge and value preferences which lead to its adop- 
tion are all recognized to be the product of education. What is miss- 
ing, at any rate in Raup, Smith and Stanley, is the earlier exuberant 
enthusiasm for progress on all fronts at once. Also gone is the re- 
lative disdain of earlier reconstruotionists for the very powerful anti- 
educational forces operating in man and his culture. There is no dimi- 
nution in the faith that a truly universalized education would trans- 
form the whole of society, but there is a much more sober appraisal of, 
the limited sphere in which education can extend its influence. This 
is a gain in realism, which is strengthened by the more detailed ex- 
ploration of operational procedures. 
The search for operational procedures is an extension of the ear- 
lier pragmatic theory of the operational definition of ideas. It is, 
however, more significant than this statement may imply. We have 
seen that the reconstructionist concept of education has many resem- 
blances to other theories which have no explicit commitment to the 
wider aims of the reconstructionist movement. We have also seen that 
many of the reconstructionist proposals for reform through education 
are highly schematic, partial and neglectful of countervailing forces. 
More recent advances in the understanding of organizational, institu- 
tional, social and cultural change have led to the identifying of prob- 
lems of priority, strategy, resistance, evaluation, and the reactions 
of elements within a system to each other. Attempts are now being 
made,, as we saw in Chapter IX, to clarify the roles of change agents, 
and to analyse other roles in the change process. If reconstructionism 
is to maintain its vitality its exponents have both to oparationalize 
the differences between their conceptual apparatus and that of other 
educational theories, and to incorporate and assess the contributions of 
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the never change theories. 
6. Conclusion: the Quest for Order 
I have had perforce to survey a wide range of issues in this chap- 
ter. Even so, I have given scant attention to a number of topics which, 
especially in the more recent development of reconstructionism, are of 
great significance. I shall have a comment to make on this in a moment. 
But, first, I shall briefly recapitulate the key elements in the recon- 
struotionist concept of education. The general target of cultural re- 
newal is an expression of five basic ideas, 
First, that present culture is in a condition of turmoil and critical 
discontinuity. 
Second, that the vital elements in culture are experienced and ex- 
pressed in human lives, which are therefore subject to turmoil and stress. 
Third, that culture renewal is a form of directed growth or re-or- 
ganization through reflective inquiry and df experience in social situa- 
tions. 
Fourth, that the reorganization of experience should be directed 
by criteria of continuity, and order; thus, culture renewal is, or 
should be, a movement toward some form of unity or coherence of ex- 
perience. 
Fifth, unity and coherence of experience are beat achieved through 
a kind of world consciousness, or seeing oneself as integral with a 
modern, world-wide culture. 
I have suggested that these concepts give rise to certain difficulties, 
for example, the problem of defining clear criteria for growth; the con- 
fusion of education and enculturation; the problem of authority in a 
democratic system; the overlap of character formation and indoctrination; 
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and the inter-relationship of educational and other social institu- 
tions. It can hardly be said that the reconstruotionist theory has 
grappled successfully with all of these issues. This perhaps is an 
inevitable consequence of the attempt to embrace within a single 
thought'system many diverse ideas. It is, after all, much easier 
to solve problems and to achieve consistency when the frame of re- 
ference is severely delimited or when some single principle is adopted 
to which all other principles are reduced or systematically related - 
e. g., concepts like rationality, or authority, or alienation. 
Reconstructionism is not reducible, nor did it attempt to reduce 
its own ideas to some such single principle. Yet, there have re- 
curred a small number of central themes. Of these, the quest for 
order, as I have noted in previous chapters, is the positive counter- 
part to the confusion and breakdown observed in culture. This quest 
lies at the heart of the conception of education advanced by two of 
the post-war experimentalists, Stanley and Brameld. For Stanley, it 
is, in the spirit of Dewey, still a methodological principles 
"This conception of education in a very vital sense 
undertakes to make an integrated and integrating social 
philosophy the goal rather than the foundation of the edu- 
cational programme of the public school" (50). 
Stanley was satisfied that the democratic heritage could provide adequate 
materials for the new order. I have argued that such a claim is inoon- 
eistent with the alleged extent and seriousness of the breakdown. How 
Can we be sure that the attempt to establish a community of outlook 
through the teaching of a heritage of values will succeed where in the 
Past it has, on the reconstruotionists' own analysis, failed? In any 
Case, heritages oust be interpreted, and the constant invoking of a 
heritage, or, as with Clarke, the English tradition, distracts attention 
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from the actual locus of authority, which is the group of interpreters. 
Also, it is hardly consistent to adopt the democratic heritage, in the 
particular range of forms it inevitably takes in a single society, while 
at the same time advocating a completely critical reflective method. 
Brameld appreciated the need to give a coherent account of the new 
order which he so frequently advocated but, since he sought to combine 
the consensual quest with the adoption of specific programmes expressing 
the new synthesis, he was unable to avoid another kind of incoherence. 
I pointed out that, for Wells and Mannheiz4, the quest for order became 
a quasi-religious mission. They looked to religious concepts and ex- 
perience both for inspiration and for analogies to the secular culture 
designs they proposed. These religious elements in earlier forms of 
reconstructionism provide an appropriate setting for Brameld's most 
recent general statement of his position. Under the banner of "exis- 
tential humanism", he has proposed a new alliance of educational, reli- 
gious and philosophical interests: 
"By a philosophy of education or philosophy of religion 
I mean a philosophy of culture-building and evolution-direot- 
ing, a philosophy that provides man with symbolic self-expres- 
sion, that generates confidence in his power to control and 
renew hic life, that impels him to search for, commit himself 
to, and identify with the most meaningful whole which he is 
capable of grasping" (51). 
Brameld equates religious experience with the quest for wholes, 
thus bringing to the fore the implicit religious quality of his concept 
of reconstructionism. This makes of education a religious concept but 
only in the most general or eclectic sense, since a quest for wholes can 
be accommodated within any of the great religious systems, and barely dis- 
tinguishes those religions from any ideological system. This is perhaps 
another way of saying that the reconstructionist concept of education is 
an ideological concept, held at times with the intensity of religious 
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conviction. It expresses a longing for order and unity, not only 
of outlook but of community and of action. The tensions and strains 
within the theory are enormous, since it has to accommodate, besides 
this quest for order, a powerful emotional demand for agreed, com- 
mitted action (consensus), and a wholly naturalistic and sceptical 
empiricism. Cassirer remarked of the enlightenment that it replaced 
the seventeenth century, Cartesian idea of "the spirit of systems" with' 
the more open, scientific and concrete "systematic spirit" (52). Re- 
constructionism wishes to combine these, but has been unable to show just 
what form the new, unitary concept of education would take. Despite 
valiant efforts, no Thomiatio synthesis has been achieved. Since the 
reconstructionists have treated education as the source and method for 
building a new culture, it follows that there can as yet be no assurance 
that this hypothetical culture will be unitary, and thus the problem of 
a fragmented or disunited culture, which they set out to solve, still 
remains. 
CHAPTER XI 
CURRICULD DESIGN It THE WEBBS, WELLS, DESM AND KILPATRICK 
Reconstructionist ideas on the design of the curriculum comprise 
an extremely miscellaneous array of proposals ranging from the more com- 
prehensive and substantial studies of some of the experimentalists to 
the very fragmentary suggestions of the Fabians. In my attempt to sys- 
tematize these various proposals I shall be conscious of a risk of conceal- 
ing this fragmentariness and of implying a greater schematic unity and 
wholeness than existed. With this reservation in mind I shall consider 
the reconstructioniat ideas on curriculum, with reference to several to- 
pics of interest to contemporary curriculum theorists. These topics in- 
cludes 
1. the overall structure of the curriculum, conceived as 
an arrangement of subjects, topics, themes and activi- 
ties designed to achieve the broad educational objectives 
I discussed in Chapter X; 
2. processes of curriculum making, or strategies of curriculum 
change, including the use of a rational design model which 
proceeds systematically from an analysis of learning situa- 
tions to the design, implementation and assessment of learning programmes; 
3. the problem of determining roles of different partici- 
pants; e. g., teachers, pupils, parents, subject specia- lists and others; 
4. the relationship of the so-called domains or disciplines 
of knowledge to teaching and learning programmes. 
While I shall have these topics in mind in discussing reconstructionist 
curriculum thinking, it would be misleading to treat them as foreground 
considerations. We shall see that the total reconstructionist contri- 
bution in these areas is very uneven and that no less important than 
their positive proposals were the criticisms they made of the existing 
Curriculum. In the present chapter, I shall examine the curriculum 
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thinking of the earlier reconstruotioniets, prefacing this with a 
brief discussion of some of the principal features of recent curri- 
culum theory; in Chapter XII, I shall discuss the curriculum ideas 
of the later reconstruotionists. 
1. Some Recent Developments in Curriculum Design 
The concept of curriculum design is at least as old as Plato, and 
all theories of education incorporate design proposals. However, under- 
standing of logical issues and of planning and strategy in curriculum 
decision-taking has been considerably enhanced by the work of the ex- 
perimentalists, and especially by the contributions of Rugg and Smith 
and his associates (1). We should expect a theory such w reconstruc- 
tionism, which gives primary emphasis to consciously directed change, to 
seek in the curriculum opportunities for the planning and guidance of learn- 
ing across very broad areas of human experience. 
There are several ways of describing and analysing the overall struc- 
ture of a curriculum. For example, where chief emphasis is given to the 
transmission of the concepts and methodologies of the major disciplines 
of knowledge, or to initiation into subjects, like history and mathema- 
tics, the curriculum is commonly referred to as a disciplinary, or a 
subject curriculum, and curriculum categories reflect the conceptual 
structures, and the modes of validation of the disciplines (2). Where 
, chief emphasis is given to the ascertainment of children's interests and 
where learning programmes are constructed to develop these interests, 
whether through the use of projects, cross or inter-disciplinary themes, 
or various other arrangements of subject matter, we have what is commonly 
referred to as an experience or activity curriculum. The conceptual 
structure of this kind of curriculum is by no means clear, and the key 
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concepts employed by its advocates (e. g., interest, need and discovery) 
have often been criticized (3). Obviously, the "subject" and "interest" 
based curricula are not logically discrete. Transmission of the subject 
matter of the disciplines is not necessarily an inactive process, as 
Plato, Thitehead, Bruner and others have demonstrated, although it is 
often contended by critics of this approach that the child's activity 
is largely restricted to a limited range of assimilative and rej; urgitative 
performances, and that little effort is made to engage the child's wider 
interests and experience in the learning process. On the other hand, the 
developmont of children's interests does not preclude the transmission of 
logically ordered subject matter, since it is an open question in what 
manner and by what means the interests ascertained should be developed. 
As Dewey argued, the concept of interest does not of itself yield adequate 
criteria for growth. Recognizing the difficulties of distinguishing be- 
tween "subject" and "interest" as a basis, some of the most recent attempts 
to develop total curriculum designs have abandoned these older classifi- 
cations, and the dichotomies (and slogans) to which they have given rise: 
for example, the knowledge and experience classifications of Phenix, and 
Broudy, Smith and Burnett (4). Phenix's design involves the schematiza- 
tion of knowledge and experience into six major forms: 
Symbolics (language, mathematics and non-discursive symbolic forms); 
aesthetics; 
empirica (human, biological and physical sciences); 
synnoetics (personal, intuitively derived knowledge); 
ethics; 
synoptica (integrative meanings: history, religion, philosophy). 
Phenix's attempt to outline a map of knowledge and experience, and his 
conception of synoptios as a quest for "comprehensively integrative meanings", 
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express that interest in "Coherent wholes" which has characterized 
much reoonstruetionist thinking on culture and education. I shall 
raise this point again in Chapter XIV, where I discuss Phenix's views 
on teacher education. 
Broudy, Smith and Burnett have produced a Curriculum design from 
which they devised a common core programme for all youth in the upper 
years of secondary education. In their design model these authors 
convert the traditional subjects into a system which retains the separate 
identity of processes of inquiry while combining and re-arranging subject 
matter into new fields: 
Symbolic skill studies (in English, foreign languages, mathematics); 
'Basic concepts from sciences (general science, biology, physics); 
Developmental studies (of cosmos, institutions, cultures); 
Value exemplars (from art, literature, philosophy, religion); 
}solar social problems. 
For these areas, separately and in combination as a general education 
core programme, Broudy and his associates prepared systematic teaching 
and learning schemes. These schemes involve teachers and pupils in 
building up cognitive and evaluative "maps", and cognitive operations 
Of interpretation, association, application, and replication, of ideas 
"d skills. 
From this brief outline we may see that both Phenix and Broudy and 
Ilia associates developed general design models which transform the fami- 
liar curriculum categories of "subject" and "interest" into comprehensive 
networks of Concepts and fields of knowledge. The processes they iden- 
tified are not defined exclusively by traditions of inquiry - e. g., his- 
tory or physics - but by types and relationships of concepts and strategies 
Of knowledge use. Pupil interest is not excluded, as a criterion of choice, 
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but in the'strategy of curriculum designing interest takes second place 
to conceptual analysis. With their multi-dimensional structure, Broudy 
and his associates provide a framework within which teachers could plot 
a wide range of school programmes and rates of individual progression, 
thus overcoming, in some measure, one of the main objections to a core 
curriculum; namely, that it prescribes no ways of relating individual 
differences to a common and carefully pre-structured study programme. 
Structural complexity and subtlety of analysis, together with the no- 
ticeable emphasis on higher levels of cognitive process, give to the 
Broudy scheme a general character or orientation which distinguishes it 
from the older core curricula which were directed by the vaguer notions 
of examining a miscellany of contemporary social problems, or of satis- 
fying expressed child interest. The Broudy scheme does not, of course, 
achieve the impossibles a common programme which is both the same for 
all pupils and yet different for all of them, but it does make it pos- 
sible for curriculum designers to relate their more practical decisions 
to a common and clear set of variables. 
These attempts by Phenix, Broudy and others to build up systematic 
structures of knowledge and experience, comprised of a variety of inter- 
connected logical operations and modes of experience, are amongst the 
most constructive features of the intellectualist reaction against both 
the older progressive idea of an interest-based curriculum and the more 
recent life-adjustment approach. 
In addition to the three approaches I referred to in the preceding 
paragraphs - i. e., logical operations, child interest, and social func- 
tionalism - we should incorporate into the concept of curriculum design 
an idea that might be termed thematic unity. By this, I mean that curri- 
cula, whatever their particular structures, are dominated by soma major 
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motif or set of assumptions which impinge upon all the elements. This 
thematic unity is more apparent in some curricula designs than otherst 
for example, the Soviet motif of polytechnicization, which characterizes 
(or so its exponents intended) large parts of the Soviet curriculum. It 
aims at$ 
"giving the younger generation a knowledge of the most impor- 
tant branches and general principles of the techniques, tech- 
nology and organization of socialist production, and equipping 
the young with habits of work and experience of socially pro- 
ductive work" (5)" 
Whatever the practical results, the intention underlying polyteohnicizatii 
is the extremely ambitious one of attempting to give a definite ideological 
coloring to all studies by encouraging pupils to examine any possible links 
between the content of their school studies and socialist work culture. 
It is not in the ordinary sense a form of vocational education. By 
suffusing the whole programme, po], ytechnicization seeks to affect learn- 
ing in mazy different ways, ranging from direct cognition to absorption 
and unconscious adoption of values. In these respects, it is similar 
to certain views of religious education, as an all pervasive atmosphere 
or ideology and not simply a single subject on a par with all the rest (6). 
2" Reconstructionist Curriculum Proposals 
The choice of polyteohnioization to illustrate the idea of a thematic 
unity in the curriculum is not fortuitous. There is much in the poly- 
technical ideal which bears upon reconstructionismi its pronounced idso- 
logical quality; the attempt to inter-relate theory with practice; em- 
phasis on the intellectual significance of work experience; the strong 
social orientation; and the notion of a definite core of values upon 
which all might agree. Yet, despite these affinities, the reconstruo- 
tionists have not in their curriculum thinking made use of polytechnicization, 
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and, apart from Dewey's contributions, have hardly touched upon the 
whole question of industrial education or the specific relationships 
that should obtain between school education and work culture. This 
is & subject to which future reeonstruotionist thinking needs to give 
particular attention in view of the rapid changes in conditions and re- 
lationships of work. 
None of the earlier reconstructionist curriculum proposals reaches 
the level of analytical clarity and systematic rigor of the Broudy scheme. 
Only Rugg, and to a lesser degree Brameld, have aspired to design total 
programmes in any detail, which may seem surprising in view of the 
general reconstructionist preoccupation with a new cultural synthesis 
towards which the school is intended to contribute through curriculum 
design. Since, insofar as the school is concerned, the curriculum is 
a major device for expressing this synthesis, or of developing in chil- 
dren the intellectual and emotional capacities with which they may later 
achieve the synthesis, the failure of the majority of the reconstruetionists 
points to a missed opportunity. It should be noted, however, that the 
Broudy scheme was produced by three members of the social and philo- 
sophical foundations division of the University of Illinois College of 
Education. This division, as we saw in Chapter VIII, has been one of 
the major centres of reeonstruotioniet thinking and, while Broudy himself 
is not an experimentalist, both Smith and Burnett are. Thus their study 
may be regarded as in some senses an extension and development of one of 
the main lines of reconstructionist thinking. 
Most of the earlier reconstruotionists gave some sketchy idea of 
the total design of the curriculum and one or two of them some indica- 
tion of how a unifying, synthetic curriculum might be built. From a 
review of these incomplete suggestions we can form an idea of the general 
character of the reconstruotionist curriculum. 
2.1 The Webbst utilitarian studies for elites and masses 
The Aebbe said too little on the curriculum to enable us to do 
much more than associate them with the modern studies movement of 
whom Spencer and Huxley were leading and influential exponents in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century (7). The explanation for the 
brevity of their comments on the content of education is not lack of 
interest, or any failure to recognize the potential contribution of 
educational reform to social change, but a regard for the rights and 
responsibilities of the teaching profession. Education was seen as a 
focal point of national recovery, in the latter part of the First World 
War: 
"The subject to which, above all others, we desire to 
draw attentions is that entitled 'Can We Effect a Revolution 
in our system of Education? ' We suggest that failure to 
find an affirmative answer to that question will mean the 
frustration of the national hope of effective recovery from 
the war or of building up a civilization worth fighting 
for" (8). 
The teachers were expected to show in detail how an affirmative answer 
could be givens but Webb and Freemen outlined a programme within which 
detailed reform might occurs 
"The teachers must tell us how to modify the subjects 
taught and the methods of teaching so as to facilitate in 
every way the free, healthy and spontaneous development 
of the child's personality through its own interests and 
efforts" (9). 
However, Webb was by no means confident that teachers would meet 
this challenge, and in his Fabian Tract, The Teacher in Politics, he 
criticized them for their past failure to formulate a policy of reform 
(10). 
The Webby proposed replacing the classical secondary and tertiary 
curriculum of ancient languages and literature, and the nonvocationaliem. 
of classical humanist schooling, with a structure of vocationally- 
directed modern studies: sciences, social sciences, technical and 
technological studies, and modern European languages. This is, 
broadly, the so-called realist programme of the post-Renaissance 
period, filled in with contemporary subject-matter. All pupils 
were expected to partake of a modern programme, but whether this 
would be common, or specialized, and at what stage it should be 
introduced, remains uncertain. The Webb modern studies programme appears 
to have been intended mainly for the secondary schools, whose separate- 
ness from the elementary school system Webb accepted, and for the uni- 
versity and continuation and adult education. For London University, 
he proposed professional studies and research. He rejected the leisurely 
Greats and triposes as unsuited to people looking for professional train- 
ing. The faculty of arts would have to become professional, too, by 
specializing in languages. He proposed a scheme for teaching some 
fifty languages and a course in world literature. Webb was not unaware 
of the professional origins of European universities and he appealed to 
tradition in support of his argument for a professionalized university 
which at the same time concerned itself with citizenship trainings 
"The London University, like the universities of mediaeval Europe and modern America will ... necessarily take on the 
character of a technical school for the brain-working profes- 
sions of its time" (11). 
By abandoning the pursuit of "the whole realm of knowledge", and by seek- 
ing for practical applications, university teachers would be compelled to 
push out "into the yet unknown - that is to say, into the region of 
original investigation and research" (12). Hence the university would 
come increasingly to specialize in graduate work as well as professional 
studies. On both points Webb may be regarded as an accurate forecaster 
of twentieth century trends in university education. 
So much for the elite in the universities. For the masses, the 
Webby had two main proposals: first, content embodying ideas of mother- 
craft, home management and child nurture, as a necessary condition of 
achieving a national minimum, and, eventually, the socialist common- 
wealth (13); second, specifically for London since this was Sidney's 
chief interest, a very comprehensive programme of commercial education 
intended to overcome the very serious deficiencies in provision with 
which Webb contrasted the superiority not only of continental capitals 
but of Manchester as well. His plan for commercial education was 
conceived not merely as technical instruction, but as "the beat pos- 
sible education" for those whose future lay in commerce and business. 
Through commercial studies, the two systems of mass and elite educa- 
tion could be drawn together in a single, scholarship-linked system 
from elementary school to university (14). At all levels, the tra- 
ditional literary-moralistic programme was to be replaced by subject 
matter of a more technical, practical and more obviously contemporary 
character. The Webbs shared Huxley's opposition to the classical 
humanist tradition in both its older forms and as revived by Matthew 
Arnold. But, unlike Huxley, they had very few suggestions for throwing 
bridges from the one to the other. Indeed, their proposals envisaged 
the submergence of humanistic study in work-orientated programmes, and 
one could well imagine the disappearance of the valuable as well as the 
more doubtful elements in traditional culture from universities and 
secondary schools it their proposals were ever fully implemented (15). 
On the other hand, the Webbs were not simply elevating the principle of 
efficient education for a managerial democracy. Sidney Webb, on one 
of the rare occasions when he was aroused to a passionate denunciation, 
criticized "class education" which condemned people to a servile role, 
and hinted at a curriculum that would unite the classes and eliminate 
vocational predestination. There is no contradiction between this 
ideal of social unity as reflected in a common core curriculum and a 
utilitarian approach to learning. Nor should it be too readily as- 
sumed that, because they opposed traditional university culture and 
advocated an enlightened vocationaliam, the Webbs were opposed to any 
form of liberal education. As Dewey demonstrated, the realist pro- 
gramme refuses to acknowledge that vocational preparation is necessarily 
illiberal, or, indeed, that the classical curriculum makes no vocational 
assumptions. 
The gradualist theses of Fabianism assume that, through education 
and the provision of a minimum standard of material comfort, political 
activists can direct society towards socialism. The equation of educa- 
tion with socialism was not thought to entail a propagandist education. 
As far as the Webba were concerned, no propaganda is needed, because the 
rationality nurtured by a realist education is presumed sufficient to 
convince people of the rightness of planning, of organization, and of 
socialism. At least, the Webba believed that those people who will be 
in a position to have much influence will inevitably, in an educational 
programme of the kind they envisaged, accept the rational superiority 
of socialism. Hence the readiness of the Webba to leave the London 
School of Economics free of propagandist pressure. 
Few other reoonstructionists had this confidence in the results of 
a modern realist education capped by research training in the methods 
of the social sciences. Wells was by no means content to leave the 
curriculum in that condition of relative neutrality which seemed to 
satisfy the Webbs, although he did share with them the belief that 
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rationality and socialism are inextricably linked. 
2.2 Wells: curriculum design foreshadows new order 
Wells never worked out a detailed curriculum structure, but certain 
general features stand out in his proposals. He condemned the bookish- 
ness of conventional schooling; its reliance on ancient knowledge, much 
of it factually incorrect, for example in the sciences; its neglect of 
the issues of contemporary life; its parochial nationalism; and its 
subservience to technical and vocational pressures (16). Building up 
a common culture meant, for Wells, providing a common core programme, 
comprising subject matter whose inter-relationships and connections are 
to be explored in cross-disciplinary topics. Wells wanted not only what 
he called horizontal integration of topics; he also wanted a pre- 
planned, sequential programme of school studies. From the adoption 
of such a programme, it follows that we can map out a totality of topics 
for school study, year by year from the elementary school onwards, and 
Wells did in fact sketch out a scope and sequence model for "informational" 
studies, of a kind which the upsurge of "discovery" methods in primary 
schools has unfortunately pushed into the background (17). The main 
features of this model are the predominance of scientific studies - 
physical, biological, and social; world history and contemporary cultural 
studies; a workshop method of directed inquiry and research; and indi- 
vidual and group assignments (18). Like all core programmes, it shares 
with the traditional curriculum the idea of pre-planning of overall struo- 
tured according to implicit or explicit learning objectives held by the 
teacher. Ideas about the scope and sequence of learning are accordingly 
based on the teacher's awareness of known achievements said standards, 
both of the child and within the subject, The sequence element in Wells' 
plan extended into adult education, where "world consciousness" was to be 
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a major objective of cultural studies. He was not, in the narrower 
sense, a professional educationist, so Wells neither filled in the 
detail nor, apart from listing descriptive categories, attempted to 
analyse the conceptual structure of his scope and sequence model. 
Nevertheless, as a practical adult educator he save some indication 
of the possible applications of his ideas. In his highly appreciative 
intellectual biography of Sanderson, headmaster of Oundle School, and 
in his re-creation of aspects of Sanderson's life and work in his novel, 
The Undying Fire, we may see what kind of a school programme, possible 
in his own day, was acceptable to Wells. The main elements in this 
programme wares boarding, hence substantial custodial control; a semi- 
secular religious service designed to create in the boys a common com- 
mitment to community service; the replacement of individual competition 
as a motive by group work and interest in the task at hand; and a broad 
programme of "modern studies, dominated by science, study of society, 
and many forms of workshop technology. " The school was to achieve through 
its laboratories, art rooms, library, museum and chapel the atmosphere 
of a kind of Salomon's house of inquiry, criticism and constructive 
analysis of contemporary problems. It was to equip the pupils with a 
capacity to reflect upon, criticize and rebuild society, not merely to 
become its efficient managers and compliant servants: 
"More and more does he [Sandersoni see the school not 
as a training ground of smart men for the world that ie, but 
as a preliminary working model of the world that is to be" (19). 
This world that is to be is, however, a reformed version of the pre- 
sent model, not something wholly new and different. For Wella, the 
visionary and utopian, even a drastically reformed school curriculum 
would be inadequate as a microscopic plan of the future social order. 
His highest aspirations for cultural change, expressed in his utopian 
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romances, were accompanied by the sober note that a hundred genera. 
tions or more of changing education would be required to nurture the 
emerging "new man". No single concrete curriculum scheme could give 
more than a faint intimation of what eventually was to come. But 
for utopian reformers there need be no sharp dichotomy between present 
and future and Wells# curriculum design for the schools of his own time 
reflected some of his larger culture ideales the quest for rationality 
through science; the oommunitarian ethos which he hoped group work and 
community service might achieve; the systematic discussion and study 
of social policy and reform; the creation of a new spiritual-moral 
order of inter-related ideals, reflected in the total unity of a common 
curriculum; and the blending of hand and mind work, in teohnology, work- 
shop, art and museum activities. 
Wells had no confidence in the capacity of the average teacher to 
design a curriculum of the Sanderson-Wells type. The answer to the 
question as to who should be responsible for designing the curriculum 
can be inferred from Wells' criticisms of the conventional apparatus of 
education. Responsibility for reform could not be vested in the existing 
education authorities, central or local, nor the bulk of the whole educa- 
tion profession, since these were the agencies responsible for the pre- 
sent system and all its faults. Wella could only point to isolated 
figures, like Sanderson, hopefully the pioneers of the futures from whom 
others may eventually learn. His answer, then, to the question of who 
designs the curriculum is that the elite of socially-conscious, future- 
minded reformers are the only ones fitted to design anything worthwhile. 
This answer reminds us of those social reformers in independent progres- 
sive schools who abandon the general education system in the hope that 
a few individual achievements of great merit will diffuse, by their own 
excellence, throughout the system. Admittedly, 
by proposing a very 
long transitional period, Wells had tried to safeguard himself against 
the criticism that this is a weak diffusion model for a national system. 
Its weakness lies not so much in the smallness of the elite, as 
in the 
difficulty independent progressive schools have in maintaining con- 
tinuity and of commanding adequate resources for major experimentation. 
Wells seemed unaware of these difficulties and showed a remarkable con- 
fidence in the willingness and capacity of a shadowy elite to transform 
the whole of education by the hortatory and exemplary methods of Sanderson. 
In his biography, he remarked on Sanderson's lack of success in convert- 
ing others to his views. If, indeed, the school curriculum has the 
potential significance for cultural renewal ascribed to it by the re- 
constructionists, then in a mass education system much more organized 
forms of innovation, diffusion and implementation than Sanderson-Wells 
charisma and propaganda are needed. 
2.3 The experimentalists 
2.3.1 A curriculum for the jublic school system 
It is not surprising that the problems of transforming a mass system 
of education should be best appreciated by the American experimentalists. 
The United States had already had some hundred years' experience of mass 
education and of the common public school when, in Enngland, serious ef- 
forts were first being made to abandon the parallel streams of elemen. 
tary and secondary education in favor of an end-on system. What the 
experimentalists took for granted - namely, the common public school - 
was by no means accepted as a desideratum of reform by English recon- 
structionists, even as late as the time of Mannheim and Clarke. 
Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter VI, the democratic tradition, 
its myths, ideals and institutions, had very powerfully taken hold in 
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the minds of the experimentalists. They professed very little interest 
in educational ideas or possibilities that were capable of realization 
only by minorities, whether these minorities were social classes, ability 
groups, or cultural elites. However, an we have seen, despite their 
professions of faith in the common man, many of the experimentalists 
set education tasks which would depend for their realization on minority 
initiative and leadership. This point aside, they perceived education 
as an ongoing process in a public school system stretching in a continuous 
ladder from elementary school to college and into adult education. There 
were of course recognized drop-out points, but these were a consequence, 
as far as the experimentalists were concerned, of remediable social and 
economic inadequacy on the part of individuals and communities. Ideally, 
all should, and eventually would, be educated through a common curriculum, 
and in common institutions, under surveillance until young adulthood. 
Only thus could all be said to have a necessary (if not sufficient) 
opportunity, to make the best of themselves and be provided with means 
for responsible democratic participation. 
Holding these beliefs firmly as tenets of the democratic faith, the 
experimentalists approached the question of curriculum design as a total 
system problem. None of the English reconstructionists ever saw it quite 
in this light, as none of them, including Clarke, conceived of the system 
as even potentially a homogenous whole. This is not surprising, as the 
strength of the Public School tradition in England, the persistence of 
separate, class-biased education in elementary and secondary schools, 
and the lack of a coherent structure of tertiary education, made total 
system thinking extremely artificial until very recently. The present 
controversy and uncertainty over the status and inter-relationships of 
the various elements in tertiary education suggest that the idea of the 
educational system as a totality of inter-related parts 
has still not 
taken hold. There are, of course, many educationists who have argued 
strenuously against the notion of a homogeneous totality. 
They have 
defended the continuance of different structures - for example, in 
secondary education - and different programmes of study - 
i. e., directed 
by the values of mass and minority culture (20). In the United States, 
by contrast, there is a close and widely acknowledged relationship be- 
tween total system thinking and the conception of democracy as class- 
less, equalitarian, and nation-binding. 
Thus, the general structure of the curriculum has been for long a 
primary practical consideration in the United States, in view of the 
continuing move towards a universal system from elementary school to 
college. Many of the points raised in post-war Britain about general 
education, specialization, vocational training, "relevance" in the 
curriculum of the young school leaver, and the preparation of specialist 
curriculum designers, were being actively debated by the experimentalists 
and other schools of thought in America in the early decades of this cen- 
tury (21). 
It is interesting to see how some of the proposals for designing 
the curriculum made at that time raise possibilities explored even ear- 
lier when the provision of mass elementary education was being discussed 
by nineteenth century European reformers. Pestalozzi made an extremely 
detailed analysis of the elements of understanding in the tool subjects 
of arithmetic and language (22). This work was important for him as a 
systematic articulation and further development of his pedagogical think- 
ing and for the practical demands made on him as a teacher of young children. 
But he felt the need to provide a rational basis, not just as a personal 
consideration, but because he foresaw the possibility of staffing mass 
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education systems in the first instance with lightly trained teachers. 
Provided these teachers had satisfactory moral characters, and a sym- 
pathetic intuitive understanding of children, he could guarantee to 
provide them with manuals of instruction based on the most meticulous 
analysis of the growth of sensory skills the so-called ABC of Anschauung 
(23). The quest for teaching schemes free of the dangers arising from 
the troublesome necessity to use frail humans to teach them has, as we 
might expect, an even greater ancestry. The production of guaranteed 
cures for illiteracy almost ranked with the better known arts of alchengy 
in the seventeenth century, when the more perspicacious curriculum de- 
signers were able to make a good living with the promise of one scheme 
0 
or another to the interested princes of Europe. Even Comenius felt 
obliged to ask one of the most celebrated of these hawkers, Ratich, to 
disclose for the public good the secret of his mystery (24). The 
perennial quality of this quest transcends the scepticism of the scien- 
tific era, and as recently as 1959 Bruner, one of the most distinguished 
of contemporary educational reformers, could write of the teacher as one 
of the aids to teaching, and of the necessity to design curriculum ma- 
terials of a power, elegance and structural sophistication sufficient to 
overcome the inadequacies of the average practitioner (25). 
The alternative solution, of training teachers as curriculum designers, 
or as participant members of curriculum design teams, has been lese pro- 
minently canvassed. This may mean no more than that the traditional 
craft of teaching has for a very long dime proceeded on the comfortable 
English assumption that the teacher designs, and designs adequately, his 
own curriculum or the parts of it for which he is directly responsible. 
Practice, therefore, might seem to have settled the issue. If this as- 
sumption were made, it would of course be very inadequate. It has rightly 
- 455 - 
been described as one of the myths of the English system 
(26). mazy 
factors limit the teacher's freedom to design as he might wish, and 
there is little ground for confidence that his training at present 
equips him to perform adequately even the more limited function of 
designing parts of a programme. The American answer to this problem 
has been not to rely on the teacher's craft, but to develop a new edu- 
cational speciality, that of curriculum designer or consultant, who 
is employed by the state and local boards to direot, facilitate, en- 
courage and engage in committee-based curriculum construction. This 
in effect is the Pestalozzian answer, of structuring the teaching pro- 
fession by clear role definitions which, at the lowest level, distin- 
guish the mass of practitioners from a much smaller sub-group of spe- 
cialist innovators or diffusers. 
2.3.2 Dewey and Kil! atricks problem-solvin, ýze occupations 
and scientifib culture 
The experimentalists quite clearly recognized that designing the 
curriculum for a universal system of public schooling raises the most 
difficult problems for democratic reformers. We do not find agree- 
ment amongst them as to the best ways of redesigning future curricula. 
Dewey led the criticism of existing practices by pointing to the unsatis- 
factory practical results of the methods of curriculum-making by local 
school boards, by state boards, by national committees and by individual 
teachers. None of these agencies had succeeded in removing long-stand- 
ing shortcomings. These included teachers neglecting such important 
forces in the shaping of American culture as industrialism, population 
mobility, and the transformation of an open-frontier rural community 
into an urban-industrial eoaiety. Just as they looked to a more dis- 
tant past to provide curriculum content, so did those responsible for 
curriculum-making organize teaching content through methods of adult, 
logical differentiation, a false psychology of stimulus-response, rote 
learning, textbook assignment, individual competitiveness, and a 
discipline of imposed authority (27)" A universal system had been 
created but the necessary differentiation needed to accommodate the 
enormous variety of individual experience and capacity and sub-cultural 
inequalities had not occurred. As we saw at the beginning of this chap- 
ter, this, too, is the problem to which Broudy and his associates re- 
turned, correctly judging that the theoretical solutions so far pro- 
posed were inadequate. Traditional methods and the philosophical, 
psychological and pedagogical assumptions underlying them were the 
object of sustained attacks by Dewey, who inaugurated perhaps the most 
comprehensive critical onslaught in the history of educational thought 
(28). But Dewey was a critic only in order to reconstruct. For the 
structure he demolished, he offered his own alternative. This alter- 
native reflects his confidenoe in the goodwill, common sense and poten- 
tiality for growth in skills and understanding of the average performers 
of any task. He did not look to an army of experts to do all that was 
necessary in the way of redesigning the content of education. In terms 
of curriculum designing, he proposed that teachers, working in teams in 
schools and in groups of schools, should engage in the business of curri- 
culum criticism and renewal. Dewey distinguished the right of the public, 
including parents, to enter into partnership with teachers in defining 
the broader social concepts and purposes of education, from the pro- 
fessional and expert role of the teacher as curriculum maker. This is a 
distinction which some of his later followers blurred, in the programmes 
of curriculum making by public participation - for example, the Illinois 
state curriculum programme (29). From the operational standpoint it 
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cannot be a sharp conceptual distinction because, according to opera- 
tionalism, the meaning and significance of ideas, including the con- 
cept of education, can only become clear, and therefore ideas can only 
be validated, in the course of the practical operations they specify. 
The public policy-makers could justly complain that they could not 
meaningfully discuss the general ends of policy unless they could 
see what these wider purposes might mean in teaching programmes. This 
may be so, but there are nevertheless various ways of acquiring more 
detailed understanding. While Dewey wished to separate the two pro- 
cesses for institutional purposes he had no desire to restrict the 
outcomes of discussion, inquiry and design to the particular group res- 
ponsible. 
Dewey's work as director of an experimental elementary school, the 
Laboratory School at the University of Chicago, from 1894 to 1904, when 
he was head of the departments of philosophy, psychology and education, 
reveals his own general style of curriculum making. Detailed descrip- 
tions of the work of teachers as curriculum designers are given in Mayhew 
and Edwards, The Dewey School, and in the nine issues of the Elementar= 
School Record which appeared under Dewey's editorship, in 1900. 
Later developments of the Deweyan idea of the teacher as curriculum 
designer cannot be adequately summarized, but two influential and more 
recent exponents of the idea that design involves pre-planning according 
to either some unifying theme (the "organizing centre") or defined ob- 
jectives are Herrick and Tyler. In their thinking we may detect methods 
of curriculum design which have evolved from Dewey's emphasis on studying 
the psychology of children's learning and his stage-by-stage model of 
problem solving, or reflective thinking. Dewey's more general commit- 
ment to the idea of curriculum planning which is both flexibly responsive 
to children's interests yet directed by clear intentions about learn- 
ing outcomes is reduced, by Tyler, to a sequential model in curriculum 
design. This model is divided into four major stagese 
"the educational objectives; 
"the learning experiences that enable pupils to attain these; 
"the organization of these learning experiences to facilitate 
consequential development and enlightenment and enlightening 
relationships with other concurrent experiences= 
"the means of appraising student learning" (30). 
This sohematization, for all its value as a more precise methodo- 
logical device than Dewey over produced, subtly diminishes the impor- 
tance and oversimplifies the social complexity of the initial situation 
of learning. Dewey's criticism of the traditional school was, as we 
have seem concentrated on its failure to adopt the Rousseau imperative 
to study the individual child and its neglect of what we might term the 
Marxist-Mannheim maxim of studying the social and cultural context of the 
child's thought and behavior. If we combine these two, and identify 
children and their teachers in the setting of particular schools, we 
have in outline the learning situation, a nexus of psychological, cul- 
tural, social and institutional forces. Dewey grasped the fundamental 
fact of planned change in education, that the starting point in any in- 
quiry or enterprise is not some set of objectives or ends in view, but 
an awareness of a problem or a difficulty, something which unsettles the 
pattern of habitual response. We must first elaborate this awareness 
into a concrete perception of the context of action, before we can define 
objectives. Dewey made several criticisms of the approach which is now 
known as management by objectives, arguing that we do not enter proble- 
matio situations with a clear goal but begin to think about objectives 
as we work towards a mode of resolving the problem before use Aims are 
- 459 - 
in, or arise out of, situations; they should not be imposed upon 
them (31). This concept of aims as immanent is traceable to the 
influence of Idealist philosophy on Dewey's thought. It implies that 
we do not become fully aware of all the objectives in enterprises 
(e. g., 
e. teaching sequence) until we have moved on to something elses the owl 
of Minerva takes flight when the shades of night have drawn. The 
situation is, initially, a problem situation; in education, the child 
is problematics we don't know in advance just what is best for him, 
and the task is to find out. This finding out is the unified pro- 
cess of designing the curriculum, teaching, and assessing one's teach- 
ing; that is, we don't and can't for educational purposes adequately 
understand the child outside the context of teaching, any more than we 
can decide what and how to teach him until we have begun to study and 
think about him as an individual. For this purpose, the data of psy- 
chology are a useful resource, but they require interpretation through 
the reflective analysis of specific practical problems. They cannot 
be direettl* translated into practical contexts but require the mediation 
of concrete, problem-directed thinking (32). 
The teacher is an agent of the child's growth; he discovers to 
himself and to the child what his educational needs are. To do this, 
he has to begin to make and to go on making in his teaching an imaginative 
construction out of the followings 
the impulses, interests and learning capacities of the indi- 
vidual child; 
the child's life history of experience - his cultural self; 
a generalized, scientific method of inquiry, the method of 
reflective thought; 
the traditions of inquiry and experience: - the subjects; 
the major issues, and problems of and challenges to, contemporary 
society; 
the democratic ethic, which provides a stable context. 
For each of these elements, there is a relevant if incomplete body 
of scientific data which the teacher is expected to mediate or inter- 
pret in his analysis of the situation. 
Dewey denied that fully prepared kits of materials, schemes of works 
syllabuses, textbooks and so forth, could ever adequately express this 
imaginative construction. The curriculum is an ongoing creation of 
forethought, shared teacher-pupil experience, plans of action, re- 
flection on achievements modification of tasks and of direction. it 
is a succession of unique situations, reflected upon, and reconstructed. 
To design a curriculum in this style, the teacher needed the opportunity, 
facilities and relevant knowledge and skill to decide for given groups 
of children what is most appropriate for them. Dewey took this idea 
from Rousseau, in whose Emile it is exhaustively documented, but he gave 
to it a wider references the sources of the curriculum are inevitably 
social, its major bearings are social, and it should be experienced in 
social groups, never in the isolation of Emile's upbringing (33)" 
The more genaral formal content of Dewey's curriculum design may 
be brought out by considering his remarks on the educational value of the 
major occupations of mankind, and his contribution to what became, in 
Kilpatrick's hands, the project method. Dewey's use of the occupations 
in the curriculum is a reminder of his claim that American culture has 
been most powerfully and profoundly modified by the impact of industriali- 
zation. To study the evolutionary history of human occupations is to 
study the history of at least the main features of this transformation 
as they have been experienced in everyday work life. While at the 
Laboratory School, when he did his most sustained thinking on curriculum 
matters, Dewey built a three-stage elementary curriculum using a 
project approach to* 
(1) a selection of the fundamental occupa- 
tions or socio-industrial arts of mankind - e. g., carpentry, cook- 
ing, textile-making; (2) the early history of man and the origins 
of society; (3) reflective inquiry into social forces and processes 
in history (34). He looked upon the arts or occupations as entire 
sub-cultures, or rounded forms of human experience, whose values, 
skills, interpersonal relationship patterns and ethos could be 
imaginatively recreated, talked about and assessed. Thus the re- 
creation of the sub-culture of the occupations much more closely re- 
sembles the imaginative emphasis to be found in idealist theories of 
history and in Mannheim's perspectivism than it does industrial or 
vocational training. Through the study of occupations, children's 
experience could be systematically connected with the history of their 
culture, with social change, and with the present occupational enter- 
prises of mankind. Dewey's aspirations in this respect were very simi- 
lar to those of the defenders of polytechnical education in the Soviet 
Union, and there is much in common in the ancestry of the polytechnical 
theory and Dewey's. 
Dewey did not restrict his efforts in developing appreciative under- 
standing of work culture to the elementary curriculum. He objected 
strenuously to those exponents of classical Greek culture who associated 
menial toil and illiberality of mind with manual work. He opposed all 
educational schemes which appeared to be restoring the aristocratic 
theory of liberal education. This theory equates true and worthwhile 
leisure with critical thought, contemplation and the study of classical 
works (scientific as well as humanistic), and thereby opposes those studies 
of an applicative kind which make no sharp distinction between work and 
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leisure, or vocational and general education (35). Dewey advocated 
a new humanism in place of classical learning: 
"The humanism of today can be expressed only in a 
vision of the social possibilities and the intelligence 
and learning embodied in the great modern enterprises of 
business, law, medicine, farming, engineering, eta. .. 
The emancipation of intellectual power which would result 
from an open and above board identification of motives for 
study with the main social interests of the day would se- 
cure an infinitely better preparation for a later unhurried 
enjoyment of leisure than results from an attempt to culti- 
vate secluded plots which few care to enter" (36). 
This sounds like a possibly hazardous intellectual programme, with 
its assimilation of study to social interest - whatever that interest 
happens to be. However, from his own work at the Laboratory School, 
it appears that Dewey in practice was highly selective about the "social 
interests of the day". He was still heavily under the influence of the 
Froebelian and Herbartian tradition and of the historical, developmental 
models then popular in psychology and sociology, so the curriculum se- 
quence he proposed was broadly chronological as it was intended to mirror 
and draw sustenance from the "stages" of the childts liter the so-called 
recapitulation theory. The earliest life of man yields materials for 
younger children to study, and so on through the social and industrial 
history of civilization. In their study of occupations, the younger 
children at the Laboratory School examined textiles, their history, the 
practical skills of dyeing, spinning, weaving, the science of textile 
production, and aesthetic, geographical and economic aspects of this 
and other crafts. According to Dewey's psychology of learning, children's 
activity isboth a quality of the organism, hence no stimulus is needed to 
make the child active, and it is indivisible - i. e., cognitive learning 
is affected by and affects the emotions, motor performances, etc. The 
children did not, then, merely observe, read, and write, as was the common 
practice even in those classrooms affected by reformed pedagogy; 
for example, the transformation of Pestalozzian thought into highly 
contrived "object lessons" in which teachers performed while children 
watched and answered questions. Opportunities were provided at the 
Laboratory School for experimentation, practical work in groups, out- 
of-school activities, and for imaginative work in the arts. Later in 
their schooling, children undertook more systematic work in the sym- 
bolic domains: soiences, mathematics, literature, history. 
Dewey never subsequently gave to secondary education the atten- 
tion he devoted to the elementary curriculum while at Chicago. His 
approach was more orthodox, and in the second part of Democracy and 
Education, where he discussed most fully the secondary curriculum, 
he did not attempt to dismantle and reconstruct the traditional subject 
domains into a unified core curriculum as did several of his followers. 
However, three points in his treatment stand out. All three features 
are reminders of the reeonstructionist quest for culture order, for a 
coherent structure of understandings and a unified method of thinking into 
which children should by degrees be initiated, thus coming to share the 
meanings of pre-existing cultures and, in the very process, learning the 
ways of renewing these cultures. 
The first of these three features of Dewey's thought on the secondary 
curriculum is his confidence that a single, generalized method, that of 
open, reflective inquiry, may suitably be employed in all subjects as a 
means of converting otherwise inert ideas, or adult structures, into a 
flow of ideas related to children's interests, questions and puzzlements. 
Dewey was careful to point out that method is not strictly separable from 
subject matter, but he nevertheless believed that there is a "method of 
knowing"which is relevant to all subjects, and this is the method of 
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reflective inquiry. For Dewey and all the experimentalists, this 
generalized method was both scientific and democratic in character. 
Childs summarized the connection, in arguing for the consistency 
between teaching children how to think for themselves and the values 
of science and democracy. Teaching children how to think iss 
"wholly compatible with the deliberate effort to culti- 
vate in them the habitat the attitudes, the techniques, 
the knowledge, and the perspectives that are the cor- 
relative of the scientific way of thinking and of the 
democratic way of living" (37). 
The second feature of Dewey's analysis of the secondary school 
curriculum is his search for some dominant, typical social purpose or 
theme about which subject teaching could be organized. This approach 
was neither dependent upon nor was it intended to disclose the logical 
structure of the disciplines of knowledge. On the contrary, as with 
polytechnical education, a unified structure of social purposes or themes 
was expected to emerge, by degrees, from the teachers' search within their 
separate disciplines for common themes and modes of inquiry. Thus, the 
problem of curriculum sequence is to be resolved through a scheme which 
progressively yields understandings of social processes and, at the 
highest level, of the symbolic systems of thought and experience. 
The third general point about Dewey's scheme for secondary education 
is his relative neglect of mathematics and langguages, in favor of the 
sciences, history and geography, the social sciences and vocational 
education. This does not imply a lack of awareness of the theoretical 
significance of the symbolic systems of mathematics, language and humani- 
ties. But there can be no doubt that, pedagogically, Dewey had re- 
latively little interest in the logical and symbolic structure of 
separate subjects. He wished to direct pedagogical thinking towards 
the world of social action, for which, leaving aside the humanities, 
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neither mathematics nör foreign languages seemed to have much direct 
relevance. Even in these limited terms, however, Dewey's assump- 
tions were mistaken, since mathematical thinking underlies many of 
the most rapidly developing branches of modern technology and indus- 
trial practice. Of course, from this fact it does not follow that 
theoretical sciences and mathematics should feature prominently in 
common core curriculum. It is conceivable that the mathematics of 
ordinary life could be taught relatively quickly, in practical situa- 
tions without occupying a lot of curriculum time. This would not, 
however, be true of the development in pupils of mathematical think- 
ing and understanding, which call for more sustained study. Since 
Dewey wished to create a mature democracy of active participants, 
based on the widespread understanding of the major social and indus- 
trial processes, his tre.: tment of theoretical sciences and mathematics 
was quite inadequate. The critical problem for the reconstructionists 
in defining the general content of science and mathematics is no longer 
that of indicating a content of applied arithmetic and geometry; it is 
instead the much more difficult problem of universalizing awareness and 
understanding of those mathematical processes at work in industrial 
civilization. Neither the older utilitarian approach nor the more 
recent attempt to spell out key mathematical concepts free of any cul- 
tural associations provides an answer to this problem. Those who sup- 
port the latter approach on the grounds that children will generalize 
their mathematical thinking have an unsubstantiated confidence in 
children's skills of transfer, interpretation and application. 
Despite Dewey's ingenious attempt to create, through the school 
curriculum, a historically-conditioned understanding of key forces or 
motifs in social life, his own analysis of culture, and hence his 
- 466 - 
currioulum prescriptions, are fundamentally defective. This is not, 
as is sometimes alleged, because he provided no scope for individua- 
lity. His account of the interaction of the self with society makes 
it clear that no theory of individual experience is adequate which 
fails to recognize the social dimension of self; furthermore, the inter- 
aotive-theory does not deny impulse, private experience and contempla- 
tion, three considerations critics have raised. The problem is, 
rather, that the Dewey diagnosis does not in fact get at some of 
the factors and forces in culture which precipitate fundamental 
change, and as a consequence his curriculum proposals minimize the 
importance of large areas of symbolic thought. In Chapter VI, I 
pointed to a difference of emphasis between Dewey and other experi- 
mentalists, such that Dewey gave prominence to shifts in scientific 
thought underlying social change, whereas Rugg, for example, neglected 
these and concentrated on technology. Despite the difference of em- 
phasis, Dewey tended, in Democracy and Education, and in other of his 
educational writings, to assimilate changes in the particular sciences 
to a single model of "science". It would be quite possible to make a 
social-historical study of sciences in this sense without acquiring an 
understanding of the experimental procedures for testing hypotheses in 
the particular sciences. These are distinct and different intellectual 
processes and, while Dewey gave due attention to the former, he neglected 
the latter, thus giving to his curriculum proposals a character which must 
appear in some respects hostile to science, a paradoxical outcome for one 
so ardent in defence of scientific method. 
We turn from Dewey's view on occupations and social problem-solving 
to the project method and reflective inquiry. The project approach, 
which Kilpatrick popularized in The Project Method and Foundations of 
Method, has been widely misunderstood and so debased as to refer to 
the most trivial exercises in producing scrap books of miscellaneous 
magazine out-outs. The reduction of projects to miscellanies of 
information on broad topics is not at all what Dewey intended; he 
used the idea of the project as a way of organizing the elementary 
school study of occupations, and as a means of vitalizing study of con- 
ventional subjects in secondary schools, The project is initiated by 
some point of interest, whether an expressed individual child interest, 
or something of more general concern which provokes comment and questioning 
and may be used as a starting point for organized inquiry. A skilful 
teacher could thereby considt-? rably reduce instructional approaches to 
subjects while still retaining the virtues of disciplined inquiry, se- 
quential study, and conceptual understanding which characterize sound 
teaching of the subjects as separate disciplines. Unfortunately, the 
antithesis between subjeot-centred and project teaching, while not an 
explicit part of Dewey's thinking, was given great impetus by Kilpatrick, 
who persistently challenged and discounted the educative value of dis- 
ciplined knowledge. 
The germs of this antithesis are to be found in Dewey's confidence 
that he had discovered, in the method of reflective inquiry, a concept 
far more important than the distinctive logical structures of individual 
subjects. 'What mattered, in his view, was that the child's impulsive 
life might be directed by the teacher finding interests upon which the 
child could be encouraged to reflect. It was of less consequence 
whether the pupil acquired specialist expertise in one field or another 
than that these reflections led him into a consideration of social issues. 
Society has need of specialized skills and knowledge, and it must 
make provision for them in higher education, but this$ for Dewey and 
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Kilpatrick, was no reason for making the school curriculum a narrow 
funnels 
"The scheme of a curriculum must take account of the 
adaptation of studies to the needs of the existing coanru- 
nity life; it must select with the intention of improving 
the life we live in common so that the future shall be 
better than the past. ldoreover, the curriculum must be 
planned with reference to placing e. -sentials first, and 
refinements second. The things which are socially most 
fundamental, that is, which have to do with the experiences 
in which the widest groups share, are the esnentials. The 
thin]-, s which repr,, sent the needs of specialized groups and 
technical pursuits are secondary" (38). 
For Dewey, content is educationally meaningful, and becomes an 
"object of study" as it is brought into a perceived relationship with 
"a course of events in which one is engaged and by whose outcome one 
is affected". Furthermore, he wished so to direct this "course of 
events" as to produce two outcomes: increased awareness of and par- 
ticipation in social activities; and increased reflectiveness (39). 
'thus we may see how he treated logically organized subject matter as 
an educational resource - akin to the findings of psychology and socio- 
logy in this respect, to be drawn upon and interpreted by the teacher in 
mapping out activities - but not to be taught as such, except at the 
levels of specialization and technical training. Kilpatrick formu- 
lated this approach as the project method, but it was Dewey who pro- 
vided the fundamental theory. 
As we have seen, Dewey thought it possible and useful to give a 
liberal quality to vocational training by drawing out its social bear- 
ings, and exploring its relationships with other forms of human enter- 
prise. Although he favored a common curriculum in elementary and 
lower secondary education, he was not an advocate of an indefinitely 
extended general, non-vocational prob-ramme. What he proposed was 
that vocationalism should be incorporated, by degrees, into a curriculum 
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directed at exploration of the sooial world, and that all inquiries 
should be structured by the procedures of reflective thought. The 
project method was a particular expression of Dewey's more general 
theory of inquiry. Aooording to this theory, thinking may be ana- 
lysed into five steps or stages, which link the "pre-refleotive" 
doubt situation with that of "post-reflective" satisfaction. The 
stages are= 
suggestion; 
problem; 
hypothesis; 
reasoning; 
testing (40)" 
By building this model of thought into the curriculum as the normal 
pattern for structuring inquiry, Dewey hoped to achieve not just a 
revitalized subject-matter learning, but the emergence of a new type 
of thinking being: the critical, experimentally-minded thinker, alert 
to practical and theoretical problems in his environment. Hie argu- 
ment for this model is that man commonly responds to the shifting pat- 
tern of his environment either habitually, or, where the shifts disrupt 
habit sequence, by a more conscious, directed response. Both indi- 
viduals and societies may respond by retreating into more primitive, 
or defensive or irrelevant patterns of behaviors or they may embark 
upon the more risky but also potentially more rewarding business of 
reflective inquiry: Biskyt because reflection involves the insecurity 
which arises from discarding or modifying existing beliefs, assumptions, 
institutions, and modes of action which under scrutiny are found to be 
inadequate for one reason or another, Rewarding, because through re- 
flective inquiry it is possible to reconstruct problematic situations 
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and ideas into something more closely corresponding with expectations, 
values and ideals. 
In reflection, the individual or group becomes aware, or is brought 
to awareness, of a problem. The source of disturbance or disruption 
is identified and compared with previous similar problems and other 
relevant experiences. Next comes an imaginative leap into the un- 
known, the formulation of an idea, an action programme, that could bring 
about a solution to the problem as it has been identified and contextually 
located. This leap is then formalized into a hypothesis; deducations 
are made, and projections and predictions carry the mind forward to the 
likely consequences of one course of action or another. In this pro- 
jective stage, the hypothesis may be re-formulated, before action is 
taken to toot it critically. The problem may be resolved in this 
phase of concrete action; or it may persist, and the whole reflective 
cycle be re-enacted. 
Thus reflective thinking, while it involves conceptualizing, con- 
templation, and imaginative speculations, is primarily a change process, 
a means of transforming an indeterminate, troublesome situation into a 
determinate, satisfying situation. luny forms of action are included, 
apart from abstract thoughts materials may be handled, improvised, made; 
there may be discussions, observations to make, data to collect, and so 
forth. If the development of thinking, as Dewey analysed it, were to be 
made the basic objective and methodology of all education, then education 
would itself become a change process. Children would be brought up, 
not as spectators, witnesses, and institution-fodder, but as self and 
social change agents. Thus, in the theory of reflective thou;; ht, Dewey 
espoused the basic tenet of reconstructionism in the sphere of educational 
method. A successful education, according to this theory, is one which 
effectively builds rationality into the habits and dispositions, not 
just of a minority, but of a whole society. 
Kilpatrick's popularization of Dewey's stages of reflective 
thought, in his book, The Project Method, made no material addition 
to the methodolopr, but showed how different types of projects might 
embody the steps of the reflective act. However, Kilpatrick's skill 
in popularizing Dewey led him into eloganizing. When, in The Founda- 
tionsof Method, he attempted to combine Dewey's thought with Thorndike's 
"laws of learning", with which Dewey's more purposive psychology ill 
accords, there emerged a frail doctrine which lent itself to very 
crude applications. In The Foundations of Method, Kilpatrick dis- 
tinguished narrow from broad methods the former is primarily a matter 
of empirical psychological inquiry into effective means, while the lat- 
ter is a fusion of empirical, conceptual and moral elements, a prescrip- 
tive procedure. Into this prescription Kilpatrick poured Thorndike's 
stimulus-response psychology (laws of readiness, exercise and effect); 
the idea of "wholehearted purposeful activity"; the idea that in schools 
important concomitant or unanticipated learning occurs in subject teaoh- 
ing, especially the formation of attitudes; the notion of S-IR bonds ag- 
gregating into "centres of interest"; the value of shared experience in 
groups; and the complete act of thought (Dewey's reflective inquiry). 
From these ingredients, Kilpatrick built a composite, broad method - 
the project, and reduced curriculum design to the devising of a series 
of projects built on interests and vaguely related to social affairs. 
Kilpatrick's definition of the project unifies these ingredientas 
"As the desired unification lay specifically in the 
field of methods might not some typical unit of concrete 
procedure supply the need - some unit of conduct t: -, at should 
be, as it were, a sample of life, a fair sample of the worthy 
life and consequently of education? 
't... the unifying idea I Bought was to be found in the 
conception of wholehearted purposeful activity proceeding in 
a social environment, or more briefly, in the unit olement 
of such activity, the hearty purposeful act. 
"It is to this purposeful act with the emphasis on the 
word purpose that I myself apply the term 'project"' (41). 
The main business of curriculum making, he said, was (1) to know what 
interests the child has and (2) to know how these interests may be stimu- 
lated, guided and directed to bring growth (42). He sua3ested four 
major types of project for this purposes 
producer project (where the purpose is to make something); 
consumer project (where the purpose is aesthetic enjoyment); 
problem project (to clear up some intellectual difficulty); 
drill, or specific learning project. 
Under the teacher's guidance, children in groups or as individuals develop 
projects from their own interests, and education becomes "exactly a suc- 
ceusion of interest, new practice, new interest, still further practice, 
still now interest" (43). The formal division of ubjects, too remote 
from "life", was abandoned in favor of intervat-based projects. 
As we saw in Chapter VI, Kilpatrick in the 1930s became very conscious 
of the difficulties of a society which relies on an automatic economic 
regulator and on an undirected assimilation of new to old ideas and 
institutions. He proposed a role for education which demands exercise 
of the highest qualities of intellect. Education was to function as 
"the stratob4io support and maker of a better civilization" (44). Yet 
his thinking in TheProieot Method and The Foundation of Method was in- 
nocent of all concern for the possible intellectual shortcomings of the 
interest doctrine. While undoubtedly a valuable critical argument, when 
directed against schooling which ignores or suppresses children's in- 
terests, purposes and problems of understanding, his doctrine was 
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scarcely adequate as the basin of curriculum and method 
for universal 
education. Nothing in the project method as Kilpatrick 
developed 
it specifically directed the attention of teachers to higher order 
cognitive processes 
(45). By equating education with "life", 
Kilpatrick renindcd teachers of the inadequacy of the traditional 
curriculum for the education of many children, and this was salutary. 
However, he did not appreciate that, in order to make the curriculum 
realistic and challeneing for children of all levels of ability, at- 
tainment and background, it is neither necessary nor desirable to 
equate it with "worthy life". Kilpatrick recognized that choices 
must be made, although he was, it seems, less sensitive to this issue 
than were Bode and Childs, but he did not face the implication, that 
much that is ", worthy" in life may have to be provided for outside 
schools, which have limited resources. The expansionist ideal thus 
overlooks the basic problem of priorities in educational decision- 
taking, a problem that perhaps may be overlooked in making criticisms 
of existing practice, but not in recommending alternatives. 
Dewey's model of reflective thinking did not guarantee or even 
encourage acts of intellectual supererogation, which it has been one of the 
virtues of the classical curriculum to encourage and reward. The simplest 
and most comfortable in:: thod of solving a problem can well bring satis- 
faction, where teachers make no attempt to draw attention to the idea of 
standards or levels of performance. Indeed, the concepts of a standard 
bf performance and of raising expectations form no part of the reflective 
process. Similarly, to abandon subject teaching, as Kilpatrick proposed 
in the project method, is to deny oneself access to one of the main 
sources of criteria of performance - e. g., elegant proofs, inferential 
reasoning, structursd associations of ideas, the marshalling of evidence, 
and clarity of exposition. By its deliberate emphasis on interest 
as a starting point, on pupil initiative, on cross-disciplinary in- 
quiries and on group participation, the project method subtly die- 
couraged teachers from taking up these more challenging tasks of 
searching for and redefining standards. The Dewey-Kilpatrick 
arguments for the central importance, in education, of developing 
problem-solving procedures are sound, insofar as methods of thinking 
are needed that are flexible and widely adaptive in rapidly changing 
social conditions. However, necessary as these methods are, they 
are not sufficient, and the weakness of the curriculum thinking of 
Dewey and Kilpatrick is essentially their failure to consider the 
full-ran. e of cognitive, as well as the non-cognitive, processes 
which should be provided for and actively promoted in schooling. 
A further point to note is that those who defended the teaching 
of organized bodies of subject matter, by methods which included the dis- 
covery of the pupil's interests, his motivations, his learning difficul- 
ties, and his aspirations, might well point to Dewey's and Kilpatrick's 
advocacy of a more drastic reform as evidence of misplaced confidence 
in the willingness and capacity of the teacher to make the very strenuous 
efforts required to achieve high performance standards of project work. 
It was partly because of the extraordinary triviality and superficiality 
achieved by many teachers in the life adjustment era that the reaction 
favoring predefined, "teacher-proof" materials set in. I shall return 
to this point in Chapter XIV, in discussing the preparation of teachers. 
The last point I wish to make about Dewey's curriculum design is 
the very considerable emphasis he gave to science. What emerges from 
his treatment is not so much the separate teaching of physics.., biological, 
and social sciences as Dewey's wish to communicate the values and basic 
strategies of a scientific culture. The new culture towards whose 
realization he sought to direct the school's efforts was to be a 
culture marked by open-mindedness, love of truth, co-operation, 
respect for skill, orderliness, confidence in rationality, the 
quest for knowledge and understanding, and so forth. These he found 
to be the qualities of scientific culture; not any particular scien* 
tific culture we have known, but an idealized coalescence of qualities 
thrown up and exemplified by the scientific thinkers of the last three 
centuries. Thus to characterize his general curriculum design by the 
term scientific is to refer to its mode of construction (experimental), 
to subjects or theories taught, and to an atmosphere or ethos which Dewey 
wished might pervade the total school enterprise. We must be careful 
here to distinguish between that ethos and the study of particular 
bodies of subject matter. While, obviously, the sciences well taught 
will communicate it, badly tauj; ht they will not. No less important, 
any subject matter at all is susceptible to the treatment Dewey desig- 
nates scientific. It is somewhat misleading to use the term scientific 
so lavishly, and some confusion has arisen thereby. Dewey has been cri- 
ticized for his neglect of the arts, and the humanities; for turning all 
that is private, idiosyncratic, perverse, personal and unique in experience 
into the langua6e and thought of the public domains. Undoubtedly, Dewey 
gave more attention to the limitations of private experience than to 
its values. The function of science in the curriculum was to be the 
same as that which it has performed for humanity at large: 
"emancipation from local and temporary incidents of experience, 
and the opening of intellectual vistas unobacured by the ac- 
cidents of personal habits and predilections" (46). 
This is disconcerting to those who, so far from seeking this form 
of emancipation, seek deliverance from the massification of culture into 
large public categories of belief, expectation and value. Dewey gave 
relatively little attention to this issue despite his interest in art 
as a means of personal understanding and awareness, as well as in its 
communal, sharing aspects. His theory of experience, as we have seen, 
does treat "secondary" apprehension of the public, cognitive domains 
as instrumental to a purely private realm of feeling-states, from which 
no emancip-tion can be satisfactory because it is only in "primsry" 
experiences that there is any satisfaction at all. Nevertheless, 
there is very little in Dewey's ideas on curriculum design to suggest 
that there are valuable tensions between the public and private domains 
of experience. 
CHAPTER XII 
CURRICULUM DESIGN II: RUGG, MANIJfiF: Ihl, BRPJ LD AND 
LATER EXPERIMENTALISTS 
Dewey was the most original and systematic thinker of all the 
experimentalists, yet there are strands in the emerging experimenta- 
list curriculum which he hardly touched upon. Apart from Dewey, 
the most fertile curriculum theorist amongst the experimentalists 
was Rugg, who was one of the leaders in the American curriculum 
reform movement from the 1920s until the 1950o. In Rugg's prophetic 
delineation of the emerging "great technology", the content of school 
and adult education, and hence the curriculum designers, are invested 
with major responsibility for effecting change. 
1. Ruggi Curriculum as Cultural Synthesis 
The curriculum, according to Rugg, is not so much a content outline 
as a form of anticipatory experience; to live through the activities 
it prescribes and to experience its total ethos is both to apprehend 
the possibilities of a reformed society and to learn how to precipi- 
tate those possibilities out of the flux of a turbulent present. This 
makes the designer of the curriculum, at the most exalted level, the de- 
signer of the futures on a somewhat lower plane he is the designer of 
a possible future to which children will be encouraged to aspire. The 
life-making functions of the curriculum are outlined in a list of impera- 
tives for educatores 
"Education should% 
1. Make people aware of the general interest and 
develop a strong desire to promote it, regard- 
less of the special interests that may have to 
be sacrificed for it. 
2. Develop a strong faith in democratic institutions 
and a realistic understanding of how they operate 
through political pressure groups, as well as an 
understanding of the machinery of democratio go- 
vernment. 
3" 
4" 
5" 
Convince people of the essential need of consensus 
in democracy, arrived at through a free discussion. 
Develop a healthy sentiment in favour of national 
and community order and unity. 
Promote the assimilation of minority groups and a 
belief in justice to minorities, 
6. Train people actively in the actual day-to-day 
practices of citizenship. 
7" Foster a vigorous and abiding interest in the dis- 
cussion of public affairs. 
8. Develop a sense of the general interest among the 
members of groups that are strongly organized to 
promote their special interests (e. g., business men, 
farmers, organized Workers, and their children). 
9. Train and select democratic leaders. Education for 
leadership generally. 
10. Train for educational followership. Develop a 
sense of the degree to which followership is or 
is not democratic. 
11. Train for the vocations of politics and the civil 
service. Encourage the entry of people of high 
calibre into these fields" (1). 
In his more prophetic, historicist passages, Rugg saw the reformed 
curriculum as an actual foretaste of the future (2). His basic argu- 
ment for attempting to plan the future in this way, like those of Wells 
and Mannheim, was that we either plan rationally or experience total 
collapse. Since no one can envisage total collapse with equanimity, 
we are left with the need to embark on large scale, rational planning. 
These three reconstruotionists were not, on the whole, fond of more 
limited measures, like the improvement of particular items in existing 
educational arrangements. 
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To apprehend the structure of a rationally planned culture, we 
are enjoined to take the school curriculum and make it into a total 
culture model in miniature, a pattern of "expressive living", fusing 
"mental and emotional" life and creating new "cultural groups" (3). 
To ensure that those best fitted to plan the future - the creative 
cultural leaders - have the necessary impact, they are to be brought 
into curriculum design teams. These are not primarily the politicians, 
applied economists and administrators - although there will be a sprinkl- 
ing of them - they are literary intellectuals, artists, jurists, community 
leaders, scientists, philosophers, and so forth - the makers of the emerg- 
ing American mind, the creative minority who alone are capable of grasp- 
ing the extent and complexity of the task (4). Admittedly, this is an 
extrapolation and an interpretation of Rugg's more prophetic passages, 
rather than a summary of his total position. But it hardly distorts 
the importance he attached to the curriculum as a design of the future 
and the desirability of securing the engagement of the most creative 
thinkers and practitioners in society. He very frequently referred 
to a reconstruotionist curriculum as a possible model of the future, and, 
however exaggerated this may seem, it is a quite consistent development 
of the reconatruotionist claims that education should become more "life- 
like" and that through education culture can remake itself. 
Rugg took Dewey's and Kilpatrick's arguments a long step further, 
both in envisaging curriculum making as a fabrication of possible future 
cultural states, and in adopting and expanding their reflective and pro- 
jeot methods through the addition of "the artist's way of knowing". 
But he seems not to have realized that, in taking this further step, 
he would be contradioting, or at least severely qualifying, two other 
planks of his platform. These are, first, the critical, problem-solving 
method of inquiry, and, second, the principle of consensus, or policy- 
making by general discueaion and agreement. Leaving aside 
Dewey's 
objections to the pre-planning of detailed programmes by the 
"objec- 
tives" method, it is difficult to see how Rugg can reconcile the holis- 
tic commitment required in order to make a detailed total design, with 
his commitment to the critical, problem-solving method of inquiry. 
This method addresses itself to specific problems and takes the form 
of a continuous modification of practice. Rugg's own design could 
not, consistently with this view of the method of change, be offered 
as a blueprint, but as material for critical analysis and, perhaps, 
inspiration. His justification of holistic curriculum reform is 
in this respect quite revealing. In Culture and Education in America, 
he condemned the schools for always acting, primarily as the "great 
conservative agency ... the halo of the past has orientated those who 
have made the content of our school curriculum" (5). Much later, in 
Foundations for American Education, he wrote that the schools, lacking 
a basic and consistent creed, preached democracy and practised authori- 
tarianism. 
In Culture and Education in America, Rugg postulated two tasks 
for the school which were required if it were to perform its "true 
function": the encouragement of child growth, and the remaking of 
culture. The school, he asserted, "must assume prophetic leadership" 
via its curriculum design, to capture the youth, who will be the leaders 
of the movement to create a now synthetic culture in America. 'Why 
the school? Because "it is the only organized agency at all competent 
to cope with the problem of developing in our youth an understanding 
of this complicated order" (6). But the school programme as it exists 
is incapable of achieving the level of understanding, just because its 
teaohers are inadequate. He asked rhetoricallys 
"Lacking a half-a-million artist teachers, are we 
not forced to put into our schools a dynamic curricu- 
lum" (7) - 
There were plenty of sceptics who, disregarding this kind of appeal, 
looked elsewhere than the schools for materials with which to build the 
new order, or merely to prop up the existing one. Rugg developed two 
approaches to the problems of enlisting indifferent or, in his terms, 
incompetent teachers to the support of processes of culture renewal. 
The first of these approaches was methodologicali an appeal to like- 
minded culture analysts and synthesists to join in a colossal planning 
enterprise, or, rather, a vast network of nationwide planning enter- 
prises, of which curriculum planning would be of necessity an integral 
part. The weakness of this proposal, in terms of his own theory, is 
that, given the size and diffuseness of such a procedure, there could 
be no guarantee that it would result in educative solutions or, indeed, 
in the identification of the school as a key agency of renewal. Advo- 
cates of consensus cannot have it both ways: prescribing substantive 
programmes, and invoking the principle of policy-making by universal 
agreement. Rugg's second proposal was that creative leaders should 
draw an outline of the contours and major features of the new cultural 
synthesis; he showed the way by drawing up his own outlines. This 
proposal, by giving the school Curriculum a centrally recreative role, 
meets the objection I raised to his first proposal but encounters two 
further difficulties, first, the reconciliation of predefined models 
with consensus methods and, second, the artificiality and incomplete- 
ness of any conceivable model of the future. If we eliminate the more 
grandiose and prophetic elements in Rugg's theory, which would be no 
great loss, what remains is simply his personal sketch of a possible 
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design for an integrated, culture-orientated curriculum. This 
sketch has considerable value, giving as it does an indication of 
the re-orientation which curriculum thinking is required to undergo 
if the reconstructionist theory is to have any practical impact. 
This is rather less than Rugg appears to have thought he had 
achieved. However, as a total curriculum design it has some fea- 
tures which are unique in reconstructionist writings, and form a de- 
finite contribution to the development of the theory. These features 
tend to counterbalance the very heavy emphasis given by most reoon- 
structionists to self-conscious, rational modes of experience. The 
first of these features is the point noted above= Rugg's call for 
multi-dieci. plinary teams of curriculum makers, including artists, 
research workers and others, to replace the existing power blocs: 
the administrators, the highly conservative college entrance boards, 
and the textbook publishers. In the 1926 Yearbook of the National 
Society for the Study of Education, Rugg deplored the curriculum con- 
sequences of their dominating influences an atomistie, fact-dominated, 
mental-disciplinary, standardized programme had been the result. Such 
reform as had occurred was a piecemeal tinkering under the dominance 
of subject specialists who lacked a wider Cultural vision (8). The 
idea of the creatively-minded team he proposed to take responsibility 
for national curriculum making was, as we have seen, an essential part 
of his culture theory. The Woods Hole conference in the United States 
in 1959, which crystallized a highly significant movement to involve 
scholars and research workers from many disciplines in curriculum mak- 
ing, illustrates this idea (9). 
Rugg's second main oontribution points to another essential element 
in his culture design. The new curriculum should be no less emphatic in 
its emphasis on the arts and humanistic study than on technical, 
scientific and utilitarian studies. Its ethos should intermingle 
aesthetic with scientific values, and the experiences it predicated 
in schools would be those of the art and design studios no less than 
the laboratories and workshops. This aspiration, which marks a 
conspicuous advance over all previous reconstructionist thinking, 
was not, however, very well realized in his own massive series of 
social studies texts. These texts, despite Rugg's glair that they 
were uniquely based on substantial research, are highly descriptive 
and verbal, largely relying in conventional textbook style on infor- 
mative text and questions. The texts were, nevertheless, regarded 
as a landmark, by friends and foes alike (10). 
Of all the reconstructionists, only Rugg took seriously the our- 
rioulum issues arising from the attempt to incorporate into a pro- 
dominantly technical and scientific culture the values and experiences 
of the aesthetic domain. Imaginativeness, critical insights and the 
quest for new paradigms for ordering experience, were qualities he as- 
sociated with the artist. These, he said, were the qualities needed 
to provide experimentalism with a dynamic (11). Unfortunately Rugg, 
in his curriculum proposals, did not distinguish the particularity of 
the artist's creativeness and his distinctive way of knowing (12). Thus, 
when he outlined a structured, sequential, inter-related core curriculum, 
such was the hold Dewey had on reoonstruotioniat thinking that the dominat- 
ing motif was provided by Dewey's problem-solving methods employed on pre- 
dominantly social studies materials. Rugg's own set of social studies 
texts and his interpretative studies of American culture emphasized the 
familiar experimentalist themes, although he did argue for a threefold 
classification of activity methods into problem-solving, creative, and 
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appreciative, with more attention being given than in Dewey's 
thought 
to the latter two. 
In his later works, Foundations for American Education and Social 
Foundations of Education, Rugg made more ambitious proposals for a 
unified core which should do justice to different forms of experience 
and knowledge, arguing 
(inoons is tent ly as it may seem with his view 
of the educator as the primary innovator) than 
"educators are especially called upon to integrate man's 
knowledge of his world, for their primary function is to 
teach others what the scholars have learned" (13). 
Rugg's core programme in these later books had grown into a conceptual 
map of modern biopsyohology, sooiologyº, aesthetics and industrial-demo- 
oratic ethics. Not surprisingly, his views on the arts were an eclectic 
distillation of ideas from Whitman, James and Peirce, Dewey, Icadora 
Duncan$ Sullivan and others who had from their different standpoints 
contributed, in RugS's judgment, to an emerging, American expressionist 
movement. Rugg himself took the next step, of converting this move- 
ment into a "consensus". This synthetic achievement may be regarded 
as an illustration of perspeotivisms the creation of a new unity through 
the labors of scholarly interpretation (14). 
Rugg made his last attempt to construe the curriculum significance 
of the evolution of American culture in the volume he wrote with Withers, 
Social Foundations of Education, where, after a prolonged discussion of 
key concepts, he outlined a high school core curriculum comprisings 
American and world civilization both contemporary and historical; 
scientific study of personality and behavior; creative and appreciative 
arts; physical education; and general mathematics. All of the major 
symbolic systems were to be deployed in vide-ranging inquiries within 
and across these subject fields (15). 
Unlike most reconstructionist curriculum models, Rugg's included 
the arts and gave them a prominent place. But the inclusiveness of 
the scheme discloses yet again the tendency of the more holistic re- 
constructionists to produce schemes which exuberantly and indefinitely 
ramify backwards through history and outwards through the major domains 
of human experience. Flinging outline schemes of key concepts across 
these constantly expanding territories provides no solution to the prob- 
lem of producing workable teaching schemes. This is because of the es- 
sential vagueness and descriptiveness of the all-inclusive and synthetic 
forme of thinking which these schemes are intended to encourage. we 
are never shown how such grandiose structures, the product of Rugg's 
fertile, eclectic and esemplastic imagination, might be related to 
existing and more mundane forms of thought. This is a variant of 
the problem of the new man in utopias it is not too difficult to specify 
that he shall think synthetically and take a comprehensive view of all 
situations; what is difficult is to trace the logical and psychological 
connections between these thought processes and the ones we are familiar 
with in our present experience. This difficulty is, in the logical and 
psychological spheres, analogous to the problem of transforming existing 
institutions, customs and traditions into those which by definition are 
more attractive and yet are rooted in another and unfamiliar dimension. 
Rugg's ideas could have been made more intelligible and practical 
had he reduced them to an outline sketch of the whole curriculum. He 
might have shown how, for example, historical and scientific thinking 
could be brought to bear on various intellectual and practical problems 
to which they have a common relevance while yet retaining their recog- 
nizable conceptual distinctiveness. This is one of the unexplored poe- 
sibilities in Dewey's problem-solving method, and in his thematic approach 
to the secondary curriculum. Since it would not, however, point to 
any particular reorganization of knowledge or necessarily anticipate 
any future culture "wholes"9 its very modesty makes it unacceptable 
to the more flamboyant reoonstruotionists. 
2. MannheiMt Core, Practical Studies, and Pereneotivism 
Mannheim criticized the traditional curriculum as scholastic, 
bookish, formalistic and ossified, and he condemned conventional 
methods of teaching as intellectually deadening. They displayed 
a "restrictive aspect of learning" which should give way to a new 
approach. The new approach was needed both for mass and elite educa- 
tion if schools were to perform the various tasks of individual and 
social reconstruction that Mannheim assigned to them. The new ap- 
proach was to be characterized by, inventiveness, trial and error 
processes, problem-solving, and a workshop and co=unitarian atmos- 
phere. Further, Mannheim proposed a programme built around (a) 
practical pursuits, such as family living, rearing children, transacting 
business, spending leisure, etc., (b) a core of political, social and 
economic studies of change in contemporary civilization, particularly 
the goals, processes and problems of the democracies, and, (o) more 
orthodox bodies of subject matter, including the disciplines of know- 
ledge (16). 
Mannheim nowhere gave a systematic account of the structure of the 
curriculum. It is uncertain just how far he would advocate a Wells- or 
Rugg-type single unifying core of social science knowledge and under- 
standing, which all children should study in order to become culturally 
aware and available for socio-political participation. It could be in- 
ferred from his concern to achieve a new cultural unity, enriched by 
spiritual values, that there would be a common core for all. But 
Mannheim also advocated separate specialist training for elites, and 
the continuance in modified form of traditional selection and training 
procedures. The common core would of necessity comprise only part 
of the education of future elite members, and it would only be common 
in the sense that some common subject matter was being studied by all 
children, in different types of institutions. The future leaders 
would continue, in school and university, to receive more specialist 
training in what Mannheim called an esoteric world view, or theoretical 
knowledge. The importance of this theoretical knowledge was partly 
that it would help maintain some of the traditional standards whose 
survival Mannheim considered to be of fundamental importance in pro- 
tooting society from the tendency of democracy to dilute and dissipate 
the achievements of minority culture. This esoteric knowledge was 
no longer, as it had been in the past, to be provided through the 
classics, but through the social sciences, including the theory of 
perspeotivism, which, Mannheim suggested, it was appropriate to in- 
clude as a methodological principle. 
Another qualification to the common core approach which Mannheim 
introduced is that individual differences of intelligence, attainment, 
social background, and vocational aspiration post problems that can be 
resolved only by some form of separate provision. Although he did 
not examine the problem of relating common core programmes involving 
mixed groups of children with what are now known to be highly complex 
questions of the nature and sources of individual difference in learning, 
we may infer that no curriculum proposal would be satisfactory to Mannheim 
which did not provide for some form of individually differentiated learn- 
ing. Provision for individual learning was not to be confined to 
individual treatment of common core topics, for Mannheim's belief 
in the culturally creative role of individual innovators led him 
to advocate opportunities in school for new and individual depar- 
turess new topics, discovery methods, and abandonment of the con- 
straints and the partiality of external examinations. 
What is most significant in Mannheim's curriculum thinking is 
not, then, any contribution he made to resolving the very difficult 
problem of differentiating and relating common core and individual 
study programmes. There are, however, two points of particular 
interest in his proposals. The first is that the common elements 
in the curriculum should be comprised not of formal subject matter 
but of a series of topics, themes, workshop projects, assignments and 
discussion issues in the social studies, selected for their relevance 
to social issues, and so designed as to encourage an inquiring, experi- 
mental outlook in children, together with the ability to work in teams 
and small groups. In discussing this so-called "romantic" form of 
learning, Mannheim acknowledged his debt to the experimentalists (17)" 
The second feature of his curriculum thought that I wish to emphasize 
is that Mannheim distinguished between his own methods of sociology 
of knowledge, and of perspeotiviat interpretation, and the methods of 
study appropriate to the capacities and needs of the average child in 
school. 
There are many examples of the core approach in the "life adjust- 
ment" curriculum in the U. S. A. in the forties and fifties and in British 
secondary schools in the post-Newsom era. These programmes are commonly 
distinguished byt 
I. the requirement that all pupils should engage in some 
common learning oaperienoes; 
2. the abandonment of teaching based directly on the struc- 
tures of the disciplines, as being irrelevant to ordinary 
children's needs; 
3" 
4" 
5" 
6. 
attempts to develop news integrated conceptual structures, 
with concepts and materials taken from several social 
science disciplines and variously inter-related; 
adoption of individual pupil interest and capacity, and 
of social relevance as major criteria for selecting ma- 
terials and or, anizing teaching; 
emphasis on practical problems of living: personal rela- 
tions, work, leisure, democratic citizenship, etc. { 
partial and sometimes complete abandonment of homoz, enoOus 
inatruotional groups, of textbooks, and sometimes of books 
and reading materials altogether in favor of a wide variety 
of proceduress mixed ability discussion and manual work 
groups, surveys, projects, discovery and inquiry methods; 
7. pupil participation both in the planning, of curriculum 
processes and through self and group assessment; 
B. replacement of teacher-dominance models of classroom inter- 
action by looser, more fluid, more informal relationships, 
for which the classroom provides only ono and not necessarily 
the most stimulating setting; 
g. flexible workshop-type buildings and the treatment of the 
wider environment an a "space for learning" in place of 
traditional olassroome; 
10. the attempt, in the interest of a unified culture, to ensure 
some form of educationally significant interaction between 
children of widely different abilities, attainments and 
baokj ounds; 
11. the adoption of large and flexible timetable blocks. 
We cannot be sure how far Mannheim was prepared to substitute core 
programmes for more traditional forms of organization and how far he would 
treat them as minority-time additional nor can we be sure that his re- 
commendations on core curricula refer to the whole range of abilities. 
He may well have accepted the implicit Crowther-Newsom distinction of 
an improved traditional academic programme for the minority, and "life 
adjustment" education for the masses (18)" He did not live to complete 
the educational section of Freedom. Power and Demooratic Plannin, and 
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much of his more positive and systematic thinking on these matters 
has to be inferred and extrapolated from partial discussion and from 
criticism of existing arrangements. 
Mannheim's educational proposals are by no means, in all details, 
entailed by his culture reconstruction proposals. For example, 
there 
are several different ways of providing elites with the understanding 
of mass interests which Mannheim felt to be needed if unity and sta- 
bility of culture were to be achieved. The common core and the common 
school were, as we have seen, adopted by American reconstruotionists, 
but Mannheim was never an unequivocal supporter of either; instead, 
he sought for ways of reformulating and renewing the English tradi- 
tion, and this meant finding new directions for existing institutions 
and modifications of the existing content of education, rather than 
the imposing of something quite alien. When he discussed the reform 
of the Public Schools, it is clear that Mannheim had in mind the con- 
tinuance of a separate system of elite-preparing institutions, and these 
would certainly not provide opportunities for the kind of mixing which 
a more extreme form of the common core doctrine requires. However, 
even within the state sector of education, a common core is only one 
way of developing common understanding. Again, selection of themes to 
illustrate problems and trends of contemporary social life is not the 
only way of organizing social science knowledge so as to bring out 
themes and methods which characterize different sciences, or to dis- 
cuss questions of practical interpretation and application. Inter- 
disciplinary discussion groups, linked with separate subject teaching, 
is one possibility; the teaching of separate subjects with an eye to 
the wider social and intellectual problems they raise is another. It 
is an indication of his belief that English institutions are not easily 
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modified that Mannheim was prepared to work within the existing insti- 
tutional framework, injecting into it not a new curriculum form (the 
classics, after all, have long acted as a common core), but a new con- 
tent, that provided by social science knowledge. - 
The payoholodical restructuring that Mannheim called for, in 
order to produce now elite and new mass mentality, was itself by no 
means unambiguous, and could have predicated any of the following= more 
competitive or more co-operative methods, or both} a more pliable or a 
more determined individual= a Jamesian tough-minded person, or one who 
is tender-minded; planning-mindedness or self-distantiation, or both. 
Mannheim's essay on "Economic ambition", and his remarks on ecstatic ex- 
perience and on the self that lies behind experience, illustrate his own 
uncertainty as to the general character of the proposed new man. Thus 
a wide variety of possibilities for the content and methods of education 
suggest themselves. Mannheim vacillated in his treatment of these ques- 
tions but was nevertheless firm in his advocacy of a limited common core 
of practical and social knowledge. 
It is difficult to see how experience of this core, together with 
the other curriculum experience he proposed, could achieve all that 
Mannheim hoped for by way of unity of basic value orientations, commit- 
ment to common social policy objectives, change-mindedness, and availability 
for democratic participation. Recent evidence on political learning shows 
just how ineffective most school pro&rammes are in contributing to the 
development of the democratic attitudes Mannheim wished to encourage. 
This research suggests that, in a society whose way of life is in many 
respects hostile to rational and democratic outlooks, we need to begin 
to exercise educational control at a much earlier age than Mannheim 
appears to have envisaged (19). 
The second main point of interest about Mannheim's proposals for 
the reorganization of the content and method of school learning is how 
widely they differ from the methodology of the sociology of knowledge 
and perspeotiviam. It seems that, for the mass of school learners, 
not even simple analogues of these esoteric knowledge forms were needed. 
Following Scheler, he distinguished two streams of knowledge: first, the 
understanding which arises in the continuum of everyday experience, where 
the individual is forced to solve practical problems as they arise, 
without reference, necessarily, to conscious methods; second, eso- 
teric world views, which require effort, cultivation, etc. (20). Per- 
haps it is just as well that he did not incorporate perspeotiviat methods 
into everyday education, as the following imaginary encounter between 
Dewey and Mannheim indicates: 
John met Karl on the way out of the staff club and fell 
into conversation with him. They discovered that they were 
both bound for the library, which was half a mile away, on the 
other side of the campus. It had been raining heavily and 
the short route, which lay across some marshy ground, seemed 
inadvisable; however, since Karl was in a hurry they decided 
to risk a damp passage. As they hurried along, John remarked 
that his hens were not laying well because they were moulting. 
Karl looked blankly at his companions a distinguished pro- 
fessor of the university keeping henst John asked politely 
whether Karl might care for some fresh egk$s. A look of frigh- 
tened bewilderment momentarily flitted across Karl'6 face; 
he stuttered something incoherent and looked away in embarrass- 
mento kiowever, he made the hasty mental note that this was 
further evidence in favor of the weltanschauung theory on which 
he was just now working. John, poor fellow, was just talking 
into the air because his background in homely Vermont had left 
a legacy of chickens and such like while he, Karl, had derived 
from another social setting altogether. Hens, and homely 
farmsteads, were a world removed from cafes, anarchists and 
Marxist activists in revolutionary Hungary. Alas, the cul- 
tural disunities of our time, and how to mend them when even 
he and the esteemed Dewey could only mumble at each other! 
Karl was roused from his reverie by stepping into a very 
large puddle. He caught John's arm, and together they looked 
ahead at the path, which dipped into a flooded hollow before 
rising abain to the library. There seemed no way across, ex- 
cept by taking a very long detour. "The stream seems to have 
flooded, " said John, "and we shall have to go back. " Ha 
paused, then added, "perhaps there is some way across through 
those bushes higher up. " John moved up to the bushes and 
stumbled over a pile of planhsand ladders near an outhouse. 
"Let's see if we can't throw these planks across, " he said, 
"and get over that way. " But again he was talking to him- 
self, for'Karl had moved up on to a mound and was gazing 
intently in turn at the stream, the library, and the out- 
house, at John, the trees, and back towards the distant 
staff club. Karl looked on with an abstracted gaze while 
John threw the planks across the stream. These hasty new 
worlders, he thought; even the finest of them lack the ele- 
ments of awareness, and as for vision! Taking up what he 
supposed to be the appropriate stance, he looked fixedly about 
him and began to relate the various phenomena he observed to 
one another. How wide was the stream? A difficult matter 
to establish from this distance. He ruminated over some of 
the more celebrated streams and rivers of his native Hungary 
and of the contiguous nations of Europe. Ah, those ancient 
beauties of city and country! No, this one was a more trickle 
compared with them and very muddy; but, as compared with bow 
he remembered it the last time he came this way, it was a , usher; 
perhaps it would got even lamer, if those rain clouds building 
up again in the south continued this way. The lay-out of the 
land interested him, too. Had anyone realized, he wondered, 
that the path could have been driven straight through that 
clump of elms, thereby avoiding the marsh? 
Karl's reflections were interrupted by loud voices be- 
hind him. Several of his own students were approaching. 
He thought to inquire of their views about these matters and 
asked the foremost of them to stand a little way to the right, 
look at the stream, and report on what he saw. Was it indeed 
a stream that was overflowing, or perhaps, now, a small river; 
or was it a saturated swamp, or what? If they could spare a 
few minutes he would be able to form a correct perapedtive of 
the situation and then consider ways of reaching a decision 
about what to do next. With luck they might all be able to 
reach a unified view, transcending the one-sidedness of their 
particular viewpoints. 
Since the students were good natured, tolerant of their pro- 
fessor, and in no hurry, this dialectical quest for consensus 
went on for some minutes. Meanwhile, John had tried several 
planks until he found one that was wide enough for a safe pas- 
sage and just the right length. Laying it in position, he 
looked back for Karl. Finding his erstwhile companion ear- 
nestly engaged in a conversation that had the little party 
grouped about him inexplicably turning in all directions, he 
looked puzzled for a moment, then set out to test his makeshift 
bridge. He stepped gingerly across, and strolled up to the 
library, reflecting that he had done well not to give in to his 
first impulse to turn back. 
Karl remained in intense conversation with his students for 
some time, feeling both a growing sense of communion with 
them, and the sense of mastery that comes from creatively 
re-interpreting total situations. By degrees, he achieved 
insight into the inter-relationships of all that lay about 
him, so manifesting that flexibility and readiness to shift 
intentions to suit changing circumstances which, as he noted 
to himself, not without feeling that this was a trifle im- 
modest, is just what our disintegrated culture needs of its 
future leaders, the socially unattached intelligentsia. 
Unfortunately, by this time John's plank had floated away, 
as the stream rose even higher and the whole perspective 
changed. 
During his long walk back to the staff club, Karl ap- 
peared to be in a state of groat emotional excitation. An 
acute observer sufficiently aware of the subtle relationships 
between situations of social confusion and the individual 
discovery of new spiritual truth might have supposed that 
Karl had had a vision. At any rate, keen students of his 
work noted that, soon after this experience had occurred, his 
proposals for educational policy came to incorporate a new 
element. Some of the historians amongst them traced this to 
John's literary and practical influence, for Karl was writing 
about mass education in terms such as a more practical form 
of schooling, and discussions of current social issues; and 
he was enthusiastically advocating problem-solving methods of 
thinking, even for the elite. Others, however, in an attempt 
to sustain the methodological unity of the master's thought, 
pointed out that it was from Dilthey, Scheler and Heidegger 
that he learned about problem solving, his only debt to Dewey 
being the discovery that the elites, too, should be educated 
to solve the practical problems of everyday life. 
3. BrAmelds Study of World Cultures 
Brameld maintained continuity with the Rugg tradition of a common 
core curriculum by proposing, as a common core for the seventeen to 
twenty-. ý8ar age group, a comprehensive study of world cultures. This 
study was intended to be primarily critical of the past and directed by 
the ideals of a better future for all mankind, through the universalizing 
of democracy and material well-being. The task was to give direot ex- 
pression to the reoonstruotionist concept of education as "normatively 
creative and recreative rather than primarily reflective or reproduc- 
tive" (21). Braneld gave history a rather less prominent place than it 
typically occupies in world culture courses, substituting for the 
idea of long-term historical development the anthropological con- 
cepts of order and process in contemporary cultural settings. 
We 
should, he argued, apply to a selection of the economic, political, 
social and personal problems of contemporary life the analytical 
structures of culture in process, and encourage youth to think about 
the world they can have and would want. Thus, "the hub of every 
curriculum", according to Brameld, should be "the problems and pros- 
pects of reorganizing democracy itself" 
(22). 
For this "problems of democracyti" curriculum, Brameld proposed the 
use of a variety of methods, including general assemblies, discussion 
groups, work experience, and community activity. The methods should 
be those of public problem-solvingt experiential, evidence-amassing, 
public discourse and debate, clear communication and the quest for 
consensus, conceived as a "defensible partiality" in the common, agreed 
policies of a particular group (23). 
While Bramold incorporated into his curriculum recommendations 
concepts from anthropological and social-psychological theory which 
were not available to Rugg$ neither the shape he gave to a common cul- 
tural core nor his advocacy of activity methods represents a signifi- 
cant step forward in curriculum thought. But, instead of continuing 
with the Rugg idea of a crusade to enlist a like-minded elite to design 
a national core curriculum, Brameld has accepted for himself the more 
modest role of designer and promoter of experimental programmes. Like 
Rugg, however, he sees curriculum experience as a possible model for 
future social behavior. Learning patterns and interpersonal relation- 
ships are intended to express a pattern for future relationships; the 
general holistic, integrative character of the curriculum is intended to 
provide a model for strategies of culture and policy-making} and 
the invitation to students to outline the world they want is in- 
tended as an incitement to them to act to achieve that world. Thus 
Brameld'e curriculum theory confirms the reconstructionist aspirations 
to re-create culture through education. 
4 Stanley L Raun et al: Practical Judgment and a Moral Core 
Without departing from this aspiration, Frank, Stanloy, snd Raup 
and his associates largely abandoned the quest for a core embracing 
very extensive tracts of cultural experience. They returned to the 
more manageable Deweyan strategy of devising a methodology of inquiry 
and of consent which could perhaps in time yield a new order of values 
and convictions. Stanley reverted to a still older tradition in 
American educational thought, that of Herbartianism, in a quest for 
a content of his t orico-moral-procedural rules which could form a uni- 
fying core for the education of all American children. With Smith 
and Shores, he explored the possibilities of such a core very fully, 
and contrasted the strengths and weaknesses of the core approach with 
other more general curriculum orientations (24). However, Stanley's 
main intention in Education and Social-Integration was, as we have 
seen, to provide a supporting argument for the method of practical 
judgment worked out by Raup and his associates. 
I have already discussed this methodg in Chapter VIII, and the 
only point I wish to make here is to contrast the concept of practical 
judgment with Frank's psycho-culturism. Practical judment is an es- 
sentially consensus-seeking group exercise in policy formation. Its 
advocates intended that the ideology and the techniques of practical 
judgment should permeate personality, producing a community of skilled 
democratic deliberaters, in whom, so far as social affairs are con- 
cerned, individualistic aggression and the impulsive life are firmly 
sublimated to the requirements of Dewey's reflective discipline. 
5. Franks Scientific Humanism 
In his 1950 paper, "Culture and personality", Frank, too, treated 
education at all levels as the key to directed culture change, and, 
like Raup and his associates, he examined ways of replacing the hierarchical 
principle of leadership by that of group decision-taking. Furthermore, 
his psychological approach was manifest in his arguments for supporting 
individual expression through the therapy provided by group experience. 
In 1959, in The School as Agent for Cultural Renewal, Frank had shifted 
the emphasis of his inquiry a little, towards the public procedures of 
scientific thought and the processes of cognitive learning. He cri- 
ticized the more direct approach to culture change which Counts had 
preached in Dare the School Build a New Social Order? and, in a more 
Deweyan spirit, commended schools to the iconoclastic tradition of wes- 
tern scientific thoughts criticism, and -a crucial task - "the renewal 
of our culture in the light of contemporary scientific thinking" (25). 
Frank did not take this to mean the construction of science-dominated 
utopias, or the saturation of the curriculum by scientific subject mat- 
ter. Like Whitehead, he foresaw the emergence of a new scientific 
humanism, whose success depended upon the schools providing children with 
an initial reorientation away from the unreconstructed assumptions of com- 
mon, naive experience, towards what Einstein has called the scientifically 
conceived universe. His theme was receptivity to modern scientific world- 
views. Frank did not make the Rugg-Brameld mistake of trying to encap- 
sulate this in an impossibly elaborate and ultimately vague common core 
curriculum. The meaning of modern science is 
batter communicated, 
in his view, by teaching procedures intended to promote cognitive 
self-awareness, communication awareness, the transaotionalist method 
of knowing (a Dewey-Bentley development of Dewey's theory of 
inter- 
ctionism L26j), concept learning, and other strategies which have only 
in recent years begun to be systematically studied. There is much in 
Frank that anticipates Bruner, who in all other respects, too, belongs 
to the experimentalist tradition, although not explicitly a recon- 
structiýnist (27). 
I remarked in Chapter VIII that Frank's outline of a programme of 
cultural study was open to the same criticism I have made of Mannheim's 
porspectiviem and the broad culture outlines that Rugg and Brameld in- 
corporated into their curriculum designs. This criticism does not 
apply to his views on teaching procedures, which are both consistent 
with his methodological reconstructionism and capable of being tested 
empirically. Yet Frank prpposed a profoundly challenging, und many would 
think, an intellectually over-ambitious, programme for the elementary 
school. He argued that it should induct children into the contem- 
porary conceptual world, not merely by arranging experiences from which 
glimmerings of awareness might develop, but by having children unlearn 
their false concepts of the physical world and then consciously and in- 
dividually orientating towards the new conceptual frames of modern 
science. While this proposal provides a direction in which studies 
at this stage should be moving, the cognitive demands it makes on 
children and teachers alike limit its practical applications. Never- 
theless, the continuing tendency of reconstructionist thinkers to set 
teachers and pupils the most ambitious and demanding cognitive tasks 
is a reminder that, despite their emphasis on the loose ideas of social 
relevance and individual creativity, they have always regarded the 
universal cultivation of rationality ae a primary curriculum objec- 
tive. 
6. Overview and Assessment 
From this review of reconatruotionist ideas on the curriculum, 
a few themes may be extracted to serve as a summary and to raise fur- 
ther issues: 
6.1 Curriculum and the straten-_y of change 
First, most of the reconstructioniate sat themselves the very 
difficult task of more or less systematically exploring relationships 
between educational content and methods of teaching and learning, and 
their more general proposals for culture renewal. Almost all of them 
perceived that curriculum and teaching procedures are the most impor- 
tant factors in a strategy of directed change to be achieved through 
education, and none of them restricted the definition of curriculum to 
conventional lists of subjects to be taught in schools. Those who, 
like Rugg and Brameld, wished both to involve the oom, nunity in educational 
policy-making and to prepare substantial curriculum schemes of their own, 
did not fully investigate the problems of professional authority and 
shared responsibility that are thereby raised. On the other hand, 
those who, like Dewey, Kilpatrick and Frank, invested teachers with major 
responsibility for curriculum making, did not adequately justify the very 
heavy intellectual demands thereby made of large and not always very 
sophisticated teaching forces in mass education systems. The danger 
of both sets of proposals is that of abandoning traditional standards 
without achieving new ones. This could easily result in contempt for 
and trivialization of the very procedures they advocated. The reconstruotioni 
intentions were highly demanding, intellectually and in many other 
respects, but the expression of these intentions in curriculum out- 
lines was often disappointing, and it underlines the need for more 
detailed and systematic curriculum analysis than any of the recon- 
atructionists engaged in. Of course, this need is always present, 
as conditions and possibilities change, an idea which the reoonstruc- 
tionists themselves were largely responsible for introducing into 
curriculum theory. Despite the transformation of the content of 
education in post-war years we still do not possess adequate insti- 
tutions or procedures for ensuring that curriculum development is on- 
going and comprehensive rather than saltatory and partial. 
The fact that the reconstruotionists treated the curriculum as 
the major educational instrumentality for effecting culture develop- 
ment does not mean that they necessarily treated curriculum design as 
equivalent to culture design. There was a tendency towards this in 
Rugg and Brameld. However, even they recognized that the chief po- 
tential contribution of an effective educational programme in a demo- 
cratic and pluralistic society is to make pupils aware of possibilities 
for directed change and to provide them with some of the relevant skills 
and understandings. Even so, these and other reoonstructionists made 
little direct acknowledgement of the problems of power, resources and 
alternative sources of influence. Schools might, under the most 
favorable circumstances, work toward the achievement of universal 
rationality, in the manner recommended by Dewey, or Russell. But 
educationists typically (and, as cultural pluralists would add, for- 
tunately) lack effective power to mobilize scarce resources to this end 
and to control alternative sources of influence - e. g., mass media, 
and family nurture. Nor did the reconstructionists succeed in showing 
how they might achieve this power. We can detect both vacillation 
and ambiguity in reconstructionist thinking on the question of the 
cultural significance and impact of major curriculum change. Even 
those reoonstructionists, like Dewey, who were more modest in what 
they expected schools to achieve, contributed to the expansive de- 
finition, as it might be termed, of the curriculum. According to 
this definition the curriculum includes all those activities and ex- 
periences, which the school seeks to provide in pursuit of its edu- 
cational objectives. These activities and experiences, as we have 
seen, were sometimes equated with life, or at least with a worthy or 
good life. Thus, in designing the curriculum the reconstructionist 
is doing all in his power to design or to shape the good life. It 
is inconsistent with the principle of plural influence in an open 
society to wish to centralize in any one institution or process, such 
as the curriculum of the schools, the power required for the more 
ambitious versions of reconstructionism to work. As defenders of 
democratic pluralism, the reconstruotionists, who by implication, if 
not more boldly, claimed this power as a right, were involved in a con- 
tradiction: nor could they be rescued from this contradiction by their 
argument in favor of joint community action, since this action was to 
be governed by their own criteria, and, or so-they thought, directed 
by their purposes. The resolution_of this difficulty is perhaps to 
be found in the recognition that other agencies than schools educate, 
and in the attempt to involve in educational policy-making very wide 
sections of the community. Blueprints and models for the curriculum, 
produced by creative minorities and individuals, could function to stimu- 
late debate about possibilities. A scheme of this kind is what many 
of the later reoonstructionists, and Dewey, were seeking to implement. 
In large urbanized societies which are changing rapidly, it is very 
difficult to organize and stabilize community involvement and decision- 
taking, and it could not be expected that the solutions proposed by 
one generation would adequately serve the next. Unfortunately, there 
is little evidence in contemporary educational thought of awareness 
of the political, social and technical complexity of curriculum de- 
velopment in societies which aspire to be both efficient and demo- 
cratic. 
6.2 Common core of social studies 
A second general comment that I have on reconstruotionist curri- 
culum thinking is that, whilst it covers a wide spectrum of possible 
structures, it tends to focus on the idea of a common, integrated core 
of social studies subject matter (28). This is very obvious in American 
thought, but it is a clear, if only partially developed, trend in British 
thinking. None of the reconetruotionists grappled very seriously with 
the conceptual problems raised by the now popular concept of integra- 
tion, and various bases or key concepts were proposed, from interest, 
to culture evolution, to contemporary world problems. Those who recom- 
mended integrated, sequential programmes were satisfied, on the whole, 
with descriptive outlines of topics, concepts and fields and with themes 
which were grouped according to subjective ideas based on historical 
overviews, feelings of the urgency of this or that issue (e. g., inter- 
national relations) or a semi-socialistio interpretation of the indus- 
trial substructure and ideological superstructures of society. Brameld's 
use of the anthropological concept of process is an exception, although 
even Brameld made little use of the concept in listing topics for study. 
Different forms of the "core" idea give rise to quite different problems. 
The attempt to work from and to develop children's interests, as Dewey 
remarked, requires a further set of criteria to determine 
how the 
interests will be elicited and in which direction they might be 
encouraged to move. The assertion of social need as a curriculum 
determiner is open to the objection that it presupposes certain 
ideas about what is good for society and frequently begs the ques- 
tion of who should adjudicate in cases of disagreement. The re- 
constructionists all believed they knew what society "needs" in this 
sense, but inevitably their own interpretations were highly partial 
and subjective. Thus, to build a curriculum core upon the hypothe- 
sized need to achieve a new synthesis, or a scientific quality in life, 
or to universalize critical thinking, raises many of the problems I 
discussed in Chapters IX and X. In effect, the core proposals of the 
reconstruotionists are built upon an unexamined, nineteenth century 
view of culture evolution, and the studies that emerge repeatedly 
are historical and sociological. These studies carry what might be 
termed the Herbartian load of moral principles, with the difference 
that the morality is a largely assumed heritage of democratic values, 
ey3#pathies and practices. Although the reconstruotioniste preferred 
to take a "world view", their historico-socio-ethical core in peculiarly 
a phenomenon of nineteenth century . western civilization. This gives 
to the curriculum, as a design for future living, a definite quality 
but it is a quality which is much less dynamic and much more parochial 
than that which the reconatructionists themselves claimed to be seeking. 
Their criticisms of traditional, subject-centred teaching were, on the 
whole, sound, but only quite recently - for example, in the work of 
Broudy and his associates - has it come to be appreciated that it is 
possible to meet these criticisms by a new, unified structure of sub- 
jects which satisfies many of the reconstructionist aspirations, without 
diminishing the importance of systematic study within well defined 
fields and subject areas. 
6.3 Curriculum and culture lag 
ä6y third general observation on the curriculum arises from one 
of the issues I mentioned in the previous paragraph. The reoonstruc- 
tionists, as we saw in Part I, were very impressed and troubled by the 
idea of culture lag. They found that the traditional curriculum neg- 
leoted issues and problems of contemporary culture. They criticized 
its disciplinary assumptions which, if they were valid, might in fact 
warrant such neglect. By this I mean that there may be grounds for 
supposing that analytic and interpretative thinking powers, at least in 
some pupils, are more economically developed on, say, the subject matter 
of mediaeval history, or Euclid, than on the lese orderly subject matter 
of contemporary social issues. At least, there are complex and educa- 
tionally significant relationships between conceptual powers in indi- 
viduals and the conceptual structure of subjects to which the recon- 
struotionista paid too little attention. Having too hastily disposed 
of the transfer of training argument, they tried to build into the core 
of the curriculum topics and themes from recent and contemporary social 
affairs, economics, technology and other scientific and social scien- 
tific fields. Their intention, we should note, was not primarily to 
provide an informational programme, but it was strangely similar to that 
of the mental disciplinarians, namely, to develop thinking Capacities 
and attitudes which might yield a generation of socially-minded critics 
and reformers. This worthy intention was, however, often defeated 
by the difficulty of developing organizing concepts for the analysis 
of contemporary affairs. The lack of such concepts leads either to 
a dismal jumble of miscellaneous topics, refleoting the passing interests 
of all who can be persuaded to contribute to the melange, or the 
dominance of one subject or another. As we have seen, dominance 
was frequently achieved by history and one or other of the social 
sciences. Curriculum integration is still an ill-understood con- 
cept and the common tendency to substitute exhortations to integrate 
and synthesize for analysis of the task have not advanced our under- 
standing of it. 
6.4 Probr em-so lving an d projects 
My fourth general comment on reconstructionist curriculum think- 
ing refers to Dewey's pursuit of a substitute for the discredited faculty 
psychology. It was through the repudiation of nineteenth century 
educational psychology that Dewey developed his theory of original 
mind activity and his problem-solving method for developing the capacity 
to think. His and Kilpatrick's discussions of teaching and learning 
processes in small groups saved them from the difficulties encountered 
to some extent by Wells, and Mannheim, and more obviously by Rugg and 
Brameld, of trying to schematize large tracts of cultural experience 
and human knowledge, for which there are no adequate conceptual struc- 
tures. The Dewey-Kilpatrick pedagogy is also lese exposed to a cri- 
ticism which could be made of the grand designers, that many of the 
learnings they proposed could in practice very easily become highly 
abstract, atomiatic and informational. But problem-solving and 
the project method are ill-suited, or only with great difficulty 
adaptable, to some subjects and forms of thinking and practical 
activity which have values of their own. Attempts to reduce the 
diversity of the pedagogically-valuable forms of knowledge and modes 
of experience to these methodologies would be better abandoned, and in 
their place an effort made to find other appropriate procedures. To 
persist with attempts to reduce subject matter to a common mode 
is in 
practice impossible and leads to self-deception, uneconomic 
learning 
and a serious trivialization of learning. These outcomes are quite 
inconsistent with the scientific temper reconstructionism wishes to 
promote. 
6.5 Teachers as curriculum designers 
My fifth General observation is that the recons truotionists were 
not agreed about the best ways of developing and promoting their our- 
rioulum designs. Some, notably Rugg, tended to pro-judge the issue 
by producing their own elaborate structures. With characteristic op- 
timism, Dewey by contrast supposed that a mass education system could 
ultimately come under the control of a fully profeasionalized teaching 
force and this meant, for him, a wide diffusion of the skills of curri- 
culum makinge ks a teacher training and re-training target, this has 
much to commend it. Provided it is not assumed that the target is 
achieved when all that has happened is that, as in the English system, 
teachers are vested with this responsibility, it seems better to pursue 
it, and modify it in practical situations, than to abandon it for curri- 
culum-making by experts. The arguments supporting this view are com- 
plex, but may be stated very briefly: curriculum design is not a dis- 
tinct process, but is integrally related with teaohing: soma form of 
designing or adaptation takes place even with imposed curricula, so 
teachers need skill at least at this level; there are good arguments 
to support pupil participation in some aspects of curriculum making; 
there are reasons of professional status and teacher motivation; 
teacher participation in curriculum design is more likely than even 
the most expert of imposed systems to incorporate awareness of local 
conditions and possibilities - i. e., identification of the learning 
situation. 
6.6 Political sooialization, and teacher attitudes 
My sixth general point refers to the understanding of the pro- 
cesses of political socialization, which has only recently begun to 
be-strengthened by empirical inquiry. In the next chapter, I shall 
mention the problem of anti-democratic attitudes amongst teachers. 
This clearly raises a problem for a theory of directed change whose 
success depends so intimately on teacher involvement. But, as we 
should expect# anti-democratic attitudes exist also amongst pupils. 
The research of Reamers and others has revealed a disturbing pattern 
in American high school youths 
"A significant proportion of the nation's high school 
seniors does not agree with the freedoms guaranteed by the 
Bill of Rights" (29). 
The reconstructionists never assumed that children entered school 
, with minds ready 
to receive the ideals and values they wished to promote. 
But they did tend to overlook the educationally restricting effect of 
what has recently been described as the "hidden curriculum", that ia, 
the constricting effect of impoverished language, and of certain forms 
of neighborhood, family and peer group culture (30). It is not that 
they were unaware of some of these issues, The Webbs, for example, 
were very conscious that there are severe limitations imposed on school 
learning by deprivation - hence, in part, their advocacy of state-sup- 
ported child nurture. However, the optimistic temper of reconstruc- 
tionism, especially Dewey's idea of the continuous reconstruction of 
experience, led to the underestimating of patterns of resistance, in 
children themselves, to curriculum reform. It has been argued that 
children lack the Cynicism and distrust of their elders in political 
matters (31). It was the innocence (in this sense) of childhood, and 
its receptivity to new ideas, that struck Dewey. Amongst the re- 
constructionists, it was generally assumed that, although there are 
problems of learning, there are not problems of unlearning. 
Prank 
is an important exception to this, and there are others, but I am 
speaking now of the overall impression conveyed by a wide assort- 
ment of writings. Recent research has shown amongst American high 
school youth, who on the whole receive a greater saturation of po- 
litical teaching in schools than do Soviet youth, the persistence 
of deeply seated hostility to minority groups 
(32). These are ir- 
rational phenomena, resistant to benevolent, rational argumentation. 
I cannot pursue the question of educational possibilities for dealing 
with prejudice of this type, but it is clear that the curriculum pro- 
posals we have reviewed barely touched upon the problem of what pupils 
might have to unlearn in ordler to develop the rational, tolerant, cri- 
tical outlook the reconstructionists prescribed. 
6.7 Reconstructioni tcontribrottions 
Finally, these criticisms notwithstanding, the reconstructionists 
have made significant contributions to the understanding of curriculum 
development issues. Their persistent emphasis on relationships between 
school, community, society and culture has contributed to the marked de- 
cline of the isolationism that is signified by the instruction to parents 
not to proceed "beyond the notice", and by the disregard in subject teach- 
ing of contexts of social use. They played a major part in promoting 
awareness of the possibility of systematic re-direction of the school's 
purposes through curriculum design. Although they did not resolve 
its difficulties, they have contributed to our appreciation of the 
core curriculum and to fresh thought about relationships between 
subjects. Thus, they have encouraged thought about cognitive maps, 
key conoepta, directed inquiry procedures, needs, interests, rele- 
vancel and other of the leading ideas about which controversy and 
discussion in contemporary curriculum theory is centred. These 
contributions should be set against the weaknesses and extrava- 
canoes of some of the proposals we have considered in these two 
chapters. 
CHAPTER XIII 
SCHOOLS, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR RECONSTRUCTION 
In the three preceding chapters I have endeavored to show how far 
the reconstructionists conceived education as a force for cultural re- 
newal. We have seen that, while it was by no means intended that through 
education alone the crisis culture of our time should be regenerated, edu- 
cation was treated as the chief agency in this process of renewal. 
This conception of education places a peculiarly heavy burden on tea- 
chers and schools, even though the reeonstruotionists did not regard 
teachers as the only educators or schools as the only suitable insti- 
tutions in which to conduct the educational enterprise. In this, and 
the succeeding chapter, we shall see that they were very often severely 
critical of those who normally perform teaching roles, and that they 
advocated a variety of institutional developments to supplement the 
work of the school, Nevertheless, schools and teachers remain for 
reconstructionism the principal instrumental means for introducing and 
sustaining the kind of educational changes they proposed. 
In this chapter, I shall discuss some of the more typical recon- 
atructionist conceptions of the school as an institution, or set of 
institutione, for culture renewal. As in previous chapters, I shall 
consider the different groups of reconstructioniste separately, bring- 
ing out their ideas on teaching in relationship to selected themes. 
It is evident that a great deal of detail will have to be omitted, in 
an effort to sort out the major issues the reconstructionists identified, 
and to identify the problems and difficulties to which their proposals 
give rise, 
0 
1. The Webbs: Administrative Infrastructure 
As we should expect, the Fabians gave more detailed consideration 
to the topic of administrative structures in education than to teacher 
characteristics and tasks or to teacher education. Indeed, their con- 
tributions to these latter topics are so slight that I shall incorporate 
the main part of them into my discussion of Webb thinking on institutional 
structures in education. 
The proposals Sidney Webb made in 1903 for the reform of London 
education are a more carefully worked out scheme of administrative 
infrastructure than any other reconatruotionist theorist produced. We 
shall not enter into the details of his proposals except insofar as they 
illustrate wider issues. The issues that seem to me most significant 
in the Fabian administrative platform area 
proposals for national unity and a national minimum or provision; 
the search for a balance between national and local control; 
increased public finance, including scholarships; 
a unified or inter-related structure of provision, from pre- 
school to adult education. 
1.1 Public provision and control 
Sidney Webb argued that, by the turn of the nineteenth century, it 
had become accepted that public education was not a charitable provision 
for the poor, but "a matter of national concern undertaken in the in- 
terest of the community as a whole" (1). This was a collectivist and 
utilitarian ideal of democratic provision which Webb upheld against 
notions of charitable provision and an elitist system of education 
only for scholarship holders. The interest of the community could 
best be served, he maintained, by the design of a national system for 
the education of all children. Following the passage of the 1902 and 
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1903 Education Acts, he characteristically announced his intention 
to produce for London a workable plan according to the requirements 
of the new legislation, quickly, pragmatically and without regard for 
party politics: 
"We cannot afford to let London education mark time 
this year, .. * pending the possible transfer of political 
power from one party to another. Whoever may be chosen 
to administer London's thousands of schools, and to direct 
its millions of scholars, must necessarily work out some 
plan of educational organization, under the law as it is 
for the time being, and shape that organization according 
to some administrative policy" (2). 
There is in this a touch of disc genuousnesa, since Webb had played 
no small part in shaping the 1902 Act, and the reference to "some ad- 
ministrative policy" should be set against the fact of his chairmanship 
of the very powerful London Technical Education Board from 1892 to 1902 
(he was vice-chairman in 1899 and 1900). Furthermore, his proposals and 
those of other Fabians were not simply for an organizational scheme and 
an administrative policy whose objectives had been politically and so- 
cially determined elsewhere; they were themselves a very definite 
policy and programme. The Fabian aim was to strengthen public control 
and direction of a universal system of schooling and to give that system 
a definite and distinct character. This character was to be determined 
by several objectivest the creation of a national system of publicly 
provided schooling, headed by a strong minister of education; state 
registration and inspection of private and denominational schools; the 
integration of the then separate stages and components of education (e. g., 
of pro-school, secondary, and tertiary stages, and of academic and tech- 
nical programmes) within a national system of administrative units like 
the London County Council; the development of a substantial aid and 
support prograume for schools and pupils (scholarships); and the dominance 
of the content and methodology of teaching by modern, technical and 
practical studies. These objectives may be illustrated 
from the 
mass of proposals Sidney Webb made for the London County Council, 
foreshadowing the development of public administrative systems which 
should have a controlling, or, at least, a major, role in all 
forms 
of education, not least university education 
(3). They express the 
totalistio educative mentality to be observed in The Prevention of 
Destitution, where the (ebbs urged local education authorities to take 
charge of the total well-being of school age children not by custodial 
control, but by increasing provision, laying down standards, and inter- 
vening directly where these were not net. 
The Webbs proposed their elaborate structure of public provision 
and control only thirty years after the state in Britain had effectively 
embarked upon the development of a national system (4)" Their most 
notable achievement was to support and contribute to the development 
of an infrastructure for the emerging system. From the reconetruo- 
tionist standpoint, their work and ideas on this subject are of interest 
for several reasons: first, in their adoption of the ideal of univer- 
salism, implicitly or explicitly propounded by all the reconstructionists. 
This took the form in the Webba' thought of universal schooling, but not, 
it should be noted, of a common school. Education for all was to be made 
effectively available, through physical provision of schools, materials, 
equipment, etc.; scholarship sup, Jort; and practical, modern courses 
likely to attract children and youth uninterested in typical academic 
programmes. Since universal schooling, in western societies at any 
rate, has now been achieved, it is easy to underestimate the signifi- 
cance of this outlook at an earlier period. A rough analogy today 
is the movement towards, and the debate about, universal tertiary 
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education. The universalist quality in reconstruetionist thought 
would tend to support the indefinite extension of education, not 
necessarily through institutionalized means of the type now familiar, 
but perhaps, following the Webba, through the extension of part-time 
and continuation education in a wide variety of institutions. This 
extension, or something like it, is necessary if the democratic society 
is to become a reality, and sets distant targets for contemporary re- 
constructionist thinking. 
Second, Webb identified two stages of formal provision which we 
know now are of crucial importance in the education of'a mature, par- 
ticipating democracy. They are the related stages of pro-school pro- 
Tision, not just of public nursery olasses, but of nurture and pbyaical 
facilities; and young adult education in parenthood and in socio- 
political awareness. No society, with the possible exception of the 
Soviet IInion, has developed adequate provision at these critical stages. 
The Webbs were more appreciative than most reconstruotionists of the 
strategic importance in attitude formation of these two forms of edu- 
cational provision, and it was the Soviet achievement in these spheres 
that they wrote of so enthusiastically in their Soviet Communism. 
Third, Webb, with considerably more prescience than many professional 
educationists have displayed, identified the problem of institutional 
provision for adolescents who, not compelled to stay at school, must 
be persuaded through experimental courses, continuation classes, and new 
kinds of institutions, that education is a good which is worth pursuing. 
Fourth, he recognized the need, in a pluralistic society, to co-operate 
with other agencies, -, e. g., churches, trade unions, co-operatives, 
business firms, in developing universal education. Fifth, as an ex- 
perienced aziministrator, he accepted the strengths and limitations of 
existing institutions, and saw the need to work in large measure 
through these in order to reform an ongoing system (5). 
1.2 Assessment 
These are practical merits in the Fabian concept of a reformed 
and enlarged infrastructure of schooling which certain other recon- 
struotionists would regard as capitulation. For examples the implied 
acceptance of the existing socio-political system provoked Wells' hos- 
tile criticisms. We saw in Chapter IV that the Webbs themselves in 
the twenties and thirties came to recognize that the forces with whom 
they had been ready to compromise at an earlier stage had effectively 
forestalled the full realization of their more radical and holistic 
ideals. Thus, the education programme they advocated early in the 
twentieth century, while it was never repudiated by them, was submerged 
in their enthusiasm for the higher bureaucracy of the Soviet system. 
I noted in chapter IV the irony of their abandoning gradualism at about 
the time when its successes had begun to accumulate. There is a fur- 
ther irony in the Webbs' position. Their London programme of provision, 
while recognizing the need for schools to recognize and respond to the 
socio-cultural context, nevertheless affirmed the autonomy of teaching 
and learning. At this earlier stage, the Webbs had no apparent wish to 
absorb education into a monolithic state structure. A critical, socially 
reconstructive programme along Webb lines could have emerged, had the tea- 
chers accepted the full challenge which the Webbs and others offered to 
them. This was not entirely the fault of the teachers, as the Webbs 
and the whole Fabian movement did too little to stimulate forms of tea- 
cher education that might equip teachers to rise to this challenge. 
They seemed to assume that all their designs, schemes and proposals, if 
accepted by politicians and administrators, would be put into effect in 
the same spirit by teachers. Greater familiarity with the background, 
education and conditions of employment of teachers might have indicated 
to them the gulf between administrative structure, and teaching and learn- 
ing. A further point is that other movements in social and educational 
thought, of which T. P. Nunn's Education: its Data and First Principles 
is one example, encouraged teachers to adopt a far more individualistic 
outlook than that represented by the Webb form of collectivism (6). 
Greater awareness of ideological alternatives available to teachers and 
influential in their thinking might have led the Webbs to take a more 
serious view of the problem of gaining teacher, as distinct from ad- 
ministrative, acceptance of their ideas. 
The Webbs in the 1930s came to accept the Soviet system of effec- 
tively subserving educational institutions, the education of teachers, 
and the exercise of the teacher's role, to the political requirements 
of the central organs of the state. This may be thought to provide 
something of a counterbalance to their previous neglect of the problems 
of securing teacher acceptance and implementation of their ideas, but 
the consequence is that it could no longer be claimed that they con- 
caived education as an autonomous. recaustructive force in a plural 
society. 
2. Welle: Experimental Institutions 
2.1 Criticism of existing institutions 
I discussed some of 'Wells' criticism of existing educational prac- 
tice in Chapters X and XI. He was impatient of the impoverishment of 
mass education and of the traditional elitist institutions, the Iublio 
Schools and Oxford and Cambridge. The great majority of Public Schools 
he looked upon as invincible obstacles to change, which could not be reformed; 
they had to be by-passed, by the creation of new institutions. Most 
Public Schools, and their "world unrelated" curriculum go on because 
they have begun and because they represent powerful social interests 
(7). The ancient universities,, like the Public Schools, were in Wells' 
judgment out of touch with modern industrial life; he condemned their 
products for being unable to preach, write and explain. Wells produced 
several characters in his novels to match his stereotype of the univer- 
sity teacher as pompous, patronizing, prosy, timid, out of touch with 
the common man. He dismissed the older universities by likening them 
to a "beautiful sunset over a battle-field" (8). 
In view of Wells' distaste for Fabian compromise and detail, we 
should not expect to find any very precise proposals for the reform 
of existing institutions. We may perhaps infer from scattered re- 
ferences, and particularly from his criticism of existing arrange- 
ments, that he would support a universal, free, structurally integrated 
system of public schooling. But since he was intransigently hostile 
to very well entrenched non-public institutions - denominational schools 
in addition to those already mentioned - it is impossible to visualize 
just what form his proposed alternative system might take in Britain, 
where a national system of education has involved both fully publicly 
provided and denominational institutions (9). The Webba' compromise 
at least enabled them to work in partnership with institutions, which, 
while they embodied views and ideals the Fabians rejected, were funda- 
mental factors in the situation they wished to change. Like Clarke 
and Mannheim, the Webby recognized not only the validity but also the 
power of a complex cultural tradition. Wells denied the one and fre- 
quently disregarded the other. His grudging recognition of the strength 
of the forces sustaining the particular private or semi-private institutions 
he condemned prevented him from proposing a national system 
fully 
under public control. On the other hand, his opposition was so 
intense and his desire for tidy solutions so passionate that he 
felt unable to make any constructive proposals for partnership. 
Thus, his vague ideas about a universal system are incoherent, ex- 
cept in utopia, where people will have outgrown the need for com- 
promise and makeshift arrangements, and even the idea of organized 
institutions will have been replaced by a direct contact of minds 
with one another. 
2.2 Proposals for pioneering institutions: Oundle and "world brain" 
While dells had no coherent ideas for a universal system of education, 
he looked to certain kinds of minority institutions for a lead in educa- 
tional reform. This is as we should expect from the pronounced elitist 
strain in his reconstructionism: the common man and his ordinary ex- 
perience are rotten almost beyond retrieval, at least for the foresee- 
able future. The best to be hoped is that a few pioneering spirits 
will begin to think out ways of redesigning a better life for future 
ages. These pioneers may expect little success or reward initially, 
but they can increase the likelihood of their insights being accepted by 
wider audiences if they create experimental institutions. Wells made 
two such proposals: first, a remodelled boarding school, in which 
some of the future leaders in industry, politics and the professions 
can be properly educated; second, and much bolder, the idea of a uni- 
versal adult intelligence service. This latter proposal, reflects the 
eighteenth century idea of a universal encyclopaedia, transformed into 
a world-wide research and information retrieval service. 
Wells was fortunate to find in the reformed Public School, Oundle, 
under the headmastership of Sanderson, a prototype for his new secondary 
level boarding institution. He subsequently described it as "not 
so much a public school as a happy and all too brief lapse of a pub- 
lic school into education" 
(10). Sanderson, for whom Wells had a 
deep admiration, had a sufficiently similar outlook to Wells for the 
latter to invest his school, his thought and his work with many of 
the Wellsian educational prescriptions. Perhaps the chief effect 
of Oundle on Wells' thought was to give his grander and vaguer educa- 
tional ideals a focus and clarity they would never otherwise have 
achieved. Despite his recognition of the strength of the existing 
institutions which he despised, Wells supposed that the Sanderson 
model might be widely adopted, and Sanderson himself actively cam- 
paiLped to this end. It is just as well, however, that Wells pro- 
vided a three thousand year transition period, from the present to 
the ideal future, and that he assigned to the wars and depressions with 
which he interspersed the earlier stages of the transition the function 
of forcing awareness of the need for drastic reform. To depend upon 
isolated Public Schools to transform a total system, whose complexities, 
diversities, traditions, and power blocs the more cautious Webb had ap- 
preciated very well, is to adopt an extremely weak diffusion model. 
wells had nothing to say about the problems of recruiting like-minded 
people to these isolated institutions to ensure continuity, or about 
the problems of relating their expectations to those of other institu- 
tions with which, inevitably, they had and continue to have close as- 
sociations - e. g., the universities which he criticized so contemp- 
tuously. 
A school like Oundle - or the idealization of it in Wells' bio- 
graphy of Sanderson and in The Undyin-FFire - may be useful as an 
exemplar and as a stimulus to critical thought about existing institutions; 
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its very uniqueness, which delighted Wells, makes it a far too limited 
model for the reform of a national school system. To propose, as 
Wells did, that we should look upon Oundle as, in Sanderson's words, 
a "microcosm of the new world" is to conceive that new world in the 
very narrowest of tsrms, as the sub-culture of a particular group. 
Sanderson intended his pupils to treat this maxim as a guide to their 
own future conduct, but :: "ells interpreted it to mean that the life of 
the school could somehow provide a pattern for the future society. 
Whatever one may feel about the quality of this life, it is absurd 
to suppose that in a complex society such a highly particularized school 
model could indicate even the very general features of this society. 
Wells' second proposal, for a world brain, may sound at first no 
more realistic than the hopes he entertained of Oundle. Yet several 
of the ideas expressed in the world brain proposal are quite practical, 
given modern teehnoloar and the rapid development of international 
scholarship since the second world war. There is also in Wells' world 
brain propo: +al a concern for universal adult education which goes some 
way to meet the objection that schools and teachers, as he perceived 
them, lacked the skills, resources and ideals to perform the recon- 
structive role he admonished them to adopt. 
On the . rone hand, Wells observed the Northcliffe-Harmsworth Press 
empire mis-educati Cy, a gullible public by exploiting their newly won 
literacy through narrow, nationalistic, emotionally-trite journalism: 
"a roaring factory of hasty printing", as he called it in The Dream. 
On the other hand, he held out a prospect of rational, enlightened world 
consciousness, with the thought systems and discoveries of modern science 
and scholarship universally disseminated and assimilated. An encyclo- 
paedia of a new type was to achieve this. Like Diderot's encyclopaedia, 
his was to aim at an interpretative unity of knowledbe and not be a more 
assemblage of facts: the "world brain" was, in the best eighteenth cen- 
tury manner to usher in the rule of science. Unlike Diderot's scheme, 
Wells' encyclepasdia was to remain in continuous creation; not so much 
a set of books (although there would be books) as an international com- 
munication' system of classification, analysis and rapid dissemination in 
several media. The service would be provided by an international federa- 
tion of research institutions and universitiesa 
"a sort of mental clearing house for the mind, a depot where 
knowledge and ideas are received, sorted, summarized, digested, 
clarified and compared" (11). 
we have begun to be familiar with at least the beginnings of what 
Wells outlined, for example$ through the work of national and inter- 
national clearing-house systems in the physical and social sciences] 
through the growth in abstracting and digest services, also on an inter- 
national scale; and through information retrieval systems in libraries. 
But these systems and services are highly specialist; they are not opera- 
tionally inter-related in the manner advocated by Wells, and they have 
not succeeded in creating the "world intelligence" amongst the masses 
(or the leaders, for that matter) that he hoped for. The explanation 
is in part that the more holistic and universalist of Wells' objectives 
do not characterize these newer services and systems. For Welle, they 
were an essential feature. Yet, despite his criticism of previous 
utopian theories on the grounds that they had failed to consider rele- 
vant details, he failed either to establish any theoretical principles 
for the integration of knowledge, or to show just how the average citi- 
zen might be encouraged to substitute for his present cultural interests 
and enthusiasms the highly esoteric, conceptual concerns of international 
scientific culture. The latter depends in part on the former, for, 
lacking any unifying and simplifying principle, the total culture 
of science cannot be popularized in the way Wells envica3ed. No 
programme of multi-media adult education alone could achieve this, 
and the answer, if there is one, must include the early and continuing 
education of children, a point that Frank appreciated, as we saw 
in 
Chapter XII. Wells, by contrast, had no coherent proposals for uni- 
versal schooling, although he was an enthusiastic advocate of popular, 
mass education. Despite this enthusiasm, he failed to show just how 
we might build the foundation of disposition, habit and mental growth 
without which "world brain" as a universal phenomenon would be inef- 
feotivo. His institutional schemes could not, therefore, meet the 
universalistic demands he made upon them, but they would in all pro- 
bability reinforce the elitist and separatist aspects of his culture 
theory, without rehabilitating mass culture. So far, then, from pro- 
ducing an intellectually sophisticated democracy, they would in all 
probability increase elite-Hass differences, thus itensifying one of 
the cultural disunities which Wells sought to eliminate. 
3. Experimentalism and the Democratization of Public Education 
A very different set of questions from those we have been con- 
sidering was posed by the experimentalists in their criticisms of 
traditional schools and their proposals for creating a truly demo- 
cratic structure of schooling. Those differences arise largely from 
the fact that universal, publicly provided and controlled schooling 
was, when they wrote, already well established in the United States. 
The basic structures were certainly faulty, in the jud rent of all the 
experimentalists, but these faults were not so grave that they could 
not be remedied. Thus the major institutional objectives were not 
to create a public system, as with the Webbs, nor to by-pass it, as 
wells at times proposed, but to enlarge, clarify and refine an exist- 
ing public system. This is pre-eminently a reconatructionist system- 
objective, and it parallels, at the level of systems, what Dewey pro- 
posed for individual experience and for cultural renewal; namely, a 
re-making or a reconstruction of what was already there. Of course, 
the reconstruotionists were not all agreed about how best to do this. 
Suggestions ranged from Dewey's and Kilpatrick's reconstruction of the 
existing forms of public schooling to the more sweeping proposal by 
Rugg, and by Brameld - the latter's a more moaest suggestion - for uni- 
versal adult-education (12). However, the seeds of these later, more 
ambitious, schemes were planted by Dewey at the beginning of this cen- 
tury when, in The School and Society, he attempted to enlist active 
adult support for the experimental work of the laboratory School at 
the University of Chicago (13). 
Much of what I have discussed in preceding chapters bears both 
directly and indirectly on experimentalist ideas about the reform of 
the school and of schooling conceived as social institutions. I shall 
not attempt to recapitulate these earlier discussions, but instead shall 
raise what I take to be the two major issues on this theme explored by 
the experimentaliots: 
1. Criticisms of traditional and progressivo schools. 
2. Proposals for the democratization of publio education, 
and for building new patterns of sohool"coity relations. 
3.1 Criticisms of traditional and tiropressive schools 
The traditional school, or rather the stereotype which became familiar 
through a barrage of criticism lasting from Dewey's earliest writings to 
the present day, was condemned on many different counts, So far as the 
institutional life of the school is concerned, Dewey concentrated his 
attack on the authoritarian direction of educational policies, the 
remoteness of schools from other social institutions, and the failure 
of schools to co-ordinate the different aspects of their work. These 
criticisms were taken up by Dewey's followers. Kilpatrick, for example, 
held that the determination of curriculum policy and selection of teach- 
ing materials by school boards, administrators and university specialists 
prevented the teacher from exercising the freedom of choice ahd flexibility 
which were an essential part of the experimentalist position which he 
outlined in The Foundations of Method (14). Bode, arguing that the re- 
moteness of the school from other social institutions was not' so much a 
matter of clear commitment to older and now obsolete purposes as evi- 
dence of uncertainty and confusion about the social role of schooling, 
proposed that the school should undertake to clarify the meaning of de- 
mocracy (15). Dewey had argued for this conception of the school's task 
in his earlier works; he wrote more forcibly in the 1930s, when, in 
Experience and Education, he condemned the aimlessness and triviality of 
much that was culled progressive education. In his earlier criticism, 
he had been more concerned about the persistence of what he described 
as traditional models of schooling, which were based on a false psy- 
chology of learning and on a view of society deriving from a pre-indus- 
trial era. I have already discussed Dewey's criticisms of the ne leot 
in traditional schooling of children's impulsive life and of the prac- 
tical and co-operative enterprises which he believed the emerging in- 
dustrial democracy required. His argument about the older perception 
of the social role of the school is closely related to his theory of 
social change. In a fairly stable, or slowly changing, society, of 
which small, and relatively homogeneous, communities are a leading feature, 
educational responsibilities are widely distributed amongst several 
different and responsible institutions: family, neighborhood group, 
church, occupational group, etc. The impact of rapid industriali- 
zation upon these institutions is highly disruptive: commerce and 
trade supplant self-sufficiency and convert inward-looking groups 
into complex societies; populations move; extended family units are 
split and separated; the transmission of traditional occupational skills 
through apprenticeship is replaced by large scale and accelerated train- 
ing schemes; and newer ideological viewpoints arise to challenge traditional 
religion and the older community ethos. In these kinds of unstable si- 
tuations, the commonly accepted role of the school as an institution 
for establishing literacy, transmitting settled bodies of knowledge, 
and training for a determinate character, is challenged in many dif- 
ferent ways. Its settled assumptions about the educative role of 
other institutions are no longer valid; its stable perception of its 
own role is replaced by uncertainty, misgivings and doubt (16). This 
is typically a "problem situation" in Dewey's language, and we must not 
be surprised to find in schools the characteristic responses of retreat 
into the older orientations, and condemnation of the "mis-educative" 
changes taking place in society at large. For Dewey, by contrast, 
reconstruction, or problem-solving, should in this situation take the 
form of a determination to come to grips with changing social realities. 
This will require concentrated study by educationists, and in schools, 
of the dynamic social forces, an assessment of the extent to which other 
institutions have abandoned or lost control of their educational purpose, 
and a commitment to develop a new institutional purpose and form to de- 
fine a new educational role in the changing circumstances. 
In assuming a new purpose and character, the school undergoes vast 
changes, but these changes, while they impose severe strain on all 
concerned, provide an opportunity for the school to assume a 
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greater responsibility for directed cultural change than has previously 
been possible. This is because the emerging industrial society re- 
quires a more universal, a more intensive education, than has ever 
before been demanded, and an education qualitatively different from 
previous forms. Only the school can contribute the intelligently 
directed, scientifically grounded type of education which Dewey re- 
commended, but he and his followers made it very plain that the school 
could not do this alone. The impetus to change comes very largely from 
changes in other institutions, particularly those of economic life. 
Furthermore, only by working with other social forces and institutions 
can the school expect eventually to give to industrial society the stamp 
of an educative society (17). 
An educative society, for Dewey, is a democratic society in which 
reflective thinking has been thoroughly institutionalized. The school 
must therefore become an institution which is structured according to 
the values of democracy and rationality and organized so as effectively 
to initiate all its members into the cultures of scientific rationality 
and democracy. As Hardie, in his criticism of Dewey, pointed out, there 
is no logical entailment here, but this is a criticism which has never 
affected the experimentalist convictions about the desirability of a 
reconstructed democratic school (18). 
The fundamental weakness of the traditional, as, indeed, of the 
child-centred progressive, schools was, on this argument, their failure 
to accept the challenge to define a new social role for the school in 
the light of rapid industrial change. For Counts, who in this matter 
was influenced as much by the economist and social critic, Veblen, as 
by Dewey, this failure was a consequence of teacher commitment to 
middle-class, individualistic, values, and of the dominance of school 
boards and educational programmes by middle-class and business interests 
(19)" The middle classes, according to Counts, assumed that family 
prosperity and culture, together with the wider social opportunities 
their money could purchase, provided what was in their terms an adequate 
cultural background to schooling. Counts challenged both their beliefs 
about its adequacy, and their disregard of the cultural conditions af- 
fecting the education of the mass of children. He felt that all the 
classes, though for different reasons, needed a school system more 
consciously directed by the ends of social sensitivity, awareness, 
and the skills needed in a rapidly changing order. Like Dewey and 
Kilpatrick, however, Counts cautioned the schools to recognize their 
limitations as change agents, and to identify social forces and in- 
stitutions with which they could ally themselves in forming a spear- 
head of social change (20). Chief among the institutions with which 
Counts recommended the schools to associate themselves were those of 
organized labor and, for a time, he and Childs departed from the main 
body of experimentalist thought by advocating a vaguely defined class- 
war rule foil teachers (21). 
3.2 Democratization of public institutions 
In a variety of ways, the public school system was being admonished 
to achieve awareness of its historic mission to educate a democracy. 
But one great difficulty was that the public schools were themselves 
very undemocratic in their internal teaching and organization, and were 
harnessed into systems which were undemocratically administered. The 
experimentalists, and especially Dewey and Kilpatrick, were amongst the 
leading American critics of the "cult of efficiency" in school administration, 
arguing for the priority of democratic criteria over those imported 
into education from cost-conscious business (22). But, given these 
pressures, how was the school to become a rationalistic, democratic 
institution, acquiring a structure and an atmosphere conducive to 
the newer kind of education and, henoe, expressive of the best as- 
pirations of the society of the future? Dewey at Chicago and other 
experimentalists in experimental schools attached to university de- 
partments of education tried to show what the new democratic insti- 
tutions would be like (23). However, they did not, as Wells had done, 
restrict their hopes for reform to these minority institutions. 
Through their writings and the substantial programme of teacher educa- 
tion they built up at universities, including Columbia, Chicago, Illinois, 
Ohio State, Florida and many others, they explored ways of achieving the 
democratization of the total educational system. This effort to 
operationalize the concept of democracy may be summarized as a com- 
posite model. This model has these key elements: 
total school participation in policy making, and curriculum 
design, but not to the detriment of individual role perfor- 
mance, e. g., by the expert and experienced teacher; 
direction of the school's interests and work towards wider 
social issues and community concern in the form of clarifi- 
cation of issues and analysis of cultural trends; 
creation within the school of a community-living atmosphere 
distinguished by ease of relationships, and co-operation; 
treatment of all children as individuals worthy of respect 
and in need of individual treatment as well as group- 
solidarity experience; 
encouragement of pupil initiative, activity and freedom. 
Of course, at this level of generality, there is a danger that 
recommendations will degenerate into slogans and it has been one of the 
unfortunate consequences of the popularization of experimentalism that 
generalized slogans were adopted in place of the reflective, critical 
analysis of purposes and procedures so strongly emphasized by Dewey 
and Bode. 
It will be apparent that even at the level of generality the 
experimentalists proposed a marked shift in the locus of school 
authority and power. To democratize a public school system meant 
affirming the rights and increasing the responsibility of the mass 
of those involved - teachers and pupils,, parents and the wider com- 
munity - for the construction of the norms and procedures of the 
schools. This meant challenging not only very powerful forces within 
the educational system; the hierarchy of administration, school boards, 
state departments of education, and universities$ but also the attitudes, 
beliefs and institutional strength of many extra-school agencies, parti- 
oularly social pressure groups like business, labor and agriculture 
lobbies. It was rash in the extreme to suppose that these groups 
might acquiesce in the view that schools are "maintained by society 
for its own progressive reconstruction" (24). 
Instead of advocating a direct confrontation, which would have been 
ineffective and in any case antithetical to the spirit of co-operation 
and community-wide policy making$ the experimentalists proposed to de- 
velop a network of active school-community relationships from which now 
policies might emerge. Rugg's advocacy of massive universal adult 
education programmes to develop understanding and enlist support for the 
school's new conception of its task was one such proposal. A second 
move in procuring widespread support for educational change was the 
effort to increase direct community, participation in policy making. 
This was an extremely risky procedure, given the anti-educational 
character of some of the pressure groups, but it was necessary if the 
teachers were not to appear to arrogate to themselves the right of 
determining the new, wider role for education as remaker of society. 
We shall see, when discussing Brameld's ideas on consensus later 
in 
this chapter, that other difficulties arise from the attempt to secure 
wide community participation in the redefinition of the ends of social 
policy. A third proposal of the experimentalists was to make 
the 
school itself a kind of community centre, outward-looking so 
far as 
its programme of study was concerned, ready to provide a multitude of 
community services, and to bring individuals and groups from the wider 
community into the ambit of the school 
(25). 
The experimentalist campaign to democratize the public school 
system represents a fuller appreciation of the extent of the problem 
of systematically relating educational institutions to the tasks of 
cultural development than do the proposals of earlier writers. The 
existence in the United States of something approaching a universal 
public school system provided the experimentalists with an institution 
which was capable of reaching and influencing the entire population. 
Their analysis of the breakdown of community enabled them to ascribe 
to the school educative functions previously exercised, or thought to 
be exercised, by more diverse, less easily controlled, social insti- 
tutions. By outlining and frequently reiterating a detailed programme 
for the democratization of schools and the whole school system, they 
sought to give them the character they thought was necessary to pre- 
cipitate out of present social uncertainties the rational democracy 
of the future. 
Each of their major proposals, however, raises difficulties which 
they have not adequately analysed. The notion of reaching an entire 
population is more intelligible in a totalitarian or a highly centralized 
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system of educational control than it is in a system which, at the 
time the experimentalists wrote, comprised literally thousands of 
local systems. These local systems were all autonomous in certain 
respects; each was linked up into some wider system, but never into 
an articulated national system which was, in the fashion recommended 
by the Webbs, controlled, and energized from some single source. 
Thus, against the fact, utilized by the experimentalists, that all 
children pass through the system of schooling, must be placed. the 
lese frequently acknowledged fact of the enormous diversity of the 
sub-unite of this system. There is some self-deception involved in 
thinking that all children can be "reached" through this kind of system. 
It might well be that some other system of influence would be more 
amenable to change, on experimentalist lines, or that some strategic 
sub-section of the school system could be more easily reached and be 
more influential than the totality of public schoolss for example, 
the mass media, -io-t associations of school superintendents, or colleges 
of education. None of these latter institutions was in fact ignored 
by the experimentalists. Indeed, they have been attacked for "indoc- 
trinating" the future staff of colleges of education from the great cen- 
tres of educational power such as Teaoherh' College, Columbia (26). 
However, the main force of experimentalist argument and exhortation was 
directed at the total school system, with the apparent expectation' that 
not some part of it might change to lead the way, but that the whole of 
it would be transformed. This is another form of the characteristic 
enthusiasm of the reconstructionists for "wholes", their relative neg- 
lect of problems of priority and effective use of resources, and their 
general optimism that progress, in their terms, could be achieved on 
all fronts. The experimentalists were not unaware of obstacles; they 
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perceived many barriers to change, within the educational system 
and in other sectors of society. It was not ignorance of effec- 
tive change mechanisms, but their very commitment to the democratic 
creed, which dictated this undifferentiated progression on all fronts. 
Thus, if an idea or a pedagogical procedure could be shown to have 
value, either by demonstration in an experimental school or by argu- 
mentation, then a very powerful motive impelled the experimentalists 
to seek to universalize this idea with all speed. Their concern for 
equality of consideration, for the claim of all children to individual 
treatment, for the equal worth of all children, and their confidence 
in the capacity of science and technology to satisfy wants, including 
educational wants, encouraged them to seek universal, rapid applica- 
tions. Anything less would be discrimination and timidity. While 
this does not mean that they naively expected quick results, it does 
point to a dilemma in the reconstructionist theory. To the extent 
that it conceives democracy as the universalization of values and pro- 
cedures in schooling, it is likely to underestimate problems of imple- 
mentation. To the extent that such problems are given priority of 
treatment, the universalist aspirations of the democratic creed must 
be held in abeyance. These are issues which have become increasingly 
important in contemporary developing societies where scarce resources 
and European academic traditions combine to frustrate the socialist 
idealism of advocates of mass, popular education (27)- 
A problem of quite a different order arises when we consider what 
it is the school is required to do in its efforts to institutionalize 
democratic and scientific values. The experimentalists conceived 
education as a process directed by these values. Their discussions 
of how schooling might become more democratic and more scientific led 
them at times very nearly to the point where all distinctions between 
education and other worthwhile activities evaporated. This tendency 
is already apparent in Dewey's early criticisms of the "formalism" of 
the traditional school and its neglect of contemporary life. It was 
Kilpatrick, however, by directing the school to attend to "life", to 
equate its instructional programme with living, and to conceive of edu- 
cation as synonymous with the quest for the good life, who brought to 
the fore all the inherent expansionist possibilities of the experimen- 
talist theory. 
Dewey had rightly argued that, with the breakdown of traditional 
communities, the school was faced with new tasks. These tasks could 
be tackled by the school assuming a "residual" role, taking up those 
educative functions which other institutions were abandoning. However, 
this role expanded to become almost an all-inclusive, nurturing role. 
In addition to clouding distinctions between any and all processes of 
human development and education, the equation of education with growth 
and the commitment of schools to an enlarged educational role, raise 
very serious institutional difficulties. It becomes virtually im- 
possible to distinguish admissible from inadmissible roles for the school, 
since almost anything it does can be given an educational character, 
or turned to educational use. But as a distinguishable, if not always 
very distinct, social institution, with enormous possibilities, but 
limited human and material resources, and with a role to define in relation 
to other institutions, some of them educational, the school needs clearer 
and more limited criteria than those provided by experimentalism. It 
would not be unjust to say that the experimentalists rescued the school 
from the traditional and progressivist misconceptions, but, by liberat- 
ing and, as it were, socializing, it, they lost sight of distinctions 
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which are both conceptually and institutionally highly important. 
They recognized the need for a fresh definition of the role of the 
school, but their own contributions have created further problems 
and uncertainties. 
4, Mannheim and Clarke, the School as a Transitional Society 
In Mannheim's ideal of a democratically planned society, the 
school was cast into the role of the chief, but by no means the sole, 
agency for universalizing the new kind of planning mentality while 
preserving vital elements in the elitist tradition. Clarke, although 
influenced by Mannheim's diagnosis of crisis, was less interested in 
the departures schools might make in achieving the new planning men- 
tality than in treating them as one agency amongst many in the slow but 
steady evolution towards an educative society. Both regarded educa- 
tion as a force in society whose full effect could be felt only if it 
entered into alliance with other agencies: 
"No educational system is able to maintain emotional 
stability and mental integrity in the new generation, unless 
it has a kind of common strategy with the social agencies 
outside the school" (28). 
While neither Clarke nor Mannheim expounded very precise structural 
ideas concerning the school system, both used transitional and evolutionary 
models which depended on initial acceptance of the system as it was. By 
"transitional" I have in mind two ideas. First, "transitional" refers 
in Mannheim's and Clarke's thought to the movement which is required 
from the institutions and thinking of the more or lees chaotic, unplanned 
past to a planned future, with the school conceived as one of the chief 
transitional agencies, or an institution in which society experiments 
and learns about new possibilities. This was an Idea that appealed 
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very much to Mannheim (29). Second, Mannheim and Clarke intended 
by "transitional" the more familiar idea of the school as a transi- 
tional society through which the child learns to clarify his experience 
and to come to terms with the impersonal, secondary groups of the adult 
world (30). By "evolutionary" I mean Clarke's and Mannheim's accep- 
tance of the value of a steady, continuous modification of existing 
institutions and the development of now ones within the overall frame- 
work of the "English system" (31). I shall disregard any historicist 
tendency in Mannheim's thinking, since, in discu3sing educational insti- 
tutions, he never invoked the doctrine of necessary and inevitable 
change, nor suggested that the system was moving inexorably toward 
Borne clear and definite ends. 
4.1 Modifying and extending public education 
Clarke and Mannheim greatly admired what they took to be the 
flexibility and adaptability of the English system. They were equally 
impressed by its long term stability and continuity. However, they 
proposed two kinds of change, one of which comprised modifications of 
elements within the system, while the other involved a much vaguer 
notion of the overall directions of the system. 
4.1.1 Modifications of the system 
Taking modifications of elements within the system first, we find 
a variety of proposals. These proposals may be reviewed very briefly. 
They'took the form both of modifying and extending the existing system. 
Modifying meant reducing the class bias of the tripartite system and 
increasing the public accessibility of the Public Schools and grammar 
schools, through scholarships, improved selection procedures, and the 
development of various links of the type proposed in the McNair Report. 
Clarke went beyond this to advocate an extended structure of public 
education very similar to that recommended by the 
Plowden Committee 
and now in operation in some parts of the country: junior, middle 
and senior schools linked in a continuity of stages. 
He also re- 
commended, as did Mannheim, the development of a universal system of 
continuation and adult education to follow on an enlarged secondary 
system (32). 
Both Clarke and Mannheim treated the specialist preparation of the 
elites as one of the elements in the tradition which should be sus- 
tained and strengthened. They divided education into "preparatory" 
and "advanced" in the Platonic-Aristotelian fashion, a reminder not 
only of classical but also Jesuitical influences on their thinking. 
Thus, public education was, despite the reformed pedagogy Mannheim in 
particular stressed, to be in a subtle sense assimilative, in that 
the child was to absorb the values, patterns of behavior and knowledge 
structure relevant to the "planning era": 
"You cannot create a new moral world mainly based upon 
rational value appreciation, i. e., values whose social and 
psychological function is intelligible, and at the same time 
maintain an educational system which in its essential tech- 
niques works through the creation of inhibitions and tries 
to prevent the growth of judgment" (33). 
However, Mannheim was careful to point out that the new moral 
world would enter the consciousness first of a minority and only 
gradually, and in a simplified form, would it spread to the masses. 
Only a minority of adults could be expected to act with intelligence 
and a wider sense of social responsibility, since the exercise of these 
%ualities depends upon a highly disciplined, lengthy training combining 
intellectual excellence with sustained submission to moral standards. 
The relationship between elite-orientated secondary schools and uni- 
versities on the one hand, and the mass systems of primary, secondary, 
and adult education on the other were never made clear. Both Mannheim 
and Clarke wanted a reform of the Public and grammar schools and of 
the universities, together with the enlargement of adult education 
programmes, to encourage them not only to become more conscious of 
their place as elements in a wider system but also to substitute a 
modern for a traditional curriculum. However, it is possible to 
make such changes without making any basic alteration in the relation- 
ships between different kinds of institutions - for example, the 
mechanisms of selection, transfer, and progression through the system. 
Mannheim made many inconclusive suggestions, signifying mistrust of 
the existing techniques and suspicion that they expressed inequalities 
of cultural background, including wealth, rather than the more objec- 
tive factors of ability and attainment (34). From these observations 
and criticisms we might infer a purely meritocratic intent, but, as I 
argued in Chapter VII, Mannheim hoped to fuse meritoeratio principles 
with those less tangible considerations of birth, position and tradi- 
tion which determine aristocratic elite selection. The lack of any 
very definite scheme for this process of elite recruitment also charac- 
terized his thought on the relationships between mass and elite insti- 
tutions within the educational system. 
Mannheim was more precise in discussing the pattern of life which 
he hoped might come to govern individual schools. Both he and Clarke 
wanted schools that were more "life-like" in the experimentalist manner, 
and more closely related in their programmes of study to the world out- 
side the school, preparing: 
"a groundwork for social life by providing a focus for other- 
wise unrelated educational activities ... The school may thus perform its special task by intensifying and systematiz- 
ing social experience" (35). 
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This remark of Mannheim's echoes not only Dewey and Kilpatrick, 
but 
also Clarke, who, in his early volume Eseavs in the Politics of 
Edu- 
cation, written when he was professor of education at Cape 
Town, 
proposed bringing children "into their inheritance in the common 
life of their kind", through the study of social institutions and 
forms of common cultural experience (36). 
In the previous section of this chapter we saw that this kind of 
proposal may indefinitely, extend the role of the school. Clarke 
in 
particulars and Mannheim to a lesser extent, were, however, anxious 
to avoid this. Thus Clarke criticized Tawney and the Labour Party 
for directing their policy of secondary education exclusively at the 
school, instead of doing more to strengthen the family and to build 
up - what was to become a favorite term of Clarke's - the "educative 
society"' (37). 
4.1.2 Overall system objectives 
Clarke was never very clear just how society was to become educa- 
tive, nor as to how a common culture could be developed and communicated, 
without a profound transformation of the schools. Apart from any more 
positive role they might perform, schools could, unless greatly changed, 
provide obstacles to the more idealistic conception of education which 
Clarke hoped to see permeate society. Clarke's opposition to an all- 
inclusive educative role for schools was based on a consideration which 
sharply separates his thought from Mannheim's. This is his fear of a 
state monopoly of education (38). He conceived the state not as a 
universal provider and determiner of educational policy, but as a co- 
ordinator of effort, almost as a Platonic kind of guardian of the ideal 
of an educative society. Thus he called for "unification" without 
"uniformity" (39). The state, however, was to be the unifier, so it 
is difficult to see how this proposal avoids the state direction which 
Clarke feared, It is unfortunate that Clarke did not develop his 
thought on this subject, for it raises one of the most profound of 
the issues of state-school relationships. In discussing the report 
of the Kothari committee, I pointed to the difficulty of maintaining 
the freedom and autonomy of educational institutions and processes 
when it is a major objective of national policy to enlist education 
in a programme of modernization for which there is a desperate need. 
In less pressing circumstances, it is a duty of oducationists to find 
ways of relating educational policy to other elements in national policy 
without losing sight of the peculiar importance of education as a ori- 
tical and creative force. Clarke's remarks on avoiding a state mono- 
poly show an awareness of the problem and serve as a reminder that this 
relationship constantly needs to be reviewed and redefined. 
Mannheim was prepared to concede to the school a more powerful 
educational role by comparison with other institutions than was Clarke. 
He was also very much less perturbed at the thought of a state monopoly 
of education - at least a monopoly in overall educational planning, if 
not in institutional provision. This overall planning strategy meant 
co-ordinatiog the efforts of schools and other social institutions which 
do or might perform an educational role. 
The common strategy involving schools and other agencies, as we 
saw in Chapters VII and X, is one which seeks to build new personali- 
ties through the transformation of existing institutions and the mani- 
pulation of group controls. Thus, in his comments on the overall 
direction of the educational system, Mannheim was more rigorous and 
consistent than Clarke, who on the one hand wanted the co-ordination 
of state control, but on the other balked at the consequence in the form 
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of greatly enhanced state power. Yet Clarke's unease on this point 
underlines a very serious deficiency in Mannheim's proposals. If 
the schools can come to acquire the determinate role in shaping per- 
sonality that Mannheim supposed, and if the exercise of this role is 
determined by an overall, state-controlled strategy which relates all 
educational agencies within a common personality-shaping policy, we 
have a system which may be effective, but only by being totalitarian. 
The school becomes part of the man-making apparatus of the modern state, 
as the Webfis were pleased to find it in Soviet Russia; and man-making, 
to the extent that it is equated with the shaping of human material, 
ceases to be an educational process (40). There are perhaps self- 
consistent arguments for totalitarianism, but I have tried to show 
that these arguments must proceed by disregarding any claims that might 
be made for education as a fundamentally critical process. Mannheim 
accepted this critical conception of education and he also maintained 
that the "third way" of democratic rational planning avoids the totali- 
tarian tendencies of state communism and fascism. However, I should 
argue that the centralization of an educational policy-making apparatus 
in homogeneous elites of state officials, and the fusing of educational 
policy with centralized political-economic-social policy, effectively 
inhibits or destroys the diverse and democratic qualities which g, annheim 
recommended schools to adopt. Against Mannheim's quest for culture 
unity we may set a profound split in his theory between the totalistic 
elements in the creation and implementation of national educational 
policy and his recommendation, following Dewey and Counts, that 
schools should assume as their special function the interpretation 
of "all phases of life in terms of democratic experience" (41). Given 
the power which Mannheim himself noted is accruing to central institutions 
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and "key positions" in the industrial society, it is most unlikely, 
therefore, that the schools would become the sources and agencies 
of cultural renewal. Instead, the strategic territory of culture 
growth would be monopolized by the policy-making elites. Dewey 
rightly remarked on the difficulty of developing a school into a 
participatory, sharing democratic community when its goals, materials, 
resources, etc., are all externally determined. Despite the slight- 
ness of his analysis of state-school relationships, Clarke seemed to 
have had a better appreciation than Mannheim of this problem of re- 
lating school autonomy, experimentation and innovativenesa, to the 
targets set by a national development plan. 
5" Later Experimentalists: the Schools and Consensus 
Reconstructionism has meant for the later experimentalists not so 
much new kinds of educational institutions as experimental uses of 
public schooling, and the redefining of power and authority relation- 
ships between schools and the hierarchy of educational control (42). 
If their proposals are far-ranging, the post-war reconstruotionists 
have nevertheless accepted that the ideal of the reconstruction of cul- 
ture through education depends for its realization very largely upon 
the public school system. 
5.1 Raup and associates: participation 
In previous chapters I drew attention to a problem in Rugg's and 
Brameld's thought which arises from their advocacy both of a consensus- 
seeking procedure of policy-making, and of determinate schemes based on 
some model of an ideal future state of culture. In Chapter XII we 
considered some of the issues associated with a content of cultural 
studies directed by the ideal of a unified world civilization. Since 
the schools were expected totnach their pupils the arts of democratic 
deliberation, we should also examine their role in relation to the con- 
sensus proposal. Raup and his associates made a succinct statement 
of the doctrine: 
"'s`hoever may be affected by a decision or policy shall 
in some way have a part in shaping it" (43)" 
They specified three levels on which this principle should become effec- 
tive: making decisions, making policies, and reconstructing the basic 
norms of conduct. It is interesting to see how far, through the recent 
use of the "charette" principle in formulating school-building policy, 
their argument has been acted upon in the upsurge of participatory 
politics in the 'United States (44)- 
5.2 Brameldt consensus 
Brameld examined the problems arising at the different levels of 
control, on each of which he wished to see the consensus principle intro- 
duced in order to convert reconstructionism from a utopian to a power- 
orientated theory. He argued first for the determination of educa- 
tional policy through the increased exercise of federal control. 
Second, in the spirit of Counts, he suggested the reorganization of 
school boards to make them more representative, especially of the work- 
ing class. Third, he wanted to see a more responsible and democratic 
exercise of local and re3ional educational leadership. Fourth, he 
raised the question of control conceived as "majority-determined order 
for attainment of majority-desired goals" within schools (45). 
Unfortunately, his analysis failed to distinguish two different 
sets of activities, both relevant to a democratic theory of consensus, 
control and authority. The first of these consists of individuals of 
roughly equal standing in face-to-face relationships, seeking agreement 
on some decision they need to make or policy they need to determine. 
The second refers to decisions taken and policies made, by repre- 
sentatives or delegates who in some sense can claim to speak for the 
wishes or the interests of larger groups of whom they form a part. 
Democratic societies and perhaps all others provide occasions for 
both types of decision and to this extent schools engaged in educat- 
ing children for active membership of democratic society should attend 
to both types of decision, whether by te-. iching, which involves direct 
experience, or by a more indirect preparation. It is not at all clear, 
from an undifferentiated democratic standpoint, that in the determina- 
tion of the procedures governing relationships amongst pupils and tea- 
chers, greater emphasis should be given to one or the other of these 
two types of decision. Should we, be giving children more experience 
of "direct democracy", or teaching them about the workings of repre- 
sentative and impersonal systems of government? The "democratic 
criterion", frequently invoked by reconstruotionists, is too crude 
to serve as the clear guide which they sometimes assumed it to be. 
The difference between the direct and representative approabches may 
be illustrated by reference to two types of school. 
The first approach is represented by Neill's Summerhili, where 
a weekly school meeting to discuss policy is conducted by pupils. In 
this meeting, pupils and teachers, at least superficially, are put on 
to an equal footing in the discussion and voting; there are a few 
matters settled by fiat, e. g., physical safely and health, and come 
by state law and acquiescence in public opinion, but virtually all 
other matters may be decided by majority vote. These include Brameld's 
"majority-determined order", since discipline is frequently debated (46). 
I do not wish to embark upon a discussion of the more subtle constraints 
affecting children's opinions and votes in this kind of situation, beyond 
noting that the idea of consensus as a higher order of agreement, or a 
reconstruction of all existing, divergent beliefs into a new idea, is 
not a necessary feature of this scheme. It may even be largely lost 
to view in a rapid succession of "complaint, argument, vote, next 
item". At any rate, behind consensus lies a form of awareness which, 
as Raup and his associates and Stanley saw, requires careful prepara- 
tion, training and self-discipline; it cannot be expected to arise 
spontaneously in children's discussion groups, although, occasionally, 
insightful individuals may light upon it. 
The second and much more familiar approach to the question of con- 
sensus in schools is for those vested with authority, the teachers, and 
especially senior staff, to claim to speak for the agreed aims of the 
community whom they represent, which is not simply the community of 
children but that of a vaguely defined society. Decisions are taken 
by teachers which may or may not satisfy the wishes of children, but 
which are intended to express a judgment about what society at large, 
which includes children as one of the set groups, either wants or needs. 
The difference between want and need is of course highly significant, 
for in the former case the school is directed by a notion of adjust- 
ment to society, whereas in the latter it is directed by the notion 
of educating society to an awareness of what in best for it. The 
former is not the reconstruetionist approach, whereas the latter is, 
however unclear and uncertain reconstructionists may be about the con- 
cept of need and the most effective way of translating the need concept 
into a school action programme. 
Returning to Brameld's consideration of the question of levels on 
which the consensus principle might operate, we may now see several 
difficulties arising from his argument. First, the increased 
exercise of federal control implies consensus of the type where 
representatives claim to speak for "the people" and to express 
majority wishes. I need not enter into the details of this claim, 
for it is obvious that it gives rise to a mass of problems about 
majority wishes, how they are ascertained, the rights of lenisla- 
tore to determine policies against majority wishes, and so forth. 
Second, the reorganization of local units, e. g, school boards, to 
increase the representation of the working classes, raises the ques- 
tion of "local option" and the extent to which local units mij, ht opt 
out of a federally determined policy. Desegregation of schools is a 
case in point. The stronger and more fully representative of 
local opinion these units become, the greater the possibility of con- 
flict between the national "consensus" and the local "consensus". 
Third, the responsible exercise of educational leadership in a situa- 
tion of potential, and perhaps actual, conflict between local and na- 
tional policy groups becomes a matter of great tact and delicacy. The 
need for these qualities is intensified by the requirement that the tea- 
chers and, indeed, the pupils be involved in planning, many of the deci- 
sions that affect them. It is unclear just how these educational leaders 
are to exercise the "consensus" authority with which Brameld seeks to 
invest them and yet satisfy possibly conflicting sets of requirements 
from schools# local units and national centres. Fourth, majority 
rule and a reement by mutual adjustment of beliefs in discussion within 
schools are not the same, as we have seen, and should not be assimilated 
the one to the other in the single concept of "consensus". The prob- 
lem for the public school system, as distinct from island-communities 
like Summerhill, is that there is not simply one majority or one co=unity, 
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that of the immediate members of the school. Brameld rightly identi- 
fied several levels at which the problems of control and consensus 
must be considered. But what at first glance appears as a fairly 
straightforward issue of distribution of authority, on closer scrutiny 
emerges as a tangled and obscure network of responsibility and control 
problems. 
It appears, then, that the proposal so to structure schools as to 
make them agencies of the emerging social consensus is not, as Bramold 
has discussed it, a manageable proposal at ails or, rather, schools 
which conceived themselves as reconstructive agencies by virtue of 
their practice and teaching of the art of consensus would have to per- 
form an intricate set of roles, some of which would clearly be contra- 
dictory. This, it may be countered, is the consequence of trying to 
drive a principle too hard. It would be possible, and from the recon- 
structionist standpoint highly desirable, to find practical ways of 
increasing pupil involvement in certain kinds of decisions. Again, 
parents and other members of the wider community could be encouraged 
to take a more informed and a more active part in school affairs, 
through the provision of adult education programmes and the develop- 
ment of kinds of meetings in which they felt free to comment and suggest 
and argue. Similarly, it would be desirable to pay more attention, 
in the curriculum, to the problems, such as those indicated, which 
arise when in a democratic society attempts are made to distribute 
authority and decision-making responsibility while still maintaining 
the framework of national policy. The exponents of consensus have 
not succeeded in showing how schools and educational systems might 
harmonize the various roles ascribed to them. Nevertheless, they 
have shown that there is a great deal that might usefully be done by 
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schools and school systems, both to enhance motiviation and to in- 
crease understanding of the problem of harmonizing policies and deci- 
lion, which inevitably in a plural society arise from different and 
often competing sources of control and authority. 
6. Conclusion 
6.1 The school as institutional agency of change 
I have not attempted to examine the full range of reconstructionist 
proposals on schools conceived as institutions for culture renewal. 
However, I have selected what I take to be some of the more significant 
issues and problems arising from their proposals. Even in the most 
comprehensive reviews of the task of the school, those of the experi- 
mentalists, there is no really detailed and adequate account of how the 
complex, living institution of the school can be brought to the degree 
of awareness, self-control and technical sophistication required by the 
more ambitious tenets of reconstructionism. This may perhaps be ex- 
plained by the slow development of empirical study of the school as a 
social institution, a form of inquiry which has become a major sooio- 
logical interest only very recently. Further progress in reconstruc-- 
tionist thinking will in part depend upon critical assimilation of the 
results of these and related types of inquiry. 
6.2 Education and the apparatus of state 
Behind the various proposals and problems we have considered in 
this chapter lies a fundamental dichotomyr, between the Wobbs and Mannheim, 
on the one hand, and all the other reconatruotionists, an the other hand. 
The Tebbe and Mannheim were ultimately prepared to see the school system 
and the processes of education absorbed into the centralized apparatus 
of state-planning. In this respect their thinking is similar to that 
of the Soviet educationists, at least of an earlier period, and that 
of many of the policy-makers in developing countries - for example, 
the signatories of the Kothari report. The arguments for this ab- 
sorption have to do with the critical problems which, it is suggested, 
confront society. These arguments invoke or assume. ideas deriving 
from the views of Plato and Aristotle about the relationship of edu- 
cation and politics, and express a more abstract preference for a 
monolithic model of planned change. The arguments against it are 
those indicated by Clarke's misgivings about state absolutism, and 
Dewey's confidence in the capacity of the ordinary man to think for 
himself and to co-operate with others without being directed to do so, 
subtly or in other ways. Reconstructionism is a movement which iden- 
tifies education as an autonomous cultural ideal, or social process, 
and its institutional agencies (c. 6., schools) as in some sense auto- 
nomous, while yet being interdependent with other culture processes 
and social institutions. On this definition of reconstructionism, 
are the Nebbs and Mannheim re constructionists at all? ere they 
consistent in their advocacy of a politically subservient role for 
the school, the answer would be no. Their character as reconatrue- 
tioniats, paradoxically, emerges out of their inconsistency. Thus 
the Webbs thought of socialism as an idea which rationally and politi- 
cally educated individuals will naturally hit upon, and schools as 
places where critical inquiry into current social problems and deeply- 
seated social, political and religious beliefs should be carried on. 
Mannheim likewise equated the "planning mentality" with socially- 
orientated, critical education, and thought of schools, not just as 
agencies of an all-powerful central bureaucracy, but'as centres for 
critical argument and debate on contemporary issues. 
6.3 Democratic organization of schooling 
The particular forms of the experimentalist argument for a demo- 
cratically organized school system are in many respects unsatisfactory. 
Confusion arises when we probe the issues of authority and responsibility. 
The universalistic aspiration to proceed on all fronts minimizes very 
real problems of priority in the allocation of scarce resources, both 
mental and material. Yet, if schools are to be effective in contri- 
buting to the initiation of children into the modes of life and the 
forms of understanding of a democratic society, then the questions 
raised by the experimentalists are highly pertinent. While , ranting 
the difficulty of distributing educational roles amonc, st various insti- 
tutions in a changing society, we need to keep this before us ,, s an 
objective. To ignore it is to impose impossible burdens on the school, 
or to overlook failures in overall institutional provision which fall 
especially hard on certain sectors of the population. Yet to restrict 
the consciously defined role of the school to purely cognitive and aca- 
demic enterprises is not only to fail to understand the problem of pupil 
motivation in a mass system; it is also to ignore a point Kilpatrick 
emphasized. .: Many different kinds of learning apart from those intended 
occur in schools; some of these relate to social experience, and atti- 
tude formation. It is better to be more explicit about these learnings, 
to relate them to clearer objectives for personality development and 
social participation, and to take more definite steps to assess their 
achievement, than to treat them as peripheral to the school's performance 
of its role. 
CHAPTER XIV 
THE TEACHER AS AGENT OF CULTURE RECONSTRUCTION 
Teaching is an enterprise upon whose successful performance the 
reconatructionists ultimately based their aspirations to transform 
culture through education. The criteria of successful teaching in- 
cludes, to use Dewey's term, children's growths but the reconstrue- 
tionista, unlike some of the child-centred progressives, neither be- 
lieved in growth as an unfoldment of latent powers, nor did they aban- 
don the concept of teaching in favor of a concept of learning (1). 
Rugg outlined the three great tasks which the teacher should perform 
as remaker of culture: 
"First, Inspiration. The youth of America must be set 
on fire with a deep and abiding belief in the ability of the 
people to build a world of peace and of physical and demo- 
cratic abundance ... Second, a generation of young Americans 
must be informed. To enable growing youth to understand our 
problems and to help resolve our conflicts by a steady re- 
integration of the culture, our teachers must assemble and 
organize in a curriculum the world's best knowledge and man's 
most sensitive statements ... Third, our youth must become 
persons of disciplined initiative ... There is no other 
profession but that of teachers to take the leadership- in 
satisfying these needs. To do this, the teacher must have 
a range and depth of understandin that would have been in- 
credible to earlier generations" (2). 
This plea for understanding would be not only incredible to earlier 
generations but it is, I shall argue, at least as Rugg conceived it, 
extremely difficult to visualize in the form of concrete proposals for 
teacher education. Yet it expresses, in a more extreme form, the 
typical reconstructionist conception of the teacher, his task and his 
education. Despite their criticisms of teacher dominance in tradi- 
tional schooling, it is apparent that virtually all reconstructionists 
viewed the teaching act and the personality and education of teachers 
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as of central importance for the reconstructive process. Teachers 
were not, in the manner of the more laissez-faire versions of pro- 
gressivism) or as in the Plowden Report, at least as perceived by some 
of its critics, relegated to the ancillary role of providers of learn- 
ing opportunities (3); nor were they ascribed the role of instruments 
of policy and implementers of designs for learning devised by adminis- 
trators and experts. On the contrary, the tendency towards the bureau- 
cratization of the teacher by reducing him to a functionary in a hier- 
archical system was vigorously criticized by Dewey, Kilpatrick and Childs. 
Technological development had not, when the main body of recon- 
structionists was most active, reached the point where it might be 
conjectured that teachers could be replaced, or even substantially 
supported, by machines and programmes. The reconstruotioniets did 
not envisage the possibility of large-scale, non-school learning pro- 
grammes for children and adolescents, as suitable substitutes for 
the improvement and extension of existing institutions. Thus their 
concept of the teacher's role. took a great deal for granted which has 
more recently begun to be questioned, especially in large urban centres 
where problems of motivation and discipline are acute. I do not wish 
to imply by these comments on what the reconstruotionists assumed about 
teaching that their model of a highly skilled, culturally aware teacher, 
designing and modifying his own schemes of work, should be treated as 
unsatisfactory, in the light of these newer developments. On the 
contrary, there is much to be learned from their concept of the teacher 
in heightening our understanding of the teacher's task and the best 
ways of preparing him to perform it. While I shall make specific 
criticisms of different reconatructionists' concepts of teaching, I 
shall also suggest some ways in which their views might be moderated 
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and developed 
(4). Instead of treating individual reconstructioniste 
separately, I shall consider and compare their views under the separate 
headings oft 
1, the qualities sought in teachers; 
2* perceptions of the teaching task; and 
3. the education of teachers. 
1. The Qualities 3ouRht in Teachers 
1.1 The teacheras data and criticisms 
The reoonstrutctionists gave relatively little consideration to a 
number of important empirical questions: who are the teachers, what 
are their social and personal attributes, what perceptions have they 
of the teaching task and what has been the nature of their preparation? 
Except for isolated inquiries these are questions which only in recent 
years have been systematically explored (5). Thus the reoonstruotionists 
were at a very serious disadvantage in spelling out desirable teacher 
qualities, in not being able to relate these specifications in any very 
concrete manner to the kinds of people being attracted into teaching. 
There were exceptions, but on the whole they did too little to over- 
come this disadvantage, by drawing upon such research as had been con- 
ductedg or by asking themselves about the practicability of their spe- 
cification of the model of the "good teacher". Critics have pointed 
out that during the 19305 the experimentalists notably Counts and Bode, 
prescribed a role of radical political activism for teachers, which paid 
scant attention to the social background, training and political atti- 
tudes of those already in the teaching profession and those likely to 
enters 
"It was found that the task envisaged was the discouraging 
one of trying to achieve radical social change with a pro- 
fession that was largely politically conservative and so- 
cially indifferent" 
(ä). 
Has this situation changed significantly? There is recent evidence 
of the persistence of anti-democratic attitudes among teachers, and 
resistance to the idea of a change-agent role; but there is evidence 
also of increasing professional unity, militancy, and political radi- 
calism. It is the latter which led Burnett to suppose that teachers 
might, after a long period of quiescence, once more take up the recon- 
structioniat challenge to enlist the schools in a campaign for a new 
social order (7). Nash's criticism of Counts and Bode, quoted above, 
is just, but it should not be inferred from it that reconstructionists 
were unaware of qualities in teachers wt might seriously jeopardize 
the achievement of the reconstructionist ends. There is evidence that 
they felt keenly the inadequacies of teachers in relation to reconstruc- 
tionist objectives. Also, since many of the educationists whose think- 
ing I have discussed were deeply involved in large-scale teacher educa- 
tion programmes, such an inference would be a strange commentary on 
their professional competence (8). 
Dewey, with Kilpatrick the most persistently optimistic of the ex- 
perimentalists, qualified what often appears as a bland confidence in 
the capacity of the teaching profession to achieve reconstractionist 
objectives: 
"In the main the most docile among the young are the 
ones who become teachers when they are adults. Consequently 
they still listen docilely to the voice of authority" (9). 
Dewey also, at the very end of his life, remarked sadly on the tendency 
in colleges of education to teach experimentalist theory by non-experi- 
mentalist procedures, thus splitting the teacher into a being who perhaps 
cognitively accepts certain ideas, but teaches in the manner he was taught (10; 
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This comment indicated no great confidence that teachers of the right 
combination of qualities were emerging from training institutions. 
It is a comment for which many parallels can be found in Dewey's life- 
long attacks on the practice of teaching in American sohooles the 
teacher has been submitted to a narrow training, or is subject to 
authoritarian direction, or is ignorant of the constraining effects 
upon his work of certain social and political forces, or is the victim 
of a false psychology of learning, or is dominated by pedagogical 
stereotypes, whether ancient or modern. Dewey contrasted with the 
American teacher the teacher in the Soviet Union. (This was in 1929, 
immediately following his educational tour. ) The latter, he thought, 
had attained professional dignity, by being taken into confidence and 
partnership in social and economic planning (11). Other experimen- 
talists, notably Childs and Kilpatrick, called for teachers who could 
share in the reconstructive process, as partners, not slaves of exist- 
ing institutions or minions of the administration (12). It was as- 
sumed that "autocratic" treatment of teachers by administrators "na- 
turally" leads teachers to treat children autocratically. This is 
not, perhaps, an unreasonable assumption if we accept the cyclic argu- 
ments pupils in schools were denied responsibility for their own learn- 
ing; they progressed to college where they were still treated primarily 
as recipients of knowledge and were denied effective control over their 
communal lives; they then entered schools where primary decisions about 
policy, curriculum, and so forth, were taken for them. Apart from 
their own individual efforts to imagine, read and think about alter- 
natives, there was nothing in this cycle to disturb assumptions about 
adult-, child, or leader-follower, authority relationships. This 
cyclic account of course is an over-simplification of which some of 
the reconstruotionists made effective polemical use. Their criticisms 
were directed at the so-called progressive teacher as well as at 
the 
more typical public school practitioner. One of the most severe 
critics of teacher perception and performance of role was Counts, who, 
in his onslaught in Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, casti- 
gated the pedagogical reformers of the Progressive Education 
Associa- 
tion as a group who were, amongst other failings, oblivious of social 
trends and issues, professionally unorganized, and hence politically 
naive, untrained in a serious intellectual sense, and unintelligent 
in their dedication to slogans like "the natural goodness of the child". 
This a-political enthusiasm for the child was not, in Counts' judgment, 
or in Dewey's, a characteristic suitable for the teaching profession in 
America. The lack of interest in social affairs and the preoccupation 
with the immediate concerns of small groups of middle-class children 
unfitted these teachers to act as social change agents. 
However, it should be noted that even the most severe of the ex- 
perimentalist criticisms were seldom directed at the person of the tea- 
cher. Instead, they focussed on characteristics produced or reinforced 
by the institutional framework within which the teacher was educated and 
required to teach. Despite their emphasis on the force of environment 
on individual behavior, the experimentalists sometimes leave the impres- 
sion that teachers could rise above these institutional limitations and, 
by an act of the rational will, achieve a new awareness of their task. 
This now awareness was needed if they were to reconstruct the very order 
of which they were a functioning part, or if, in Russell's terms, they 
were only to act as "the guardians of civilization". The experimentalists 
provided some grounds for optimism about future changes, by avoiding ex- 
tended criticism of the personal qualities of teachers, and by treating 
their faults as the consequence of a regrettable but remediable im- 
pingement of unfavorable aspects of the environment upon their better 
selves. Institutional changes, particularly the education of tea- 
chers and the breaking of the bureaucratic grip of the administration, 
could produce a new type of teacher. The experimentalists did not show 
in detail how a very large, relatively unorganized, politically quiescent, 
and inadequately educated profession employed in thousands of separate 
school districts, could achieve the stature required by the exalted ex- 
pectations hold of them. But they said nothing about the present de- 
ficiencies of teachers which would make this an impossible expecta- 
tion. 
1.2 Experimentalist behavioristic model 
Optimism about the possibilities of re-educating teachers reflects 
the experimentalist perception of the person which, while it recognizes 
an enduring "nature" of feelings, experience, dispositions and habits, 
always leaves open the possibility of significant change and further 
growth. The organism, while it is still alive, is engaged in con- 
tinuous interaction with its environment. Its transactions with the 
world of thought are open-ended, to the extent that new ideas can be 
received and acted upon. The teacher, therefore, is always capable 
of further Growth and development in understanding. His attitudes 
and habits have been shaped by environmental interaction, but they are 
never fully and finally formed, and what one environment has shaped 
another environment can modify. Hence continuing, inservice education 
opens up great possibilities for system reform. Mannheim and the later 
reconstructionists, Brameld, Stanley, Raup, Bennet Frank and others, 
shared this more optimistic view. They all treated personality, character 
and role perception as susceptible to modification by deliberate social 
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effort which can be extended well into adult life and certainly 
beyond the stage of initial preparation and induction into a pro- 
fession. The work of McClelland at Harvard on enbaaoing achieve- 
ment motivation in management training courses for executives is 
an illustration of one of the many uses now being made of this general 
model of institutional formation and reformation, not only of role but 
of more basic drives in personality. His objective for inservice 
education closely parallels that which all the reconatruotionists set 
the teachers the "development of personal motives and values that will 
make the individual an effective change agent" (13). More extreme 
uses of this model are to be found in the utopian and dystopian ro- 
mances - e. g., Skinner's Walden Two and Huxley's Brave New World. 
The behavioristic model is open to many objections, including its 
reduction of complex factors in personality to overt behavior and its 
neglect of unconscious aggression and deeply-seated resistance to 
change. But, because it is a model which encourages people to think 
that they can improve behavior, it is of great strategic significance 
for reconstructionism. The optimistic pedagogy to which writers as 
diverse as Webb, Mannheim and Kilpatrick subscribed has as one of its 
central tenets the enlargement of personality attendant on the assump- 
tion of responsibility and exercise of the will to reform existing 
situations and arrangements. Unless teachers could be encouraged to 
look upon their existing performance as only a hint of what was possible, 
they could have little confidence in the more grandiose claim that edu- 
cation could serve as a reconstructive agency in society. Inspiring 
confidence in the group is one of the tasks of ideological thinking: 
confidence in the secure possession of a worthwhile set of experiences 
and institutions, where the ideology is primarily conservatives confidence 
in the group's capacity, through its own efforts, to achieve better 
things in the future, where the ideology is primarily radical and 
optimistic. Thus, whatever deficiencies might be revealed in 
teachers and patterns of teacher recruitment and education in the 
present state of society, the strategy of reconstructionism requires 
that these deficiencies be qualified in the ways I have suggested. 
They do not imply moral fault or stupidity in teachers " but they 
may well imply these defects in others, especially administrators, 
policy makers, and pressure groups like business associations. 
Even here, however, the experimentalists, who wished to see a com- 
bined community effort, had to be careful not to reduce those other 
groups to incorrigibility. The deficiencies they found in teachers 
are serious - or why else should significant change be proposed? But, 
primarily through teacher-education programmes, these deficiencies, it 
was felt, could be overcome. The experimentalists adopted the strategy 
of change through teacher education and were successful in attracting 
a large and enthusiastic teacher following in the United States. 
1.3 Clarke and Wallet assessments of teacher potential 
Neither Clarke, who w"s Mannheim's most influential English popularizer, 
nor Wells, thought along experimentalist lines when defining desirable 
qualities in teachers. The traditions were quite different, since in 
America teachers were more under the direct control of local boards and 
administrators, whereas the English tradition of centralized charitable 
provision set up different lines of authority and relationship (14)" 
Clarke's writings soberly remind the teacher that he, like the whole of 
humanity, is a victim of original sin, and thus not capable of a steady 
improvement or of reconstructing his own experience in the unbounded manner 
envisaged by the experimentalists. Furthermore, Clarke circumscribed the 
teacher's role in a manner seldom proposed by the experimentalists% 
the teacher was to be something less than a free, responsible and 
independent critic. Clarke valued the freedom of the English tra- 
dition but, like the Webbs and like Rugg in his more exuberant phases, 
treated the teacher as the implementer of policies evolved by more ex- 
pert and, specialized educationists (15). 
Wella' thinking on this subject was characterized by the sharp 
dichotomy he so frequently introduced, splitting the muddle of the 
present from the perfect order of the future. He vehemently attacked 
teachers in all kinds of institutions from elementary schools ("shockingly 
illiterate and ignorant") to universities ("the theorising recluse") for 
their snobbishness, pettiness, narrowness of outlook, inadequate educa- 
tion, and failure truly to educates 
"The last human beings in the world in whom you are likely 
to find a spark of creative energy or a touch of imaginative 
vigour are the masters and mistresses of upper middle-class 
schools ... quiet, inaggressive but obstinate champions of 
the old order against his bolder contemporaries" (16). 
This is the stereotype of the old style teacher which Washington Irving 
memorably exploited in The Legend of Sleer Hollow. Yet Wells also had 
Job Russ, who is modelled upon Sanderson of Oundle, say that man is born 
a beast, lustful, egotistical and fearful: "it is we teachers alone who 
can lift him out of that self-preoccupation ... into a wider circle of 
ideas beyond himself" (17). The expectation that the same teaching 
force which has all the vices and deficiencies Wells attributed to 
them is to produce in increasing numbers from its own ranks luminaries 
capable of lifting their pupils into this wider world typifies one of 
the confusions into which reconstructionist thinking lapses, and from 
which it is rescued by invoking an elite of self-conscious critic-re- 
formers who will lead the majority into better ways. 
dells' stinging criticism and hortatory appeals are a poor sub- 
stitute for a precise analysis of the concept of teaching and of pre- 
sent conditions and factors in the teaching situation. Expositions 
of the teaching process which issue in an imposing list of moral and 
intellectual virtues and an implied mastery of all conceivable prac- 
tical problems, so far from encouraging and inspiring, can have a very 
deflating effect on teachers caught up in the difficulties of early 
professional adaptation and rapid changes in school organization and 
curriculum. 
1.4 Exalted expectations of teachers of the future 
There is of course nothing new in these exalted expectations: the 
shahmanical, brahminical and priestly elements in the ancestry of the 
craft of teaching have set a persisting standard for teachers, of a more 
cosseted and exclusive moral excellence than can be expected of the wider 
community. Those elements in the craft which have descended from the 
Greek and Roman use of slaves as pedagogues have ensured that the teacher 
should be looked upon as somewhat less worldly, practical and business- 
minded than his employers, who might enjoy pleasures from which the tea- 
cher is expected to protect his charges. Furthermore, the slave or 
dependent servant element in the tradition complicates role expectations 
by making the teacher uncertain whether he is a "free" or a "kept" 
guardian of social norms. These considerations leave the teacher in 
the peculiarly difficult position of having to safeguard virtues which 
other members of society may more or less discreetly flaunt. 
The distinctive contribution of the reconstructionists to this pic- 
ture of an excessively virtuous, and somewhat less than fully human, tea- 
cher was to exalt many of the qualities which might in other circum- 
stances provoke a mild contempt. They did this by skilfully reversing 
conventional and traditional assessments of certain qualities. 
The 
lack of a vaguely defined practicality is reversed by demonstrating 
that an industrialized, scienoe-based, rapidly changing society needs 
more of the intellectual skills, and of imaginativeness, and 
less of 
the older practical skills and qualities of the craftsman, though one 
need not exclude the other. The old practical craftsman must take 
second place to the knowledge worker and social evaluator of whom the 
teacher is - or rather can become - the type. A society undergoing 
a deep moral crisis as traditional values are rapidly dissolved needs 
the skills of moral analysis and a visionary determination to recreate 
a new order out of the chaos. The traditional moral codes and a worldly 
utilitarianism must yield to moral inquiry. This, too, is what the 
teacher, by virtue of his role as critic, interpreter, and synthesizer, 
is well fitted to practise and to stimulate in others. In performing 
this creative role, the teacher will inevitably encounter opposition and 
he may expect to be attacked for, amongst other things, his "immorality" 
and his "corrupting" influence on the young. 
2. The Teaohini Task 
2.1 A calling 
The qualities expected of the teacher by the reconstruotionists are 
drawn from their perception of his task; they then serve to color this 
task with a missionary fervor. The most general task teachers are set 
is so to educate the community as to convert it from its old form of 
worship to new gods. The use of religious metaphors is not rhetorical 
exaggeration; they are quite consistent with the overall reconstructionist 
objectives of building a new cultural order upon a core of values and per- 
ceptions, and of making a new man. Teaching becomes not simply a job, 
or the performance of a professional role, but a callings 
"The most creative profession of all ... that great 
calling which with each generation renews the world's 
'circle of ideas', the Teachers"" (18). 
In his preface to Gentile's The Reform of Education, the Italian 
Idealist historian, Croce, gave to the wider circle of thinkers, with 
whom teachers should ally themselves, an even more explicitly religious 
task " which Gentile elaborated in his addresses to the teachers of 
Triest, one of Italy's victory prizes after the first world war. It 
was, said Croce, "the duty of thinkers" to: 
"form the new faith of humanity - anew Christianity or a new 
Humanism, as we may wish to call it. Such a faith will 
certainly not be spared the conflicts from which ancient 
Christianity itself was not free; but it may reasonably 
be hoped that it will rescue us from intellectual anarchy, 
from unbridled individualism, from sensualism, from scep- 
ticism, from pessimism, from every aberration which for a 
century and a half has been harassing the soul of man and 
the society of mankind under the name of Romanticism" (19)" 
The "rescue" came through fascism: Gentile was himself a minister of 
education under Piuasolini, and Croce was, for a time, an active supporter. 
Fascism is sometimes treated as a romantic "aberration", which rather 
complicates Croce's position (20). However, neither those complications, 
nor the tangled roots of fascism, are at issue here. The items in Croce's 
list of aberrations are the familiar echoes of the reconstruotionist diag- 
nosis of a culture crisis. His and Gentile's educational proposals were 
different from theirs, yet he brought out very sharply the religious qua- 
lity of the role of the thinker and the teacher. These religious qua- 
lities are rather more those of the argumentative, theologically-equipped 
Pauline reformer, willing and able to inform the world of the rules of 
the now procedures, and rather less those of a Christ figure understanding 
and forgiving all. The difference is important, for in educational 
terms it signifies a shift from the fully receptive, child-centred position 
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to one which defines for the teacher more determinate roles as organizer, 
interpreter and judge of children's experiences. 
2.2 Counts and Brameld: organized, collective action 
A more prosaic expectation for teachers than that of a quasi-reli- 
gious calling underlies the argument for organized teacher militancy. 
Counts called to the teachers to become conscious of their economic 
status and political powerlessness and join with organized labor. 
This argument, also used by the radical economist, Veblen, and the 
muck-raking novelist, Sinclair, has been revived recently by Burnett 
and Brubacher, who think that teachers have at last begun to recognize 
the value of organized collective strength (21). Counts also urged 
teachers to perceive their role in the light of powerful anti-demo- 
cratic forces. Teachers should shake themselves free of the misty 
belief that "the school is an all-powerful educational agency" and 
recognize that to achieve their ends they must form associations with 
-other agencies, in opposition if necessary to the vested interests of 
capitalism. Bence Counts' recommendation to the teacher that he become 
an agency of class war, which, as we saw in Chapter XIII, prompted a 
rebuke from Dewey, who preferred an alignment with "social forces" to 
a major political front between workers and teachers (22). Counts also 
advised teachers to demonstrate their commitment to democratic thinking 
by becoming active indoctrinators. This advice, too, prompted Dewey's 
criticism that indoctrination for any cause was inconsistent with the 
critical, scientific-democratic canons of experimentalism. Dewey's 
criticisms of indoctrination were sound but, as Childs pointed out, to 
substitute "Social forces" for "class war" is to confuse the issue of 
the exact relationship between teachers and organized interest groups 
in society. Counts' proposal is both socially divisive and possibly 
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self-defeating, since in western societies political power has not 
lain 
with the exponents of class war so much as with their entrenched enemies. 
Yet for teachers to seek to ally themselves with the dominant interest 
groups, in the hope of significantly influencing them, is to run the risk 
of compromise and assimilation. Counts' proposals were unsatisfactory 
but they had the merit of expressing a very sensitive and difficult issue 
in reconstructionist theory. Teachers must seek ways of influencing and 
co-operating with other social institutions than the school, if only to 
secure an adequate resource allocation and the freedom from arbitrary 
interference that they require to perform their work as constructive 
critics. But, as religious reformers have so often found, it is but 
a short step from developing social consciousness to acquiescence in 
the values of the institution whose reform is sought. 
The argument that teachers should be brought to recognize the social 
and political interests that impinge upon the schools has been reiterated 
by Brameld. This kind of awareness, he argued, was necessary, together 
with affili. tt©n. with the American Federation of Labour, in order to 
counteract the traditional tendency of the profession to accept external 
control and to ally itself with more conservative movements in society 
(23). All of the reconstruotionists have insisted that adequate per- 
formance of the teacher's task involves greatly increased socio-political 
awareness. This of course follows from their treatment of education 
as a major cultural force, capable of tranaforraing the conditions of 
socio-political life. But they have, with the exception of Counts and 
Brameld and, for a time, Childs, denied that enhanced socio-political 
awareness should be expressed in partisan political activity outside the 
school. In several respects, this denial is hardly consistent, since 
the intimate relationships Dewey, for example, posited between school 
and other social institutions make it very difficult to define the 
limits of political activity, the more so as membership of politically 
conscious professional associations was actively encouraged by the 
reconstruotioniats. Dewey proposed a spectrum of political activity 
extending from indirect political participation through the critical 
analysis . af political 
issues within the school, to more direct action 
through politically conscious professional associations. What he 
could not accept was partisan uses of schooling in the interests of 
organized labor, the working class, or some self-proclaimed partisan 
movement. His criticism of Counts reveals the reason for his objections: 
the experliaentalist method is essentially one of critical probing, in- 
quiry and discussion - it always seeks to delay implementation; demo- 
cracy requires the tolerant acceptance of a plurality of interests and 
viewpoints, and the effort to reconcile these. Presumably, also, ac- 
ceptanoe of an active political role in a period of great social and 
industrial upheaval. increased the likelihood of violence, and this 
Dewey always resisted as a political weapon. He thought that three 
basic forces controlled society: habit; coercive and violent force; 
and intelligence. His preference was always for the third: 
"The feeling that social change of any basic character can 
be brought about only by violent force is the product of lack 
of faith in intelligence as a method, and this loss of faith is in large measure the product of a schooling that, because 
of its comparatively unfree condition, has not enabled youth 
to face intelligently the realities of our social life, 
political and economic" (24). 
2,3 neer and leader of inqu 
Raup and hie associates, Stanley, and Brameld, all developed Dewey's 
argument by seeking a method of collaborative deliberation, and converting 
the teacher into an engineer of democratic change through the organized 
pursuit of consensus. Benno outlined the requirements: a collaborative 
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methodology built on the "core convictions" of democracy. Teachers 
were to become leaders of task-orientated groups, comprised of actively 
participating, experimentally-minded inquirers. In this way, and not 
through the more stridently partisan and militant methods of direct 
political action, should the informed and experimental collective judg- 
ment be elevated over unchecked private judgment. It is a develop- 
ment of experimentalism which has now become an integral part of an 
empirically-orientated school of thought which identifies the teacher 
as a group organizer, technician and change agent (25). 
Brameld criticized Dewey's and Kilpatrick's treatment of teachers 
as organizers and leaders of open inquiry - forever guiding pupil in- 
quiries and stimulating reflection, but never comnitting themselves on 
the pressing issues of the day. He advocated, in place of what he des- 
cribed as a spurious neutrality, the adoption by teachers of definite 
socio-political positions, for which they could offer argument and evi- 
dence in public discussion. This "defensible partiality" of the teacher 
was to be a concrete expression of the ideals and values of a democratic 
society, committed to certain major policy objectives. This commit- 
ment, Brameld felt, could be taught without resort to indoctrination as 
a way of life open to critical scrutiny and modification, but closed to 
nihilism, scepticism and complete detachment (26). Bremeld's criticism 
of Dewey missed the point that the reflective method is not in fact po- 
litically neutral in the wider sense. Dewey's expectation of reflec- 
tive inquiry was that it disposes those who use it to adopt process 
objectives which have definite implications for the conduct of political 
decision-taking and for the exercise of political power. It seemed to 
Brameld that this was a proce: ys which was too slow and uncertain for a 
rapidly disintegrating social orders a more definite avowal of the goals 
of reconstructionism was needed, when so many forces in society threa- 
tened the potentially educative work of the school. 
Brameld's role proposals for the reconstructionist teacher, in 
spite of his criticism of Dewey's failure to acknowledge clear social 
targets, are nonetheless similar to Dewey's. The teacher should seek 
to counteract the subtler, persuasive uses of propaganda by showing 
how propagandists operate; he should eschew indoctrination, should 
seek out evidence, find ways of establishing clear communication, 
promote a respect for disagreement and encourage a wider community 
of action (27). Thus the consensus procedures Brameld so often 
advocated are not intended to discourage criticism and disagreement, 
although he did expect that these divisive characteristics of dialogue 
would yield to a higher agreement on action. Also, his doctrine of 
defensible partiality encourages the teacher both to take a more de- 
finite stand on great public issues and to present arguments for his 
viewpoint. Provided these arguments are fair, and that they do not 
inhibit pupils and colleagues from expressing alternatives, Brameld 
argued, quite reasonably, that the teacher would be performing his 
function as a non-indoctrinating educator. 
2.4 Russell: the teacher as guardian of civilization 
Of the English reconstructionists, only Russell conceived the 
task of the teacher as Dewey had: the leader of dispassionate inquiry 
directed by the assumption that this would in time produce a truly 
scientific civilization. In his essay, "The functions of a teacher", 
Russell objected to the obscurantist and irrational means used to in- 
duce loyalty to the state and urged teachers to instill habits of im- 
partial inquiry, and to lead the young to judge issues "on their 
merits". This would almost inevitably mean criticism of existing 
social arrangements. To this end, the teacher needs to feel intel- 
lectually independent and to have a sense of an ideal, or of stan- 
dards, to which pupils could be encouraged to aspire. Russell did 
not say just what these standards might be, but he suggested that we 
become aware of them or learn to think about them through the study of 
culture and history, as a "vast panorama", "which enlarges the mind 
that contemplates it" (28). Similarly, on the emotional side, the 
teacher should seek ways of taking children out of themselves, to 
witness and examine diverse human achievements. In this way, pupils 
would be drawn from merely dispassionate inquiry to feel a warmth of 
interest, and a passionate concern for the possibility of human achieve- 
ment. For these more imaginative enterprises to be possible, teachers 
would have to develop a warmth of affection towards their pupils, and to 
practise and cultivate a wide tolerance. They could not undertake these 
tasks adequately unless they wore assured of freedom from petty inter- 
ference and inhibition. By implication, then, Russell proposed a state 
apparatus guaranteeing and supporting the free exercise of the teacher's 
educative role, even if this should involve severe teacher criticism 
of that very supportive apparatus. This is an ideal of a free, plural 
society, with education conceived as a semi-independent, but vitally 
important, public estate. Hence Russell's reference to the teacher 
as a guardian of civilization. 
The difficulties of sustaining this position in practice are con- 
siderable. There is always a temptation, as I noted in discussing the 
Kothari Report, to enlist education as an instrumentality of state policy, 
to conceive of the teacher as a functionary of the state apparatus, and to 
evade the difficult, but vitally important, issue of the separate realms 
of the nation, the polity and education in a Genuinely plural and open society 
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In a critical situation involving physical survival, it is justifiable 
to mobilize education to determinate political ends, provided other 
purposes and roles for teachers are also fostered. Where a powerful 
set of overriding objectives or interests - such as military ascen- 
dancy, or a fixed view of public morality - assert themselves, the 
threat to independent educational action may be severe, as in Germany 
and Japan in the 1930s. Since there are very important issues of 
community freedom and development at stake, to seek to ensure a cri- 
tical and creative role for teachers, even in the most adverse con- 
ditions, is no less vital a task for a public providing agency than 
are the more obvious tasks of material provision and organization. 
Russell's conception of the teacher's task, while very close to 
Dewey's, was different in one important respect. This emerges from 
Russell's attitude toward the community. For hin, the community, so 
far as the school is concerned, was a possible source of threat. For 
Dewey, who very actively campaigned for professional freedom for teachers, 
awareness of a possible threat was counterbalanced by a sense of the 
wider purposes and possibilities of teaching. The teacher has the 
task both of educating the community and of finding ways of working 
with community interests in the formation of educational policy. This 
is a corollary of the argument that teachers should share in policy- 
making. The extremes of exclusive control, either by teachers or by 
other community interests, were both rejected (29). 
2.5 Kilpatrick, uarticipation in the organization of learning 
The theme of participation by teachers and by pupils was given par- 
ticular emphasis by Kilpatrick. As we saw in Chapter XI, the project 
method was intended to involve pupils and teachers in a common planning 
enterprise. In the first section of the present chapter, I referred 
to Kilpatrick's and Dewey's condemnation of the autocratic treatment 
of teachers by administrators. Kilpatrick regarded school adminis- 
tration as "the factory system applied in a field where its evils are 
peculiarly aggravated" (30). If the teacher were to be a "self- 
determining person", or, as Childs put it, "an end in himself", then 
ways must be found to enable him to co-operate in the "joint work" 
of preparing curriculum materials and taking teaching decision 
(31). 
Kilpatrick have no clear indication of the way in which the different 
roles of administrator, curriculum-maker and teacher mi,; ht be combined. 
This has become a pressing problem when rapid changes in the structure 
and content of education are disrupting older role definitions and ex- 
pectations in many countries. Kilpatrick's preferences were clear, 
but he ne6lected the implications and consequences of these for the 
whole system. He did not envisage the devolution of power and authority 
entirely to schools, but appears to have had in mind a loosening of 
bureaucratic and centralized routines through consultation, joint work- 
ing parties, and more informal networks of communication. 
Kilpatrick's discussions of the project method make this matter a 
little clearer. The project method, as Kilpatrick conceived it, meant 
the abandonment of predefined courses of study, set text books and formal 
and external examinations (32). Dewey had not proposed the abandonment 
of predefined courses of study, but his work at the Laboratory School 
assumed that the major curriculum decisions would be taken within the 
school, by teachers, in consultation at least with the older pupils 
over matters of detail. For Kilpatrick, the teacher, or r9ther the 
school staff, was to become the single most powerful determinant of 
the processes, content and materials of schoolinü, within the very 
broad limits imposed by buildings, resources, their own competence and 
similar anstraints. He set no theoretical limits, and 
it is charac- 
teristic of experimentalism that it should constantly seek to push 
back the practical boundaries without specifying priorities: in- 
creased resources, better facilities, indefinite improvement of 
tea- 
cher skill, and so forth. For Kilpatrick, the teacher's task as an 
organizer of learning was not to "purvey knowledge" but to study 
the 
individual child, to develop a live and growing "map of values", to 
work out with children learning objectives, to stimulate and guide, 
to mediate ideas, and so forth. These expectations pose many prob- 
lems for teachers, which I shall discuss in the following paragraphs. 
They introduce a possibly acute conflict into his role expectations, 
by requiring him to repudiate traditional subject orientations while 
yet remaining ready to draw on demand upon wide bodies of subject 
matter. Another tension set up is that between the teacher's tradi- 
tional authority expectations with respect to the administration and 
external exports and his own growing sense of autonomy. Again, the 
attempt to build learning programmes upon expressed child interest 
and a cultural perspective may leave the teacher uneasily poised be- 
tween two cots of requirements which at times can he harmonized only 
with the utmost difficulty. These are examples of possible conflict 
in role performance to which the experimentalists gave too little 
attention. They pose issues for teacher education programmes which 
only in the past few years have begun to be systematically studied 
(33). 
N 
The chief difficulty in the reconstructionist perception of the 
task of the teacher arises from the implication of an indefinite ex- 
tension of performance possibilities. The teacher's task is indefinitely 
extended by the kinds of understanding the reconstructioniste expected 
of hims there are no limits that can be set for the type of inquiry 
that is necessary to establish a child's interests, background, moti- 
vation, and so forth. The apparently simple exhortation to study the 
child is an invitation to ramify one's inquiries into the depths of 
personality and the ever-shifting patterns of interpersonal relation- 
ships. Similarly, the advice to study culture or study contemporary 
society - to become aware of one's membership in an ongoing civiliza- 
tion - poses truly daunting tasks of cognition and sociability. There 
is yet a third kind of study required by reoonstructionist theory, and 
that is mastery of the subject matter of teaching to the point where 
it can be segmented, re-arranged, integrated and reconstructed to suit 
the shifting and unpredictable requirements of the project, or of re- 
flective inquiry, or of workshop learning. Apart from the emotional 
demands of this kind of teaching, great mental alertness and flexibility 
are required to leap, for example, from a child's immediate interest to 
world problems. Rugg unconsciously highlights this difficulty in dis- 
cussing just one aspect of the teacher's task, developing an awareness 
in the child of social changes 
"The teacher must understand and apply the theory [i. e., 
Kug6's theory] of social and individual change to the students 
before her in relationship to the social and cultural milieu 
in which they are growing up ... She must understand the 
thought patterns and their social context; the forces that 
are generated; the likely points of conflict; and the ways 
in which these conflicts may result in frustration and irra- 
tional behaviour on the one hand, and in useful and rational 
integrative change and activity on the other. Ythat goes on 
inside the child, inside his school, inside his family, and 
inside his recreational groups is largely cultural integration, 
disintegration, and reintegration, due to physical, emotional, 
and mental changes. This means that important to her task is 
an understanding of these processes at work in her community, 
her state, her nation and her world. She must know of inte- 
gration, disintegration and reintegration at large, since it 
is in these larger contexts that the grown man will function 
in conflict and co-operation with others" (34). 
Lurking behind the invitation to the teacher to learn all she can is the 
notorious Hegelian dilemma that to know and to do anything one must know 
and do everything. Russell's criticism of the failure of Dezwey's theory 
of inquiry to set any definite limits to the scope of an inquiry, re- 
jected by Dewey, touched upon one of the most serious weaknesses in ex- 
perimentalism (35). This weakness, as I have noted in several other 
places, affected their discussion of many other topics than the logic 
of inquiry. 
Of course, teachers have not been encouraged by reconstruetionists 
to continue indefinitely in inquiry conceived as an intellectual exer- 
cise. There has been, however, a marked tendency to encourage them to 
believe that the problems posed by this new model of expansive teaching, 
while acute, are manageable. Kilpatrick, for example, implied that, once 
secondary teachers had been liberated from subject specialization, they 
could expect success in their more legitimate tasks of character and 
personality formation. Brameld, too, thought that, if teachers felt 
intimidated by the prospect of synthesizing knowledge, this may be a 
result of their having been conditioned by specialization. The im- 
plication is that liberation from specialization will be accompanied 
by an access of creative energy sufficient for the more heroic task 
of creating a new curriculum synthesis which should presage a new 
unification of culture. 
There is an oppressive unreality about these proposals to lift 
teachers from the sub-culture of s. 4bjeot specialization, or the school 
and child-centred sub-culture of Froebel and Montessori, and set them free 
in an expanding cultural universe. In periods of rapid system expansion 
and change, for example, the growth and reorganization of schooling in 
the post-war period, the demands made upon teachers often proved 
exhausting and a source of serious stress in a profession which normally 
operates with a high degree of altruism in emotionally exposed situations. 
Criticism of the dominance of the teaching models of the classic 
and romantic sub-cultures (namely, "transmission" and "discovery") 
was undoubtedly needed. The first, transmission, confuses the 
issue 
of what it is that is transmitted by neglecting the modifications and 
transformations of meaning involved in the transfer of an id^a from one 
context, the teacher's thinking, to another, the child's thinking. 
Herbart was well aware of this problem, and Dewey, in his criticisms of 
traditional pedagogy, was influenced by Horbart's theory of "apperceptive 
masses". Yet, for all their misgivings, the experimentalists have not 
done so muchby way of systematic criticism of transmission doctrines as, 
for example, Cassirer has done (36). "Discovery", too, was ripe for 
criticism, in that its exponents paid too little attention to the dis- 
tinctions between different forms of discovery and tended to neglect both 
the hidden structures in their own discovery methods, and the arguments in 
favor of teaching structured knowledge. Again, these and related cri- 
ticisms have also been more fully developed by writers other than the 
experimentalists (37). 
In place of the limitations of the criticized models, we are presented 
by the reeonstruetionists with a conception of task which lacks a clear 
structure and any definite priority, both for the work of individual 
teachers and for the teaching profession as a whole. The initial stimulus 
to thought and encouragement to action that this wider definition of task 
yields can, unless we articulate appropriate action programmes, lead to 
a paralysis of action or a cynical distinctionbetween the theorists' ex- 
pectations and the "real world" 'of the classroom. These are possible 
consequences which are inconsistent with the idea of education as a 
I 
constructive and progressive force in society. This should have made 
them unacceptable to the reconstzuotionista, as indeed they are to any 
rational theory of the teaching process. 
3. Teacher Education 
In Shawls play ManandSupSuperman, the liberated heroine, Ann Whitfield, 
disgusted with the existing race of men, proposes to found a new dynasty, 
and calls for a father for the superman. The father to the new teacher 
is teacher education, and. it was to a new design for teacher education 
that several of the reconstruotionists looked for the inspiration, if 
not the source, of the new movement. This expectation narrows our in- 
quiry to a relatively small group of people and institutions. 
3.1 Kilpatrick and RuRRs the educational foundations approach 
The prototype of the new design for teacher education is the educa- 
tional foundations programme, which first appeared in the 1920s at 
Teachers'College, Columbia University, in two programmes under the 
leadership respectively of Kilpatrick and Rugg. From there, during 
and after the second world war, the "foundations" idea spread to a 
number of highly influential teacher training institutions in the United 
States, and, by virtue of the drawing power of these institutions for 
graduate students from other countries, it has come to exert an influence 
on teacher education in many different parts of the world, Rugg des- 
cribed the original foundations approach at Teachers College, Columbia, 
as comprising three stepss first, the interdisciplinary study group 
which met under Kilpatrick's chairmanship in bi-weekly dinner round 
tables from 1928 to 1941 to discuss "the problems and trends in modern 
society and the revolutions in the natural and physical sciences and 
the expressive arts"; second, the design, in Columbia and elsewhere, 
of "unified and organic divisions of 'Educational Foundations'" 
(these were courses for teacher education in a wide range of theore- 
tical disciplines variously combined and integrated within single, 
interdisciplinary departments in colleges of education; third, the 
group teaching and assessment of these programmes (38). 
Brauner, in a hostile criticism of the superficiality which he 
claims resulted from the literary, visionary and futuristic elements 
in the foundations approach, gave a more detailed account, emphasizing 
these points$ 
1. foundations were a reaction to extreme specialization; 
2. they aspired to wholeness, and unity of concepts drawn 
3- 
4" 
5" 
from philosophy, history, social and behavioral sciences; 
they incorporated the study of current social issues and 
problems; 
they were part of the same movement which produced liberal 
arts courses in contemporary civilization at Columbia Col- 
lege and elsewhere; 
they were a "literary combination of the scientific and 
the poetic"s 
6. they pictured the teacher as an "artist-statesman"g not 
a technician (39). 
We have seen how the reconstructicnists in their analysis of change 
eliminated various other possible sources of planned change in favor of 
education. This was done by a method of pre-emption. Crisis in cul- 
ture and change in culture were so defined as virtually to exclude or 
to minimize the significance of all forges and factors for constructive 
changes other than education. Acquiescence in the basic institutional 
forms given to education, through the public school system, led the re- 
constructionists to focus their attention almost entirely on the school, 
especially the public school. The process of education was so defined 
as to emphasize the role of the teacher as a designer of new types of 
learning situations and a leader of wide-ranging study enterprises. 
Teachers as they exist in society are not able to rise to the chal- 
lenge to lead in the renewal of culture, but this is not because 
the task is impossible, or because of irremediable faults and de- 
ficiencies in their own make-up. They suffer, as does the whole cul- 
ture, from their own inadequate education. If the vicious circle 
which perpetuates crisis, confusion and disintegration is to be 
broken, then it shall be through the education and re-education of 
teachers into a new theoretical awareness. However, it was spe- 
cifically teachers of teachers and not the whole profession of edu- 
cationists whom Rugg singled out for the new creative roles 
"Ideally all the leaders of education, among them 
superintendents, principals, teachers, and the teachers 
of teachers, should take part in the task of building a 
theory of education. But conditions have developed 
that have barred all but the teachers of teachers from 
sufficient study of the foundations of education to make 
that possible" (40). 
My remarks in the preceding paragraph are a simplified reduction 
of the terms of many separate arguments, which so far as I am aware no 
single reoonstructionist made, but they seem reasonable, if unduly simple, 
inferences from the mass of ideas we have considered. Emphasis on 
teacher education as an ultimate source of change raises the further 
problem, which troubled Mannheim, as it has troubled generations of 
ideational reformers, of who educates the educator of teachers. This 
problem, we may suspect, points to a flaw in the whole argument, that 
a continuous regression back to some supposedly more fundamental point 
is indeed a continuous regression. Those reconstructionista who re- 
jected the idea of a campaign to reintegrate culture exclusively through 
education were guided more by social than by logical considerations: 
the school is but one amongst many institutions; it has or can have 
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the power conferred by knowledge and ideas, but this is not the only 
form of power, and it is liable to be abridged or directed by other 
forms of social power (e. g., economic and political). The quest for 
an ultimate, single source of directed change leads us to absurdities. 
There is a multiplicity of forces and institutions at work in society, 
and culture emerges, only partly by deliberate effort, from the inter- 
actions of these forces and institutions. It is impossible for any 
one or set of institutions to take control of the process of designing 
culture. Indeed, the idea of overall design itself misses the sig- 
nificance of the non-deliberate, tacit, accidental aspects of culture. 
For example, designing produces unexpected as well as expected outcomes. 
Some of the limitations as well as the potentialities of education 
as a culturally re-creative force were recognized by the reconstructionists. 
Yet some at least of their proposals for teacher education display their 
characteristic preference for an all-inclusive holism and for total 
change. Change is certainly needed in teacher education and the re- 
constructionists have indicated some of the major possibilities open 
to us in the organization of the theoretical disciplines of knowledge. 
Just as teaching in schools can no longer assume the validity of tra- 
ditional knowledge and understanding, so, in a rapidly changing society, 
teacher education must become more than an initiation into a settled 
and established craft, or into predefined disciplines of knowledge. 
3.2 Clarke, the scientific study of education 
A modest outline of the role of the university in teacher educa- 
tion was given by Clarke in the 1920s. Clarke, like Dewey before him, 
and Bode afterwards, urged university departments of education to con- 
centrate their energies on the scientific study of education, of which 
teachers' education should form part, but not the whole (41). This 
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scientific study should attempt to build an inclusive theory or a 
science of education, about whose structure Clarke was none too clear. 
We may assume that it was to be some kind of synthesis combining "his- 
torical determinants", the findings of scientific study of the educa- 
tional process in demonstration schools, and Clarke's own theory com- 
prising Platonic Idealism, Rousseau's views on moral effort, and 
Mannheim's sociological approach. In fairness to Clarke it must be 
added that he gave only a very sketchy outline of possibilities, and 
never, so far as I am aware, attempted a serious analysis of the nature 
and scope of educational theory. But it should also be remembered 
that Clarke, as a highly influential director of the London Institute, 
and chairman of the Central Advisory Council on Education, had a world- 
wide influence on educational thinking. His inchoate thoughts on syn- 
thesis might well have contributed to the extremely loose and confused 
combinations of subject matter which in many colleges have been offered 
to teachers as educational theory. Following the criticisms of Peters 
and others, in many institutions these eclectic combinations of educa- 
tional study have been replaced by a formal division of subject matter 
which appears to have been determined more by an academic reaction to 
loose thinking and to a faulty synthesis than by a fresh analysis of the 
structure of educational theory. 
Both in Clarke's concept of educational atudy, and those more recently 
proposed, the reference to a science of education is a reminder that a 
new subject matter for study was to be continuously created. Emphasis 
perceptibly shifted from the results to the methods of inquiry. Childs 
summed this up by grounding expert authority not in status, or tradition, 
or esoteric knowledge, but in method: 
"The authority of the expert is an authority that rests, 
in the last analysis, on the empirical and public character 
of the methods by which he works and produces his results" 
(42). 
3,3 Proposed framework for teacher education 
Teachers were to be prepared for their new role by experiencing 
and practising the method of reflective inquiry. But this was only 
one part of a very comprehensive, if never clearly articulated, pro- 
gramme. I can do no more than piece together elements from various 
sources, which do not yield a complete programme of teacher education, 
but indicate its major foci of attention. The major fields and themes 
of study proposed were as follows: 
1, the methods and procedures of science as encapsulated 
in "reflective inquiry", or "practical judgment"; 
a. 
3" 
behavioral sciences; 
culture sciences, including history and surveys of 
"social issues"; 
4. the arts; 
5a, individual - or grouped - subject specialization; 
6, the structure of the school curriculum; 
7, teaching methods; 
8, a "philosophy of living" (43)" 
YIowever, it is not so much the fields of study that distinguish re- 
constructionist thinking on teacher education as the two features of 
wholeness or inclusiveness, and unity or integration. Kilpatrick 
criticized the typical programme of secondary teacher preparation, 
based on student specialization within a research-orientated subject 
department (44). We might perhaps expect this specialization to meet 
with approval, in the light of the experimentalist preoccupation with 
methods of inquiry, but Kilpatrick in fact denounced it on the grounds 
that it produces young teachers whose chief teaching interest is to 
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organize their work in high schools as a pale imitation of the research 
department in the university. This, he concluded, was inadequate for 
the majority since only a tiny proportion would ever become research spe- 
cialists. Lest it be replied that other benefits than research-mindedness 
might accrue from this kind of teaching, Kilpatrick argued for a programme 
of teacher education which did not depend on incidental outcomes and advan- 
tages accruing from specialization but focussed directly on the principal 
objectives of secondary education. These, he said, are the formation 
of "character" and "personality", or, more generally, as we saw in Chapter 
XI, the cultivation of the "good life". The tendency of this line of 
argument is away from a precise study of a clearly defined subject field 
towards an indefinite and, indeed, limitless "whole" of knowledbe and 
understanding. Since the whole in practice would need to be severely 
limited, and since Kilpatrick, in 1950, was advocating a form of life- 
adjustment education, it is evident that the particular form teacher 
education would take is very much limited by the expectations and as- 
pirations of the American culture of that time. Kilpatrick made it clear 
that it was a "world outlook" which he wished to promote, but this can 
very easily become the "world outlook" of a given society at a particular 
point in history. In rejecting what he called the Alexandrian concept 
of subject specialization, and substituting an ill-defined study of 
"character formation", Kilpatrick bogged the question of the relation 
of character to scholarship. Yet scholarship ie a sphere of activity 
which transcends parochial considerations, and challenges basic assump- 
tions. What appears, then, as an attempt to develop a broader outlook, 
by breaking with a narrow specialization, might well become, in practice, 
intellectually stultifying and emotionally narrowing. 
Another expression of the reconstructionist determination to develop 
"wholes" in place of traditional specializations in teacher education 
is the advocacy by Rugg and Brameld of the inclusion of culture sciences 
in teacher education programmes. Brameld has argued for the pursuit 
of standards in teacher education as high as those in medicine and for 
a radical lengthening of the teacher education programme to nine years 
(including two years normally taken in high school) (45). Students 
would commence a general education programme in a four-year, non- 
specialist college, at the ago of sixteen. The programme would be based 
on interdisciplinary themes within and between: science, the arts, social 
sciences, religion, politics, and education. From the anthropological 
concept of order Brameld derived various patterns, themes, and configu- 
rations for inter-relating this material. The point was to see them 
as patterned elements in culture conceived as an organic whole and not, 
as in the past, distinct academic specializations. However, in view 
of the requirement for specialized knowledge in secondary teaching, 
this thematic study was to be accompanied by single discipline study. 
Brameld's approach in certain respects is reminiscent of Hutchins' 
proposal for the "great books programme" of tertiary education, which 
combined themes with disciplines, although neither would care to acknow- 
ledge a debt (46). 
In the second four years of Brameld's programme, future teachers 
were to undertake four kinds of study: 
cultural and behavioral sciences; 
specialized study in a teaching subject; 
practice and work experience (not only in schools); 
integrated philosophy of education. 
After a one or two year internship, they would commence teaching at about 
the age of twenty-five. Clearly, this proposal is directed at the teacher 
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education institutions of a very wealthy society which already 
has 
a substantial base in secondary and tertiary education upon which 
to 
build expensive experimental programmes. However, Brameld's apparently 
extravagant scheme embodies several ideas worthy of consideration 
in 
less affluent societiest for example, the combining of specialist, 
discipline-based study with the attempt to establish a synoptic over- 
view of culture through the use of the conceptual tools of culture 
science. Although these tools are still in a condition of relative 
infancy, the exploratory use of them in avowedly experimental situations 
could help to introduce a purpose and coherence which is frequently 
lacking in the multiplicity of short courses introducing students to 
this or that aspect of education and society. A second point worthy 
of much more consideration than it has received is Brameld's reference 
to integrated philosophy of education. This typical invocation of the 
value of synthesis is a reminder that the legitimate and important aca- 
demic task of carefully circumscribed theoretical analysis is not suf- 
ficient for the development of firm teaching objectives and clear out- 
looks. The explanation for this lies more in what such analysis ex- 
cludes than in what it includes. As I pointed out in the Introduction, 
the usefulness of the concept of ideology is that it directs attention 
to intellectual structures which combine the ingredients necessary for 
action, including value preferences and implementation models. Brameld's 
"integrated philosophy of education" is a similar enterprise to ideo- 
logical thinking - and it displays some of the weaknesses as well as 
the strengths of ideology. 
Rugg, too, prepared comprehensive and detailed schemes of study, 
which direct the student toward the history of civilization, rather in 
the manner of Wells' histories. However, history is only part of the 
quest for a totality of cultural studies. These are also to embrace 
key concepts from the social sciences, major issues and problems in 
contemporary culture, and theories of social change, especially Rugg's 
own formulation, which draws upon several of the well known theories 
(47), Rugg referred to his own social science textbook series for 
schools, to indicate the range and scope of studies expected of the 
future teachers. In discussing these texts in Chapter XI, I said 
that in treatment and presentation they are synoptic and descriptive. 
This is perhaps an inevitable outcome of an eclectic, survey approach, 
and it results in materials whose level of analysis, explanation and 
interpretation falls below that appropriate for any teacher, let alone 
the future leaders of culture. Of course, Rugg did not mean that all 
of these books would be used in college, although some of the later 
ones in the series were prepared with this in mind. Also, in his own 
adult survejs of the development of technology and other branches of 
civilization in America, he adopted a more critical approach than in 
the textbook series. But it was still an approach which essentially 
involved the assembly and organization of information, interpreted by 
the grand overview method which Wells and Brameld also practised. Apart 
from the risk of superficiality in these kinds of surveys, they have the 
disadvantage of imposing interpretative frameworks upon students instead 
of encouraging them to make their own estimations of data and their sig- 
nificance. These outcomes of the survey approach are not inevitable, 
but they are to be expected, except in the very rare instances when a 
powerful scholar creates a mature work of synthesis, interpretation 
and wide-ranging reflection. It is unreasonable to suppose that, when 
there is an acute scarcity of synthesizing intellectuals in society, 
teacher education institutions will be staffed by such scholars or by those 
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able to handle their works with the subtlety and critical acumen 
needed to keep them alive. Rugg's own writings, despite their 
superficiality, are impressive feats of synthesis and organization, 
and they display an alert, imaginative mind. It is very much to 
be doubted whether these qualities would be promoted by the wide- 
spread adoption of courses mapping out and integrating some hypo- 
thetical totality of culture. 
To overcome the vague drift in teacher education towards the 
total study of man and culture, various attempts have been made to 
define some integrating themes. I have already mentioned Rugg's 
interest in key concepts. These might at first glance seem promising, 
but when as part of the recent movement to reform the content of educa- 
tion scholars have been asked to identify the key concepts of their 
disciplines, they have sometimes produced very long lists, like the 
lists of life tasks around which Bobbitt and others proposed to build 
the school curriculum in the 1920s. Alternatively, the scholars have 
not agreed, and have produced different sets of key concepts, or dif- 
ferent. organizations of them: hence the three different American bio- 
logy curricula of the 1960s. Such disagreement is not necessarily a 
disadvantage in curriculum thinking, but it does give rise to questions 
about the meaning of "key" concepts, and the possibility of other, more 
inclusive, sets of concepts lurking in the background. A third res- 
ponse to the key concepts proposal is that some scholars have argued 
that the notions of key concepts and structures of concepts is barely 
relevant for their subjects. These responses all refer to the struc- 
turing of separate subjects, but Ruugg's proposal was for nothing as 
simple as this. He wished to build a structure of key concepts em- 
bracing the cultural and the social sciences and, lacking any scholarly 
models, he had to devise his own. Rugg had both the self assurance 
and the eclectic range of interests and understandings upon which an 
enterprise of that kind depends, but to expect teacher educators 
to 
build up and modify their own sets of key concepts is to invite cynicism 
and superficiality. By contrast, separate subject teaching in colleges 
of education has the great advantage that accrues to accretive activities. 
By this I mean that changes in subjects, although at times cataclysmic 
and profoundly re-orientating, are, for long periods in between these 
upheavals, steady and accumulative. They do not require a complete re- 
orientation in perspective and understanding but rather a continuous 
process of adjustment and modification of outlook. This, however, is 
not at all the case with proposals for synthetic overviews, such as Rugg's. 
It is characteristic of these that every new one demands a fresh appraisal 
of the totality of all that it embraces. Each has to be learned and ap- 
plied afresh, a task which, in a period of rapid system expansion, is 
appropriate and perhaps possible for academics, but quite unrealistic 
in what has become the normal atmosphere of teacher education institutions. 
Another approach to the problem of promoting some coherence and 
structure for the very comprehensive sets of cultural studies proposed 
by the later experimentalists is Phenix's idea of "integrative studies" 
(48)" Phenix argued very much as Mannheim, Rugg and Brameld did that con- 
temporary culture is out of balance by virtue of an excess of differen- 
tiation, multiplicity and plurality over unity. Like Frank, and other 
of the later experimentalists, he thought that the school could best under- 
take the task of "insuring the needed integration". But, for the school 
to do this work well, its teachers had to be more adequately prepared than 
at present. He proposed three kinds of studies: 
1. studies in the major skills and fields of knowledge 
(every skill area and field in some measure, and 
"come field or fields in depth"); 
2. professional studies, comprising the "essential areas" 
of psychological foundations of education, social sciences 
of education, history of education, special curricular 
studies, some special professional discipline (e. g., 
guidance) and supervised teaching; 
3" integrative studies. 
It was to the latter that Phenix looked for the cultivation of unity, 
namely, "more or less comprehensive and coherent schemes of life and 
thought". Phenix listed six "fundamental integrative studies impor- 
tant for all professional educators and relevant to all special fields 
of learning": 
ae human nature -a synoptic study of ideas from relevant 
disciplines; 
b. teaching students to think - as in logic and scientific 
method; 
c* creativity - sample studies; 
d. values - e. g., "a synoptic study of the substantial values 
in American civilization and how they might be taught"; 
es realms of knowledge - comparing and contrasting methods, 
fundamental concepts, and root metaphors; 
f. general curriculum - i. e., the philosophy of general 
education. 
There are many similarities between this scheme and those of Rugg 
and Brameld. As in the others we have considered, it is noteworthy 
that Phenix's proposal assumes there is nothing in existing thought or 
scholarship which quite provides the framework and the tools it is urged 
that teachers need. Thus teacher education cannot take the form of an 
initiation into established ways of knowing. The creative task set 
for teacher education follows from the reconstructionist determination 
to treat education as a mode of experience or a subcultural system 
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whose practitioners themselves set out to redefine the structures 
of knowledge, the values of the culture and the scope of action. 
These tasks could not be achieved unless those guiding the enterprise, 
the teachers of teachers, were actively engaged in the process of cul- 
tural redefinition. Brauner, in his hostile assessment of the "foun- 
dations of education" approach to educational study, described the am- 
bition to create an "artist-statesman"s 
"Picturing the teacher as an artist-statesman, the 
foundations program had to concentrate on cultivating 
temperament on top of technical skill. Technical com- 
petence had to be capped with the feelings, beliefs, 
attitudes, and emotional commitment which enabled spe- 
cialized ability to rise above itself and to reach for 
a now integration of understanding and performance that 
is more than the sum total of what has come before - 
that is, creative" (49). 
Brauner did not refer to Phenix, but it is this striving to reach 
for a new integration of understanding which lies behind Phenix's pro- 
posal to treat the education of teachers as the key to cultural unity. 
It is highly significant that it is a new elite or olerisy of education 
professors who thereby become the prophets of a new culture. 
It is not only the reconstructionist, however, who treats education 
as a creative and recreative process. All those who hope for some ame- 
lioration of the social consequences of ignorance, stupidity, superstition, 
prejudice, and ineptness, through the work of the school, have these ex- 
pectations or hopes, muted though they may be. Nor are the reconstruc- 
tionists alone in looking upon the teacher as a custodian or an authority 
on culture, in the value-laden sense. This has always been the outlook 
of educators in the classical tradition. It has been reaffirmed by 
Peters, in a manner that reminds us of the strong religious associations 
of this whole way of thinking: 
"In a pluralistic society, when there is no unified 
ideal that can be handed on by the priests, who else is 
there to stand between the generations and to initiate 
others into the various aspects of a culture within which 
the individual has eventually to determine where he stands? 
If the teachers are not thought of as, to varying degrees, 
authorities on this culture how effective are they likely 
to be in a society in which most of the pressures on young 
people are not in the direction of education? " (50). 
To treat the teacher as both a guardian of culture and a creative 
factor in society raises questions about the adequacy of those teacher 
education programmes which never give thought to the possibilities these 
ideas suggest. I have argued that the more ambitious reconstruotioniet 
ideas on the content of teacher education, even as sketches, are in many 
respects unsatisfactory. Yet they represent in educational thinking 
an awareness of the serious inadequacy of fragmented, inward-looking 
teacher education programmes and a recognition of possibilities which 
should be seriously explored and tested in experimental institutions, 
of which, in teacher education, we have very few. Rug and Brameld 
themselves insisted that their own ideas are only first hints and out- 
lines of the more detailed and systematic work that is needed, by future 
generations of teacher educators. Thus, criticism should be tempered 
by the recognition that some at any rate of the reconatruotionists ap- 
preciated the profound challenge to teacher education arising from their 
conceptions of the possible relationships of education to culture. 
CHAPTER XV 
OW. RVIEF' AND CRITIqUI, OF PART T',, 'O 
The essential feature of reconstruetionicm is the treatment of 
human thought, dispositions, attitudes and behavior as the focus of 
efforts by chan, _e agents 
to influence the directions of cultural de- 
velopment. As educational theoris, s, reconstructionists have attempted 
to invest with distinctive qualities these efforts to influence thought 
and modify behavior. Thus they have, by and large, adopted criteria 
of rationality and the r, ell-being of the person, rather than those of 
propaganda, manipulation, indoctrination, instrumental efficiency, and 
so forth; and they have looked to schools and similar institutions to 
provide educational and cultural leadership. 
The basic objectives of reconstructionism conceived as an educa- 
tional theory of cultural renewal is to create, in and through educa- 
tional enterprises, what Clarke called the "educative society". In re- 
viewing this theory, we mi6ht profitably ask questions of three kinds: 
first, about the concept of education held by the reconstructionists; 
second, about their contribution to the understanding of practical edu- 
cational processes and institutions; and, third, about their awareness 
of the difficulties confronting; utopian reformers. I shall summarize 
and assess the reconstructionist contributions to educational thinking 
under those three broad headings: 
1. Education: Concepts. nd Objectives 
1.1 Pensions between ratiorialit: Y and functional adaptation 
'Despite lapses into language appropriate to the educationally indis- 
criminate processes of socialization and enculturation, the reconstruotionist 
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generally held to what I called value laden concepts of education. 
To 
be educated, according to their definitions, is to become a different 
kind of person -a new intellectual and moral being. But no sudden 
change, as in some religious conversions, was anticipated; rather, 
in Dewey's terms, educative growth is continuous and steady, not saltatory 
and dramatic. In defining educative growth, Dewey invoked the criteria not 
only of continuity but also of communication, of reflectiveness and 
rationality. The moral quality of education as a form of the good life 
was brouht out by Kilpatrick but, while his account of amiable, well ad- 
justed, socially-minded hedonists is easier to apprehend than Dewey's less 
concrete list of criteria of growth, it has the disadvantage of tending to 
subserve educational processes to whatever happen to be the dominant social 
and political interests of the day. 
Such a possibility is inherent in the experimentalist assertions that 
the basic purposes and functions of education will vary in different socie- 
ties. They all maintained this cultural relativism, even Dewey, despite 
the difficulties it presents for a general, formal definition of education. 
Some aspects of education will, and should, vary, but to make the defini- 
tion of education rest entirely on specific social conditions, as in 
places Dewey says it should, raises at least two problems. First, the 
problem of understanding how a more general definition and theory of 
education (such as Dewey's own) could be used to assess practice in a 
wide variety of cultural situations. There must be some common, and 
even universal, features in a theory that can provide a frame of re- 
ference for the analysis of education in many different societies and 
at different periods of time. Second, if the social context deter- 
mines the aims and methods of education, it becomes only too easy for 
the dominant interests in any given society to exploit educational 
processes for their own advantage. The tendency in experimentalist 
thought to treat education as relative to specific cultural contexts 
is valuable insofar as it reminds us that education performs social 
functions which need to be frequently assessed and redefined. But 
we need to be on guard lest the recognition of a function and the de- 
finition of a context mer6e into acquiescence in whatever social assump- 
tions and purposes are uppermost at any given time. There is, thus, an 
unresolved tension in the reconstructionist concept of education, between 
the critical, rational and universal qualities of growth on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the social relativity and functionalism of the aims 
of educaticn, and the adaptive processes which those aims proscribe. 
In previous chapters, I have argued that roconetruotionist ideas 
about the relationship of education to other social processes may be 
divided into two main groups. In the first of these , roups, education 
may readily be shown to have a definite social function because the major 
objectives which are set for educational institutions are provided by 
other social systems, for example, by the polity or the economy. 
Ideas of this type are welcome to functional rationalists - e. g., 
social planners - and all those who, more or less in the Aristotelian 
tradition, look upon schools primarily as institutions designed to 
achieve or to move towards pro-arranged and unfolding social ends. 
This view of the social function of education has the advantage of 
being easily understood and of conferring upon the school a set of very 
definite and valuable social roles, as an instrument of national policy 
(1). But, since it begs the question of the function of education as 
a socially and individually recreating, process - fundamentally as a 
form of criticism - these ideas are of limited value, and, as I have 
indicated, they may give rise to certain dan;; era. 
The second set of ideas concerning the relationship of education 
to other social processes brings us to the principal contribution of 
reconstructionist thought to education. In this second position, 
education is regarded as a way of life, or a set of qualitative cri- 
teria, setting a standard and pointing directions for social and cul- 
tural development. Thus, the concept of the cultural context is of 
central, but not of over-riding, importance. The cultural context 
conditions and qualifies purposes; it does not completely determine 
them. Education is said to have its own aims, to set standards and 
ideals for the growth of individuals and of society, and educationists 
seek aid and support from society at large in their endeavor to realize 
these aims in practical situations. This is how I interpret the main 
tendency of Deweyfs theory of educative growth, although, as I have 
indicated, Dewey vacillated between this conception of education and 
the one I outlined in the preceding paragraph. When stressing the 
creative role of education in the formation of personality, the recon- 
struotionists have shown that the conventional treatment of education 
as essentially a process of transmitting pre-determined ideas and values, 
and thereby inducting children into the cultural and social systems, is 
quite misleading. Given the extensive and profound changes in culture 
whose diagnosis, as I tried to show in Part One, comprised the major 
objective of reconstructionist strategy, very serious problems arise 
for tho'belection and transmission" school of thought. If culture is 
in a condition of flux, signified by the breakdown of tacit agreement 
on basic norms, the disruption of customary ways of living, new paradigms 
and metaphors and accelerating change in the key sectors of thought and 
practice, then what is to be transmitted, and the appropriate modes of 
transmission themselves become problematic. Those who have the task 
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of selecting patterns of culture to transmit have to make qualitative 
judgments about what in culture is worthwhile, and what is needed in 
future living to compensate for present inadequacies. These are 
educational decisions taken in specific cultural situations, but they 
are fundamentally assessments of, or commentaries upon, the prevailing 
condition of culture and the institutions of society, 
qualitative judgments concerning a broad and vague concept such as 
culture must always be partial and limited. The reoonatruotionists have 
consistently emphasized the value of rationality in human affairs, but 
they have given too little attention to the conditions in personal and 
social life which sup, ort or inhibit rationality. For example, the 
persistence of prejudice and violence in human affairs reminas us of 
the power of irrational beliefs and of the impact of the impulses, and 
of the unconscious, on experience and behavior. A concept of education 
which defines the conditions of rationality needs to go beyond an analysis 
of rational thought to the personal-social context of fantasy, feelings, 
the will, and institutional constraints and opportunities. Furthermore, 
it is arguable that the attempt to reduce to rationality the totality 
of worthwhile elements in experience runs the risk of neglecting less 
clearly definable values, such as fellowship, imaginative associations 
of ideas, sympathy, compassion, playfulness, group identity, and so forth. 
The reconstruotionists acknowledged other values than rationality, but 
tended to reduce them to a single common mode of experience, instead of 
making a radical appraisal of the qualify of diverse experience in con- 
temporary society. This more radical appraisal is needed in any fur- 
ther development of the theory (2). 
1.2 Choosing worthwhile elements in culture 
Problems of selection and judgment in relationship to cultural ends 
and means have of course always existed. ßeoonstruetionists have 
shared with classical theorists a determination to select for en- 
couragement and development those particular ways of life wrlich they 
apprehend to be worthwhile and significant and these, as we have seen, 
they built into a model of democratic-rational action. One important 
contribution of the reconstructionists was to emphasize the urgency, 
seriousness and novelty of the situations in which choice has to 
be made - e. g., in the aetermining of curriculum content. They 
sought for new criteria to guide selection in a period when total break- 
down of wcotern culture appeared - even if in fact it were not - immi- 
nent. But various difficulties arose in their efforts to indicate 
the form which these choices should take. Dewey's process criteria 
for growth in and through reflectiveness and inquiry appeared to many 
to lack a definite character, to be too indirect and long term in their 
l 
effect on society and to leave too much to the chance circumstance that 
highly motivated and capable teachers, well supported by their communities, 
would have the necessary insights and skills of judgment and the oppor- 
tunities to perform the difficult roles of culture critics and inter- 
preters. 5eeking to lend a more definite appearance to these criteria, 
and to give te,, chers clearer guidance on practice than Dewey ever did, 
other reaonstruotionists (notably It ; g, Counts, Childs, Braaeld, and, 
to a lesser extent, Mannheim) encouraged teachers to adapt a militant 
social stance and to advocate by the various means at their disposal 
the doctrines of democracy. In this way, they hoped the school would 
act more directly as a vanguard of social change. I arg=ued that these 
doctrines, upon inspection, proved to be very much vaguer than their 
advoc:. ºtes supposed. Nevertheless, in combination they suggest a pro- 
gramme of social actions large-scale social planning, greatly increased 
governmental intervention to produce an "economy of abundance", 
the equalizing of opportunity, substantially increased educational 
provision, and the development of a common culture dominated by rational 
thinking. Teachers were encouraged to find ways of embodying these 
and other doctrines in their teaching. The reeonstruetionists suc- 
cesssfully created an atmosphere, or a climate of opinion, of a broadly 
democratic character, but were less successful in producing more definite 
action programmes (for example, curriculum proposals) except in the social 
studies. These programmes in the social studies were intended to convey 
to children an awareness of the contemporary social and cultural world, 
and to persu, _de them to accept a firm commitment to democratic and ra- 
tional values. The particular cultural designs offered by the recon- 
struetionists in many ways lent themselves to being promulgated through 
indoctrination, but, on the whole, because they all included critical 
thinking in their list of desirable qualities for teachers to encourage, 
the reconstruotionists, even Counts and Mannheim, could be considered 
as indoctrinators only in a very weak and trivial sense of that term. 
However, I pointed to other difficulties which arise in the effort 
to depict the school as a primary agent of cultural renewal. Apart 
from objections such as the limitations of teachers, and the force of 
other social institutions not seeking cultural renewal, the reconstruc- 
tionists were faced with the dilemma of espousing both a common, shared 
culture which reflects majority interests and aspirations, and elite 
leadership. It is clear that reconstructionism, in all of the forms 
I have considered, sets educational tasks which require dedicated and 
highly skilled leaders. The leaders constitute a corps of change 
agents who perceive their role as members of a culturally transforming 
elite with a mission to reform society along broadly democratic lines. 
whether, as with the Webbs and Mannheim; and the authors of the 
Kothari Itepo. -t, this elite acts within the framework of a socio- 
political plan which educationists have not themselves devised, 
or whether, as with Rugg and Brameld, it is the educators who 
claim ultimate authority for determining the directions of social 
policy, self-conscious elite enterprise forms a necessary, if not 
always acknowledged, condition of successful change in the recon- 
atruotionist theories I have examined. But, since reconstructionism 
also incorporates the values and ideals of alasslese democracy, its 
exponents have had to relate their ideas on creative leadership to 
cons ida: rations which express the aspirations of mass culture, and 
they have had to avoid sharply separating mass & elite sub-cultures. 
1.3 Tensions in reconstructionist thinking and the quest for 
order 
Efforts to reconcile what may be briefly stated as the principles 
of leadership and of participation produced a variety of educational 
proposals, none of which seems to me wholly successful. Perhaps re- 
constructionist ideas on this subject can be most usefully conceived 
as sets of tensions, which need not be resolved, but which it would be 
foolish of educationists to ignore or, as so often happens, to polarize 
into two sets of mutually exclusive principles. These tensions may 
be defined ass 
1. Leaders defining targets and processes of change; and 
:.: ^ses affirrnin6 the riý;, ht to disa"ret, to pose alter- 
natives and even to oppose change. 
2. Leadership from cultural centres; and also from the cul- 
tural ueriphery. 
j. The provision of common and approximately enual educa- 
tional experiences, in the form of subject-matter, class 
,; roupines and common institutions 
(e. {;., the comprehen- 
sive school); and special and privileged provision for 
4" 
5" 
particular talents, including intellectual talents, 
and for deficiency in children 
(e. g., severe emotional 
difficulties and materially impoverished environ- 
ments). 
qualitative distinctions which represent as worthwhile 
those activities within the symbolic system which are 
effectively available only to minorities; and recog- 
nition that mass culture expresses values and aspira- 
tions which, while qualitatively different, are not 
necessarily inferior to what minority definitions 
establish as worthwhile. 
Assimilation of a common core of values and expecta- 
tions (ideological commitment); and the maintenance 
of cultural alternatives, disunities and of the right 
of fundamental disagreement. 
6. Rationality and uniformity of policy in the public 
domain; and private experiences which are much more 
idiosyncratic, diverse and emotional. 
Reconstructionism has not succeeded in reconciling these and similar 
tensions. But the intention to do so - through the synthetic, uni- 
fied schemes of Rugg and Brameld, or even through the Raup-Stanley 
normative core - may itself be a mistaken one. I argued that per- 
vading the whole of reconstructionist thinking is a more or less 
conscious quest for cultural order and integration. It is not dif- 
ficult to understand this quest in view of the heightened awareness 
the reconstructionists themselves brought to processes of cultural 
change, especially the breakdown of traditional social and intellec- 
tual communities. Further, as an ideological theory of a highly 
moralistic kind, reconstructionism echoes older religious themes, esr 
pecially those expressing a sense of spiritual disunity and depriva- 
tion. The notion of a unitary principle of order is in reconstruc- 
tionist thought a secular version of traditional concepts of God. 
I gave examples to support this interpretation from Wells, Mannheim 
and Brameld, in particular - all of whom drew upon the language and 
mythology of religion in trying to express their deepest feelings 
about culture disunity. Their versions of reconstructionism express 
some of the aspirations of traditional theology - Thomistic theology, 
perhaps, or at least those forms of pre-twentieth century theology 
which attempt to organize all thought and experience within a single 
system of thought and action, all of whose parts inter-relate. 
To achieve both totality and consistency is a theoretical ideal whose 
realization is constantly defied by the complexity and extensiveness 
of the data, the variability of human action, and the genuine novelty 
of fresh thought and new experience. Dewey understood this# but his 
utter openness to new experience and his radical affirmation that all 
the order we need would be provided by universalizing the method of 
reflection were in practice less congenial to his followers than is 
apparent from their repetitive use of his leading ideas. They re- 
peated his ideas but they also tried to produce more specific culture 
patterns and models of behavior than Dewey's ideas predicate. Rugg, 
Brameld and Stanley pleaded for a new cultural synthesis -a modified 
set of social-moral procedures. Bode insisted that more definite 
statements of educational ends and purposes were needed, Counts com- 
mitted the schools to a democratic ideology, and Kilpatrick urged 
reforms leading to the "good life". These later formulations of the 
more radical experimentalist doctrine of the unity yielded by the adop- 
tion of a single method of inquiry express a characteristic reconstruc- 
tionist unease over the likely outcome of the trends towards disinte- 
gration in contemporary culture. To avert these trends, more was needed, 
they felt, than the essentially sceptical and critical intelligence which 
would be developed through the procedures of reflective inquiry. More 
definite sets of ideas on social and cultural organization should be 
presented for discussion by educational institutions and pupils should 
be encouraged to develop a central, unifying core of eooio-moral 
principles. Thus, unity of culture and unity of experience, 
how- 
ever vaguely expressed in the writings of later reconstructionists, 
were conceived as goals which it was proper for education 
to pursue, 
not only through the use of a common method but also through 
the 
propagation of specific principles of action and a general 
demo- 
cratic framework of interpretation. 
The pursuit of order may be regarded as expressing no more than 
the theorist's determination to comprehend and unify the phenomena 
with which he is dealing. For the reconstructionists, however, 
it 
was always more than this; they were action theorists, more interested 
in guiding conduct than in explaining social movement. In Mannheim, 
and perhaps also in the later experimentalists, the search for a total 
unified system of social thought and action runs the risk of assimilat- 
ing diversity and novelty and imposing orthodoxy. The tensions I re- 
ferred to earlier may be reconciled in social action by arranging the 
positions they express in a hierarchy of policy objectives and by ex- 
cluding some of them altogether. The conversion of ideology into po- 
litical orthodoxy is usually accompanied by attempts to construct 
such hierarchies. 
To maintain freedom of thought and to encourage experimentation 
in the social sphere it may be better to forego the advantages of con- 
sensus and united action beyond that minimum agreement necessary for 
the co-existence of diverse institutions. Total co-ordination of 
effort seems to imply a clear hierarchy of decision-taking, the exact 
delineation of roles, and high concentration of power in central bureaux. 
For education, as for other elements in the social system, we should 
consider, as an alternative to the more extreme versions of the "quest 
for order", a dispersal of authority, involving a looser definition 
of roles and, most important, the diffusion of responsibility and 
decision-taking as widely as possible throughout whatever system 
we have in mind - whether the national policy system, the local 
authority, the school, or the class. This approach, inefficient 
and slow as it may appear, from the educational standpoint has 
the great merits of facilitating treatment of members of systems 
as ends in themselves and of seeking roles and responsibilities 
which are educative for individuals. 
2. Educational Processes and Institutions, and the Teacher's Role 
I shall review under this heading reconstructionist contributions 
to curriculum theory, to the understanding of the school as an educa- 
tional institution, and to the distinctive role of the teacher as a 
culture change agent. I shall not attempt to summarize the subject 
matter of Chapters XI to XIV, but shall emphasize what I take to be the 
major issues. 
2.1 Curriculum 
Curriculum thinking has changed rapidly in the past ten years, as 
a consequence, first, of the great expansion and modification of the 
structures of public education, in response to social, political and 
economic pressures; second, of the relatively large investment of 
private and publio funds in specific projects to redesign studies in 
different areas of the curriculum; and, third, of the attention given 
to curriculum theory by writers like Broudy, Bruner, Herrick, Phenix, 
Smith, Tyler and others (3). These sets of contributions have advanced 
our understanding of curriculum issues to such a degree that the work 
of the reconstructionists has been superseded in several respects. 
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However, the more recent developments themselves incorporate many 
of the ideas advanced by the reconstruotionists. 
I shall review 
these ideas in relation to the following topics: 
curriculum design as a foreshadowing of the new order; 
curriculum requirements of universal, public education; 
problem solving, occupations and projects; 
scientific culture; 
practical judgment, and a core of agreed moral values; 
tasks of curriculum designing. 
2.1.1 Curriculum design foreshadows a new cultural order 
Those reconatructionists who have conceived education as an agency 
of renewal in the most ambitious terms are also those who have discussed 
the curriculum as if the design of school experiences could somehow 
intimate or foreshadow patterns of future cultural experience. 
These writers are Welle, Rugg and Brameld. They attempted to organize 
the subject matter and experiences of the curriculum into a programme 
of integrated studies, in place of the familiar groupings of separately 
taught subjects and activities. The curriculum was intended by these 
writers to serve as an introduction to, or even as a kind of model of, 
the unity of life in the new age. Whereas most educationists are satis- 
fied if children can themselves progressively inter-relate those parts 
of their studies which have things in common, most of the reconstruo- 
tioniats wanted to introduce a structure or a grid into which teachers 
could incorporate descriptions of their teaching tasks and of the sub- 
jects of study with a view to co-ordinating or integrating them. This 
intention requires the adoption of rational design models, including 
clearly defined objectives and detailed learning structures (4)" These 
are difficult processes to visualize and only after considerable experience 
of curriculum planning, team teaching, the "integrated day", com- 
bined courses in, for example, humanities and so forth, will it be 
possible for us to gain a clear understanding of what is common or 
similar in the various enterprises thus brought together, and of how 
they may be integrated into core programmes. The vagueness and ten- 
tativeness of reoonstructionist proposals on this topic are partly a 
consequence of the relative lack of experience of the integrated 
approach in schools. This deficiency partly at least accounts for 
the over-generalized and highly speculative character of their argu- 
ments in favor of "unity" and "synthesis" in the curriculum. 
Two major difficulties which the reconstructionists failed to 
resolve in discussing the curriculum are, first, the tendency of 
supporters of integration to exclude or minimize the value of what- 
ever does not readily fit the grid; and, second, the obscurity of the 
claim that a curriculum design can be a model of future culture ex- 
perience. I maintained in discussing the aspiration for a unitary 
culture that this can be achieved only by excluding highly valuable 
elements of diversity and novelty, and that, accordingly, a cultural 
model comprising tensions is preferable to one which achieves a totali- 
tarian, or even a substantial, unity. This argument is also relevant 
to the claims advanced on behalf of total, unified curriculum design, 
granting that these claims were usually qualified or moderated by re- 
ference to items that were accepted as worthwhile even though hot in- 
corporated into the grid. For these reasons, it would be preferable 
to embark on simpler outlines of the "total" curriculum, building these 
in part on statements of desired learning outcomes prepared and agreed 
by participating teachers (and pupils), and seeking specific ways of re- 
lating one area - science, for example - to another - for example, language 
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within the experience of the learners. There may be very 
few op- 
portunities for joint teaching available in given situations, but 
those that suggest themselves to the participants are more meaningful 
than a general directive to produce a total "synthesis", which of 
necessity would ignore relevant aspects of pupil and teacher ex- 
perience. For example, there are many opportunities in the secondary 
school for language teachers to participate in and draw upon the work 
of other teachers when preparing ideas for written work 
We Simi- 
larly, history is always the history of something, and it frequently 
touches upon other curricular subjects - for example, science and re- 
ligion. Attempts to develop teams of teachers who contribute from 
their specialist standpoint to a single set of themes might demonstrate 
the bearing of specialized knowledge upon issues of pressing, common 
concern. In the primary school, the search for mathematical proper- 
ties and relations in the familiar and undifferentiated environment 
of the child's experience may furnish opportunities for demonstrating 
the universal character of mathematical analysis, but this need not lead 
to the total absorption of particular activities into a single master- 
plan grounded in a hypothetical totality of experience (6). 
Despite these objections, it must be conceded that the reoonstruc- 
tionists who sought to replace conventional teaching of the subjects by 
schemes which pointed to relationships amongst them performed a valuable 
service. This they did not so much by their own frequently unworkable 
schemes as by arguing that the content of school education should be 
constantly under surveillance and criticized from definite standpoints 
(7). They correctly argued that, if the school is to perform a creative 
role in society, it must look to the design of the curriculum, its central 
intentional activity, as the source of ideas and suggestions for future 
living. It is in this sense that the curriculum may properly be 
said to foreshadow the future cultural order. 
While we may propose a general relationship between the inten- 
tional activities which comprise the curriculum and future social 
living, we cannot in any precise way foreeast relationships between 
what schools do now and how life is or may be ordered in the 
future. 
"Life" and "culture" are highly generalized, but the school is a single, 
particularized institution. Intentional curriculum activities are a 
major part of the life of the school, but by no means the only part; 
for some educationists they are, in any case, subsidiary to less cal- 
culable transactions between children and adults, in the form of warm 
and spontaneous personal relationships and so-called "encounter" teach- 
ing, which is unpremeditated and intuitive. Furthermore, apart from 
teacher-child relationships, planned or unplanned, other influences, 
especially that of the peer group culture, bear upon children while 
in school. Influences other than the school also bear upon them, and 
these are influences which educationists frequently underestimate, 
especially when they are not in harmony with those exerted by the 
school (6). Except in a society where custodial control of children 
is complete, as in Plutarch's semi-mythical account of Sparta, there 
is no possibility of the curriculum serving as an actual model of future 
living, and even in this hypothetical society one would need to assume 
completely static conditions, if factors subsequent to school experience 
were not-to intervene and upset the predicated curriculum-life relation- 
ship. Plainly, the reconatruotionists had no such hypothetical society 
in mind, and what they appear to have meant by the claim that the curri- 
culum might serve as a model of the future is that educationists should 
so design the curriculum that they do their utmost to make it an effective, 
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worthwhile and highly influential set of experiences in a child's 
life. This reformulation of the more sweeping reconstructionist 
aspirations draws attention to a serious problem - that for many 
children it is still true that parts of school experience are scarcely 
meaningful or even intelligible. If education is to exercise any 
powerful influence on social development, then the reconstructionists 
were right to claim that the curriculum is of central importance as 
a lever of change. The curriculum must be considered as a whole; 
it should be so designed as to engage and develop children's experiences 
of contemporary life, of each other and of their teachers; and it must 
be treated as one of the major control systems in any system of planned 
change. But it does not follow that education should be conceived 
simply in terms of the planning of experience. On the contrary, 
careful curriculum planning, by helping to reduce the incidence of 
impoverished and ineffective teaching, provides teachers with better 
opportunities than hitherto for the exploration of the many different 
situations and patterns of relationship within which educative growth 
might occur. 
2.1.2 Curriculum for universal public schooling 
Realization that through universal, public education a whole nation's 
children may be influenced has led those reconstructionists in societies 
where the common school is a reality to propose measures for reaching and 
influencing whole populations. Of these measures the most notable is 
the common core curriculum. The existence of a common school system 
makes it possible to conceive of a common programme of studies, or at 
least of common elements in diverse programmes of schooling, but it 
does not of itself explain the appearance of these common programmes. 
Two major aspirations lay behind the thinking of those reconstructionists, 
namely the American experimentalists and Mannheim, who advocated a 
common core. The first of these was the intention to use schools 
to sustain and develop a socially-binding democratic heritage in which 
consciousness of membership of a common culture, basic agreement on 
policy objectives, and the sharing of experience feature prominently. 
The second aspiration of the core theorists was to seek ways to stabi- 
lize and direct change in society which, if left undirected, threatened 
to destroy the traditional fundamental unities of values, beliefs and 
behavior. Thus the universal, public school was assigned the task of 
stabilizing change by forming an integrated, democratic character in 
the youth. The curriculum was to be the principal means to this end, 
and it was to serve a symbolic function, as exemplar of the new demo- 
cratic order. Hence the distinctively moralistic tone of reconstruc- 
tionist curriculum theorizing, the emphasis on a set of basic values, 
the prominence given to historical and social subject matter, and the 
recommendations concerning pupil participation and activity. 
In American thought, the public school was very largely taken for 
granted. Despite its weaknesses, the public school system satisfied 
certain basic democratic requirements. In principle, it was open to 
all, free of charge, non-discriminating, and no special advantages 
were conferred by opting out, into the tiny independent system. Of 
course, in practice, these democratic considerations were sharply 
limited - for example, by the wide economic disparities between neigh- 
borhoods and regions. These and other failures in practice were 
heartily condemned by Dewey, Counts, Childs, Kilpatrick and other of 
the experimentalists, and by the Webbs, Mannheim and Clarke in England. 
Nevertheless, the Americans were fundamentally satisfied that the basis 
of an adequate structure of universal education existed - there was no 
need to create it. By contrast, reconstruotionist thinking in England 
has been circumscribed by the existence of a powerful and quite sub- 
stantial system of independent schools and by deeply rooted status 
distinctions among the various sectors of the maintained system. 
In the light of these considerations, it would have made no sense 
to proclaim a universal, common school as the necessary vehicle of 
reform. however, none of the English reconstruotionists took suf- 
ficiently seriously the problem of redesigning a core curriculum for 
a society where, in both independent and grammar schools, which were 
sharply divided from higher elementary and secondary schools, the tra- 
ditional practice of subject specialization in well-defended fields 
was very firmly established. 
Mannheim made relevant suggestions for practical, workshop-based 
activities and for a heavy emphasis in the curriculum on social science 
and on issues arising from social change. However, these suggestions 
were, at the time, so far removed from the formal system of separate 
subject teaching, by traditional literary or laboratory means, that it 
is difficult to imagine that they could have any significant impact on 
that system. One unfortunate consequence of the deep divisions between 
academically orientated and other forms of education is that, in the 
secondary schools, proposals for radical curriculum reform, of the 
practical and social character recommended by the reconstructionists, 
have been accepted as appropriate for children of "ßverage and lower 
than average" ability (9). Thus, the leaders to whom reconstructionists 
looked as future reformers have continued to receive a different educa- 
tion from the masses who attend different types of schools and undertake 
a different programme of studies. This programme of studies, further- 
more, has traditionally looked to the culture expressed in the disciplines 
of knowledge and to the social system of the professions, business 
management and the universities for inspiration and direction. 
Thus, English reconstructionist thinking in the past has been 
severely circumscribed by a structure of education that explicitly 
and implicitly repudiates the concepts of the common school and a 
common curriculum. 
Two changes are transforming this situations first, the post- 
war success of maintained primary schools, which are widely regarded as 
the leaders of innovation in education and are becoming increasingly 
acceptable as alternatives to preparatory schools, even for those 
children who subsequently move into the independent sector. The 
success of the maintained primary school means that there is now the 
possibility of a universal public school system acceptable to a very 
large proportion of the population. However, the emphasis in the 
ideology of primary education upon individualistic, child-centred 
concepts, to some extent militates against acceptance, or even serious 
consideration, of the kind of curriculum recommended by reconstruc- 
tionists. 
The second change which marks the emergence of a universal public 
school in England is the development of the comprehensive system in 
secondary education. The various reappraisals now being made in these 
schools of the traditional content of the secondary curriculum are 
creating a situation in which receptivity to reconstructionist thinking 
is a definite possibility. This suggests that future development of 
the reconstructionist theory in England could be very profitably re- 
lated to the curriculum of the secondary and the middle schools where 
new structures require new programmes, and there are grounds for sup- 
posing that teachers are ready to consider the kinds of curriculum ideas 
- 610 - 
reconstructionists have typically advanced; a core of socially- 
related studies; identification for study purposes of critical 
issues and problems in contemporary society; broad areas of re- 
lated subject-matter in place of exclusive emphasis on single dis- 
ciplines; the use of workshop teaching, case studies, discussion 
groups; and the encouragement of socially reconstructive thinking 
within a broadly democratic framework of values and aspirations. 
2.1.3 Problem-solving. occupations and projects 
I contrasted the teaching and learning methods which Dewey and 
Kilpatrick recommended with the approach to education which they 
stigmatized as "formal" and "traditional". All of the reconstruc- 
tionists were critical, in some measure, of existing practice and 
sought to undermine and to supplant it. Their objections ranged 
from the belief that most conventional teaching was ineffective even 
in relation to its own objectives, to the more sweeping condemnation 
of objectives which were devised with scant regard to the great social 
changes which the reconatruotionists themselves diagnosed. Kilpatrick's 
project method was not simply a new way of teaching old materials, by 
making them more intelligible and interesting to children, it was 
intended to designate a new form of subject matter. This new con- 
tent was derived from the curriculum that Dewey had introduced at the 
Laboratory School and its focus was the industrial life of man, in 
particular the evolution of industrial processes and the emergence 
of modern industrial-urban culture. Other subject matter was included, 
and it is possible to use project methods in many different subjects, 
but in Kilpatrick's hands the project was largely a method for social 
studies teaching. Similarly, Dewey's concept of problem-solving, 
and Mannheim's designation of a "romantic" approach to teaching, while 
they were by no means restricted in principle to certain areas of 
the curriculum, nevertheless they lend themselves most readily to 
application in fields whose conceptual structures are looser and 
less well demarcated than the subjects of the traditional curriculum. 
The exhortations to teachers to adopt the unfamiliar and refor- 
mist approaches of reflective thought, problem-solving, the study of 
industrial culture, projects and so forth, is perhaps comparable to 
the wider challenge the reeonatruotionists issued to society at large 
and it is open to similar objections. These newer approaches were 
not merely different from the older ones; they implied a deep dis- 
satisfaction with the older approaches and all that they stood for. 
But the prevailing curriculum and methods of teaching, the life of 
the school, and wider social expectations all exercise a powerful 
influence on teachers, just as the existing institutions and tendencies 
of society enter into the emotional life and the basic orientations of 
citizens. Furthermore, existing educational arrangements, like exist- 
ing economic, political and industrial arrangements, serve very powerful 
interests, a point well documented by Counts and Stanley. To change 
a curriculum, as Bonne and Muntyan remarked, is to change a social 
system, not merely to substitute one device or body of subject matter 
for another (10). Thus the plea for a new orientation to the content 
and methods of education was akin to a plea for a new way of life. 
The reconatruotionists have exposed a very important problem in edu- 
cational change, but their exhortation to teachers, to embark upon 
change, now needs to be replaced by a careful analysis of effective 
and defensible measures for transforming systems, many of whose most 
influential members may be indifferent, reluctant, or even opposed to 
the changes in question (11). 
2.1.4 Scientific culture 
The scientific culture which Wells, Russell, Dewey and Frank 
amongst others sought to insinuate into society through education 
was not in their judgment to be achieved simply by teaching the 
sciences. Rather, "scientific culture" was shorthand for a way of 
life or a set of dispositions and attitudes which would affect very 
large areas of a person's behavior, and pervade the whole society. 
It would be more precise to refer to this culture as that of reflec- 
tive thought, or rationality, rather than "science", since it extends 
far beyond the sciences and in fact may be achieved without systematic 
study of the natural sciences. The explanation for the loose use of 
the expression "scientific culture" lies perhaps in the channelling of 
a great deal of reflective, critical and rational thought over the past 
three centuries into the expanding natural sciences. The thought 
structures and methodologies of the sciences have come, over this 
period, to represent for many thinkers the highest or most perfect 
forms of rationality. Since the reconstructionists have been, on the 
whole, sceptical rationalists in outlook, and since they have all 
treated the direct or indirect impact of science on culture as the 
main single source of radical change, it is not surprising that they 
have equated rational with scientific thought and have laid so much 
stress on the desirability of harnessing technology, and industrial 
and social change by the very methods which have been so successful 
in the sciences. 
The reconstruotionist emphasis on scientific culture, while it has 
served well to challenge the assumptions and the subtle authoritarianism 
of the traditional curriculum, has had the unfortunate consequence of 
directing attention away from spheres of thought and experience no less 
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significant than scientific thinking. Even if we accept that, by 
scientific culture, the reconstructionists generally meant a pers- 
pective and a set of procedures which could be applied to a very 
wide range of studies, their chief concern was undoubtedly the scep- 
tical, reflective intellect. With the exception of Wells and Rugg, 
they g-; ve too little attention to other mental processes: contem- 
plation, reverie, imaginative association of ideas, fantasy, and to 
the routinization of experience into customary and traditional modes - 
the mainstay of traditional and popular culture. Preoccupation with 
the self-conscious and reflective processes of scientific culture 
leads to the distortion and the reduction of other forms of experience 
even if, as with Dewey, acknowledgement is made of the value of those 
other forms. In curriculum terms, what is needed is a design of studies 
which discloses the diversity of valid experience and invites partici- 
pation in the major modes of experience which have become articulated 
in the life history of culture. The concept of scientific culture 
is peculiarly western and modern, and in a truly critical programme 
it should be subjected to observation and interpretation from quite 
different standpoints (for example, religious and aesthetic). Only 
through sustained experience of alternative standpoints could we ex- 
pect children to begin to make these observations and interpretations. 
2.1.5 Practical judgment and a moral core 
The more prophetic and hortatory tendencies in reconstructionism 
have been supplanted, in the post-war period, by greater attention to 
the details of contemporary crisis culture and by interest in designing 
instruments of deoision-taking. Consensus-seeking and the arts of 
practical judgment have come to the fore, in a response to the dis- 
integration which Mannheim, Brameld, Raup, Smith, Stanley and others 
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have detected in the "moral core" of culture. I argued that the 
quest for an ever-widening consensus is not consistent with cultural 
pluralism and diversity, and rained a query about the nature and ex- 
tent of agreement needed in fundamental norms and values of society. 
While policy decisions of the most general and far-reaching kind re- 
quire, in a democracy, the widest measure of understanding and agree- 
ment procurable through discussion and interchange of ideas, it is not 
clear why we should seek indefinitely to extend this area of policy 
agreement. The quest for consensus, as Brameld rightly points out, 
is a quest for the resolution of differences through creative sots of 
synthesis. This is essentially a dialectical process, in which the 
synthesis transcends the particular viewpoints about which there is 
disagreement. There are many spheres of action where it would be 
better if one could achieve such higher order agreements rather than 
persist in irreconcilable differences or grudgingly accept compromise 
situations. However, the very process of consensus-seeking depends 
upon the formation of different outlooks and these, in turn, issue 
from and express the values of diverse sub-cultures. For the dia- 
lectical process of consensus to continue we thus need, not only an 
instrument for reaching agreement, such as the techniques of practical 
judgment, but also the vitality and energy of sub-cultural diversity. 
This wris better appreciated by Stanley than by Wells, Rugg and Brameld, 
who envisaged ever-widening circles of agreement. Stanley followed 
Linton in dividing "core" values, which are, or rather should be, uni- 
versal and commonly shared, from the life styles of particular sub- 
groups. 
Can we talk meaningfully about creating a common core of values 
when it is in and through experience of life problems that values arise? 
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The reconstructionist emphasis on making and renewing suggests that 
conscious and deliberate decisions are taken about values, whereas 
our common experience is that of expressing and sensing values in 
conduct. It is perhaps only through a common life that common 
values will emerge. This raises a difficulty for the pluralist, 
who wishes for a diversity of life styles. The relationship between 
common values, diverse life styles, and the school curriculum was 
touched upon by the reconstruotionists, but there are many issues 
which would repay fuller discussion, especially in the light of the 
current move in England and Wales to establish common courses of study, 
taught in mixed ability groups, in neighborhood comprehensive schools& 
kany choices are being made in the development of these courses without 
due consideration being given to the wider social and cultural issues 
of the relationship of a common value system to individual and sub- 
cultural differences. The democratic ideal, as interpreted by the 
reconstructionists, is a common life ideal, and the public school pro- 
vides the institutional framework for common experiences. However, 
I suggested that in practice the common school is not a homogeneous 
institution but embodies the diversity of neighborhoods, regions and 
social classes. This diversity affects the realization of common 
ideals and, as with the curriculum, we need a better appreciation of 
the relationship of actual conditions to the value systems which educa- 
tion and social reforms are seeking to establish. 
The effort to establish the procedures of practical judgment re- 
present awareness of some of the difficulties of procuring awareness 
of norms and agreement on objectives. Thus, it is accepted that con- 
sensus does not in fact exist in large areas of social life and that to 
create it requires skill in organized decision-taking. It is further 
recognized that distinctions need to be made between those 
issues on 
which agreement would be valuable and those for which it would 
be better 
to encourage diversity of outlook, although the advocates of practical 
judgment offered no means of distinguishing between these two sets of 
issues. However, the exponents of consensus and practical judgment 
did not seriously consider the problem raised above; namely, that a 
common core of values requires and, indeed, presupposes a common 
life 
an expectation which is extremely artificial in large scale urbanized 
societies characterized by the division of labor, by wide economic and 
class differences, and by vocational mobility. The relentless pursuit 
of the ideals of scientific culture could, in principle at least, achieve 
something approximating to a common life, although only, perhaps, in a dis- 
tant Wellsian utopia. But, as I indicated in the previous section, it is 
very difficult to see how we could, in a diverse and fallible society, achieve 
a substantial core of common values which permeates experience. 
So far as the curriculum is concerned, it is possible to move some 
distance in several directions without creating either massive contra- 
dictions or that high degree of abstractness, which is signified by the 
contrast between talk about a common moral core and the reality of sub- 
stantial inequality of life conditions which remains a feature of all 
technically advanced societies. A range of common subject matter might 
be so presented as to emphasize universal qualities in human experience 
and possibilities of change and growth, and to provide children with a 
grounding in techniques of inquiry of wide applicability. Ideally, in 
a democracy, decisions about this "core" would involve very wide community 
participation, since these decisions should express the basic values and ob- 
jectives of the society. At any rate, efforts should be made to enlarge par- 
ticipation beyond the relatively narrow range of experts and specialists who 
at present take these decisions. For this purpose, the 
instrument 
of practical judgment and the ideal of consensus are extremely 
impor- 
tant. Beyond this minimum common core there should be opportunity 
for diversity and variety and for the expression of many different 
viewpoints. For these activities, there is no need for - and, 
indeed, there would be harm in constantly seeking - higher order agree- 
ments. Teachers and children should be free to explore many different 
possibilities or forms of excellence. Although there would be value 
in seeking the extensions of consensus and in using the ends of prac- 
tical judgment within these diverse forms of activity, their very di- 
versity would set limits to the quest for indefinite extension of agree- 
ment throughout the system. 
2.1.6 Curriculum designing 
The idea that the curriculum may be designed by teachers to satisfy 
certain oriteria, and that it need not be the product either of inspired 
intuition or of impersonal and authoritative committees of experts, is 
perhaps the most significant of the reconstruotionist contributions to 
curriculum theory. They were not of course the first to analyse this 
idea but, by giving it prominence and by discussing design processes, 
they very powerfully reinforced a growing movement towards increased 
teacher freedom, responsibility and rationality. I suggested that 
the chief intellectual impetus to this movement was provided by Dewey 
and that the experimentalists have done more than any other group to 
advance understanding of the processes of curriculum design. Thus, 
the concept of operational definitions of teaching objectives, explored 
by writers like Tyler, Herrick, Smith and associates, and now of major 
interest to curriculum theorists and developers, sprang from the pragmatic 
theory of meanings, which requires the specifichtlba° of relevant operations 
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or processes in the discussion of action concepts. The idea of 
the teacher as a curriculum designer also expresses the Doweyan 
determination to improve the standing of the profession by in""est- 
ing it with a greater responsibility for decisions concerning learn- 
ing and assessment. This was needed, it was argued, to free teach- 
ing situations and to encourage experimentation and the development 
of courses of study directly related to individual capabilities and 
interests. 
Rugg, more than any other of the reconstructionists, abstracted 
the concept of curriculum design from the broader issues of teacher 
freedom, individual learnings, and rational decision-taking. His 
editorship of the 1926 yearbook of the National Society for the Study 
of Education was one of the most important contributions to a way of 
thinking about curriculum decisions which is only now receiving wide 
recognition. Even in contemporary discussions of the curriculum, and 
particularly in the curriculum reform movement which is centred on 
national and regional project teams, there is a danger that the concept 
of the classroom teacher as a designer of learning programmes will be 
overlooked in the enthusiasm for new, expert-produced kits of materials 
and learning models. The proliferation of these kits in fact puts 
greater demands on teachers to develop skills of selection, trial and 
assessment, so the two approaches should be seen as complementary to 
each others materials produced, reviewed and provisionally organized 
into units of study by expert teams; individual judgments about suitability, 
sequence reorganization, and effectiveness by classroom teachers. 
The design criteria which have emerged as a result of reconstruc- 
tionist thought are numerous. I have given some account of these in 
Chapters XI and XII. They include the conception of the curriculum 's 
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as a learning system of interacting parts, with ascertainable inputs 
and outputs; the importance of participant involvement in decision- 
taking; the specification of behavioral objectives and of relevant 
assessment procedures; and the relevance of broader cultural and 
social perspectives to specific decisions. The last point, as we 
have seen, is very distinctive of reconstructioniet thought, since the 
contribution of the school to cultural renewal, limited though it may 
be by cultural and social restraints and deficiencies, can be most 
effectively made through the curriculum. 
By drawing attention to the role of the teacher as curriculum de- 
signer, the reconstruotionists were in effect opposing a very powerful 
bureaucratic movement towards the concentration of curriculum respon- 
sibility in expert teams and centralized units. On the other hand, by 
emphasizing the value of the design of learning situations, they directly 
challenged the popular belief of progressive educationists that personal 
transactions between adults and children, from which growth can be ex- 
pected to proceed, are unpredictable, ineffable, and in no way contingent 
on organized teaching schemes. We have become more aware of problems 
such as those concerning the pre-planning of curriculum objectives, the 
distinctive contribution to educative growth of organized knowledge, and 
the public verifiability of significant assessments of growth$ since the 
reconstruotioniste developed their ideas on curriculum design. One of 
the most important tasks now facing educational reformers is to analyse 
the relationships amongst these various considerations, in an endeavor 
to realize, in new forms and through the design of the curriculum, these 
values, which, at present, are inadequately expressed by the concepts of 
growth, personal transactions, and intuitive teaching. The curriculum, 
conceived as the totality of education experiences for which the school 
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makes provision, cannot be wholly pre-planned, but, without the attempt 
through flexible planning to achieve desired outcomes, we are likely 
to find that the very values for which the progressives set up new 
institutions either succumb under pressure from external factors like 
public examinations, or are confined to a tiny minority of the popu- 
lation. 
2.2 The school 
Although the reconstruotionists did not suppose that schooling and 
education are co-extensive, they tended to elevate the school into the 
chief instrument of educational policy in the modern state. This re- 
flects the long historical tradition of schooling in western societies, 
and the fact of enormous and rapidly increasing investment, in the twen- 
tieth century, in public school systems throughout the world. Some of 
the reconstructionista, notably Wells, Mannheim and Brameld, have empha- 
sized the potentially educative role of other institutions in society, 
especially those intended for adult education. By equating education 
with qualitatively controlled growth, Dewey gave to life itself an educa- 
tive dimension which transcended all particular institutions. Clarke, 
too, with his concept of the educative society, clearly regarded schools 
as but one agency amongst many of education. The basic concepts of re- 
constructionism, so far from encouraging exclusive concentration on the 
school, pose educative tasks and functions for the whole society and 
these wo have barely begun to explore. For example, we might begin 
to inform the common conceptions of industrial life (e. g., work relation- 
ships, productivity, the social organization of enterprises, managerial 
efficiency, and so forth) with the values of the Lrowth and culture of 
those in employment. The formative effects of industrial life upon the 
worker operate for a lards part of the day and over a period of some fifty 
years. To ascertain and to enhance the educative quality of these 
cumulative, long-term effects is a necessary requirement if we are 
ever to make a significant step towards the ideal of the educative 
society, We know that, in fact, social experience is often nie- 
educative and that modern institutional life is dositned with ends in 
view other than the education of its members. The next phase of re- 
constructionist thought should be extended from the notion of the 
school as an agency of renewal to the education, so to speak, of the 
major social instrumentalities of change. This is difficult perhaps 
to visualize, but it is required by our understanding of growth as life- 
long and as susceptible at all times to qualitative improvement. In a 
democratic society, it is indefensible to maintain institutions which 
limit the opportunity for continuing educative growth to a minority 
comparable to Aristotle's leisure class. To identify some of the 
critical sources of change in society, and to find ways of introducing 
an educational ethos into the major institutions of society, sounds 
utopian; and so it may be, but it would overcome one of the major 
objections to reconstructionism that, by concentrating on schools and 
teachers, it has underestimated the power of other social institutions 
and actors, and has overlooked their indifference or opposition to 
using schools as fundamentally critical and socially creative agencies. 
2.2.1 Public provision and control of educational infra- 
structure 
One thread which runs right through reconstructionist thinking 
identifies the public school as the chief agency of cultural renewal. 
I have just argued that this is no longer an adequate conception, but 
it only becomes possible seriously to develop this argument following 
the universal provision of public schooling. That is to say, the 
limitations of the school in relation to other institutions become 
apparent only after the possibilities of schooling have been ex- 
plored in practical terms. Universal provision is needed beoause, 
in a democratic theory, the attempt must be made to universalize 
opportunity and to facilitate the education of all. This provision 
must be public because only thus can sectionalism and various other 
forms of particularism be overcome, and something even faintly re- 
sembling a common experience be provided for. However, we should 
not equate public provision and support with state control. Al- 
though they did not argue along these lines, all of the reoonstruo- 
tionists were aware of these issues, and sought the enlargement and 
extension of the common, public school. This is true even of Wells, 
Clarke and Mannheim, who, while they recognized the strength, and, in 
the case of Clarke and Mannheim, the legitimacy, of the independent 
sector, sought rapid and widespread development of the public sector. 
The existence of private and independent schools does not necessarily 
inhibit the growth of reconstruotioniat t', ought, and it may be that some 
of them provide unique opportunities for free experimentation. Hoxeverg 
where independent schools are powerful and confer privilege regardless 
of merit, and where they emphasize exclusiveness and separatist virtues, 
they are in danger of intensifying the division between elites and masses 
which, as Mannheim pointed out, is a particular threat to democratic 
society and to the enlargement of personality. It should be possible, 
as in some of the independent progressive schools, to achieve the advan- 
tages of innovativeness whilst at the same time these schools are building 
up and strengthening patterns of relationship with publicly provided 
institutions. Yet this would not satisfy the more utopian aspirations 
of the reeonstructioniets, which require that the state should establish 
and actively sustain experimental institutions to promote criticism 
of the assumptions and values of the state itself. In practical 
terms, 
this means inviting the powerful sectional interests who are active 
in politics - notably business groups and labor unions - 
to underwrite 
institutions specifically designed to criticize their conception of 
the fitness of things. Commenting on the "liberal educational re- 
formers like James and Dewey and Whitehead" who asked Amorican business- 
men to do this, Laski wrotet 
"They ask co-operation in changing the whole character 
of one of the key institutions by which the dominance of 
the business man is maintained. They ask him to permit 
the inducement of the sceptical mind, instead of the mind 
trained to accept authority ... They suggest to him, in a 
word, that he should co-operate with them in making pos- 
sible social adjustments the outcome of which can only be 
the destruction of the supremacy he has enjoyed for so long. 
The possible worlds they offer him in exchange are all of 
them built upon a fundamental denial of one or another of 
the vital articles of his faith ... 
"I frankly think that historic experience since 1914 
makes the liberal educationists' philosophy a simple op- 
timism of which the outcome, in the end, is catastrophic. 
Its real result is not to convince the business man of its 
validity but to warn him against its dangers. He then 
seeks for a defence of his symbolism" (12). 
Laski may be right about "historic experience"p but, from the 
polarization he makes of social interests, we can expect little more 
than a suspicious hostility and mutual impugnment of motives. What, 
we may ask, is the alternative to the "liberal reformers" proposals, 
since co-operative effort for change is dismissed as "catastrophic"? 
Laski asserted that major reforms of this kind in education are impos- 
sible without major reforms in society. This, of course, begs the very 
question and issue between him and the educational reformers, and ex- 
presses a basic difference of institutional awareness between educational 
and political reformers. The argument is more complex than perhaps 
either side is ready to admit, but we should ask whether diplomatic 
and skilled educational reformers need be unsuccessful, in what is 
not after all a monolithic or a rigidly class-divided society, in 
enlisting support for institutions which are innovative and critical. 
This idea is not necessarily alien to the business community, which 
is probably more change conscious than are most educationists. 
Much depends on a distinction being maintained between, on the one 
hand, a confrontation (Laski-style) of monolithic and privileged 
business and radical education and, on the other, the effort to get 
the agreement of all parties to monitored experiment. In the FAiglish 
system, opportunities for the latter approach undoubtedly exist, and, 
for the further development of reconstructionist thinking within the 
limits of publicly provided education, we should be engaged in building 
experimental programmes, for example, in teacher education. This would 
mean the diversification and the development in depth of the public sys- 
tem; possibilitien'which, like the invention of the new educational de- 
partures I mentioned in the previous section, are dependent on the prior 
provision of a quantitatively adequate general system of public schooling. 
2.2.2 Experimental institutions 
I have already made some reference to experimental institutions, so 
I shall restrict my remarks to a comment on some of the institutions 
proposed by the reconstructionists. I discussed$ mainly in Chapter 
XIII, three types of new institutions: the reformed independent school 
(oundle); world brain; and university-attached experimental schools 
(Dewey's Laboratory School). For reconstructionism to capture the 
imagination and gain the practical support of teachers, experimental 
institutions were perhaps essential. Yet none of then has endured 
and what we now know of them is largely through 'written records. The 
virtual disappearance of the experimental and practice schools which 
at one time were regarded as an indispensable adjunct of a progres- 
sive teachers', college has meant the loss of many opportunities for 
controlled educational change. I do not wish to examine the causes 
of their disappearance, but simply to mention the significance of the 
idea of experimental institutions for a comprehensive, reformist educa- 
tional theory. It is tempting to argue that models of teacher behavior 
are preferable for purposes of innovation to the use of ostensive de- 
finitions in practice situations. However, the reconstructionist in- 
citement to teachers to redesign schools carried greater conviction 
and overcame some of the objections to the "impracticability" of the 
reform, when it could be expressed in the concrete terms of even an 
imaginary new institution. The decline of experimental schools as- 
sociated with teacher education programmes might be compensated by the 
participation of groups of schools in experimental programmes of teacher 
education and re-education and curriculum development. Such schemes 
would not require separate financing, nor would their success depend 
upon the zeal of a few pioneers. Indeed, part of their purpose would 
be to ascertain difficulties, in fairly ordinary teaching situations, 
in seeking to implement the more ambitious of the reconstructionist 
proposals (13). At the back of such schemes, lies a conception of the 
university and the college as cultural innovators, a conception which 
has been proclaimed by a committee of the Harvard Graduate School of 
Educations 
"We cannot ... think of the School of Education as simply training functionaries for an ongoing system. We need rather to relate the School boldly to the strangenesses and oppor- tunities of the new world - to encourage it to create new 
patterns and roles of endeavor, to educate the public and 
raise the standards of the profession, while holding fast 
to the tried values of critical humanism that form the core 
of the University's life" (14). 
2.2.3 The school as a democratic, transitional society 
One of the principal achievements of the reconstruotionists was to 
show how, in the conditions of change and instability of the modern in- 
dustrial state, the school has tasks thrust upon it which differ sig- 
nificantly from the tasks it had to perform in more stable circumstances. 
These new tasks are a consequence of the great expansion of the public 
sector of education; the move towards increased democratization through 
the establishment of a common school and the lengthening of the period 
of formal education; the changing character of the population in a 
technical society; the growth of knowledge; and several other major, 
long-term social trend movements. Thus the larger social and cultural 
context and many of the basic purposes of the school are determined by 
changes beyond its control. However, it does not follow that the school 
is, or should attempt to be, simply an agency which indiscriminately re- 
flects and responds to these grosser changes. We may understand the 
role set for it by the reconstructionists by referring to the views of 
Clarke and Mannheim on the school as a transitional community, and to 
the experimentalist conception of the school as itself in some senses a 
democratic community. By combining their various ideas we may perceive 
the school as an institution possessing a definite oharacter, with two 
principal tasks to perform. These tasks are, first, to examine ways 
of stabilizing and orientating a diffuse and rapidly changing culture; 
and, second, to guide children from the levels of awareness and action 
of primary groups into the emerging cultural orientations provided by 
diverse secondary groups. 
It is commonly asserted that the task of the school, in these res- 
pects, is to initiate children into worthwhile activities, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, to effect a transition from primary to 
secondary group functioning. The reconstructionist position, be- 
cause of its emphasis on the recreation of culture, or on directed 
individual and social change, is more definite as to the direction 
of these transitions. As a consequence, a whole set of implications 
and directives for action emerge. Out of the flux of contemporary 
culture particular features and directions for development are selected 
for emphasis and reinforcement. The curriculum, in this sense, as 
Rugg and Brameld have argued, becomes a plan or model of desirable 
primary and secondary group action. It cannot provide, as it were, 
a summary overview of the totality of culture; however, in the dis- 
positions, habits, attitudes and outlooks it fosters, in the form of 
inquiry it employs, in the pattern of understanding it cultivates, 
the curriculum can help to guide the transition both of the individual 
and of society. This argument applies equally to teaching and learning 
procedures and to the institutional life of the school. Indeed, it is 
the totality of its actual and possible impact, as a living cultural 
system, that should be considered when assessing the claim that the 
school might serve as a remaker of culture. By perceiving these pos- 
sibilities, and reviewing the difficulties that might arise in attempt- 
ing to realize them, teachers can begin to define and to exercise their 
professional skills as democratic change agents. 
In my discussion of the later experimentalists, I concentrated on 
the theories of consensus and practical 3udgment. I suggested that these 
theories are not in all respects satisfactory. Consensus may in practice 
take the form of a subtle imposition of authority by expert group mani- 
pulators -a reminder that even in democratic and educated Athens the 
skilled orator could very easily sway opinion and achieve demagogic 
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leadership. No less serious than the problem of possible manipu- 
lation is the question of determining proper spheres for different 
types of consensus operations and for setting practical limits to 
mass participation in decision-taking in large-scale, urban socie- 
ties. One difficulty to which I referred in discussing the pro- 
cedures of practical judgment is that they too readily assume the 
existence of the skills and dispositions needed to engage in a 
highly sophisticated form of decision-taking. Furthermore, in 
emphasizing this particular technique, Raup and his associates gave 
too little attention to more formal institutional and legislative 
safeguards. All of these difficulties may be seen as the conse- 
quence of experimentalist optimism concerning human nature and its 
plasticity. Dewey's confidence that human intelligence will normally 
be used to further humane and constructive ends is an incomplete poli- 
tical doctrine in a world where powerful organized interests are either 
intent on, or helplessly caught up in, policies which do not have the 
universal sharing of the good life as their outcome. 
however, insofar as the school can make a contribution, however 
indirect it may be, to the formation of more rational and democratic 
social policies, the instrument of consensus and practical judgment, 
and the various procedures the reconatructionista recommended for 
making school experience more involving and intelligible for all pupils, 
deserve serious study. Schools, on the whole, have yet to take seriously 
the proposal that they should perform the dual transitional role I out- 
lined at the beginning of this section, although there have been many 
Individual efforts to create communities which are directed by rational 
and democratic criteria. The reform of twentieth century education 
has been, generally speaking, a reform in individual learning tasks and 
email-group relationships. The arguments for local studies and of 
the educative value of the immediate environment have been challenged 
by Bruner (15), but it is still upon the child's view of the world 
that reform proposals are most often centred. Where there have been 
significant changes in the content of education and in the social pat- 
tern of the school, these have tended to express the child's view, or the 
logical structures of knowledge, or the principle of friendly, equitable 
relationships between children and adults. Profound and valuable changes 
in educational style have resulted, but they are nevertheless partial 
and limited reforms. We have yet to undertake the task of developing 
those cultural perspectives which would provide educational policies, 
at all levels, with an awareness of possibilities and some guidance on 
how these might be realized. 
2.3 The teacher and his task 
Reconstruotionist thinking on the role of the teacher has been ham- 
pered by lack of substantial empirical data on membership of the teaching 
profession and on the various considerations affecting role perception 
and performance. It is only in recent years that significant knowledge 
has been available. Together with this new knowledge there have emerged 
new theories of teaching, incorporating analysis of role performance, 
which are more complex, subtle and heuristically significant than the 
reoonstruotionist arguments. However, it is easy to forget that these 
theories have emerged within a context of educational thought and prac- 
tice which the reconstructionists helped to shape. There are continuities 
between the older and the newer theories, and between many of the issues 
in teaching and teacher education now being widely discussed, and those 
which the reconstruotionists debated earlier in the century. 
2.3.1 Behavioristic models 
In outlining the experimentalist theory of experience and growth, 
I drew attention to features which were to prove useful when Dewey 
and his followers elevated the classroom teacher into the principal 
agent of the proposed new education. These features included the 
responsiveness of the organism to its changing environment, the cen- 
tral role of intelligence in directing experience, and the human 
capacity to continue growing and changing throughout life. While 
they did not deny the effect upon personality of inherited factors 
and early childhood experience, the experimentalists - as did most, 
but not quite all, of the reoonstructionists - regarded change and de- 
velopment throughout life as basic human traits. This belief in human 
changeability, together with their confidence that change could be re- 
gulated and guided by environmental controls, led the experimentalists 
to suppose that even a very inadequate teaching force could be re- 
educated so as to perform their reconstructive role as culture change 
agents. They did not underestimate the difficulties in the form of 
settled habits and persuasions in individuals, institutional constraints, 
the force of miseducative pressures, scarcity of resources, and so forth. 
But these difficulties are all perhaps, in principle, remediable, either 
through action within the educational system or, more important, in other 
social spheres. Those who, like Counts, Childs and Brameld, have ac- 
tively supported teacher militancy and teacher involvement in local and 
national politics appreciated this latter point. 
The significance of what I have termed the behavioristic model of 
the teacher is that, without ignoring the strength of social and indi- 
vidual resistance, it poses a series of manageable tasks for teachers 
and for the educators of teachers which, if successfully performed, 
would mobilize teachers for action as change agents. Thus, research 
demonstrating anti-democratic attitudes amongst teachers, or apathy, 
indifference, ignorance, and a firm repudiation of the role of change 
agent would sharpen the focus on changes needed in programmes of teacher 
reeducation, but it would by no means demonstrate the futility of the 
task. Of course, it might well be that in any given situation the 
difficulties of educating and re-educating and supporting teachers in 
the change agent role were insurmountable. The theory does not deny 
this: what it does is to affirm in principle that there are certain 
possibilities which make the hope of reform a reasonable one in the 
hypothetical average conditions of technically advanced societies. 
These possibilities for change in teacher behavior were not denied 
by reoonstruotionists other than the experimentalists, but they mostly 
tended to give more prominence to a change model which distinguishes an 
elite of change agents from the bulk of the teaching profession. This 
elite might consist of teacher educators, or specialist curriculum de- 
signers, or the hierarchy of office within the school. The primary 
instrument of social control in the reoonstructionist theory is rational 
persuasion and not coercion or violence or custom, Rational persuasion 
is essentially a process of voluntary and, ultimately, self-directed change. 
However, we cannot reasonably expect such changes to operate universally 
and at a uniform rate throughout a total educational system. Even 
amongst those teachers who are interested in and sympathetic towards 
reconstruotionist objectives there will be an unequal distribution of 
commitment, skill and opportunities for change. It seems inevitable, 
therefore, that reconstructionism should become, in practice, an elitist 
movement, in the sense that communities of teachers will emerge, who see 
and prepare themselves as innovators and reformers. They need not be 
elitist in the pejorative sense, of seeking to split themselves from 
the mass of the teachers, by institutional and by more informal de- 
vices. But Mannheim was right to stress the role of elites as cul- 
ture change agents and he, more clearly than any other reconstruotioniat, 
perceived the nature of the problem of procuring elite leadership in a 
democratic society. Reconstructionism requires not only that teachers 
as a whole should constitute an elite group in society, but that within 
the teaching profession there should emerge cadres of leaders, innova- 
tors, change agents, and self-conscious reformers, and that there should 
be a clearer analysis than heretofore of role differentiation relating 
to competence and opportunity to perform specified tasks. 
The traditional concepts and language of elitism are unsatisfactory 
in an industrial society which reformers are, amongst other things, attempt- 
ing to democratize. But, if we adopt those features of the behavioristic 
model which indicate the possibility of modifying adult behavior at many 
different levels of ability and status, we should not overlook the leader- 
ship function which cadres of democratic change agents in education have 
to perform. It would be better to accept the challenge to define demo- 
cratic leadership roles, to find new ways of educating teachers to per- 
form them, and systematically to deploy diffusion procedures to univer- 
salize reform, than to submerge this whole issue in the confusions and 
self-deceptions that would inevitably result from supposing that all 
teachers can and might achieve the new levels of awareness and skill. 
2.3.2 Teaching as a calling 
I have been arguing for a more open recognition that, in a mass 
system of education, we should acknowledge the creative, innovatory 
and leadership tasks that a reforming minority might perform, and that 
we should be prepared to make special educational provision for these 
leaders. However, the reconstructionists themselves have rightly 
maintained other perceptions of teaching than this one, which is 
closely related to modern managerial thinking. These other per- 
ceptions disclose a unity of purpose and task, together with the 
basic homogeneity of the teaching profession. Russell expressed 
this viewpoint in his designation of teaching as a calling, and of 
the teacher as a guardian of civilization. I have in several places 
suggested affinities between reconstructionism and religious thoughts 
the sense of crisis, a quest for unity and order, concern for the 
totality and the quality of experience, a moralistic mission to con- 
vert natural man into the new man, and so forth. The view of teach- 
ing as a calling is consistent with this broadly religious outlook. 
To give exclusive emphasis to performance of leadership functions by 
a minority would be to introduce a serious schism into the more uni- 
versalistic tendencies of the whole theory. Furthermore, the impor- 
tance of relationship between individual teachers and their classes and 
groups of pupils is such that no democratic theory could ignore the 
problem of the quality of education in those schools and classes where 
there are no leaders to be found. 
These difficulties may perhaps be resolved by a closer study of 
the relationship of leadership to average or ordinary performance. 
Traditional elitism vests small minorities with esoteric knowledge, high 
status and commanding authority, and it treats masses as followers and 
as less worthy in certain respects than the elite members themselves. 
By contrast, reconstruotionist elitism emphasizes the importance of all 
teaching ants, the unity of the whole teaching profession, and continuity 
of leadership activities and ordinary role performance in an articulated 
scheme of performance roles and responsibilities. I have in various 
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sections of this study touched upon issues which are relevant to 
the redefinition of leadership roles in education: shared decision- 
taking, the specific roles of experts in curriculum-making, the func- 
tion of the teacher of teachers, and others. What is needed, in this area 
of reconstructionist thought, is systematic analysis of a wide range of 
issues, instead of the concentration common in organizational and manage- 
ment theory, on empirical questions and the tacit acceptance of effi- 
ciency criteria. 
Teaching is deeply involving of the self; it calls into play a 
wide range of personal qualities, and its success very often depends 
upon complex patterns of relationship with pupils. The strength of 
the concept of teaching as a calling is that it appeals to deeper levels 
of the self, and to a wider spectrum of the profession, than does the 
concept of the teacher as leader and organizer of change. In the re- 
constructionist theory, these represent two facets of teaching which 
have not been sufficiently related to each other. This is a consequence 
of the fact that different writers have tended to emphasize either the 
more elitist or the more universal features of teaching, 
2.3.3 The teacher as democratic engineer and organizer of 
-group 
learninge and leader of inquiry 
that formally differentiates reconstructionism from other systematic 
educational theories is the attention given to the wider social and cul- 
tural context of education and the exploration of ways in which schooling 
might interact with other social institutions to effect change. However, 
in addition to these wider viewpoints, reconstructionism includes a more 
specific appraisal of the teacher as an organizer of classroom learning. 
It is, indeed, through his work as a designer of learning situations 
that the teacher can best make an impact, even if this impact is, on 
the whole, indirect and long term. This point Was well understood 
by Dewey and Kilpatrick although, as I pointed out, diagnosis of an 
urgent social crisis seems to require more decisive and faster-aoting 
measures than those available to the classroom teacher. 
There has been in recent years a considerable growth in the use 
of the techniques of discovery and inquiry learning, much of it ill- 
informed, and inadequately analysed (16). The specific reconstruc- 
tionist contribution to thinking on these subjects has been the iden- 
tification of a wider context of issues and sources for learning than 
has been provided in the normal classroom. Inquiry, in their sense, 
has meant the analysis, through the use of procedures like reflective 
thinking, of problems and issues in the wider society; and discovery 
has been guided discovery, directed towards the realization of the com- 
plex structures of modern thought and society, and of the relationship 
of individual states of mind and feeling to those larger structures. 
As engineer, the teacher has been expected, by the reoonstruetionists, 
to design school learning situations within which children could actively 
participate in the development, or, in Dewey's term, the reconstruction, 
of their own experience, becoming in the process members of ever-widening 
social groups. This participation was intended to lead to the sharing 
and acceptance of responsibility, tasks which require careful prepara- 
tion and substantial and varied experiences of decision-taking, for 
teacher and pupils alike. 
The tasks proposed under the rubric of the democratic engineering 
of group learning are not easily circumscribed. The reconstruotionists 
tended to place heavy burdens on teachers, by their broad definition of 
their role. This is because more thought and preparation are required 
to perform these wider tasks than in more conventional teaching. The 
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strains attendant on flexibility, adaptability and mobility of role 
performance are multiplied where it is a substantially new general 
role for the teacher that is being proposed. The uncertainty and 
confusion of the normative system of society, which was treated by 
Dewey, Mannheim and the later experimentalists as a critical problem 
area in modern society, affects teachers and teaching. Lacking ade- 
quate training in the techniques of democratic group leadership, teachers 
were expected through a great effort of the will to set up, in their 
classrooms, models of social relationship and group consensus for which 
there existed few parallels in society at large. It is not surprising 
that critics pointed to a wide gulf between the exalted demands of or- 
ganized consensus, practical judgment, universalized reflective inquiry, 
and workshop models of teaching - and classrooms where small group demo- 
cracy and courses in social living produced boredom and disgust. 
A more rigorous analysis than the reconstruotionists undertook is 
needed, to produce models of classroom learning which satisfy the cri- 
teria of intelligibility, sequential organization of study, and cognitive 
significance, as well as those emanating from the democratic creed. 
This analysis should not be expected of teachers unless they are very 
much better supported than at present, through ancillary staff, lighter 
timetables and opportunities to visit and discuss their work with col- 
leagues. It should be part of the work of bodies such as the Schools 
Council to promote this type of analysis and to stimulate the develop- 
ment of models of teacher-pupil interaction which are not restricted to 
single subjects. It is not sufficient to produce new materials, which, 
in any case, teachers need to learn to select and to use; what is no less 
important is that the acts of teaching and learning should be analysed, 
both within and across subjects. For this purpose, the production of 
new materials is a neoessary, but by no means a sufficient, condition. 
The reconstructionists outlined general models of teaching and 
learning that are different from, and much more demanding than, the 
traditional model of controlled transmission - reception - assimi- 
lation - regurgitation. But their contribution was more inspira- 
tional and schematic than analytic. Even the device of practical 
judgment, intended to replace by an operational model the earlier 
exhortations to behave democratically, needs to be translated into 
specific procedures relative to the changed outlook of youth and 
the new conditions in schools and colleges. Efforts to build up 
new models of teaching, grounded in ideological theories and sub- 
jected to monitoring control, might help to overcome the serious 
splits, not simply between "theory" and "practice" but between three 
sub-cultures: those of the classroom, the research centre, and the 
teacher training establishments. A bridging theory is needed to bring 
these sub-cultures into active inter-relationship with one another. 
Because it conceives education as the wider setting of cultural de- 
velopment, reconstructionism has an advantage over other theories, 
which may quite effectively relate one of these three sub-cultures 
to the others, but thereby reinforces the isolation of all three from 
other systems of social thought and action. 
2.3.4 Teacher education 
Rugg, Brameld and others amongst the later experimentalists have 
rightly pointed out that the key institution in reconatructionist think- 
ing is not the school, but the teacher education establishments* if 
one includes in the latter the whole system of re-educative and inser- 
vice agencies, then it is obvious that a significant change in the tea- 
cher's perception of his task, and the development of relevant skills 
and understandings and dispositions, can only occur if teacher 
education is significantly different in character from the processes 
of education to be observed in other institutions. Without a sig- 
nificantly different programme of teacher education, old habits and 
practices will be repeated, and modified, not always intelligently, 
under pressure from other social institutions. 
The emergence of the social foundation movement signifies the 
reconstructionist awareness of the critical importance of a now form 
of teacher education. I suggested that this movement was directed, 
in part at least, by the characteristic cultural goals of the recon- 
structionista: wholeness and inclusiveness, and the unity of parts. 
Thus teacher education itself was to be an embodiment and an expression 
of the new order. It was also to provide skills-training relevant to 
the organization of problem-solving situations, projects, and so forth, 
and thus to demonstrate the transformation required of the sciences of 
education to render them into usable resources for teaching. 
Only very occasionally, if ever, have concrete programmes of teacher 
education arisen to satisfy the extremely ambitious demands made of them 
by reconstruotionists. Clarke's and Bode's ideal, of university depart- 
ments primarily advancing educational knowledge, and only as a secondary 
matter conducting apprenticeship-type teacher education programmes, 
has been, on the whole, reversed. Rugg's requirement that programmes 
of teacher education should represent a living synthesis of knowledge 
and experience may be contrasted with the increasing tendency to split 
educational knowledge into separate disciplines and to offer students 
introductory courses in them and, except occasionally, to leave virtually 
untouched the systematic study of contemporary culture. Dewey's argu- 
ments that the educational sciences need to be translated through the 
development of middle-range action-orientated courses of study may 
be contrasted with research-centred pursuit of these sciences in 
universities, which commonly achieves such a level of abstruseness 
and specialization as to justify the assertion that they have no 
relevance to education. 
These characteristics of teacher education are not easily re- 
versed. They represent the universal tendency towards the speciali- 
zation of knowledge, the enhanced status of research in tertiary insti- 
tutions of all kinds, and the plurality and diversity of culture in free 
societies. The latter point raises a difficulty which the reconstruo- 
tionists only rarely acknowledged. To achieve widespread harmony of 
interests and agreement over purposes, when these are formulated as 
programmes of action, is extremely difficult where a plurality of 
values and of outlook is encouraged. For reeonatruotionist thinking 
to dominate even a single teacher education institution would require 
the submergence of the separate qualities and character of the subject 
departments, and the acceptance of higher order objectives. Because 
reconstructionism challenges and condemns a great deal of existing insti- 
tutional life it would also be necessary to reverse many of the habits 
and assumptions of these institutions -a task which, as Dewey recog- 
nized, is more difficult than modifying human nature in the formative 
stages. However, it is only through such changes that the more exalted 
requirements of reconstructionism would be satisfied. 
Thus substantial institutional change is required in the reeonatrue- 
tionist theory; it is to be peaceful, and a consequence of rational dis- 
cussion, not of coercion. Such change, except when institutions are 
under great stress, seem unlikely. Even within teacher education, 
more modest changes should be envisaged by those interested in developing 
reoonstruotionist thought. These changes might occur within single 
departments, or they may be expressed in the development of a new 
programme - for example, in the redesigning of the so-called 
"curri- 
culum studies" courses - or, perhaps, in the formaticn of a small 
number of experimental institutions. Such changes are often the 
responsibility of small groups of people, amongst whom might develop 
a strong community of aspirations and expectations, and it is from 
these communities in the first instance, rather than from the larger 
institutions of society, that we might reasonably expect creative 
change. 
3. Barriers to Change 
Although in the social sciences theories of resistance to change 
have not reached a high level of sophistication, no conception of the 
school which treats it as a potential cultural innovator should over- 
look those barriers which might be reasonably anticipated. I have 
already in this chapter suggested that further progress in reconetruc- 
tionist thinking depends upon the analysis and clarification of issues 
which to date have been given scant attention. To these I would add 
the impoTtanee of appraising the strength and movements of those fac- 
tors and interests in culture which may be adversely affected by the rea- 
lization of reconstructionist aspirations. Beyond this, there is need 
for examination of the strategies and techniques of influence, per- 
suasion and controlled social change, since it is not only resistance 
which defeats reform but also the technical incompetence of reformers 
to design appropriate action programmes and to mobilize resources as 
needed. 
Definition of the skills needed by educational change agents is 
made easier by developments in recent years in many related fields 
of inquiry and practical application (17). But educational theory 
cannot remain parasitical on this knowledge and practical experience; 
it must develop its own constructs, and this is only possible through 
the formation of theories of educational change. There is a recip- 
rocal relationship between empirical knowledge and adequate general 
theories. We have seen that reconstructionism is one such general 
theory, which could be integrally related with research and teacher 
education programmes. The barrier to the realization of the objec- 
tives sought by reconstructionista, which is a consequence of ignorance 
of techniques, might be best overcome by the initial agreement to re- 
construct. This basic agreement could lead to efforts being made to 
illuminate those topics for which information and skill are needed. 
Thus knowledge and insights would be yielded through a form of opera- 
tional research that embodies definite policy objectives. 
However, there are barriers to planned change no less serious than 
ignorance# for example, the impulsive life of the individual and his 
pattern of habits; the institutions in society which perceive their 
interests to be best served by active or covert antagonism to the demo- 
cratic aspiration of reconstructionism; the tendency of institutions 
not to learn from new experience but to conserve their old identity through 
elaborate routinization of task, bureaucratization of function and other 
protective devices; and the impact upon children's learning of various 
agencies other than the school. On this latter point, I need mention 
only the mass communication media, pop culture, the peer group, and 
work culture. However, instead of attempting to resist these other 
agencies, or to build up defences against them, reconstructionist educators 
should, as Mannheim advised, learn from them and seek ways of co-operating 
with them. There is nothing inherently anti-educational in the 
operations of any of these other agencies. Instead, consciously 
or otherwise, they use whatever means of effective contact and 
persuasion they are able to procure. For example, television and 
newspapers use the visual appeal of color; pop culture draws upon 
expressed interests and builds them into communities of interest; 
the peer group feeds upon informality of relationships and physical 
contact in self- or group-determined activities; work culture arises 
from a common interest, a shared status, and co-operative enterprise. 
Educationists unwisely ignore the learning opportunities presented 
by these influence systems. Each has much to teach about motivation, 
interest, and continuity of experience, and each presents opportunities 
for the more informal, society-wide educational work which, it may be 
predicted, will be the next great phase in the attempt to create the 
educative society. 
There are, of course, serious problems that should be anticipated 
and examined if educationists are to embark on these wider tasks. I 
have raised the problem, both moral and social-political, of legitimizing 
the teacher's role as culture change agent. This problem will become 
more acute as sensitive zones of community life are touched upon - for 
example, race prejudice, religious interests, patriotism, sexual ethics, 
commercial life under capitalism, and freedom of inquiry in general. 
Reconstructionism inevitably broaches these issues, but should not do 
so unintelligently, by stridently proclaiming missionary ideals. 
Further progress lies in the direction of more detailed appraisals of 
the learning tasks facing pupils, teachers, the community and social 
institutions, to help them achieve the rational and humane aims to 
whose definition the earlier reconstructionists contributed. 
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5 
Znani. ecki, F. Cultural Sciences: their Origin and Development. 
Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1952. . 
For an interpreta- 
tion of educational theory in the light of modern culture science 
concepts, see Brameld, T. Cultural Foundations of Education* 
New York, Harper, 1957. 
In addition'to Brameld'and Znanieoki, the following, which I 
draw upon in oh. III9 illustrate the diversity of approaches: 
Alsberg, P. In west of Man. Oxford, Pergamon, 1970; 
Benedict, R. Patterns of Culture. London, Routledge and 
Kogan Paul, 1935; Bidney, D. Theoretical Anthropology. New 
York, Schocken Books, 1967.2nd ed.; Cassirer, E. The Logic 
of the Humanities. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1960; 
Geertz, C. "The transition to humanity" in Tax, S. (ed. ) 
Horizons of Anthropology. London, Allen and Unwin, 1965; 
Kroeber, A. L. and Kluckhohn, Co Culture: a Critical Review 
of Concepts and Definitions. Cambridge, (Mass. )g Peabody Museum, 
1952; Saran, A. K. "Theoretical anthropology and the cult of man". 
Et hics, LXVI, 3,1956, pp. 198-208. (An acute criticism of Bidney); 
'Weintraub, K. J. Visions of Culture. University of Chicago Press, 
1966; Williams, R. Culture and Society. -1780-1 
950. London, 
Chatto and Windus, 1958. 
Peters himself argues that the processes of education are inseparable 
from judgments of value in his paper "What is an educational process? " 
in Peters, R. S. (ed. ) The Concept of Education. London, Routledge 
and Kogan Paul, 1967. 
For example, the interplay of value spare and value laden uses in 
the writings of Eliot and Bantock, who are able through this inter- 
play to introduce marked preferences for certain types of culture 
experience (those of selected minorities) while apparently presenting 
descriptions of how culture is "in fact" transmitted: Eliot, T. S. 
Notes Towards the Definition of Culture. London, Faber, 1965 (new 
ad*); Bantock, G. U. Education in an Industrial Society. London, 
Faber, 1963, ch. 5 at pass.; Bantock, G. H. Eliot and Education. 
London, Faber, 1970. 
On paideia, or Greek concepts of excellence or of worthwhile forma 
of life, see Werner Jaeger's 3 volume study: Paideia: the Ideals 
of Greek Culture. (trans. G. Highet). Oxford, Blackwell, 1943- 
1945" On changing content during the Renaissance, see Woodward, 
W. H. Studies in Education During the Age of the Renaissance. 
New York Columbia University, Teachers College Press, 1967 1st 
ed. 1906). On changing views of the transmission process, contrast 
Plato in The Laws with g. Arnold Culture and Anarchy. In the latter 
work, critical activity of mind in the learner is contrasted with 
acoeptande of "dock notions". Yet, overall, Arnold's book forms 
part of the classical humanist tradition. 
6. See notes 4 and 5. The diversity and complexity of the classical 
humanist position in education is brought out in the following 
sample of expositions and discussions: Babbitt, I. "Humanistic 
versus humanitarian ideals in American education" in Sohilpp, 
P. A. (ed. ) Higher Education Faces the Future. New York, Horace 
Liveright, 1930; Babbitt, I. On Being Creative and Other Essayo. 
Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1932; Bolgar, R. R. The Classical 
Heritage and its Beneficiaries. Cambridge University Press, 1954; 
Campbell, F. "Latin and the elite tradition". British Journal of 
3ociolont, 19,1968, pp. 308-325; Clarke, M. L. Classical Educa- 
tion in Britain,, 1500-1900. Cambridge University Press, 1959; 
Findlay, J. J. "Three theories of the curriculums classical, 
modern, Herbartian". Journal of Education, XXIV (new series), 
391 and 392, Feb. and liar. 19029 pp. 106-109,174-176. Hutchins, 
R. M. The Higher Learning in America. New Haven, (Conn. ), Yale 
University Press, 1936; Livingstone, R. A Defence of Classical 
Education* London, Macmillan, 1916; Iforwood, C. The English 
Tradition of Education. London, John Murray, 1929; Sidgwick, H. 
"Theory of classical education" in Miscellaneous Essays and Addý" 
New York, Macmillan, 1904; and Whitehead, A. N. The Aims of Edu- 
cation and Other Easava. London, Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1959 
7" 
(especially ch. 5). 
Marrou, H. I. A History of Education in Antiguiti. London, Sheed 
and Yiard, 1956, T. 217. See also Lovejoy, A. O. A Document 
History of Primitivism and Related Ideas. Vol. 1. Primitivism 
and Related Ideas in Antiquity, by A. O. Lovejoy and G. Boas. 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1935. 
8. Rousseau, J. -J. Emile (trans. B. Foxley). London, Dent, 1911. 
9. On romanticism and education, see Barzun, J. Classic. Romantic 
and Modern. London, Seeker and Warburg, 1962; Boas, G. The 
Cult of Childhood. London, Warburg Institute, 1966; Coveney, P. 
The Image of Childhood. Harmondsworth (Middlesex), Penguin Books, 
1967 rev* ed. ); Judges, A. V. "Educational ideas, practices and 
institutions". New Cambridge Modern His_,. torv, Vol. VIII. Cambridge 
University Press, 1965; Pollard, H. U. Pioneers of Popular Edu- 
cation. London, John Murray, 1956; Schenk, H. G. The Mind of 
the European Romantics. London, Constable, 1966; Thoriby, A. K. 
The Romantic Movement. London, Longruans, 1966. 
10. Rousseau, J. -J. "A discourse on the arts and sciences" in Röusseauls 
Social Contract, Etc. (trans. G. D. IJ. Cole). London, Dent, 1913, 
pp" 125-154. 
11. See note 9. There is no comprehensive study of the vicissitudes 
and developments of romantic thought in education from the eighteenth 
century onwards, but see Cremin, L. A., op. cit.; Pollard, H. M., 
op* cit* and Stewart, W. A. C., op. cit. The infiltration of Idealism 
may be observed in Froebel's Autobiography. I refer again to 
commmunitarian socialism in chs. V. section 1.2.2; VI, section 
2.3; and VIII9 section 2. 
12. L socio-historical study of the pursuit of similar objectives in 
one of the best known of these schools has been made by M. Puncht 
"Boole Paradis": a Short History of Dartington Hall School, 
1926_1969. Mimeo. 1970- 
13- Neill, A. S. Summerhill. New York, Hart, 1966; Goodman, P. 
Compulsory Mis-Education. New York, Horizon Press, 1964. 
14. Harrison, J. F. C. Robert Owen and the Owenites in Britain and 
America. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 92 f. 
15. But none of the reconstructionists supposes that education can 
or should attempt these changes in isolation from other social 
agencies., Those who gave groatoot prominence to the school as 
a change agency are Wella, Rugg, Mannheim and Brameld. See 
ohs. X and V. 
16. It should be noted that even the more limited claims for the 
possible social effects of certain forms of education are still 
largely a matter of conjecture. There is considerable difference 
of opinion, for example, about the relationship between educational 
provision and economic growth and political development. See 
Bowman, M. J. and Anderson, C. A. "Concerning the role of education 
in development" in Geertz, C. (ed. ) Old Societies and New States. 
New York, The Free Press, 1963; and Coleman, J. S. ýed. ) Education 
and Political Development. Princeton, (N. J. ), Princeton University 
Press, 1965; Curle, A. Educational Problems of Developing 
Societies. New York, Praeger, 1969. 
17, This is most noticeable in Mannheim and Brameld. See ohs. VII, 
section 3, and VIII, section 1.1. 
18. Popper, Kr op, cit., vol. 1. Introduction and ch. 9. 
19. See ohs. IV9 section 1.2; V, section 1.3; VI, section 3; and 
VII9 section 1. 
20. The best philosophical treatment of the western tradition of per- 
feetibilism is Passmore, J. The Perfectibility of Man. London, 
Duckworth, 1970. ' On the argument about the origins of progress 
thinking (whether in pre-Socratic Greece or in the seventeenth 
century), see Bury, J. B. The Idea of Progress. London, Macmillan, 
1920; Nisbet, R. A. Social Change and History: Aspects of the 
Western Theory of Develo New York, Oxford University Press, 
1969; and Sklairj L. The Sociology of Progress. London, Routledge 
and Kogan Paul, 1970, Chs. 1 and 2. 
21. Owen R. A New View of Society and Other Writings (ed. G. D. H. Cole) 
London, Dent, 1927, P. 72 f.; Godwin, W. An Enouiry'. ConcerninR 
Political Justioe. London, 1796.3rd ed., ch. IV: The characters 
of men originate in their external circumstances; ch. VIII: On 
natural education; and Summary of principles. see also Polling I. B. 
Education and Enlightenment in the Works of William Godwin. New 
York, Las Americas Pub. Co., 1962. 
22. This possibility worried Mannheim and Counts especially. See Cho VI, 
section 1.3, and ch. VII9 sections 3 and 4. 
23# See oh. X. section 4.2, where I argue that despite these tendencies 
reconstructionism is on the whole a theory firmly opposed to 
indoctrination. 
24. The difference is discussed in the wider context of historical 
change theories by Sklair, L., op. cit., ch. VII "Two concepts 
of progress". Sklair distinguishes between innovatory and 
non-innovatory change. This distinction should not be drawn 
sharply as the reconstructionists, while primarily innovators, did not 
by any means exclude non-innovatory change - i. e., "the maintenance 
and spread of familiar things for the solution of problems" (ib. 
p. 117). 
25, On the social core curriculum see ohs. XI, section 2.3.1, and XII, 
sections 3 and 4; and Smith, B. O., Stanley, W. O. and Shores, J. H. 
Fundamentals of Curriculum Development. (rev. ed. ). New York, 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1957,. ehe, 14 and 15. 
Chapter II 
1. It should be noted that it is only the first chapter of the 
report which I discuss. This chapter provides a rationale 
for and a legitimation of the report as a whole; it is a 
publio statement of a very definite viewpoint about the 
proper relationship of educational thinking and institutions 
to national policy objectives in a country undergoing rapid, 
unsettling changes. Thus, for my purposes, it is a highly 
significant reconatructionist document, although, of course, 
it may be treated in different ways for other purposes, par- 
ticularly political and administrative purposes within India 
itself. 
2. 
3" 
4" 
A comparison of the membership of the Plowden and Kothari com- 
mittees, together with the subdivision of topics in their res- 
pective reports, would bring out these differences very strikingly. 
The Central Advisory Council for Education (Chairmans Lady 
Plowden) The Children and their Primary Schools. London, 
li. M. s. o., 1966. 
I discuss the reconstrnctonist quest for culture order in chs. 
V, section 1.2; VI, section 2.1; VII9 sections 1.6 and 4; 
VIII, section 2; IX, section 1. 
See below, che. X and XIV. 
5. This has become the common approach in so-called developing 
societies. See, for example, Gardiner, R. K. A. (Executive 
Secretary, U. N. Economic Commission for Africa)i speech to 
Commonwealth Conference on Rural Education; University of 
Ghana, 1970, reproduced in Intercultural Education, 1,8, 
Aug. -Sept. 1970; and Nyerere, J. K. Education for Self-Reliance. 
Dar Es Salaam, Governmant Printer, 1967- It has long been prac- 
tised in the Soviet Unions Pinkevitch, P. The New Education in 
the Soviet Union. (trans. N. Perlmutter, ed. G. S. Counts). 
New York, John Day, 1929, ch. 7 "The school and society". 
6. See below, ch. VI, section 2.1; and VIII9 section 2. 
7. Kothari Report, p. 22. 
9. See Fox, R. G. "Varna schemes and ideological integration in 
Indian society". Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
11,1969, pp. 27-45" Fox describes varna categories as ideo- logical models which provide culturally stereotyped standards 
to be absorbed by local caste groups (p. 43) - hence they would be'effective barriers to the realization of some of the Kothari 
objectives. Educational difficulties arising over ideological 
differances, and ways of overcoming them, are discussed in Kabir, Hunayun "National integration in India" in Brembeck, C. S. and 
Hans, J. w'. (eds. ) Education and the Development of Nations. 
New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966; and in a lively 
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9. 
piece of reconatruotioniat writing by Saiyidain, K. G. Educaattioonn, 
Culture and the Social order. Bombay, Asia Pub. House, 1958. 
2nd ed. ). 
quoted in Moddie, A. D. Brahmanioal Culture and"Modernit . 
Bombay, Asia Pub. House, 1968. 
10. See Polanyl , U., op. cit., pp. 53-54 on tacit elements in a, 
tradition. 
U. 
12. 
For example, D. H. Lawrence who savagely criticized the "man- 
Making" aspirations of an earlier reconstructionist, Benjamin 
Franklin. Studies in Classic American Literature. London, 
iieinemann, 1964. 
S. R. Nozhko, K., at al. Educational PlemniAg in the-U. S. 
Paris, Unesco, International Institute for Educational Planning, 
1968. See especially the observations of the I. I. E. P. mission 
to the U. S. S. R., pp. 227-238. Compare Dewey's views (in 1929) 
on the dignity of the Soviet teacher, a consequence of his, direct 
involvement in major socio-economic decisions. See p. 17)1,4" 
13. Aron, R. The Industrial Society. iondong Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1967. 
14. Committee on Higher Education. (Chairmant Lord Robbins) HiBbOr 
Education. London, H. H. S. O., 1963, vol. 1, p. 48 f. and pp. 70-74. 
15. Beeby, C. E. The Quality of Education in Developing Countries. 
Cambridge, Lass., Harvard University Press, 1966, ch. 2. 
16. ib., p. 1. However$ in chs. IX and XV I argue that by no means 
all of the earlier recönstructionist thinking has been superseded. 
17. See below, ch. Xiii, section 3- 
18. See below, ch. XII, section 6.6. 
19. See below, chs. XIII and XIV. 
20. Central Advisory Council for Education (Chairmans John Newsom) 
Half Our Fxture. London, L. M. S. O., 1963. 
21. Scheffler, I. "Educational relevance". Journal of PhilosoPhy, 
Nov. 19691 "Relevant to what, how, and why? - that is the question". 
22. See Casairer, E. The Philosophy of S bolic Forma. New Haven, (Conn. ), Yale University resa, 1953-1957- 3 vols.; Phenix, P. 
Realms of Meaning. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964; Reid, L. A. 
Ways of Knowledge and F eri_ nce. London, Allen and Unwin, 1961. 
The Kothart Committee did not of course propose an exclusive 
emphasis on science, but pressed for a substantial increase in 
the scientific components of the curriculum, and for the culti- 
vation of a scientific mentality. 
23. 
24. 
Dewey, J. The School and Society# Chicago University Press, 
1915 (rev. ed. ); The Schools Council. Closer Links Between 
Teachers and Indust and Commerce. London, H. U. S. O., 1963 
Oorking paper, No. 7); Shapovalenko, S. G. (ed. ) Polytechnical 
Education in the U. S. S. R. Paris, Unesoo, 1963; Simons, m. 
George Kersohensteiner. London, Methuen, (1966, ohs. 2,49 8" 
Fichte, J. G. Addresses to the German Nation (trans. R. F. Jones 
and G. H. Turnbull). Chicago, Open Court Pub. Co., 1922. 
(Fichte 
combined a thoroughgoing nationalistic enthusiasm for the revival 
of the German nation through education with a great admiration 
for Pestalozzian methods); Gentile, G. TheReform of Education 
(trans. D. Bigongiari, intro. by B. Croce). London, Benn Bros., 
1923, p. 22 et. pass.; Nietzsche, F. On the Future of Our 
Educational Institutions (trans. and intro6 by J. U. Kennedy). 
Edinburgh, T. N. Foulis, 1909, lecture II. 
25. Pareto, V. Sociological Writinpe. Selected and introduced by 
S. E. Finer. London, Pall Mall Presa, 1966, p. 51 f. and 247 ff. 
26. Beeby, C., op. cit., ch. 4. 
27. See below, ch. XIV. 
28. "Reformed" schools are not necessarily successful either in this 
respect. See Heintz, P. "Education as an instrument of social 
integration in underdeveloped countries". International Social 
Science Journal, 19,39 1967, PP- 378-386. 
Chapter-III 
if The range of positions is illustrated bys Green, M. and Wilding, H. 
Cultural Policy in Great Britain. Paris, Unesco, 1970 "culture" 
used to refer to "high arts" ; Nietzsche F., opo cit. culture 
as the submission to models of excellence); Jaeger, W'., op. cit. 
(culture as a quest for definite standards); `Nollheim, R. Soon ialiem 
and Culture. London, The Fabian Society, 1961 (culture as socialist 
ideals of knowledge, values, work, social relationships, etc. 
); 
Alliams, R. The-Long-Revolution. London, Chatto and Windus, 1961 
(culture as an ideal, as particular ways of life, and as docu- 
mentary records of human thought and expression); Uiog; art, R. 
Speaking to Each Other. London, Chatto and Hindus, 1970. Vol. 1. 
About Society; Vol. 2. About Literature (a distinction between 
"living" and "dead" culture is substituted for the conventional 
"high", "low" distinction, Vol. it pp. 131-134). 
2, Kroeber! A. L. and Kluckhohnt C. s op, cit. j p. 308. 
3. IiidnQy, D. Theoretical Anthropology. Now Yorkq Schocken Books# 
19G7" P. xv. 
4" Court, E. W. "The biological basis of human sociality". American 
Anthropologist, 60,1958, pp. 1049.85. Reprinted in Montagu, M. F. A. 
(cc 
Culture, Stan's Adaptive Dimension. New York, Oxford University Freest 
1968, pp. 135-136. 
5. Jensen, A. R. "How much can wo boost IQ and scholastic achievement? " 
Harvard Educational Review, 39,1, Winter 1969, pp. 1.123. 
6. Kagan, J. S. et al. "Discussion. How such can we boost IQ and 
scholastic achievement? " Harvard Educational Review, 39.2, 
Spring 1969, pp. 273-356. 
7. Alsberg, P., op. cit. For the argument that man has acquired a 
somatic dependence on culture, see Geertz, C., art. cit., "Without 
men there would be no cultural forms. But .., without cultural forms there would be no men" (p. 46). Geertz extended the argument 
from the articulation of knowledge to the articulation of feelings, 
through culture. 
8. Alsberg was aware of the danger of creating a spirit-body dualisms 
but by his elevation of public symbolization, especially languages 
he minimized the significance both of gesture, movement and various 
other forms of bodily expression, and of impulsive behavior. 
9. I have necessarily drawn on a limited range of sources: Durkheim, E. 
The Rules of Sociological-Method. 8th ed. (trans. S. A. Solovag and 
J. H. Mueller ... . Glencoe Ill. ), The Free Press, 1938; Education 
and Sooiol o'(trans. and intro, by S. D. Fox), new York, The Free 
Freest 1956; - The_ Division of Labour in Society (trans. G. Simpson). 
New York, The Free Press, 1964; "Individualism and the intellectuals" ("LWIndividualisme at lea intellectuals", Revue bleue, ser. 4,1898); 
10. 
Bidney, D., op. cit.; Parsons, T. The Structure of Social Action. 
New York, The Free Press, 1968, Vol. 1 especially for the develop- 
ment of Durkheim's thought, and his conception of the social dimen- 
sion "as consisting essentially in a common system of rules of 
moral obligation, of institutions, governing the actions of men 
in a community", p. 463). On this latter point, see also Neyer, J. 
"Individualism and socialism in Durkheim" in Wolff, K. U. (ed. ) 
Emile Durkheim. Columbus. Ohio State University Press, 1960. 
Durkheim, Be The Rules of Sociological Method, pp. 5-7. Durkheim 
distinguished "social" from "individual" facts, leaving the latter 
to psychologists and others. It is his treatment of education as 
a social fact, and as essentially a moulding process, which I 
emphasize in this discussion. 
11. This is a debatable point. See the discussion of Durkheim and Marx 
below, Ch. IX, section 2.4.1., and The Rules of Sociologi. cal Math 
Conclusion. 
12. Durkheim's views on the perception of social phenomena give primacy 
to processes of reception and assimilation: these phenomena impress 
themselves, or are impressed upon individuals, e. g., through education. 
Piaget has been one of Durkheim's most acute critics. His theory of 
psychic equilibrium gives far more emphasis than does Durkheim to 
the activities of the subject, the person, in accommodating the 
schemata (the hereditary basis of representations) to actual situations. 
This is a continuing task of individual development, of great signifi- 
cance both for the theory of culture conceived as process, and for 
education conceived as an interactive process of progressive environ- 
mental mastery. See Piaget, J. The Moral Judgment of the Child. 
Glencoe (Ilia, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1948s ch. IV; and Piaget, J. 
Six. 
_Psychological 
Studies (trans. Anita Tenzer, ed. D. Elkind) 
University of London Press, 1960. Editor's introduction, pp. 7-8. 
13. See Coser, L. A. "Durkheim's conservatism and its implications for 
his sociological theory" in Wolff, K. H. (ed. ), op. cit. This point 
is a matter of emphasis. Durkheim did of course acknowledge social 
change and a critical role for individuals. 
There is nevertheless in his theory a hiatus between the two realms 
of social coercion and individual freedom; see Education and 
Sociology, pp. 71-2. 
14. On ideational and non-ideational theories of social change, see 
Cohen, P. S. Modem Social Theory. London, Heinemann, 1968, ch. 7. 
It should be noted that the theory of organic solidarity represented 
an attempt on Durkheim's part to counterbalance the constraints on 
individual action implied by the notion of mechanical solidarity.. In the latter condition, the person as a unique entity vanishes 
and action is totally dominated by "the collective life". The 
Division of Labour in Society, Book 1 and Conclusion. 
15. The Ruleß of Sociological Method, P" 3- 
16. ib., p. 10. 
17. ib., pp" 4-?. 
18. On this point, see Parsons' defence of the later Durkheim, op. cit., 
ch. X. 
19. See Note 12, and Education and Sociology, passim. 
20. Individualism and the Intellectuals, op. cit. 
21. ib. See also Education and Sociology, pp. 89-90, where Durkheim 
argues that, although, through education, adults can "transform 
the young and permeate them with the religious and moral practices, 
the national traditions, and the group consciousness which are 
the essential heritage of social being", within this same process 
man is endowed with the freedom provided by self-mastery, rationality 
and a sense of duty. 
22. These theories may be based on a distortion or a false interpretation 
of Durkheimn, as Parsons alleges that Piaget's critique is, but it should 
be remembered that Durkheim's own account of educational processes 
incorporated definitions and outlooks reminiscent of the Plato of 
The ws. The coercive, moulding, reproductive and assimilative role 
of social tradition, exercised through educational institutions, is 
central in his Education and Sociology. 
23. Aron, R. Progress and Disillusion. London, Pall Mall Press, 1968, 
p. 120. Aron also makes his conservative educational preferences 
clear in his sardonic analysis of the French student uprisings of 
1968: The Elusive Revolution (trans. G. Clough). London, Pall 
Mall Press, 1969, ch. 5. 
24. Sumner, W. G. "Sociology" (1881), and "The Absurd Effort to Make The 
World Over" (1884) reprinted in Miller, P. (ed. ). American Thought. 
Civil War to World War I. New York, Rinehart and Co., 1954" 
25, Education and Sociology. See Note 21. 
26. Bidney, D., op, cit., p. 195. 
27, Gough, K. "World revolution and the science of man" in Roazak, T. (ed. ). The Dissenting Academy, Harmondsvorth (Middlesex), Penguin 
Books, 1969. Gough asks for a statement from anthropologists of 
the "human goals" of their science, and for the abandonment of 
"spurious neutrality". 
28. Jaeger, W., op. cit. 
29. Whitehead illustrates how close, through a common interest in per- 
fectibility, theorists in the Greek classical tradition, including 
Whitehead himself, are to the reconstructionists: "life is an 
offensive, directed against the repetitious mechanism of the 
Universe ... a policy of sociological defence is doomed to failure. 
rye are analysing those types of social functioning which provide that 
expansion and novelty which life demands. Life can only be under- 
stood as an aim at that perfection which the conditions of its 
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environment allow. But the aim is always beyond the attained fact.. 
The goal is always some type of perfected things, however lowly 
and basically sensual. " Adventures of ids. Uarmondsworth 
(14iddlesex), Penguin Books, 1948 (1933)9 p" 101. Similar views 
on life as purposive striving were expressed by the prtnatiet 
William James and the creative evolutionists, Borgson and Shaw. 
The historical quest for human perfectibility is analysed in 
Pasomore, J., op, cit. 
30. Hallowell, A. I. "Self, society, and culture in phylogenetic 
perspective" in Tax, S. (ed. ) The Evolution of Man. University 
of Chicago Press, 1960 (reprinted in Montagu, MJ. A. (ed)Culture. 
Flan' s Adaptive Dimension. New York, Oxford University Press, 1968. 
) 
31. Montage, I1. F. A. "Brains, culture, gestation" in itontagu, M. F. A. 
(ed. ), op. cit. 
32. Kroeber, A. L. and Kluckhohn, C., op. cit., p. 182 f. 
33" J. iuizinga, quoted in Weintraub, K. J., op. cit., p. 219. 
34" W. Jaeger, quoted in Kroeber, A. L. and Kluckhohn, C., op. cit., p. 60. 
35" This tradition is amply documented in Kroeber, A. L. and Kluckhohn, C., 
op. cit. 
Chapter IV 
1. McBriar, A. ti. Fabian Socialism and English politics, 1684-1914- 
Cambridge University Press, 1962, chs. 2 and 3. MoBriar outlines 
Fabian political doctrines and contrasts them with rival movements. 
See also Cole, Margaret "The Webbs and social theory". British 
Journal of Sociology, XII, 2, June 1961, pp. 93-IUI for the con- 
trast withgarxism; and Pease, E. R. The History of' the Fabian 
Society. London, A. G. Fifield, 1916, ch. 1 "The sources of Fabian 
socialism". R. H. Tawney in The Webbs in Perspective. London, 
The Athlone Press, 19539 describes the üebbs as the intellectual 
leaders of British socialism whose greatest contributions lay in 
political theory and in shaping the climate of political and social 
thought. 
2. Lstwin, S. R. ThPursuit of Certainty. Cambridge University Press, 
1965. Lose hostile appraisals of her contribution to the scientific 
study of society are, Cole, Mat art. cit.; and "Labour research" 
in Cole, iiargaret (ed. ) The *ebbs and Their Work. London, Frederick 
Luller, 1950; and Simey, T. S. "The contribution of Sidney and Beatrice 
Mebb to sociology". British Journal of Sociology, XII, 2, June 1961, 
pp. 106-123. 
3" 
4" 
Sizuey, T. S., art. cit., p. 109. 
Shaw, G. B. The Fabian Societ 
Society, Tract 41,1892 
its Early iiiatory. London, Fabian 
1914 reprint). 
5. Shaw's appraisal of Sidney Webb sums this up: "A few weeks after I 
joined the Zetetical Society I was much struck by a. speaker... He knew all about the subject of the debate; knew more than the lecturer; knew more than anybody present; had read everything 
that had ever been written; and remembered all the facts that bore on the subject. " Shaw, ß. B. Sixteen Self Sketches: XI 'Fruitful Friendships. " London, Constable, 1949, p. 65- See also Beatrice on Sidney (1926) "he is, in fast, not a public personage 
at all, he is a private citizen with public aims and expert know- ledge". Webb, Beatrice Our-Paltner ship (ed. B. Drake and U. Cole). 
London, Longm ns, Green, 1948, p. 6. 
6. Webb, 8,, The Difficulties of Individualism. London, Fabian Society, 
Tract 69,1896, p. 3" On the 'Webbs' utilitarianism, see MoBriar, A. LI., 
op. cit., p. 149 f., and Webb, Beatrice. Ms. diary, Dec. 8 and 9, 1903, Our artneership, p" 39- 
7. Webb, B. MY-Apprenticeship. London, Longmans, Green, 1926, p. 27. 
8. Webb, B. Our Partnership, ops cit., pp. 43-44. But she learned from Spencer to think about society as a total syeten, and to c ltivato detachment from her material, a task which, as her diaries reveal, 
she never found wholly congenial. 
9. Webb$ B. Dýy_ Aaprentice. 
_ship, op. cit., p. 
173. 
1©. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Webb, B. ' ib., p. 430. Leonard Woolf emphasized this in paying 
tribute to their influence on methods of political study: "the 
Tebbe taught us to regard all social institutions as the natural 
genera and species of communal life, to study their dynamic his- 
tory, and to classify them according to the functions which they 
performed, " in Cole, M. (ed. ), op. cit., "Political thought at 
the Webbs", p. 50 f. For a discussion of the distinctive qualities 
of this method in relation to traditional economic analysis and 
social survey procedures, see McBriar, A. tv1., op. cit., p. 50 f. 
Cassirer, E. The Logic of the Humanities, p. 189. 
Beatrice's continuing interest in this personal world is revealed 
in jy Apprenticeship and Our Partnership. She has been frequently 
criticized for neglecting it. Margaret Cole, for example, criticized 
the Webbs' proposals for social reorganization on the grounds that 
they "seemed only to be interested in 'institutional devices' to the 
neglect of people": Cole, M. "The Webbe and social theory", art. 
cit., p. 102. More powerfully, Shirley Letwin, op. cit., identi- 
fied Beatrice's impersonal basis for social reform: "Her own feelings 
were all against a concern with personality or individuals as the basis 
of reforming society,, " (p. 356), and "Peace and salvation lay not in 
anything connected with passion, emotion, or personality, but in the 
supremacy of reason, conscience, and self-abnegation" (p. 350). 
Both criticisms, relevant to the Webbs' polemical works, overlook 
the revelation of a concerned and passionate personality in Beatrice's 
autobiographical writings, and her explicit repudiation of Spencer 
and of science itself in attempting "to realize the cause or the aim 
of human existence" M. diary, Dec. 8,9,1903, My Apprenticeship, 
op. cit., p. 39. 
The obvious reference is to the first part of Capital, a detailed 
empirical inquiry into the documents of British industrial capi- 
talism. Engels' attack on the Fabians as dominated by money, 
intrigue and careerism, etc., is characteristic, yet the difference 
between Marx and Webb can be exaggerated. karx's last published 
work was "A Worker's Inquiry", a Booth-influenced, questionnaire- 
based study of the facts of social conditions under capitalism, 
in the hope of securing remedial legislation. See Feuer, L. S. (ed. ) Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philoso . London, Collins (Fontana Library) 1969. Introduction, p. 339 and 
p. 484. Shaw acknowledged Marx's contribution to the faot-finding 
tradition in his Sixteen Self Sketches. London, Constable, 19499 
p. 67, but was a critic of Marxian economics. See McBriar, A. M., 
op. cit., p. 30 f. 
Me. diary, Sept. 21,1894, Our Partnership, p. 86. I have singled 
out the London School of Economics and Political Science to illus- 
trato the Webba' determination to institutionalize empirical inquiry. 
Their zeal for institutionalizing is seen in the programme and re- 
searches of the Fabian Society; Sidney's work on the Technical 
Education Board; his work with R. B. Haldane, to establish a new 
constitution for the University of London, and for the Imperial 
College of Science and Technology; the founding of the New 
Statesman; the reorganization of Labour Party policy after 1917; 
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and the work in producing minority reports (Commission on Labour 
and the Eight Hour Day, on the Aged Poor, on the Poor Law). 
See Beveridge's "Introduction" to Cole, M. (ed. ) Beatrice Webb! s 
Diaries, 1912-1924. London, Longmans, Green, 1952; and McBriar, 
A. M., ope cit. 
15. Beveridge, W. "The London School of Economics and the University 
of London" in Cole, P. S. (ed. ) The Webbe and Their Work. London, 
Frodorick Luller, 1950. 
16. But Shaw in Tract 116,, Fabianism and the Fiscal Question. London, 
J'abian Society, 1904, advocated "more technical instruction in 
industrial and political science" - new universities, comprised 
of technical schools, to supplement Oxford and Cambridge. 
17. Beveridge, W., art, cit., p. 51. 
16. See Fremantle, Anne. This Little Band of Prophets. New York, 
1iontor, 1959, p. 126 f. 
19. Us. diary, Feb. 2U, 1900, Our Partnerchip, pp. 195-196. 
20. Early sits of this relationship between scientific study and 
social reform are to be found in Beatrice's reflections on Herbert 
Spencer: "It was after kother's death - in the first years of 
mental vigour - that I read First Prinoip lea and followed his 
generalizations-through i3iololg, Psychology and Sociology. This 
generalization illuminated my mind; the importance of functional 
adaption was, for instance, at the basis of a good deal of the 
faith in collective regulation that I afterwards developed. Once 
engaged in the application of the scientific method to the facts 
of social organization, in my observation of East End life, * of 
co-operation, of Factory Acte, of Trade Unionism, I shook myself 
completely free from laissez-faire bias - in fact I suffered from 
a somewhat violent reaction from it. " My Apprenticeship, p. 3e. 
21. Feuer, L. S. (ed. ) op, cit., "Introduction". The role of knowledge 
in social change is stressed more by certain contemporary Marxists 
than it was by ) arx himself: )tarek, F. Philosophy of World 
Revolution (trans. Daphne Simon;. London, Lawrence and Jishart, 
1969 1966, Vienna). 
22. Popper, K. The Open Society and its 'r 'nemies, op. cit., Vol. 1, Ch. 9. 
23" its* diary, *hitsun, 1896, Our-Partnership, pp. 132-133- 
24- ibid., p. 145" There are numerous references in Our Partnership 
to the permeation tactics of the Webba themselves, especially in 
relation to the 1902 and 1903 (London) Education Acts, L. S. E., 
and the University of London. In view of Beatrice's open acknow- 
ledgement of hers and Sidney's "wire-pulling" it is surprising to 
find, Tawney arguing that this was a tactic they rarely used. (The Webbs in Perspective, pp. 4-5). The difficulty of establishing 
the effectiveness of even one exercise in permeation may be illustrated 
by the variety of interpretations historians have given to Sidney's pars 
24. in the 1902 bill. This is partly a result of his preference 
for "multitudinous anonymous activities" (Our Partnership,, p. 214). 
It is no part of the present study to assess the practical effec- 
tiveness of Fabian ideas, a problem whose complexity may be illus- 
trated as follows& In education perhaps the greatest Fabian legie- 
lative success was the 1902 Education Act. H. C. Dent refers to 
Sidney Webb's "important part" in bringing about the Act, (Change 
in English Education. University of London Press, 1952, P" 40) 
and comments that iiebb "did more than anyone else to convince the 
public that educational reform was necessary" (ib, p. 34). Just 
how significant Webb's part in the 1902 Act was is not clear. Some 
historians have ignored him when discussing the Act (e. g., J. Leese 
Personalities and Power in English Education* London, Arncld, 1950, 
and Eaglesham, E. J. R. The Foundations of Twentieth Century Education 
in England. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967. raglesham is 
the leading exponent of the view that Morant was the decisive force - 
indeed, his book is virtually a study of liorant as the "foundation" 
of modern education). Joh. Adamson (English education. 17e9-1902. 
Cambridge University Press, 1930), failed to appreciate that not 
all representatives of "the Radical tradition" would oppose the Bill, 
and made no reference to the Radical Webb's work on behalf of the 
Bill. B. Simon (education and the Labour Movement, 
_1870-1920. London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1965 ,a Marxist critic of Webb's "pragmatic opportunism", cautiously if somewhat misleadingly evades 
the issue by affirming that Webb and the Fabian Society "took up 
a position fully in accord with the policy advocated by Gorst and 
Morant, the Church of England and the Tory Party"(p2O7). At the 
other extreme, there appears to be some confusion. Lary Agnes 
Hamilton (Sidney and Beatrice-Webb, London, Simpson, Long Marston 
and Co., 1932) makes a number of extravagant claims for the Webbs (some of which have been repeated by later writers), including the 
view that Sidney Webb was the "onlie begetter of the 1902,1903 Acts": "Politically, of course, the Balfour Government is the author of the Acts of 1902 and 19031 but their 'onlie begetter' is the author 
of Fabian Tract No. 106 - The Education Muddle and the Wax Out. Un_1ts title page, this Tract bears no name. In its first form, it 
was not drafted by Sidney Webb, indeed, he objected to the original draft. Thereupon it was remitted to him to redraft; as published in 1901 it was his handiwork. Before it actually appeared in this form, Sir John Gorst, then President [sic. He was Vice-President] 
of the Board of Education sent down to the Fabian Offices, and asked to be supplied with fifteen galley proofs of Webb's Tract No. 106 for the instruction of the Cabinet. So far as Gorst himself went, 
and so far as Mr. Balfour, the Prime Minister, went, their instruction had been carried through some time before this, at 41 Grosvenor Road". (pp. 127-128). Beatrice Webb, however, makes it very clear that, by 1902, Gorst was finished, both for the Cabinet and for the Webba, 
who had turned Gorst over, working instead through the rising star Robert 'Morant. (Our Partnership, pp. 239-240). G. A. N. Lowndes (The Silent Social Revolution. London, Oxford University Press, 
1937) claims that the pamphlet Gorst saw was the original, not "ebb's 
revision, and that Liorant guided Balfour in the passage of the Bill, but that Webb's contribution, nonetheless, "had been no mean one" (p" 92) (repeated in the second edition, 1968, p. 73, footnote). R. U. Tawney, in The Attack and G: ther Papers. London, G. Allen and 
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24. Unwin, 1953, simply says that "Webb's tract on The Education 
Muddle and the-Way Out ... helped to sup ly the ideas for the 
Education Act of 1902" (p. 139); while lie Halevy in his History 
of the Enrglish Peoples EpiloguQ 1895-190), Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Books, 1939, avoids this complication but holds that the 
su, estion for the Bill emanated from the l, duct., tion Department, 
"which found a valuable ally in the person of Sidney Webb. It 
was Sidney Webb whose propaganda had rendered the Liberal ex- 
perts powerless, and who had managed to create through the press 
a public opinion favourable to the Bill ... At their 
[the Fabians] 
instigation Tory politicians had introduced into the law of Great 
Britain without intending, or even being aware of it, an important 
measure of educational Socialism" (book 2, pp. 123-124) R. C. K. 
Ensor, in the chapter entitled "Permeation" in The '. 'ebbg and Their 
Work, ed. kargaret Cole, sug6ttets that Morant was the "parent" of 
the Bills, while Webb's role was that of midwife, influential with 
the Bryce Commission and with Balfour, and called on to campaign 
strenuously on behalf of the 1903 proposals for London. E. R. Pease, 
in his propagandist History of the Fabian Society. London, A. G. 
Fifield, 1916, claimed that the 1902 Act "followed almost precisely the 
lines laid down in our tract" (Tract 106, p. 145), and that the 
educational scheme of the society "was entirely the work of Sidney 
Webb" (p. 142). On this argument, Webb sired the 1902 Act. Lord 
Haldane in his An Autobiography. London, Hodder and Stoughton, 
1929, casts Webb into a subsidiary role. This is significant, since 
Haldane, though a Liberal at that time, worked in close conjunction 
with Webb in educational matters in London. Even Beatrice Webb, 
who lost no opportunity to record Sidney's achievements, did not 
make the claim that the 1902 and 1903 Acts were basically Fabian 
in inspiration; and she showed that the Webbe' ends were not those 
of Morant, the "aristocrat" (Beatrice Webb's Diaries, 1912-1924, 
ad. Margaret Cole, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1952, pp. 97-98). 
However, A. V. Judges ("The educational influence of the Webbs", 
British Journal of Educational Studies, XI, 1, Nov. 1961, pp. 33-48) 
claims that through Tract 106 Sidney "greatly influenced the drafting 
of the education Bill", and refers to "a conspiracy of modesty about 
Sidney's real claim to be the father of the Bill of 1902"(x, 44). 
The final word must be with Brennan, who has made the most detailed - if also a very uncritical - study of Webb's work as an 
educational administrator, "Sidney Webb and the Technical Education 
Board". The Vocational Aspect, XI, 23; XII, 24; XIII, 27; XIV, 28; 
1959-1962" Brennan follows rýnsor in analysing Webb's evidence to tree Bryce Commission on Secondary Education, and, a point generally 
overlooked, shows how Webb's chairmanship of the London Technical 
Education Board provided the Unionists with evidence that a successful 
county-council based education system could supplant that based on the 
school boards. Brennan's conclusion is that ': Vebb played "a part at least as important as that of Sir Robert Morant". ho conclusive 
answer to the question of Webb'e influence on the 1902 and 1903 Acts 
can be given, but it is clear that his role involved the shaping of 
opinion, through his writings and, perhaps more important, through 
conversations, and that his work at the London Technical Education 
Board was a practical demonstration of some of the ways in which the new local authorities might work. Thus, studies seeking to establish the influence of the Fabians should attend both to the intangible but 
24. 
25- 
26* 
a7. 
important questions of the determinants of climates of opinion, 
and to the detailed working of institutions in which the Fabians 
played a leading part. 
Details in MoBriarg A. M. s op. cit., Chas 8-9. 
Phillips, y+'. L. Why are the Many Poor? London, 
Tract 1,1884, P. 3" 
Fabian Society, 
Wilson, Mrs. C. X4., at, al. What Socialism Is. London, Fabian 
Society, Tract 13,1886. 
28. Webb, S. Socialism True and False* London, Fabian Sooiety, 
Tract 51,1894, p. 10. 
29. Morris, W. Communism (intro. by G. B. Shaw). London, Fabian Society, 
Tract 113,1903 reprint), p. 3. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33" 
34" 
35" 
Shaw, G. L. Basis of the Fabian Society. London, Fabian Society, 
5th ed* rev., 1596. 
"Basis of the Fabian Society, 1919" reprinted in Fremantle, A. This 
Littlo Band of Prophets. New York, Mentor, 1959, p. 263. 
Notably B. y+ebb Our Partnership, ch. 11 "Municipal and university 
administration, 1892-1898"; McBriar, A. M., op. cit., ch. 8; 
Brennan, J. J., arts, cit. 
See V1ebb S. London Education. London, Longsnans Green and Co., 
1903; also, see Ch. XIII, section 1. McBriar, A. a,., op. cit., 
discusses this point, together with other arguments the Fabians 
directed against Marxism, p. 65 f. 
Clarke, J. S. "The break-up of the Poor Law" in Cole, J. (ed. ) 
The Webby and Their Work; McBriar, A. M., op, cit., pp. 330.331" 
Regimentation: "The social system they stand for has largely been 
realized by one State. Germany has gone further along the Webb 
route than any other nation. In the rebound against all German 
things it is natural, even if unreasonable, that all apostles of 
regimentation should incur some degree of depreciation" (Raymond, 
R. T., Uncensored Celebrities. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1918). 
Anti-democratic: Section 2.3 
Humourless. "He was somewhat earnest, and did not like jokes on 
sacred subjects such as political theory. On one occasion I 
remarked to him that democracy has at least one merit, namely, 
that a member of parliament cannot be stupider than his constituents, 
for the more stupid he is, the more stupid they were to elect him. 
Webb was seriously annoyed and said bitingly, 'that is the sort of 
argument I don't like'" (ib. Russell, B. Portraits from Memory and 
Other Essays. London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1956, p. 99). 
Narrow: "Their ruthless concentration upon a limited field of human 
life and a curious habit of open-minded dogmatism gave to their 
thought a dangerous narrowness" L. Woolf in M. Cole (ed. ), op. cit,, 
p. 267. 
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36. Fassmore, d., op. cit., passi i 
37. Webb, S. The Difficulties ofIndividualism. London, 
Fabian 
Sooiety, Tract 69,1896, p. 3. For an analysis of differences 
between social discoveries and inventions, see Sklair, L., op. 
38" 
cit., p. 119 f. 
Webb, Towards Social Democracy? London, Fabian 3ociety, 
1916, P. 34" 
39. V, ebb, 3. The Difficulties of Individualism, p. 15- 
40, Taus, on the grounds that the vVebbe proposed gradual constitutional 
changes, . argaret 
Cole said they believed in aamocracy of consent. 
("The ebbs and social theory", art* cit. ), Gradualness 
in the 
1890s, however, did not mean popular consent to Sidney, but the 
workir out of an inevitable trend. Some other Fabians explicitly 
rojeoted popular consent, notably G. B. Shaw. 
4i. 
42. 
43- 
44. 
454 
46. 
47" 
Webb, b. Labour in the Longest Reim-* London, Fabian Society, 
Tract 75,1897, p. 18. 
', '; ebb, U. and B. The krevention of Destitution. London, 
Loagmana, 
Green, 1911, p. 294. 
ib.. p. 22, 
Webb, S. and Be The -Decay of 
Capitalist Civilization. London, 
Fabian Society and G. Allen and Unwin, 1923 3rd ed" , P. 
6. 
ib., p. 62, 
MoBriar, A. k., op, cit. " pp" 159.160; Letwin, S., ope cit., p. 
368. 
Uo6, art, R. The Uses of Literacy. London, Chatto and Windus, 1957- 
But Matthew Arnold, in Culture and Anarchy, had drawn attention to 
the deficiencies in middle class life and the Webbs' close friend, 
C. B. thaw, devoted most of his plays to denouncint, them. 
48. This criticism is very apparent in The Apple Cart. London, Constable, 
193), Preface, and in FverybodY's Political What's v/hat. London, 
Constable, 1944- 
49- Wells' position is discussed in Ch. V. Tawney's position, which I 
have only alluded to, was a form of Christian Socialism with a strong 
equalitarian biast see Equality. London, Allen and Unwin, 1931. 
50. Repeated by A. M. LcBriar, opº cit.; "The Webbs were the main advocates 
(amongst socialists) of 'piecemeal social engineering'" (p. 56). 
51. "determinedly bureaucratio right through ... practically no reference 
to the individual life or personality; it is all Committees, Boards, 
Departments, Councils, kept in order by perpetual audit and examina- 
tion - by endless Measurement and Publicity" "The `°/ebbs and social 
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theory", art. cit., p. 102. "Measurement and Publicit/ is an allusion 
to the argument in The Socialist Commonwealth, that every enterprise 
should be made to account to the community accurately and publicly 
and that therefore a vast increase in social science research is 
needed. 
52. Letwin, S. i op. cit. 
53. Sidney defended Committee management in industry in Tract 196 The 
oyenent, Root of Labour Unrest, 1920, In The Consumers' Co-aoarative 14 
ch. 6 "The future of consumers' co-operation", a network of co- 
operatives, local government agencies, trade unic, ns andprofeasional 
associations is proposed an a democratic substitute for capitalism. 
Sidney defended wants in aid, as a means of strengthening local 
government and stabilizing relations with nation and Movernment, 
in Grants in kid. London, Lon4rmans, Green and Co., 1011. 
54. "The General Will of the community, which Democracy seeks to discover, 
is not and cannot be found by attempting to represent, for all pur- 
poses, the'whole varied complex of emotions and desires that'are 
joined together in the individual elector" The Socialist Commonwealth, 
p. 102. The Webbs had nothing to contribute to reducing the con- 
fusions of general will theory. They reduced its complexities to an 
unanalysed and uncertain relationship between the expressed wants 
of the electorate and the divinations, by duly constituted groups 
of experts, of eommunity "needs". These needs in certain respects 
resemble Durkheim's social facts: they are not reducible to 
individual expressions of want or intention. On the confusions 
in "general will" theorizing, see Carritt, E. F. tlorals and Politics. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935, p. 202 f. 
55" "with Socialists, it is not a question of 'socializing' at one blow 
or in any one way, the whole of industry, and all services, but of 
providing the most advantageous form of administration for each ... " The Socialist Commonwealth, p. 147. 
56. Shaw, G. B., The Intelligent Woman's Guide to socialism and Capitalism. 
London, Constable, 1928, pp. 6t-70 at pass. 
57- 
56- 
59- 
Life and work. London, Dent, 1932. 
"Introduction" to M. Cole (ed. ) Beatrice Webb's Diaries, p. V. 
A Apprenticeship, pp. 338-339. 
See Mclillan, Margaret. The Life of Rachel Alc%faillen. London, Dent, 
1927, and Wiansbridge, A" ! tar<aret RicMiillan, Prophet and Pioneers Her 
60. 'Webb, S. "Twentieth century politics" in The Basis and Policy f 
Socialism. London, Fabian Society, A. C. Fifield, 1909. 
61. Webb, S. Towards Social nemocra-ov?, p. 34- 
629 ib., p. 35" 
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63. "For the right moment you must wait, as, Fabius did most patiently 
when warring against Hannibal, though many censured his delays; 
but when the time comes you must strike hard, as Fabius did, or 
your waiting will be in vain and fruitless. " Motto of the Fabian 
Society. See Fabian Tract 7, Capital and Land, 1888, title page. 
64. Shaw, G. ß. Preface (1930) Fabian Essays in Socialism. London, 
Allen andUnwin, 19489 p. xi . 
65. Webb, i. "The basis of Socialism, Historic", in Shaw, G. B. (ed. ) 
Fnbian '! 4. ssays in Socialism, London, Fabian Society, 1869, p. '52. 
66. Everybody's Political What's What, op. cit., pp. 46,352. 
67.50118t 'H--r- The New Machiavelli. Works, Atlantic Ed., Vol. XIV. 
London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1911). 
68. Us. diary, Dec. 29,1884, Our Partnership, p. 120. 
69. See ! Fremantle, A., op. cit., p. 191. 
70. Russell, Be Portraits from Memory and Other Essays, v. 101. 
71. Tawney, I'd. The Webba in Perspective, po b. 
72. IcBriar, A. M., op* cit., p. 126. 
T3" 
74. 
Ualevy, A History of the--English Peoples Epiloý; e, (1895-1905) 
A. 1 Imperialism. Harmondsworth, Peng4in Books, 1939; Haldane, 
x. B, An Autobiography. London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1929. 
a(ebb, S. The Labour Party on the Threshold. London, Fabian Society, 
Tract 207,1923. 
75. Midaleton, 3. S. "'Cobb and the Labour Party" in Cole M. (ad. ), op. 
c; it.: 3vicBriar, A. M., op, cit., ch. XI, especiý i ly np. 336-345. 
Chapter V 
1. Wella, H. G. Facperiment in Autobiography. London, V. üollancz 
and Cressett Press, Vol. It 19349 ohs. 1-5. The struggle is 
also documented in many of Wells' earlier novels, e. g. The History 
of Mr. Polly, Love and Mr. Lewisham, Kippe, and The Wheels of 
Chance, whose heroes were all, in Wells' words, "personalities 
thwarted and crippled by the defects of our contemporary civi- 
lization": Preface, Works, Atlantic Edition, Vol. VII. London, 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1925. 
2. Locomotion and Administration. Work , Atlantic Ed., Vol. IV. 
London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1924 (1902 . Wells did at times commend 
Fabian fact gathering, for example, on population trends, (Is, "r. 
Britling, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXII. London, T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1926 (1916), p. 385. ); and, occasionally, he used the 
Fabian technique of amassing factual data to demolish some cur- 
rent misconception - e. g., the mythology of healthy contented 
homes under capitalism is rebutted in New 'orldsfor Old. London, 
Archibald Constable, 1908. See also his own curious foray into 
the fecundity of the episcopacy: Mankind in the Makinj. London, 
Chapman and Hall, 1904.4th ed., pp. 90, and 418-420. 
3" Satires on Wells scarcely do him justice. His playfulness with 
ideas is unbounded. See, for example, his delightful children's 
book, Floor Games. London, Frank Palmer, 1911. 
4. Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XVI. London, T. Fisher Unain, 1926, 
A" 505" 
5. ib. " P. 518. 
6. In the Days of the Comet. London, Macmillan, 1906, p. 144- 
7- However, Wells was an extremely complex figure, and despite his 
repugnance for squalor some of hie most vivid writing has for 
its subject the impoverished lives of the upper working classes. 
Most of his utopian romances are, by contrast, rather flat. 
Significantly, they spring to life when the conditions of utopia 
are contrasted with the old order, for example, the life of the 
Smith family in lodgings in Pimlico, in Thy, Works, Atlantic 
Edition, vol. XXYIII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1927 (1924). 
S. The World of William 3 vols. London, E. Benn, 1926, 
vol. 1, p. 166. 
9. New Worlds for Old, p. 28. 
10. The New Machiavelli, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XIV. London, 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1911), p. 48. 
11. ib., p. 154. 
12. There is also a suggestion of a satire of the Webby in the 
characters of the Goopes in Wells' Shavian novel, Ann Veronica, 
Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XIII, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 
1925 (1909-1910), p. 148. The relations between Welle, the 
Webbs and other Fabians were extremely ambivalent. Wells 
could never leave Fabianism alone, being both attracted to its lea- 
ders and their energy and skills, but also repelled by their 
propensity, as he saw it, for narrow schemes and undemocratic 
methods: "the Fabian psychology is the psychology of a very 
small group of pedants who believe that fair ends may be 
reached by foul means" (Democracy, Works, Atlantic Edition, 
vol. XXI. London, T. Fisher Uriwin, 1926 (c. 1917), p. 424; 
"The petty industry in research of these Fabians affected to 
be prodigious, but in general inquiry their inertias were 
astounding. They were all for municipalising and nationalizing, 
and yet they would never consider with any patience or care the 
constitution, the methods of election, the areas of control of 
the municipalities and parliamentary governments to which with 
the utmost recklessness they proposed to entrust the land, the 
natural resources, the public services of the community. So 
long as it was an elected body and not an assembly of private 
persons they did not seem to care. The community was just to 
elect somebody, somehow, anyhow, and the o]evar little official 
would tell that somebody what to do. Gross energetic men, it 
seems, were to wait and plan and spend and fight vehemently for 
power - and then, whichever of them won it, would hand over 
meekly and trustfully to the wise, good, quiet "experts" waiting 
in their bureaus. " The World of William Clissold, op* cit., - 
vol. it p. 198. Beatrice Webb referred to the "hot and exaggerated 
arguments" with Wells and rather loftily condemned him for failing 
to accept Fabian views on tolerance and variety -a neat reversal 
of roles, Our Partnership, Ms. diary, May 11,1905, pp. 307-308- 
130 This first appeared as Air. Britling Sees it Through, and as Mr. 
Britling in Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXII. London, T. 
Fisher Unwin, 1926 (1916), Preface. 
14- 
15o 
ib. 9 p. 249. 
Wells' The Future in America was much admired by the German, Professor 
Johann Flange, an anti-Marxist socialist and advocate of the German 
concept of a heroic life which was threatened by the English commer- 
cial idea, of individual freedom. According to Hayek, it was an 
aspiration of Plenge and other socialists in Germany at the time 
to organize Europe, and they appreciated Wells' intellectual con- 
tributions in this direction: Hayek, F. A. The Road to Serfdom. 
London, Routledge, 1944, ch. XII. On this interpretation, we 
may observe a dilemma in Wells' treatment of Mr. Britling. Wells 
had to turn him from an exponent of outmoded British liberalism 
into an advocate of international, socialist order. This could 
not mean "Germanizing" him, since wells had for patriotic and 
other reasons to retain Mr. Britling's Britishness. However, 
the problem of reconciling individual liberty with schemes for 
international order persisted throughout his social writings. 
- 66q - 
16. 
The thought that purification could come only through strife lingered 
on. Thus, in Men Like Gods, it was only after and through a series 
of great wars that men realized the need for drastic reform. 
Joan and Peter, Works, Atlantic Edition, vols. XXIII, XXIV. London, 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1927 (1918), P. 53" 
17. ib., PP- 304 and 333- 
18. The World of William Clissold, op* cit. In the first volume, 
William Clissold proclaims the distance between elites and masses: 
"Realization of a new stage of civilized society will be the work 
of an intellectual minority; it will be effected without the 
support of the crowd and possibly in spite of its dissent". p" 199- 
19. Mrs. Warren's daughter, Vivie, repudiated her mother's argument 
that wretched circumstances had led her into prostitution, but 
Shaw, in his 1931 Preface to Mrs. Warren's Profession, made it 
plain that Mrs. Warren's life was intended as a criticism of 
society. Similarly, the wealthy rackrenter, Sartorious, in 
Widower's Houses was treated, no lese than were paupers, as a 
victim of circumstances, and the medical profession, in The 
Doctor's Dilemma, was cleared of evil intent. In each situation, 
individuals could be expected to perform more adequately only when 
sustained by a socialist structure of society, and on this the 
Weibs, Shaw and Wells were all in agreement. 
20. The Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXYIII. London, T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1927 (1924)p PP" 392-393" 
21. ib., i.. P7. 
22. The criticisms are scattered throughout his works, but an overall 
perspective may be gained from the following (letters refer to text)' 
as The op. cit., "p. 375 f"; Mr. Britling, opt, cit.,, 
p. 841 Sooialism and the Famm v, 1forks, Atlantic Edi- 
tion, vol. XVI. London, T. Fisher ünwin, 1926 (1906), 
P- 505; The World of William Clissold, opo cit., passim. 
be The p... 375 f. 
a. Men Like Gods. Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXVIII. 
London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1927 (1923), P" 72, and The 
Wheels of Chance, passim. 
d. Ki ps, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. VIII. London, 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1905); Love and Mr, Levriehaa4, 
Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. VII. London, T. Fisher 
Unwin, 19259 Passim. 
e. an and Peter, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 67; God the Invisible 
Kin , Works, Atlantic Edition, Vol* XI. London, T. Fisher; 
Unwin, 1925 (1917)" 
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f. The op. cit., p, 596; The Passionate Friends, 
Worka, Atlantic Edition, vol. XVIII. London, T. 
Fisher Unwin, 1926 (1913) passim; The Wife of Sir 
Isaac Harman, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XVI. 
London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 (1914). Preface, 
at pass. 
g. A Modern Utopia and Other Discussions, Works, Atlantic 
Edition, vol. IX. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 
(1904), p. 92; World Brain, London, Methuen, 1938, p. ix. 
h. See note 6 above. 
i. This is a universal theme in Wells' work, but see par- 
ticularly his striking Platonic metaphor in TheDream 
(p" 138) where the miserable, hunted, unheroic, crowded 
and dangerous life of the II-boatmen is likened to 
mankind's lot - and it is the teacher's task to 
rescue the "crew". 
23. Apart from his scientific texts and histories Wells' use of the 
language of race evolution is sparing - but vivid when it occurs - 
e. g., a splendid Darwinian gloss on Hegel in First and Last Things, 
Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XI. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 
1925 (1917), "our individualities, our nations and states and 
races are but bubbles and clusters of foam upon the great stream 
of blood of the species, incidental experiments in the growing 
knowledge and consciousness of the race" (p. 2,50). Shaw's 
fullest exposition of his Lamackian and Bergaonian beliefs in 
creative evolution (significant change depends on a will to create) 
is in his Preface to Back to Methuselah; it is also featured in 
"The Revolutionist's handbook and pocket companion" in M! n and 
Superman, and in the Preface to Saint Joan. Both St. Joan and 
Napoleon (in The Man of Destiny) are portrayed, as, in part, figures 
of the future. Shaw's belief in the need for an "evolutionary" 
change greatly reduces his interest as an educational reconstructioniat. 
Despite his Fabianism, he had little confidence that much could be 
done through education to effect social change. 
24. Welle expressed this spark as a sense of hope, or God-in-man, in 
The Undying Fire, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XI. London, 
T. Fisher, Unwin, 1925 (1917), p. 140 f. 
25. Russell, B. Portraits from Memo and Other F, ss s. London, Allen 
and Unwin, 19569 pp. 76-60* Wells distinguished the future-directed 
mind (constructive, legislative, organising, masterful) from the 
predominant type of mind, which regards the future, if at all, "as 
a sort of blank non-existence upon which the advancing present will 
presently write events". The Discovery of the Future, Works, 
Atlantic Edition, vol. Iii, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1924 (1902), 
p. 357. 
26. But it was a science which Closely harmonized with the arts. Thus, in Jaen Like Gods, Mr. Barnstable reflects that utopian lives are like 
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those of successful scientists and artistes "a continual refreshing 
discovery of new things, a constant adventure with the unknown 
and the untried", p. 171. 
27. Harrison, op. cit., p. 92 f. The illustrations in this book show 
very clearly how the Owenitea conceived small urban communities in 
park-like landscapes. Wella, in the character of William Clissold, 
compared Owenism favorably with "political" socialism (Fabianism, 
Karxism)i "It was by turning towards politics and deserting the 
vigorous initiatives of that inspired industralist, Robert Owen, 
that Socialism went astray, and it is to the political delusion 
that we owe now, [1925-1926]. in nearly every country under the 
sun, the spectacle of a large futile Labour-Socialist party which 
clamours while it is in opposition for the nationalization and 
socialization of everything, and gives way to a helpless teriror 
of administration so soon as it finds itself in office. " The 
World of William Clissold, vol. 3, p. 637. 
20. A Modern Utopia, p. 92. In this book, Wells briefly alluded to 
the ideal of a "world-wide house of Salomon" (p. ' 245). He gave 
a thoroughly Baconian appraisal of the modern scientific and in- 
dustrial quest for control of the physical environment in the first 
fifty pages of The World Set Free, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXI. 
London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 (1914). 
29" He discussed this point in First and Last Thy, criticizing the 
"cocksure" and over-precise approach to science of Comte and Spencer* 
p. 209. 
30. ib., "p. 219; Men Like Gods, p. 72. 
31. Low-Beer, Ann (ed. ). Herbert Spencer. London, Collier-Macmillan, 
1969. "Introduction", pp. 20-21. 
32. "Education must precede the Socialist State ... Socialism ... pre- 
supposes intelligence, and demands as fundamental necessities schools, 
organized science, literature, and a sense of the State. " New Worlds 
for Old, p. 116; "Socialism is still essentially education, is study, 
is a renewal, a profound change in the circle of human thought and 
motive", Socialism and the Family, p. 506. Acting on a similar 
belief, Sidney Webb felt his conscience to be clear in using Hutchinson's 
legacy, intended to advance the socialist cause, to found the London 
School of Economics. Fremantle, op. cit., p. 127- 
33- Wells veered between praising Marx as a great social analyst and critic, 
and attacking him for "preaching predestihation and salvation without 
works", New Worlds for Old, p. 245" In The World of William Cliasold 
Marx was castigated for introducing an "ugly ungraoiousness" into 
socialist discussions "the maggot, so to speak, at the core of my 
decayed Socialism", (vol. 1, pp. 178-179)- 
34- Wells attributed the managerial strain in his thought, e. g., in A 
Modern Uta ia, to this transient influence of the Webbs. Anticipation . Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. IV. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1924 (19011- 
35. Nevertheless, these writings provide a powerful imaginative stimulus, 
comparable in this respect to Mill's On Liberty. Indeed,, the 
writings of Morris and Wells on fraternity, and of the Christian 
ea8 as Fabian Tawney on Equality , may be linked with kill's 
ý'F 
completing, for the English-speaking world, the literar7., ex- 
ploration of the French revolutionary slogan of liberty, equality 
and fraternity. 
36. Experiment in Autobiography, op. ott., vol. 2, oh. 9. Like most 
of Wells' ideas, his misgivings about existing and projected inter- 
national institutions may be traced to his earlier writings. ' 
See his satire of a world conference of authors in Boon, Works, 
Atlantic Edition, vol. XIII. London, T. Fisher IInwin, 1925 
(1911)". p" 475" 
37" 
38. 
an Gabriel, R. R. The Course of American Democratic Thoughts, 
Intellectual History Since 1815. N. Y.! Ronald Press, 1946 reprint). 
"The pseudoeducated an of the older order couldn't teach, couldn't 
write, couldn't explain. He was pompous and patronising and prosy; 
timid and indistinct in statement with no sense of the common need 
or the common quality". The Dream, p. 535" 
39. Anticipations, op. cit., V, "The life history of democracy". 
40. See note 34- 
41- See note 23. 
42. Kagarlitaki, J. The Life and Thought of H. G. Wella. London, Sidgwick 
43" 
44" 
45. 
46. 
and Jackson, 1966, p. 105. 
First and Last Things, pp. 218-219. 
Joan and Peter, ch. 7 "The School of St. George and the Venerable Bede". 
Mr. Britling, p. 140 (authorial intrusion). In The World Set Free 
Wells contrasted man's suspicion, jealousy, bellicosity and particularism 
with the monstrous destructive power released by science, p. 168. 
The theme of the "new man" pervades Wells' writings. He appears in 
various forms: as a modern imperialist (Joan and Peter); freed of 
his ape-ancestry (Joan and Peter); possessed of a new level of con- 
sciousness (The World Set Free ; flexible in the face of change 
(The World of William Clissold ; tough-minded and intellectually 
trained The New Machiavelli ; free of jealousy (The Wife of Isaac 
Harman); as an emancipated woman (ib. and Ann Veronica ; and as 
od-like and perfected in his rationality and communality in utopia 
Men Like Gods). 
47. Fichte, J. G., op. cit. 
48. von Herder, J. G. Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of 
Mankind (abridged and introe by P. E. Manuel). University of Chicago 
49" 
Press, 1968. Cp. Passmore's analysis, which emphasizes a tension 
between relativist and absolutist strands in Herder's thoughts 
op. cit., pp. 221-228. 
Blake, W. "There is No Natural Religion" (Second Series) in 
Poetry-and Prose of William Blake (ed. G. Keynes). London, 
Nonesuch Press, 1948, p. 148. 
50. Blake, 4. "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell", ib., p. 181. 
51. 
52. 
53" 
54. 
Blake, W. "The First Book of Urizen", ib., pp. 221-222. The 
explosive potential of the attempt to assimilate all experience 
to "one law" - the essence of reductionism - is explored in 
Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain (trans. from the German by 
A. T. Lowe-Porter). N. Y., A. A. Knopf, 1927. 
See Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the present work. 
The mediaeval element in the enlightenment quest for order was 
the subject of Becker's controversial The Heavenly City Qf the 
Eighteenth Century Philosophers. In later chapters, especially 
VII and IX, I return to the very powerful influence exercised 
upon many reconstructioniets by the sense of a breakdown in 
cultural order. 
Reich, C. A. The Greening-of America. New York, Random House, 1970; 
Roezak, T. The Making of a Counter Culture. New York, Doubleday, 
1969. Both authors reject the equation of technological advance 
with human well-being and consider utopian alternatives. 
55. Russell, B. "Some prospects: cheerful and otherwise", Sceptical 
Essays, op. cit'., p. 234. 
56. See Chapter III above. Skiair has argued that sociology should be 
treated as a theory of progress, op. cit., part two. 
57. Welle, H. G. The Discovervof the Future, op. cit., pp. 373-374- 
56- Russell, B. Education and the Social Order. London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1932, ch. 1. 
59" Passmore, op. cit., makes no mention of Russell as a "perfectibilist", 
presumably because of the pronounced scepticism of his thought and his 
pessimism about the future. But this is surely an oversight, and 
not a considered judgment, in view of Russell's role as a popular 
moralist and social reformer who believed it both possible anddesirable 
to attempt to reform society and modify individual character. 
60. Russell, B. The Impact of Science on Society. London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1952. 
61. Russo11, B. Principles of Social Reconstruction. London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1916, ohs. II and IV. I discussed some aspects of this diffi- 
culty of reconciliation in my review of the Kothari Report in oh. II. 
62. Russell, B. "An outline of intellectual rubbish" in Unpopular 
Essays. London, Allen and Unwin, 1950, p. 121. The "rubbish" 
included the belief that human nature cannot be changed. However, 
for the most part, Russell himself separated "nature", embedded 
in the impulsive life, from "behavior", and argued that it was the 
latter that through habit and institutional pressures might be 
modified. 
63. However, Russell argued that Lockelan liberalism, because of its 
emphasis on tentativeness of belief and uncertainty of knowledge, 
is the antithesis of ideology, which he equated with the0logys 
"Philosophy and politics" in Unpopular Essays, p. 25. I discussed 
this issue in my Introduction to the present work. It should also 
be noted that Russell's enthusiasm for the public realm of scienti- 
fic thought was not as straight-forward as this essay suggests. 
Thus in "Mysticism and logic" (Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* 
London, Longmans, Green, 1918), he made a definite place in his epistemology 
lot intuition, mystical insights and illuminations "There is an ele- 
ment of wisdom to be learned from the mystical way of feeling, which 
does not seem to be attainable in any other manner", p. 11. 
64. Freud, S. Totem and Taboo. Works, Standard Edition, London, Hogarth 
Press, 1955 (1913)1- 913 3 Civilization and its Discontents. Works, 
Standard Edition. London, Hogarth Press, 1961 (1929)o For a recent 
psychoanalytic review of Freud's arguments, see iuensterberger, W. 
(ed. ) Finn and His Culture: 
-Psychoanalytic 
Anthropoloiy After 'Totem 
and Taboo". London, Rap and Whiting, 1969. Russell's neglect of 
problems of inhibition in personal life may be contrasted with his 
determination to find social institutions in which aggressive impulses 
could be sublimated. 
65. Russell, B. Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 6. 
66. Russell, B. "The recrudescence of puritanism" in Sceptical Esp. 
On the role of the passions as springs of action, see Human Society in 
Ethics and Politics. London, Allen and Unwin, 1954, pp. 175-176. 
67. Russell, B. Portraits from Memory, p. 96. 
68. Russell, B. Principles of Social Re const tion, p. 12. 
69. Ruýse11, B. Human Society in Ethics and Politics, n. 114. 
70. Cassirer, E. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, op. cit., ch. 1. 
71. Blake, W. "A Descriptive Catalogue &o., no. 3, Sir Jeffrey Chaucer 
and the nine and twenty pilgrims on their journey to Canterbury" in 
Poetry and Prose of William Blake, op. cit., pp. 595-606. 
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Chanter VI 
1. 
2. 
ý" 
4" 
Bowers, C. A., op. cit., ch. 1; Cremin, L. A.; op. cit., chs. 6-8; 
Graham, Patricia. A, op. cit., chs. 1,2,4; Karier, C. J. Nan, 
Society, and Education. Glenview (Iii. ) Scott Foresman, 1967, 
pp. 235-251- 
Dewey 9 J. Individualism, Old and New. New 
York, Minton Balch and 
Co., 1930, p. 169. See also Childs, J. L. Ten Theses on Education 
and American Culture. Greenwich, (Conn), Edgewood School Press, 
1935, "1. It is through the nurture of the culture that human 
beings are developed. " These theses are extensively developed 
by Dewey, Childs, Kilpatrick and other experimentalists in a 
general model of human growth as culturally-interactive. Dewey 
frequently criticized the abstraction and isolation of "individual" 
from "society" and "culture" and the analysis of them outside specific 
contexts. See Democracy and Education, ah. VIII "The democratic 
conception in education", for a typical illustration of his own 
historical method of treatment. His theory of experienee, however, 
is less obviously culturally orientated. 
Dewey's affinities with Mead are very close on this point. See 
Mead, G. H. Mind, Self and Society (intro. C. w. Morris). 'University 
of Chicago Press, 1934, and Childs, J. L. American Pragmatism 
Education* cation. New York, H. Holt, ch. 4. 
At any rate, one major task of philosophy was to examine ordinary 
life problems. See Experience and Nature. Now York, W. W. Norton 
& Co., 1929, pp. 7-8 and The. Quest for Certainty. New York, Minton, 
Balch & Co., 1929, ch. I et pass. Dewey did not suppose all problems 
capable of solution; many of them, in any ca, so, simply faded away, or 
ceased to agitate attention as circumstances and thinking changed. 
See Randall, J. H. jr., "Dewey's interpretation of the history of 
philosophy" in Schilpp, P. A. (ed. ). The ramifications of philosophic 
inquiry were greater in Dewey's theory than in those of most modern 
philosophers of the empirical school. Thus he was interested in 
the interactions and relationships between logic, modes of experience, 
and the sociocultural world. The ultimate source of all these topics, 
however, was "common experience". See Ratner, J. "Dewey's conception 
of philosophy" in Schilpp, P. A. (ed. ), op. cit., p. 55. Dewey anti- 
cipated those contemporary social and moral philosophers who are 
interested in "fact/value" distinctions, who seek more "real" and 
"significant" problems for philosophical investigation, and demand 
a closer relationship between analytic, speculative and empirical 
inquiries. See human Nature and Conduct. New York, H. Holt, 1922 
(reprinted with new introductions New York, Modern Library, 1930), 
pp. 11-12. (For a discussion of the use of the term experimentalism 
in relation to this way of thinking, see Childs, J. L. Education and 
the Philosophy of Experimentalism. New York, Appleton, Century, 1931, 
ch. 1. 
5" For an appreciative comment on this contribution, see Rugg, H. and 
Vithers, W. Social Foundations of Education, New York, Prentice-Hall, 
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1955, p. 514 f. The work of the experimentalist$ in this respect 
is severely criticized in Brauner, C. J., American Educational 
Thy, Englewood Cliffs (N. J. ), Prentice-Hall, 1964, p. 202 f. 
6. Childs, J. L. American Pragmatism and Education, ch. 5. A 
characteristic discussion of the interaction of individual and 
cultural faotors in experience iss Dewey's Freedom and Culture. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1940, ch. 5 "Democracy and human nature". 
7. Dewey, J. Human Nature and Conduct, passim. 
8. These were interests the experimentalists shared with Durkheir4, 
although Durkheim appears to have had little direct influence on 
them. ' Durkheim'a own attitude towards James' Pragmatism was 
hostile. See his Pragmatism and Sociolog , reprinted in Wolff, 
K. H. 
(ed. ), op. cit. Significantly, Durkheim attacked the relativism 
of James' theory of truth, and espoused doctrines resembling Platonic 
absolutism. 
9" I give a brief overview of his career and thought in my Introduction 
to Dewey. London, Collier-Macmillan, 1970. 
10. Dewey's writings are notoriously extensive. In the following ac- 
count, I draw principally upon: How We Think. Boston, U. C. Heath, 
1910 (rev. ed. 1932); Essays in Experimental c. University of 
Chicago Press, 1916; Reconstruction in Philoso . New York, H. Holt, 
1920 (rev. ed. Boston, Beacon Press, 1946); Human Nature and Conduct; 
Experience and Nature; The Quest for Certainty; Individualism Old 
and New; Logic: the Theory of Ingui . New York, H. Holt, 1936; Problems of Men. New York, Philosophical Library, 1946. 
11. Dewey, J. Experience and Nature, p. 42; "Conflict and uncertainty 
are ultimate traits" Human Nature and Conduct, p. 12. For the role 
of thought in creating order out of uncertainty and doubt, see 11o.,,. ww Wee 
Th ink, passim., and Essays in Experimental Logic, ohs. 2 and 6. 
Cp. i"hitehead's not dissimilar treatment in Adventures of Ideas, op. 
cit., p. 14 T. and Part II. 
12. Dewey discussed the educational implications of the transition from 
a farm- and. township-based society to an urban society in The School 
and Society, op. cit. He explored the wider social and political 
implications in, e. g., Ind ividualism. ©ld and New; Freedom and 
culture and Problems of Men. There is frequently more than a note 
of nostalgia in his references to the virtues of a shared oommunal 
life on the "old farm". The "old farm" recurs in experimentalist 
writings as a source of homely democratic virtues of self-sufficiency, 
hard work, property rights, and skills of self-government which almost 
seem to. make large-scale government unnecessary& see Childs, J. L. 
Education and Morals. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950, ch. R. 
The marked individualism of these virtues contrasts with the experi- 
mental enthusiasm for shared experience, collective action, and intel- 
ligent social planning. References to a departed rural glory are 
reminiscent of Cobbett, who lamented the chance from the old farm house 
in which the farmer's family and his servants lived together as a unit, 
to the new style in which middle class notions of gentility set the 
farmer and his family apart from their employees: Cobbett, W. 
Rural Rides, entry for 20th October 1825. London, Dent, n. d. 
(1853 ed. ), 2 vols. Cobbett, like Dewey, attributed the change 
to the impact of industrialization on the values of the traditional 
rural culture. 
131 
14. 
Dewey, J. Human Nature and Conduct. Soo especially Part II, 
section III, "Changing human nature" and section IV "Impulse and 
conflict of habits". But being "built into" human nature did not 
prevent habits and customs from being modified. Thus it was not 
so much the instinctive and impulsive element in human nature that 
resisted change as the inertia of custom and "the resistance that 
acquired habits offer to change after they are once acquired"$ 
Dewey, J. "Does human nature change? " The Rotarian Ala gazine, 
52,2, Feb. 1946 (reprinted in Nordskog J. E. (ed. ) Social Change. 
New York, McGraw Hill, 1960, pp. 95-99. 
) 
These points underline 
Dewey's conviction that, through education, right habits should be 
formed. 
Dewey, J. "The teacher and his world" in Probleme of Men. 
15. Rugg, Ii. Culture and Education in America. New York, Harcourt, 
Brace and Co., 1931, Part VI and The Great Technology. New York, 
John Day Co., 1933, Passim. 
16. The work of the Laboratory School has been extensively documented: 
Dewey, J. (ad. ) The Elementary School Record (9 monographs). 
University of Chicago Press, 1900 reprinted in Findlay, J. J. (ed. ) 
The School and the Child. London, Blackie, (n. d. )) and Dewey, J. 
The School and Society; 1ayhew, Katherine C. and Edwards, Anna. C. 
The Dewey School. New York, D. Appleton Century Co., 1936; Lepencier, 
Ida B. The History of the Laboratory School. University of Chicago 
Press, 1960; Mirth, A. Q. "John Dewey's design for American education: 
an analysis of his work at the University of Chicago". History of 
Eduction Quarterly, IV, 2, June 1964, pp. 83-105. I discuss the 
Laboratory School in Chapter XI, section 2.3.2. 
17. Kilpatrick: 6.11. Education for a Changing Civilization. Now York, 
Macmillan, 1926. 
18. ib., p. 41. But Kilpatrick vacillated between a position which com- 
mended adjustment to contemporary culture and a more critical stance. 
In 1942, he criticized the political system of industrial capitalism 
on the grounds that it interfered with or inhibited the realization 
of the "American dream" of abundance for all; also, it had failed 
to establish equality of opportunity: "Philosophy of education from 
the experimental outlook" in National Society for the Study of 
Education, forty-first yearbook, part 1, Philosophies of Education. 
Bloomington (Ill. ), Public School Publishing Co., 19429 P. 41- 
19. Kilpatrick, WJ. (ed. ). The Educational Frontier. New York, The 
Century Co., 1933i especially essay 2 (prepared by Dewey and Childs) 
"The social-economic situation and education". 
20. The most revealing source of Rugg's earlier optimism is his massive 
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school and junior college social-studies textbook series. There 
are occasional criticisms of industrial civilization in these volumes 
but in general they present an optimistic and cheerful picture of a 
world steadily progressing through the application of science and 
technology. Rugg, H. and Krueger, Louise Man anIlia Changing-So.,.. oiety" 
Boston, Ginn, 1929-1940. 
21. The Great Technology, ch. X "Axioms for the great technology". 
22. As with the post-war experimentalists, the emphasis Bode gave to ob- 
jectives was on the processes of formation, with government cast 
into the role of facilitators "providing the conditions for widening 
the area of common purposes among men". Bode, B. H. Democracy as a 
Way of Life. New York, Macmillan, 1937, P" 50- 
23- The class bias of education was documented in pioneering sociological 
monographs: Counts, G. S. "The selective character of American 
secondary education" School Review and Elementary School Journal, 
bupplementary Educational Monographs, no. 19,1922, and "The social 
composition of Boards of Education", ibid., no. 33,1927. Counts' 
transition from enthusiasm to disenchantment with the Soviet system 
may be observed in (a) his Introduction to 1inkevitch, P. The New 
Irducation in the Soviet Republic and in his A Ford Crosses Soviet 
Russia. Boston, The Stratford Co., 1930 (a travel book, eulogizing 
the new order); and (b) The Country of the Blind (with Nucia Lodge and 
revealingly subtitled "The Soviet system of mind control") Boston, 
Houghton 1iifflin, 1949, and The Challenge of Soviet Education. New 
York, McGraw Hill, 1957 (a strong condemnation and warning of the 
power of totalitarian trends in Soviet education). 
24. Dewey, J. The Problems of Men, p. 109. 
25. Rugg, H. Foundations for American Education, op. cit., p. 249. Al- 
though he assented that machine technology and capitalist production 
are the prime movers, Rugg did not restrict his wide-ranging analysis 
of cultural trends in America to such a limited framework. He as- 
cribed to the ideas of individuals and groups of thinkers - philo- 
sophers, artists, sociologists, jurists, psychologists and others -a 
power which went far beyond the development of their own particular 
spheres of interest. These were the "new frontiersmen", the creators 
of a now "cultural synthesis" which was trandbrming American con- 
sciousness and social institutions* ib., "Foreword". 
26. Shapovalenko, S. C. (ed. ), op. cit. 
27. See Chapter XI, section 2.3.2, and Chapter XII, sections 1-4. 
28. In this necessarily abbreviated assessment of the "lag" theory, I 
have drawn principally upon the following essays in Duncan, O. D. (ed. ) 
03burn on Culture and Social Change. University of Chicago Press, 
1964, "Stationary and changing societies" (1936); "Technology and 
governmental change" (1936); "Culture" (1937); "Cultural lag as 
theory" (1957). 
29. Drawn principally from Dewey, J. Problems of Men, ch. 1. "The 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33" 
34" 
democratic faith and education", and Rugg, H. Foundations for . American 
Education, P. 249 f. 
Rugg, H. and Withers, W. Social Foundations of Education, p. 523 
f. 
Dewey, J. Creative Democracy - the Task Before Use 
(Eightieth 
birthday address, delivered before the National John Dewey Conference, 
New York City, Oct. 20,1939) viashington, National Education Association 
nod.., pp, 9-10. Dewey's confidence in rational, empirical, essentially 
educational, methods of change led him to quarrel with Marxism, which 
he described as an anti-scientific absolutism: Freedom and Culture, 
ch. 4 "Totalitarian economics and democracy". 
Problems of lien, p. 161. The idea of a close affinity between 
science and democracy was accepted by all the experimentalists, so much 
so that science and democracy (both heavily interpreted) may be re- 
garded as the twin foundation stones of the movement. At times the 
affinity was translated into an identity: "Democracy requires the 
same open-mindedness toward values or interests as science requires 
toward evidence. In this respect the spirit of science is the same 
as the spirit of democracy". Bode, B. ß. Modern Educational Theories. 
New Alacmillan, 1927, p. 257. 
Childs' equivocal attitude toward indoctrination in the thirties is 
discussed in Bowers, op. cit., pp. 121-122. Counts supported indoc- 
trination in the values of militant democracy: Dare theSchool Build 
a Now Social Order? New York, John Day, 1932, p. 10 fo and The 
is of American Democracy,. New York, John Day, 1938, p. 294 f" 
It should be noted that Counts was reacting against the extreme indi- 
vidualism of the independent progressive schools of his time, and that 
he was alarmed by the prospect of anti-democratic forces capturing 
the allegiance of children in public schools. 
This is a composite picture, drawn from several of the principal works 
of experimentalist social criticism in the thirties: Dewey, J: 
Freedom ani Culture; Individualism Old and New; Liberalism and Social 
Action New York, G. P. Putnam, 1935 ; Problems of Men; Bode, B. H. 
Democracy as a; tiYay of Life; Counts, G. S.: Dare the School Builds New 
SocialOrdder? and The Pros pects of American Democracy; Kilpatrick, I. H. 
(ed. ) The Educational Frontier; Rugg, H. The Great Technology; Rugg, 
a. (ed. Democracy and the Curriculum. New York, D. Appleton-Century, 
1939 (third yearbook of the John Dewey Society). 
35. Rugg, H. Foreword to Rugg, H. (ed. ) Democracy and the Curriculum; 
Dewey, J. "The future of liberalism" (1935 in Problems of lien. 
36. Rugg was most confident about what education could achieve. Dewey 
always maintained that the school's contribution of necessity would 
be indirect. But it is interesting to see how far, by 1938, Dewey had 
advanced beyond the extremely cautious approach he adopted in 1916. 
Cps Democracy and Education, ch. 1 (1916); "Gan education share in 
social reconstruction? " The Social Frontier, 1, Oct. 1934, Pp. 11-12; 
and Problems of Men ("Democracy and education in the world of today", 
19367. 
37. 
38" 
39" 
q0. 
I discuss the practical form Dewey expected science to take in 
education in Chapter XI, section 2.3.2. 
Rugg, H. Culture and Education in America, Preface and Part III. 
(Although not published until 1931, this book was written by about 
1926). 
See, for example, the "four foundational' for education in Foundations 
for American Education. Actually, Rugg calls them frontiers - the 
human, social, aesthetic, and moral-ethical frontier - which he com- 
bines into a single "educational frontier" in the last part of the 
book. 
Ru, g, H. and Flithers, W., op. cit. See note 30. Although Rue's 
own theory of social change, as he explicitly expounded it in this 
book, was eclectic, a combination of culture lag and social conflict, 
the emphasis he constantly gave to the actual and potential impact of 
the ideas of selected leaders of thought suggests that he was at heart 
an ideational theorist, with a leaning towards the theory of the 
"great man's ideas", an intellectualist version of Carlyle's heroes. 
41. RugS 1 H. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45" 
Rugg's views fluctuated. By 1939i he had far less confidence in the 
capacity of a revised capitalist system to manage either domestic 
reform or to ward off the growing threat of totalitarianism in 
Europe. After the war, his optimism in reformed capitalism was 
restored. (Foundations for American Education, pp. 286,319 f., 
365") 
The Great Technology, p. 160. 
Chapter VIII, section 2. 
Rugg 0 U. The Great Technology, p. 185. 
He gave greater emphasis to social tension as a fruitful source of 
change in Social Foundations of Education. 
46. Ruw, H. The Great Technolor, p. 189 f. 
47" ib., p. 201 f. 
48. Rugg, H. Culture and Education in'kmerica, p. 142. See also 
Imagination New York, Harper and Row, 1963), ch. 15, for Rugg's 
argument that within the person, impulse and fantasy, as well as 
rational analysis and contemplation, are required for higher order 
conceptualizing. 
49. RU6,90 R. Culture and Education in Amy, p. 211. 
50. Counts, G. S. "To vitalize American tradition" Progressive Education, 
Feb. 1932 (cited in Kandel, I. "American philosophy of education" in 
Clarke, F. (ed. ) Renew of Educational Thought. London, University 
of London Institute of Education and Evans Bros., n. d. (o. 1936). See 
also the passage I quote from Dewey's Democracy and 1Education; note 62. 
gi. 
1938: p" 13" However, he gave no more definite content to objectives 
nor did he provide any sharper perception of democratic requirements 
than did Dewey. 
rroAressive Education at the Crossroads. New York, Newson and Co., 
Bode, B.!!. Democracy as a Way of Life, pp. 48 and 58-59, and 
"The new education ten years after. 1. Apprenticeship or free- 
dom? " The New Republic, LXIII, 609, dung 49 1930, pp. 61-64. 
Bode's concepts of democracy as the free play of intelligence and as 
sharing are very similar to Dewey'e. Bode himself thought that he 
was laying more stress on the defining of objectives than did Dewey. 
He claimed that "there is considerable ground for the suspicion that 
our concern for the common man will evaporate into idle words and 
sentiments, unless we gain some perception of what is required to give 
the common man his proper share in our social and cultural heritage" 
52. Counts, G. S. Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, p. 46 S. 
53" 
54 
Lillie, F., art. cit. Childs had undoubtedly moved, as did Kilpatrick 
and Counts, from the position of radical hostility to American civili- 
zation in the 19303 to a firm belief that the American "way of life", 
by contrast with the Soviet system, had a great deal to commend it. 
In view of this, the criticism that some experimentalists had come 
to advocate an education which encourages children to adapt to their 
society as it was rather than to learn to think about ways of reform- 
ing it, is apposite. 
0 Counts, G. 3. Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, p. 10 f. 
Childs$ position was, on the waole, more warded, He clearly recog- 
nized "that the development of the program of the school inescapably 
involves tin evaluation and interpretation of the ways of life and 
thought of its society". (Education and Morals, p. 104. ) This, 
indeed, is one of the basic tenets of reconstructionism, which was 
less clearly perceived during the 1950a than in the 1930s. in periods 
of crisis, the evaluation was sharper and more exclusive of alternative 
possibilities. Hence, in the thirties, when democracy appeared to be 
threatened from within, the school could not afford to miss opportunities 
of actively commending democracy against its critics. In the post war 
period, when the external enemy appeared more serious, it was the American 
qualities of democracy that were to be strongly impressed upon children 
and teachers. 
55. Kilpatrick, W. H. PhilosoRb, y of Education, New Yorkq Macmillant 1951, 
PP. 405-406. 
56. Counts G. S. Dare the School., Build a Now Social Order?, pp. 19-20; 
Bode, B. H. Progressive Education at the Cronaroada, ohm. 5 and 7- 
57- Dowey, J. Democracy and Education, ch. VIII; and Experience and 
Educationn. New York, Macmillan, 1936, passim. For the distinction 
between aims and procedural principles in education, see also Peters, 
R. S. Education as Initiation. University of London and Evans Bros., 
1964. 
58. Dewey, J. Creative Democracy the Task Before Uap pp. 15-16. See also 
Democracy and Education, ch. VII "The democratic conception in education". 
59" Individualism, Old and New, passim. 
60. Problems of Yen, ch. 2, "Democracy and education in the world of today". 
61. See Dewey, J. The Public and its Problems. New York, H. Holt, 
1927 (reissued with a new introduction, Gateway Books, 1946) and 
Dewey, J. and Tufts, J. H. Ethics. Now York, H. Holt, 1910 (rev. 
ed. 1933), ch. XX "Social organization and the individual". 
sz. Demote and Education, Preface, ps x. 
63. For ýteber's views on democracy I have principally used s Weber, U. 
From Max Weber (trans. and ed. Garth, H. H. and Mills, o. w. ) London, 
Houtledge and Regan Paul, 1948; Bendix, R. iyax webers an Intel- 
lectual Portrait. London, Heinemann, 1960; and Pardons, T., Shils, E., 
Naegele, K. D., and Pitta, J. R. Theories of Society. Now York, Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1961. 
64. From Max Weber "Politics as a vocation". 
65. ib., "Bureaucracy". 
66. ib., "The sociology of charismatic authority" and "The meaning of 
discipline". 
67. Rugg, U. Culture and Education in America, Preface. 
68. Hugg, U. Foundations for American Education, p. 339- 
69. Bode, B. Modern Educational Theories, p. 7- 
70- For antecedents of this in American society, see Gabriel, R. H. The Course 
of American Democratic Thoughts an Intellectual History Since 1815. 
passim. 
71. Human Nature and Conduct, p. 21. This passage and many others where Dewey discusses the culture of the norms and mores of his society and 
draws extensively upon the American heritage and the Western tradition 
of philosophical, political, social and educational thought, make it 
very difficult to understand what could be meant by the charge that 
"hie ideal society is, in fact, a rootless one"s G. H. Bantock 
Education in an Industrial Society, op, cit., p. 31. The "roots" 
are indeed different from those selected for preservation and develop- 
ment by Bantock but he evades this issue under the blanket charge of 
"rootlessness". For Dewey's account of some of his "roots", see 
"The development of American pragmatism" in his Philosop y and 
Civilization. New York, G. P. Putnun's Sons, 19319 pp. 13-35" 
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Chanter VII 
1. Kecskemeti, P. "Introduction" to k1annheim'o Essays on the Sooiolo y_ 
of Knowledge. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952" 
2. tiffs saw that direct experience itself contains many elements of 
theoretical meaning, that pro-theoretical perception is charged 
with incipient reflection which, however, need not blur the 
directly given Gestalt in any way. Certain details may even 
stand out more vividly, when illuminated by theory; a theory 
may help us to see as enduring 'facts' certain things which 
would otherwise fade away after the intuitive flash is over. 
This, then, is the one thing scientific analysis can do for 
cultural products; it can stabilize them, make them endure, give 
them a firm profile. " And: "historical theory fulfils its own 
essence only by managing to derive an ordering principle from 
this seeming anarchy of change - only by managing to penetrate 
the innermost structure of this all pervading change". Essays 
on-the-Sociology--of Knowledge, p. 72 and p. 86. It is very 
characteristic of Mannheim that he should treat this reconstruc- 
tive role of theory as basically stabilizing. This, too, is how 
Dewey perceived problem-solving, and how the later experimentalists 
(under the influence of both Dewey and Mannheim) perceived the 
tasks of establishing in the community the method of consensus 
together with a stable core of shared values. 
3" 
4" 
Ideology and Utopia (trans. L. Wirth and E. Shila). London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952 (First English ed., 1936); Ess s 
on the Sociology of Knowledge; Essays on the Sociolo of Culture. 
London, Routledge and Kean Paul, 1956. (The latter two are col- 
lections of essays, published posthumously in book form. ) 
Cp. Aron, R. German Sociology. New York, The Free Press of 
Glencoe, 1964. PP- 55.65" 
5. IdeoloSZ and Utoiia, p. 28. 
6. Mannheim's most systematic treatment of this topic occurs in his 
early essay, "On the interpretation of weltanschauung" (1921-1922), 
reprinted in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. 
7. The difference between Mannheim's position and one well-known form 
of methodological individualism can be exaggerated. The two ap- 
proaches have in common a confidence that by altering social situa- 
tions, behavior can be substantially modified: "methodological 
individualism, by imputing unwanted social phenomena to individuals', 
responses to their situations, in the light of their dispositions 
and beliefs, suggests that we may be able to make the phenomena 
disappear, not by recruiting good men to fill the posts hitherto 
666lpiied by bad men, nor by trying to destroy men's socially unfor- 
tunate dispositions while fostering their socially benevolent dis- 
positions, but simply by altering the situation they confront". 
Watkins, J. W. N. "Methodological individualism and social tendencies" 
in Brodbeck* May (ed. ) Readings in the Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences. op. cit., pp. 269-280. 
Like Mannheim, Schuler was perturbed by the dis-unity of culture 
and rested his hopes in an elite to create a new organic culture. 
His religious interests were strong and, as Mannheim was to do, 
he vested final cultural authority not in scientists but in sages 
and saints. Staude, J. Max Schuler 1814-1928t- an Intellectual 
Portrait. London, Collier-Uacmillan, 1967- 
9, Fgea. 3ºe on the Sociologffof Knowledge, p. 53- 
10. ib., p. 42. 
11. ib., p. 45- 
129 Ideology and-'Utopia, p. 132. 
13. ib., p. 3. 
14. Ilan and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1940, p" 26. The link between empiricism and "recon- 
struction" was forged in Mannheim's early writingsl for example, 
this typically Hegelian passage in his 1924 essay, "Historicism"t 
He argued that culture analysis will disclose that motifs are 
"organically bound up with one another. The stream of ideas does 
not, then, flow and swell in separate channels (represented by the 
various spheres of life and culture). The separate motifs are, 
rather, mutually conditioning at the successive stages of evolution 
and are components and functions of an ultimate basic process which 
is the real "subject" undergoing change. To work out the structure 
or configuration of this total process on the basis of a thorough 
examination of its separate elements is the final aim of historicism 
a universal metaphysical and methodological principle which comes 
more and more to dominate the cultural sciences". Essays on the 
Sociology of Knowledge, p. 87. 
15. Ideology and Utopia, p. 91. This claim forms the gist of his essay, 
"Historicism". 
16. ib. 9 p. 25. 
17, ib., pp. 42-47 and 55. Sir Fred Clarke, formerly Director of the 
London Institute of Education, greatly admired and was much influenced 
by Mannheim. In his personal copy of Ideology utopia (now 
in the Clarke collection of the London Institute library), he under- 
lined Mannheim's statement that "the extension of our knowledge of 
the world is closely related to increasing personal self-knowledge 
and self-control of the knowing personality", (p. 43) and made the 
marginal note "Education". For Clarke's views on Mannheim, see 
his essay "Karl Mannheim and the Institute of Education" published 
for the first time in Mitchell, F. i. Sir Fred Clarket Master Teacher. 
London, Longman, Green, 1967. 
18. Ideology and Utopia, p. 95" 
19. ib., p. 26. 
20. Popper, Is Te Open Society and its Enemies, op. cit., vol. 2, 
p. 217 f- 
21. Ideology and Utopia, p. 186. 
22. ib. p p. 3. 
23. ib., p. 186. 
24. ib., p. 71. 
25. Mannheim himself recognized certain affinities between Thomism 
and the unified world devised by the intellectual alerisy and 
"put at the disposal of those who crave for a consistent way 
of life". Diagnosis of Our Time. London, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1943, P" 111. 
26. Ideology and Utopiat p. 83. 
a7. 
28. 
Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 107 f. 
Freedom, Power and -Democratic 
Planning (ed. H. Gerth and E. Bramstedt). 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951, ch. 13 "Thought, philosophy 
religion, and the integration of the social order"; DQ oake 2f Our 
Time, ch. VII, "Towards a new social philosophy". This chapter, 
subtitled "A challenge to Christian thinkers by a sociologist" was 
first presented as a paper to the Moot, a group of Christians, in- 
cluding John Bailey, Fred. Clarke, T. S. Eliot, Donald MacKinnon, 
J. Middleton Murray and J. H. Oldham, who met several times a year 
for a number of years from early in 1939" Clarke's Education and 
Social Change, first published as a Christian News Letter, was 
written as a commentary on and development of some of the ideas 
Mannheim had discussed. 
29. Ideology and Utopias p. 192 f. See, too, p. 82, where Mannheim 
refers to the unchanging, essential elements in human nature, 
together with freedom of the will, and ecstatio experience, which 
he developed more fully in Dian__, 
ýosis of 
Out. There is also 
a lengthy discussion of ecstacy as a valid and important part of 
awareness in Essays on the Sociology of-Culture, p. 240 f- 
30- Man and Society, p. 216. 
31. ib. p p. 20). 
32. Essays on the Sociolozy of Culture, p. 109. But this was in an essay, 
"The problem of the intelligentsia", in which he gave more emphasis 
than in most other of his writings to the creative role of individuals. 
Significantly, it is the intellectual who "has the characteristics of 
a Proteus who perennially transcends and reconstitutes himself, and 
whose foremost motives are renovation and reformation", ib., p. 92. 
This is an apt description of Mannheim himself. 
33" ibid; see also Freedom. Power and Democratic Planning, ch. 13. 
34, 
35. 
Ideolora and Utopia, p. 186. 
Essars on the Sociology of Culture, p. 190. The essay from which 
this is taken, "The democratization of culture", is an uneasy 
blend of Christian and Kantian views on the autonomy of the self, 
on the one hand and, on the other, survivals of Regelte doctrine 
of individual consciousness as a vehicle for Absolute Spirit. 
36. ib., p. 55 and p. 71. 
37. Freedom, Power Democratic Plan nom,, p. 180. 
38. "Ideological" in this sense is conservative, and "utopian" is 
radical thought. Ideology and Utopia, p. 36. 
39" Freedom, Power and Democratic Plannina, p. 189. 
40. Popper, K. The Poverty of Historicism. London, Routledge and 
Kagan Paul, 1961 (1957) "Introduction" et pass. The difference 
in perspective and method between Mannheim and Hayek is very ap- 
parent in this comment on the position Hayek adopts in Studies in 
Philosophy, Politics and Economics. London, Routledge and Kagan 
Paul, 1967% "For Hayek functionalism is an extension of Hume and 
Adam Smiths society is a dense, opaque, partly impenetrable web 
informed by the recondite harmonies of the invisible hand. It 
is a system beyond the intentions of individuals lit only by 
highly specialized enclaves of scientific uhdorstanding. These 
are not total explanations of the system leading to comprehensive 
predictions about its course, so much as angled shafts of light 
often highly general in form, which illuminate the limits of our 
knowledge. The self-conscious direction of society, where all 
is understood, either intimately in the phenomenological manner 
or typically in laws, is not only totalitarian in its proposed 
harmonization of essentially disparate individual ends, but also 
scientifically impossible", pp. 341-342; Martin, D. Review 
article, British Journal of Sociology., 19,1968, pp. 334-342. 
41. Mannheim's contribution to the sociology of generation tension 
is particularly significant; n. b. his conception of youth as a 
vitalizing agency in society, whose potential contribution is 
frequently overlooked: "Youth in modern society" in Diagnosis 
of Our Time. See also "The problem of generations" in Essays On 
the Sociology of Knowledge. 
42. Mannheim's juxtaposition (in his essay "The nature of economic 
ambition" in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge) of these two 
types illustrates his reluctance to adopt a model of social 
action which minimized the religious and contemplative elements 
of experience. Thus his thought has marked affinities with 
Platonism and Christianity (and other religions, e. ., Hinduism 
whose "karmas" include both action and renunrtation). 
43. In Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 55 f., Mannheim develops 
an interactive thesis which treats "individual" and "society" as 
dimensions rather than as separate entities. 
44" 
45" 
46. 
47" 
48. 
49" 
ib., p. 47" 
For his criticisms see ib., p. 109 f. I discuss the educational 
difficulties in ch. X, section 5.5, and ch. XII, section 2. 
Freddom, Power and Democratic Planning, p. 188* 
man and Society, p. 110 This outlook is more common in literature 
than in social science. For example, in Moravia's Two Women the 
mother in wartime Italy is likewise "haunted by a sense of crisis" 
as, after long and successful protection, she coos her daughter 
transformed by the brutality of wars there is no protection against 
violence, and saintliness and even survival are to be won only 
through struggle. 
The crisis concept is most fully explored in man and Society; tasks 
of renewal are discussed there and in Diagnosir, of Our Time, and 
Freedom. Power and Democratic Planning. These three works com- 
plete Mannheim's major output. See note 3. 
Man and Society, ch. 1. 
50. I have drawn these factors and determinants of crisis mainly from 
the'three books listed in note 48; Mannheim enumerated factors in 
Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, ch. 1. "Main symptoms of 
the crisis". 
51. Disagreement with the concept of crisis was expressed, for example, 
by M. Ginabergs "Moral bewilderment" (1944), reprinted in his 
On the Diversity of Morals. London, Heinemann, 1956. Ginsberg 
rightly argued that crisis theories give prominence to certain ten- 
"dencies while ignoring others, that they assume causal links between 
movements, and that. they attach undue importance to the analysis of 
documents. However, these are all matters of judgment or, as Mannheim 
might say, o interpretation, and their significance lies not only 
in the factual claims made about them but in the use of the inter- 
pretations rendered for purposes of directed social reform. That is, 
the concept of crisis is itself ideological. This does not mean, 
of courses that there was no objective basis for it, and Mannheim 
made very'effective use of the undeniably serious domestic and 
international problems of Europe in the thirties and forties, in 
supporting hie argument for large-scale planning. 
52. Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 104. 
53. Man and Society, p. 114. 
54. ib. # p.. 292. 
55" Freeda: n, Power and Demooratia Planning, p. 102. Lannheim's thinking 
on this subject was very much in tune with the tenor of the recom- 
mendations for the revitalization of the Public Schools in the Fleming 
Report: The Committee on Public schools. The Public Schools and 
the General Educational System. London, 1I. M. 3 O, 1944- 
56, On Dewey, see ch. X, section 1.2. Cassirer inextricably links con- 
tinuity and recreation in the processes of transmission. Of the 
great works of culture he very perceptively remarked that "their 
content has being for us only by virtue of the fact that they must 
be continually possessed anew and hence continually recreated". 
His comments on language point to the inadequacies of a great dead 
of conventional thought on the processes of transmitting a heritages 
"language exists only by virtue of the fact that it is passed on 
from one generation to the next ... The receiver does not 
take the 
gift as one accepts a stamped coin. For he cannot receive it except 
by using it, and to make use of it is to give it a now stamp. So, 
too, teacher and pupil, parent and child, never speak precisely '`the 
same' language". Cassirer, E. "The tragedy of culture" in The 
Logic of the Humanities, op. cit., pp. 197-198- 
57- The principal sources for tfannheim's elite theory are Man and Society, 
parts I and II and p. 224 f.; Freedom, Power and Democratic PlannlnL, 
chs. 3,4,13; Eseays on the Sociology of Culture, part II and p. 200 f. 
58. Man and Society, p. 82 f" 
59. Freedom. Power and Democratic Planning, p. 93- 
60. Ian and Society, p. 92 f.; Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 200 f. 
61. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, p. 96 f. 
62. Essays On the Sooiolopy ofC Culture, p. 240 f. Mannheim argued that, 
while an efficiency-minded democracy can all too easily discourage 
such experience, the attack upon social distance which democracy 
typically mounts, if successful, creates "a basis for purely existen- 
tial relationships". This he believed to be democracy's "greatest 
potential achievement" (ib., p. 242). There are close similarities 
between Mannheim's criticism of social distance and Dewey's ideas on 
shared experience. A similarity is also apparent in Mannheim's 
ideas on existential space and Dewey's theory of primary experience. 
See ch. X, section 1, and my Introduction to Dewey, op* cit., pp. 13-16. 
63. Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 119. 
64. Williams, R. Culture and Society, op. cit., and The LonR Revolution, 
op* cit. 
65. Mannheim's views on consensus exercised a powerful influence on the later American experimentalists, as we shall see in ch. VIII. 
He recognized that in a modern society social solidarity must be 
realized through conflict and stress. (Essays on the Sociolo of Cul.. 
_. 
tu er P" 194 f. ) He called for a "dynamic consensus" Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, p. 107) but beyond pointing to the need for a critical surveillance of norms, for planning mechanisms dominated by elites, for receptiveness to "impulses coming from below", and for 
the systematic use of communication media, he had surprisingly little 
to say about the most important question fbr a democracy in a 
period of change, namely procedures for achieving widespread 
agreement over worthwhile objectives. What seems to have 
appealed most to the later experimentalists is Mannheim's plea 
for a redefined set of basic norms and values (ib., p. 141 f-)- 
66. Mannheim did envisage the retention of a two-party parliamentary 
system and would retain private ownership of farina, small busi- 
nesses and innovative enterprises. (Preedom. Power and Demo- 
cratic Planning, p. 112 f. ) However, he gave far more prominence 
to the permanent, elite-dominated, and centralized institutions 
engaged in long-term planning and "co-ordination", thus insuring 
effective control by what he hoped would be a culturally unified, 
if institutionally diverse, managerial bureaucracy. Having 
thus centralized social control in powerful institutions, he gave 
education an impossible task when he said that it was "through 
education" that the public should learn to express its wishes and 
aspirations and to insure popular control over planning objectives. (ib., p" 149)" 
67. As with Mannheim's views on parliamentary democracy and central 
planning by'elites, this too is a matter of emphasis. He out- lined "principles of democracy" and the anticipated behavior pat- 
terns of the "new democratic man", respectively in Essays on the 
Sociology of Culture, p. 176 f. and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, ch. 8 "The pattern of democratic behaviour". 
68. The functional-substantive distinction is discussed in Ilan and Society, 
p. 58 f.; for the concept of youth as marginal outsiders, capable, if properly organized, of revitalizing society, see Diagnosis of Our Time, 3, "The problem of youth in modern society". 
69. Popper, K. The Poverty of Historicism, "Introduction", 
70. Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 172. 
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Chanter VIII 
1. Confusion over the nature of actual and desirable relationships 
between politics and education in different situations can easily 
lead to exaggerated generalization, e. g., "It is an accepted fact 
that education is a creature of polity, and in a sense, a poli- 
tical phenomenon". El-Ghannai, Mohammed A. Politics in Edu- 
cational Planning. Paria, Unesco, International Institute for 
Educational Planning, 1970. Occasional paper, no. 19, p. 18. 
The authority of Aristotle notwithstanding, it is not an accepted 
fact that education is a "creature of polity"; rather, the facts 
of the relationship of education to politics are extremely complex 
and various. In any case, to elide from the so-called facts, as 
Fl-Ghannam does, into the argument that it is the function of the 
educational planner to translate the politician's vision of an 
ideal future into reality is to beg the question of the role of 
education as a clarifier and critic of "visions". This question 
is begged as a matter of course in authoritarian and totalitarian 
systems. It is a condition of the survival of freedom of thought 
and discussion in democracies that the question is kept open, 
through at least some schools and other educational institutions 
sustaining a critical stance towards political end3, whatever 
their source. This argument, no less than E1-Ghannam's, recog- 
nizes that education is a political phenomenon, but it refuses 
to acknowledge that a socio-cultural system should be conceived 
as an Aristotelian pyramid, with the polity at the apex, and 
determining the ends of all other spheres of thought and action. 
One consequence of this latter model of political dominance is 
Lynsenko's biology. 
2. Brameld, T. Education for the Pnerging Axe. New York, Harper 
and Row, 1965, p. 15- 
3. Brameld, T. Cultural Foundations of Education - an Interdisciplinary Exploration, op, cit. Braneld's substantive studies of culture in- 
clude The Remaking of a Culture - Lite and Education in Puerto Rico. 
New York, Harper, 1959, and la-Pan e. Education and Change in Two 
Communities. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. Brameld 
does make some use, particularly in his study of Puerto Rico, of the 
analytic frcnework he outlined in Cultural Foundations of Education. 
4. Brtuaeld, T. Education for the Enertdi. ng AE-e, pp. xi_, 33-34" Brameld 
postulated universal changes "Change is a ubiquitous fact of rr 1nd 
all culture. " Cultural Foundations of Education, p. 125" In Ch. 
VIII I discussed Brameld's analysis of the concepts of cultural 
5" 
process - including "crisis" which he alleges experts agree about, 
although he was not able to cite much evidence of their agreement. 
Brameld, T. Patterns of Educational Philosorhv. New York, World 
Book Co., 1950, p. 59- 
6. ib., ehe. 3 and 4. 
7. Education for the . merging Age, p. 1. 
8. ib., Prelude and ch. 17. Brameld recognized the strength of likely 
conservative opposition from within the education profession (ohs. 
5 and 6). But he tended to dismiss the arguments of "conservatives" 
like Conant and others, instead of assessing them. 
9. See Roszak, T. (ed. ). The Dissenting Academy, op, cit., for a set 
of proposals on each of these topics, and Brumeld, T. The Climactic 
Decades. Mandate to Education. New York, Praeger, 1970, for 
Brsmeld'a sympathy with the increase in student radicalism. 
10. Education for the E. merRing Awe, pp. 11-12. 
11. ib., p. 80 f. The "buttresses" inoluded, in addition to an "adequate 
theory of social forces" theories of human nature, the state and 
government, and normative commitment, Srameld'e own views on 
these topics were very sketchy; what emerges is essentially the 
democratic ideolocy of the thirties, but with a more internationalist 
flavor. 
12, To illustrate the difference between appeals for "buttresses" and 
the systematic deployment of a theory of resistance to change, see 
Gross, N., Giaoquinta, J. B. and Bernstein, M. An Attempt to Imple- 
ment a Major Educational Innovations a Sociological In ui . 
Cambridge (Mass*), Harvard University, 1968 (mimeo )o Gross and 
his associates noted the paucity of sound theoretical constructs 
for analysing the ineffectiveness of institutional change in educa- 
tion, but in the course of their study built up a model to account 
for this ineffectiveness. 
13. I touch upon some of these in their relation to curriculum change 
in "Changing the curriculums forces and strategies" in Walton, J. (ed. ) Innovation in Education. Oxford, Pergamon (forthcoming). 
On achievement motivation, see McClelland, D. C. "Changing values for prcpss" in Burns, W, H, (ed. ) Education and the Development of Nations, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 19631 and McClelland, D. C. and Winter, D. G. Motivating Economic Achievement. New York, 
The Free Press, 1969. 
14" Frank, L. "Culture and personality - the psycho-cultural approach to a democratic social order" in Hook, S. (ed. ). John Dewey, 
Philosopher of Science and Freedom. New York, The Dial Press, 1950- 
15- Rickman, H. P. (ed. ). Pattern and Ueaning in History-s W. Dilthey's 
Thou. }hts on History and Society. London, Allen and Unwin, 1961. This comparison is particularly apt in view of Dilthey's analysis of volition and feeling in the culture sciences. See also Frank's Feelintrs and Emotions. New York, Doubleday, 1954, a brief but important counterbalance to the rationalistic excesses of most 8f the American experimentalists. 
16. Raup, R. B., Axtelle, ß. E., Benno, K., and Smith, B. O. The Improvement 
of Practical Intelligence. New York, Harper, 1949 (1943 ; Stanley, W. O. Eduoation and Social integration. New York, Teachers College, 
Columbia University, Bureau of Publications, 19531 Smith, B. 0., 
Stanley, W. O. and Shores, J. B. F'undame tale of Curriculum-Development. 
New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1957 revo ed., (1950)o 
17. Raup, R. B., et al, op. Cit., pp. 100-101. 
18. Stanley, W. O., Op, cit., p. 31. 
19. ib. and oh. 3 "Evidence of cultural crisis". 
20. Like }annheim and the later, experimentalista, Leavis and Thompson 
were deeply perturbed by the disappearance of an "organic com- 
munity". The disappearance signified "a vast and terrifying 
disintegration". Leavis, F. R. and Thompson, D. Culture and 
Environment. London, Chatto and Windus, 1950 (1933, p. 87" 
Furthermore, the complete disappearance of the past meant an 
irretrievable loss, a point with which the reconstruotionists' 
agreed, even if they did not attach quite so much importance as 
did Leavis and Thompson to memory: "the memory of the old order 
must be the chief incitement towards a new, if over we are to 
have one. If we forget the old order we shall not know that kind 
of thing standard? ] to strive towards, and in the and tusre will 
be no striving, ' but a surrender to the "progress' of the machine", 
ib., p. 97" 
21, Stanley, W. Q. Education and Social Integration, p. 58 f- 
22, ib., p. 117. Stanley did not want a complete integration of society 
in the sense of an all pervading uniformity of norms and aspirations. 
He followed-Linton in separating a common core of values from other 
types of social activity, in which variability end diversity would 
be practised. 
23. Smith, B. Q. j et fI. Pind m ntals of Curriculum Development, p. 4. 
24. Adams, J. The Herbartian PsycholoýApplied to Education... Boston, 
D. C. Heath, 1697, ch. III "The Herbartian paycholoig"; Uorrison, 
H. C. The Curriculum of the Common School. University of Chicago 
Press, 1940. 
25. Smith, B, 0. -, et al., op. cit., P" 578- 
26. ib., p. 58. For Parsons' view that "a change in the structure of 
a social system is a change in its normative culture" see "An outline 
of the social system" in Parsons, T., et al., Theories of Society, 
, op* cit., P" 
73. 
27. Smith, B. O., et al., p. 88- 
28* Brameld, T. "Philosophical anthropology: the educational significance 
of Ernst Casairer". Harvard Educational Review, 26,1956, pp. 207-232, 
reprinted as an appendix in Cultural Foundations of Educatibn, ope cit. 
See also Patterns of Educational Philoaorhy where, in discussing 
Mannheim's distinction between ideology and utopia, Brameld affirmed 
the "twofold obligation" of reconstructionista to analyse the methods 
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and meanings of ideology as "a major device for retarding and 
blocking our utopian propensities", and to "build future-looking 
attitudes and cultural objectives together with effective 
strategies for reaching them", (p. 454)- 
29* These issues are discussed in relation to the Illinois curriculum 
programme of the fifties, which involved considerable public par- 
ticipation, in Smith B. O. 9 at al., op, cite, p. 426 f. 
Use of the 
charette technique is much more recent. A case study report of its 
use in a poor area in Baltimore has been prepared by Educational 
Facilities Laboratories, New Yorks Kohn, S. D. Experiment in 
Planning an Urban High School. The Baltimore Charette. New York, 
Educational Facilities Laboratories, 1969. Information on other 
oharette activities is available from the U. S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, Facilities Department. 
30. Brameld, T. Patterns of Educ Educational PhilosoLby 
31. Coulton, G. G. Medieval Panorama, vol. 1. london, Collins, 1961 
(1938), p. 38. (Coulton is paraphrasing Tacitus on "the old 
Germanic principle ... of compulsory unanimity"). 
32. Raup, R. B., et al., op. cit., p. 40. 
33. ib., ch. 6. "The robs of character and community in judgments of 
practice". 
34" Practical judgment was not unreservedly welcomed by all of the 
older experimentalists. See Childs' searching critique in 
American Pragmatism and Education, op. cit., p. 298 f. The 
engineering aspects of the doctrine have been very interestingly 
developed, in terns of curriculum change and organizational theory, 
by Bennoz Benno, K. D. _ and 2Luntyan, B. 
(ode. ). Human Relations 
and Curriculum Change ... New York, Dryden Press, 1951, and Bennie, A. G., 33enne, K. D. and Chin, R. (eds. ) The Planning of Change. New 
York, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1961. The latter is in effect the 
second edition of the former. It is significant that in the third 
edition of this work, (1969), decreased emphasis is given to the 
democratic ideology, with a corresponding increase in supposed value 
free, behavioristic, organizational theory. It is just this emphasis 
which reveals the danger, that important areas of public decision 
taking will be reduced to matters of technical efficiency. Con- 
cession is made to normative issues by categorizing them as "quali- 
tative inputs". 
35" "The great conflict facing the world today is between those who be- 
lieve change must be imposed by force and coercion - the authori- tarian program - and those who believe that a free social order 
can change through education and persuasion, exhibiting the capacity 
for self-repair and self-regulation which is the basic conviction 
of a democratic society. " "Fragmentation in the helping profes- 
sions" Bennis, 1Y. ß., at ei., op. cit. (1962 ed. ), P. 46. See also Feelings and Emotions, op. cit., pp. 37-38- 
36. Frank, L. K. The School as Agent for Cultural Renewal. Cambridge 
(Maas. ), Harvard University Press, 1959. However, in Feelings 
and Emotions, the tensions which Frank perceives to be the most 
serious for society are ultimately those within the human per- 
sonality. 
37. Braneld, T. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, pp. 426-427. 
38. Braneld, T. Education for the Emerging Age, p, 83. 
39. Mead, M. "The future as a basis for establishing a shared culture". 
Daedalus, 94,1. Reprinted in Bennis, W. G., Benne, K. 3)o and 
Chin, R. (ede. ). The Planning of Change, New York, Holt, Rinehart 
and Windton, 1969. 'See also lead, U. Growing Up in New Guinea. 
Harmondsworth (Middlesex), Penguin Books, 1942, oh. XVI "The child's 
dependence upon tradition". 
40- 
41- 
42. 
Stanley, W. O. Education and Social Integration, p. 34" 
Stanley, W. O. Educatioand-Social Integrations p. 138 f. For 
recent evidence of the impact of Mannheim on Stanley's thought, see 
Stanley, W. O. and Holtzmann, E. H. "Perspectivism and unity$ Karl 
Mannheim". Educational Theory,, 19,3, Summer 1969. 
Stanley, W. O. Education and ocialInteation, p. 35" See also 
the defence of the reconstructionist approach in education in Smith, 
B. O., et al., op. cit. "The reconstruction theory represents the 
only definition of the social function of education which, in a 
period of social crisis and transition such as the present, offers 
any hope whatever that education may play a significant role in 
the uncoerced resolution of social conflicts and problems. And 
if it is true, ... that education is the only alternative to 
force, then it would appear that the public must espouse the educational 
adventure implied by this position - or else abandon the attempt to 
re-establish consensus through reasoned discussion and consent rather 
than through civil strife and dictatorship", (p. 575)" 
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Chapter IX 
1. Ausubel has recently brought the two approaches together; "one 
cannot simply soak up one's culture like a piece of blotting paper 
and expect it to be meaningful. But who advocates doing anything 
of the kind? The very processes of perception and coition 
necessarily require that the cultural stimulus world must first 
be filtered through each individual's personal sensory apparatus 
and cognitive structure before it can have any meaning. Meaning 
can never be anything more than a , personal phenomenological 
product 
that emerges when potentially meaningful ideas are integrated within 
an individually unique cognitive structure. Invariably, there- 
fore, the achievement of meaning requires translation into a per- 
sonal frame of reference, and reconciliation with established con- 
cepts and propositions. " Ausubel, D. P. l. ducutional Pe c cholO12,. 
a Cognitive View. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, 
p. 475. 
2. "On surveying the sum total of Socialist and Communist literature ... 
and comparing the infinitely slight results of the last period with 
the earlier days$ one can hardly mistake the fact that as theories 
Socialism and Communism have already run their course ... One is 
no longer wrong in regarding the Socialist and Communist theories 
as a closed chapter ... the age ... of theoretical elaboration .. 0 
having come to an end. " (Lorenz von stein, in 1847. Quoted by 
Talmon, J. L. Political Messianism. The Romantic Phase. London, 
Seeker and Warburg, 1960, p. 506. 
3. Aron, R. "On totalitarianism" in Democracy and Totalitarianism. 
London, Weidenfeld and Nicoloon, 1968 1965), pp. 193-194" 
4. Hog, art, R. S eaki c to Each Other, opo cit., vol. 1# "Culture 
dead and alive" '(1961). 
5" The classical and Christian forms of change theory are examined by$ 
Baker, H. The Image of Man. New York, Harper, 1961 (1947); 
Bury, J. B. , The Idea of Progr_; Finley, M. I. 'myth, memory and 
history". Hi tors and Theory, 4,1964-1965t pp. 279-303; and 
Nisbet, R., Social Chan4e and History. (Cp. Finley's argument 
that the Greeks were hostile to notions of change with Nisbet's 
and Bury's claim that the theory of development originates in 
classical thought. ) On modern approaches to the concept of 
universal social change, see Moore, W. E. and Cook, R. b1. (eds. ) 
Readings onolal Chýe. Englewood Cliffs (N. J. ), Prentice-Hall, 
1967, and Nisbet, R. A., op. cit. Recent arguments about the rate 
and extent of change and the degree of inter-relationship between 
science and technology mrq be contrasted with the too confident 
affirmations of the earlier reconstructioniats. Sees Dovring, F. 
"The principle of acceleration, a non-dialectical theory of progress. " 
Comparative Studies in Society and Histr ory, XI, 1969, pp. 413-425 (ac- 
celerating change is a principle at work since man's first conquest 
of'fire; population increases account for increased rates of change); 
Kuhn, T. S. "Comment" (on Dovring), ib., p. 428 (factors promoting 
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6. 
the development of science don't necessarily promote the development 
of technology); Weinberg, I. "The problem of the convergence of 
industrial sooietioss a critical look at the state of a theory", 
ib., pp. 1-15 (challenges Marxist technological determinism and 
uncritical acceptance of "total transformation"; queries conver- 
gence theory). 
The successive eliminations from the time of Locke onwards, of 
theoretical obstacles to perfeetibilism are discussed by Passmore, 
op. cit., p. 169 f., p. 192 f., p. 202 f. See also Talmon, J. L., 
op. cit., pP. 15-31,505-518 and his earlier volume, The Origins 
of Totalitarian Democracy. London, Seeker and Warburg, 1952, 
pp. 1-13,249-255, for an overview of tho ideological treatment 
of scientific-democratic themes in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Reconstructionism, partly through the 
influence of Comte on Dewey, was considerably influenced by this 
background. The contrast between (a reounstruotionist) belief in 
the possibility of progress and belief in the inevitability of 
decay is brought out in the following passages* 
1. "Perfectibility as applied to human nature means poten- 
tiality for cultural development under adequate historical con- 
ditions. Cultural evolution may be understood as the unfolding 
or activating of the potentialities of human nature through a 
process of self-conditioning and education in relation to a given 
environment. Cultural evolution is possible because man is 
capable of acquiring in time new actual psychocultural powers and 
abilities by means of the processes of education, social condition- 
ing, and individual creative efforts. This unique type of cultural 
perfectibility also explains the possibility of cultural continuity 
and discontinuity, and, hence, of progress. Cultural patterns are 
not only repeated but improved upon and surpassed by later genera- 
tions ... cultural evolution and cultural progress are direct con- 
sequences of human efforts in self-cultivation of the natural 
environment. " Bidney, D., Theoretical Anthropology, op. cit., 
p. 62. 
2. "Is it surprising that the people could see their fate and 
that of the world only as an endless succession of evils? Bad 
government, exactions, the cupidity and violence of the great, 
wars and brigandage, scarcity, misery, and pestilence - to this is contemporary history nearly reduced in the eyes of the people. 
The feeling of general insecurity which was caused by the chronic 
form wars were apt to take, by the constant menace of the dangerous 
classes, by the mistrust of justice, was further aggravated by the 
obsession of the coming end of the world, and by the fear of hell, 
of sorcerers, and of devils. " Huizinga, J. The waning of the 
Middle Ages. (A study of the forms of life, thought and art in 
France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth centuries. ) 
London, Arnold, 1924, p. 21 (see also ch. II "Pessimism and the 
ideal of the sublime life" for evidence of the effect of Christian 
renunciation doctrines on reformist thought. ) 
The portent of impending cultural disorder,, in the writings of 
Wells, Mannheim, and Brameld, may be seen as an infusion of the 
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spirit of mediaeval pessimists into the cultural theory whose 
outlines Bidney sketched. 
7. On technological and other change theories sees Cohen, P. S., 
Modern Social Theo l op* cit., ch. 7 "Explaining social change"; 
Eisenstadt, S. N. ed. ) Readings in Social Evolution and Develo - 
m St. Oxford, Pergamon, 1970 (especially papers by Ginsberg, 
Schaff, Moore, Books and Eisenstadt); Krausz, E. Sociol0in 
Britain, a Survey of Research. London, Bateford, 1969, p. 176 f. 
8. See Aron, R. The Industrial Socinty, op. cit., part I; Ginsberg, E. 
(od. ) Te chnolo and -Social Cha ve. New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1964, (especially papers by Bell, Baker and Fabricant); 
Hoselitz, B. F. and Moore, W. E. (ode. ) Industrialization and Societ . 
Paris, Unesco, 1963 (especially concluding summary). 
9. Carritt, E. F., op. cit., p. 159- 
10, The . uritan notion of "Christian Calling" illustrates the combina- 
tion of divine control of history and human notion in the world. 
See John Cotton's essay of that title in Miller, P. (ad. ) The 
Amwrioan Puritans. Garden City, New York, Doubledaj, 1956, pp. 
172-182; also, Miller's discussion of the covenants of works and 
graces The New Fn,, -, land Mind. The Seventeenth Century. New York, 
)acmillan, 1939, p. 366 f. 
11. Pasternak, Be Dr. Zhiyago (trans. M. Hayward and M. Harari). London, 
Collins-Fontana, 1961, p. 332. Compare the "new man" ideology of 
the film, "The Legend of Maxim Gorki's Youth", based on the auto- 
biography of the early hero of the Soviet revolution. Erikson com- 
ments on this films "It is clear that what we are watching in this 
picture is the emergence of a new frame of mind, a frame of mind 
which to us is primarily characterized by its omissions. What is 
omitted, again and again, is action based on a sense of guilt. Thus neither remorse nor reform seems to count in this new frame of 
mind. What counts is critical patience, incorruptible avoidance, 
and absolute intolerance of wrong action, clear inner direction, and 
then - action. " Erikson, B. H. Childhood and Society. New York, 
W. W. Norton, 1950, pp. 338. 
In this reading of the character of Alyosha (Gorki) Erikson 
identifies one of the basio motifs of the film, but there is also 
the character of the grandmother - mother Russia in symbolic terms - 
whom Alyosha is admonished by the anarchist lodger to heed, with 
the advice "-J'vil commands he would not heeds behind another's con- 
science he would not hide". Old Russia, and her conscience, are 
not entirely supplanted by the new, remorseless hero. The latter 
point, which Erikson touches on but does not develop, suggests a 
more complex "new man" than the revolutionary man of steel that 
Erikson depicts. The new is a mixture, of the traditional and 
the modern, an interpretation which is borne out by the Autobiography- 
itself. Mead argues that guilt does play a part in the "new Soviet 
man", in a paper that draws attention to }i rxian failure to develop 
a theory relating character structure to political institutional 
Mead, Margaret, and Callas, Elena "Child-training ideals in a post- 
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revolutionary contexts Soviet Russia" in Head, Margyaret, and 
Wolfenstein, b: artha (ads. ) Childhood in Contemporary Culture. 
University of Chicago Press, 1955. But how important are 
the$e kinds of ideals in modifying character? Following his 
review of a wide range of publications on the Israeli kibbutzim, 
I. Kraft doubted whether any contemporary society is producing a 
"new man". He argued, like Wells, that new human types will 
emerge, if at all, only slowly, and more in the course of sus- 
tained attacks by societies on their larger problems than as a 
consequence of specific child-rearing practices. Kraft, I. 
"A new man in the kibbutz? " Teachers College Record, 68,7, 
April 1967, pp. 588.595. This may be so, but such attacks have 
to be directed by purposes and the importance of works like "The 
Legend of Maxim Gorki's Youth" is, in this reapeot, to suggest 
possibilities. For more recent evidence than Kraft's on the 
attitudes of second generation kibbutzniks, see Group of Young 
Kibbutz Members. The Seventh Day. Soldiers' Talk About the 
Six Day War. (English ad. H. Near). London, Andre Deutsch, 
1970i and Cohen, E. and Rosner, M. "Relations between the g(anera- 
tions in the Israeli kibbutz" in The Midrasha, College of Jewish 
Studies: The Kibbutz as a Wifay of Life in Modern Sooiety. Southfield 
( 
. 
ich. ) , 1970. 
12, Freud, Be The Future of an Illusion. Complete Works, ed. J. Strachey, 
XXI. London, Hiogarth Press, 1961 1927), pp" 54-56. 
13. Iaritain, J. Education at the Crossroads. New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1943, ch. IV "The trials of present-day education". 
14. Oakeshott, M. "The tower of Babel" in Rationalism and . 'olitios, ope 
cit. "The pursuit of perfection as the crow flies" is an enterprise, 
Oakeshott asserts, that is appropriate to individuals, not to societies, 
because its reward lies not in the achievement but in the attempt. 
For society, the penalty of this approach is "a chaos of conflicting 
ideals, the disruption of a common life", (p. 59). It is not at all 
clear that, because the reward lies in the attempt, only individuals 
and not societies should seek amelioration. Oakeshott's reference 
to the disruption of the com: z. on life overlooks the fact that dis- 
ruption has occurred and the argument that to restore a common life 
concerted action is required. 
15. Parsons, T. The Structure of Social Action, op. cit., vol, It p. 463. 
16. Durkheim, E. The Rules of Sociological Method, op. cit., p. 5- 
17- For Marx's thought I have used Feuer, L. S. (ed. ) Marx andEngeles 
Basic Writings, and the following commentaries: Addis, L. "The indi- 
vidual and the Marxist philosophy of history", Philoso lyr of Science, 
33t 1966, pp. 101-117, reprinted in Brodbeak, May ed. op. Cite t pp. 517-535; Aiken, U. D. (intro. and ed. ) The A` of IdeolagL. New York, Mentors 1956; Berlin, I. Karl London, Oxford University 
Press, 1963(3rd ed. ); Delfgaauw, B. The Young rx. London, Sheed 
and Ward, 1967; Lichtheim, G. Marxism. An Historical and Critical 
Study. London, Routledge and Kogan Paul, 1961; Popper, K. The Open 
Society and its Enemies, op. cit., vol. II. For recent revisions 
of Marxist determinism in the direction of ideational initiatives 
for change, see. Schaff, A. "The Marxist theory of social develop- 
ment" in Eisenstadt, S. N. (ed. ), Readings in Social Evolution and 
Development; and Marek, F. Philosophy of World Revolution. 
18. Inconsistences in and developments of Marx's thought provide sym- 
pathetic interpreters with sufficient material for other readings. 
For example, Addis' attempt to convert sub-structural determinism 
into "total social' intera. ctionism", art. cit., p. 332, and Marek's 
use of Marx's famous argument (Preface, vol. I of Capital) that we 
may shorten the birth pangs'of the new society by jetting into line 
with the laws of motion of history. however, Marek found it neces- 
sary to revise Marxism to the extent of affirming that the laws of 
history and the development Of society are the result of human wills, 
consciousness, and activity, op. cit., pp. 43-44. Thin modification 
so far "reconstructs" Marxism as to make some of its major claims 
indistinguishable from the socialist reformism Marx and Engels 
denounced. 
19. See ch. XI, seotion 2.3.2. 
20. Berlin, I., op. oit. 
21, See Benno, K. D. and buntyan, B. (eds. ), human Relations and Curriculum 
Change; and Bennie. W. G., at al, (eds. ), The Plannin ; of Chaange. 
22. Jones, G. N. Planned Organizational Change. London, Routledge and 
Kogan Paul, 1968. See also any paper in ': ialton, J. (ed. ), Innovation 
ih ! "Muoation. I discuss the theory of practical judgnent below, 
in chs. X, section 5.6, and XII, section 4- 
23. Rogers, E. I. IThe Diffusion of Innovations. New York, The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1962. See also Sklair, L., op, oit., p. 94 f. 
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Chanter X 
1" 
a. 
3" 
4" 
5" 
Kilpatrick, ''J. H. Philosophy of Education, op* oit., p. 120. 
This is the implicit theme of the four chapters in Domocra and 
Education ig which Dewey outlines the reconstructioniot theory 
(chs. VI-IX). See also his papers "Lducation for a changing 
social order" in National Education Association* Addresses and 
Proceedina; s, Washington, D. C., 1934, PP. 744-752, and " ducation 
and social change". The Social Frontier, III9 May 1937, PP- 
235-238- On embryonic communities see Dewey, J. and Dewey, 
L'veljn. Schools of To-morrow. New York, Dutton, 1915, passim. 
See my Introduction to Dewey, op. cit., sections 4 and 59 and chapter 
VI, suctions 1.1 and 2.3 of the present work. I shall not repeat 
the references to Dewey's theory of experience that I used in those 
sections. 
Dewey argued for the educational importance of pre-defined subject 
matter in his early essay, The Child and the Curriculum. University 
of Chicago Press, 1902. He was frequently misunderstood or mis- 
interpreted on this point, even by his disciple Kilpatrick, whose 
The Foundations of Method (New York, Macmillan, 1929) and "The pro- 
ject method" (Teachers College Record, XIX, 1918, reissued by 
Teachers College Press, 1921), minimize the significance of subject 
matter prepared in advance of teaching. For Dewey's later comments 
on the abandonment of pre-arranged learning structures, see his 
Pro;, ressive Education and the Science of Education. t'iashington 
(D. C. ), Progressive Education Association, 1928, and Experience and 
Education. New York, Macmillan, 1938. 
The blementary School R oord, op. cit., and Democracy and Educ ationy 
op. cit., chs. V and IX. 
6. ib., ch. IV; The School and Society, op. cit., ch. V. 
7. Bode, B. H. Pvogregsive Education at the Crossroads, op. cit., ch. V 
"lducation as growth". See also Archambault, i. D. (ed. ) Dewey on 
Educations Appraisals. New York, Random House, 1966, especially 
essays by Archambault, Hook and Scheffler. 
8. For his Herbartian phase, see Dewey's early papers to the National 
Herbart Society (forerunner of the National Society for the Study 
of Education): "Interest as related to the training of the will". 
Second Supplement to the Herbart Yearbook for 1895. Bloomington, 
(I11. ), 1896 (revises wiu republished, 1899); and "Ethical prin- 
ciples underlying education". National Herbart Society. Third 
Yearbook. Chicago, 1897 (revised and reissued as coral Principles 
in Education. Boston, Houghton ? Mifflin, 1909); also, "The reflex 
arc concept in psychology". Contributions to Philosophy, 1,1, 
1696. University of Chicago. 
9. Critics who have made this point include Broudy, H. S. ("Dewey's analysis 
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10. 
11. 
12. 
of the act of thought" in Clayton, A. S. (ed. ) John Dewey in 
Perspective. Bulletin of the School of Education, University 
of Indiana, 36,1, Jan. 1960. Bloomington, Indiana); Bruner, 
J. 9. "After John Dewey, what? " in Arohambault, R. D. (ed. ), 
op. cit.; and Hirst, P. il. "The logical and psychological as- 
pects of teaching a subject" in Peters, R. S. (ed. ), op* cit. 
These and other patterns of eubjeot-matter organization are exa- 
mined in Smith, B. O., Stanley, N. O. 9 and Shores, J. H., Fundamentals 
of Curriculum Development, op., cit., pt. 3, "PatLorns of curriculum 
organization". 
Two prominent English educational critics are Bantock, G. H. 
(Education in an Industrial Society, op. cit., oh. 2 "John Dewey 
on education") and Walsh, Vii. The Use of Ima i nation. London, 
Chatto and Jindus, 1959, p. 192. These critics have been con- 
siderably influenced by the views of Santayana (Santayana, G. 
"Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics" in Schilpp. P. A. (ed. ). The 
ihilosophy of John Dewey, op. cit., pp. 245-261). For a more sym- 
pathetic appraisal of this and other issues, togeth©r with a eye- 
tematie attempt to reconstruct experimentalism, see Berkson, I. B. 
The Ideal and the Community. New York, Harper, 1959, passim. 
Exi, erience and Nature, op. cit., p. 78 f; 232 ft Reconstruction 
iniyhilosonhyyy oh. 4 "Changed conceptions of experience and reason". 
13. Stanley, 'ßy. 0. Education and Social IntejTation, p. 21. 
14. In experimentalist thought, the confusion of education with encul- 
turation stems from the first two chapters of Democracy and Education 
where Dewey fails to distinguish adequately between socially funo- 
tional processes of individual formation and the qualitative cri- 
teria of education. In his later writings, and indeed in subsequent 
chapters of Democracy and Education, he made a clearer distinction 
between these two. See, for example, "Democracy and education in 
the world today" (1935) in Problems of Men, op. cit. 
15. Brameld, T. Education for the erging Age, op. cit., p. 7- 
16. ib., p. 64. 
17. ib. 9 p. 107. 
18. ib., p. 115. 
19. Smith, B. O. 9 Stanley, '+7.09 and Shores, J. H., O. cit., n. 1; Stanley, 
V'ß. 0., op* cit., p. 22. 
20. Note the warmth of Sidney Webb's hostility to those class distinctions 
which are expressed in occupational differences of status and privi- leges "I want no class of hewers of wood and drawers of water; no 
class destined to remain there and forbidden from rising .., because 
we do not provide for it. I cannot believe that we are only to pro- 
vide the means of instruction for a certain limited number of people 
who we think will rise, while the rest are to toil for our convenience. 
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21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
For our convenience) Who is to hew? Who is to deliver our bread? 
Our convenience! Our comfort. Our comfort is to stand in the way 
of enabling those people, our fellow citizens, to attain anything 
better than being mere hewers of wood and drawers of water. " 
Quoted in Cole, Margaret j Beatrice Webb, 1858-1943. 
London, Longmans , 
Green, 1945, p. 46 fn. (According to Lary Hamilton, Sidnel and 
Beatrice Webb, op. cit., p. 120, these remarks are from an address 
to the Association of Technical institutes, 1909. ) 
Counts, G. S. Dare the School Build Q Now Social Order?, p. 20. 
Counts vacillated between demanding that the schools firmly eornniit 
tuierselves to a modernized version of the "American dream" and 
'osin;; a more critical role for them. However, he was in no doubt 
that even the criticism should be directed by definite criteria and 
these criteria, as he outlined them, form the basis of a socialist 
prozramme of socio-political action. The controversy in the columns 
of The Social Frontier is discussed by Bowers, C. A., op. cit., chs. 
3 and 4. 
Bode, B. H. Progressive Education at the Crossroads, op. cit., ch. 7; 
Democracy as a Way-of Life, op. cit., p. 77 f. Bode, however, op- 
posed the editorial policy of The Social Frontiers Bowers, C. A., op* 
cit., che. 3 and 4. He was dissatisfied with the lack of direction 
and of concreteness in Dewey's proposals, but no more satisfied when 
Counts proposed a more definite reconstruotioniet role for the school. 
Bode, in faot, was less precise in his treatment of the problem of 
defining objectives than any other experimentalist. The following 
is typicals "yith regard to curriculum construction L. iemoeraoyi 
requires, first of all, a type of education that enables the indivi- 
dual not only to adapt himself to the existin4; social order, but to 
take part in its remaking in the interests of a greater freedom. " (hiodern Educational Theories, op, cit., pp. 19-20.; However, this 
passage, and similar ones in the writings of Counts, ttu66, Kilpatrick 
and Dewey are a sufficient rebuttal of the claim that the reeon- 
structioniet thinking of the thirties had no significKnt antecedents 
in the twenties; op. Graham, Patricia, A., Proi; re. 3sive Educations 
from Arcady to Aoademe, op. cit., pp. 65-66. 
Not only the militant democrats held this view. Both Dewey and 
Kilpatrick shared it. Kilpatrick's argument, that the "concomitant" 
or unintended "atmospheric" learnings are more significant than many 
of the formal learning: of the curriculum, is one example; Dewey's 
argument, that the practice of the principles of probre:. sive education 
in teacher education would carry more conviction than courses of study 
taught by formal means, is another: Kilpatrick, 't.. il. The Foundations 
of Method, op. cit., ch. VIII9 "The wider problem of method"; Dewey, J. 
"Introduction" to Clapp, Elsie R. The Use of ieataurces in Education. 
New York, Harper, 1952. 
For recent analyses of stronger and weaker forms of indoctrination 
in education, see White, J. P. "Indoctrination" in Peters, i. S. (ed. ) 
The Concept of Education, op. cit., pp. 177-191; Gregory, I. M. L1. and 
goods, R. G. "Indoctrination" and White, S. "Reply" in The Philosophy 
of Education Society of Great Britain. Proceedings of the Annual 
Conference, Jan. 1970, Pp. 77-120. 
I 
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25. Whether Dewey committed the "naturalistic fallacy" is difficult 
to ascertain from his ambiguous statements on the role of know- 
ledge in moral judgments; but op. Human Nature and Conduct, 
opv cit., pp. 11-12; and "Theory of valuation". International 
Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, II9 4, University of Chicago 
Press, 1939, and "Logical conditions of a scientific treatment 
of morality" in Problems of hen, pp. 214-215. He would agree 
with Nowell-Smith about the practical usefulness of empirical 
knowledge in making moral choicest Nowell-; i; aith, ?. ti. Ethics. 
Harmondsworth (Middlesex), Penguin Books, 1954, PP. 181-162. 
26. But op. note 12. 
27. 
28. 
See chs. XI, section 2.2, and : III9 section 3. 
Sources of the Webb concept of education are scattered: Webb, 
Beatrice, Our Partnership; Webb, S. The Education muddle and 
the `'i(ay Out; London Education; "Twentieth century politics" in 
The Beis and Policy of Socialism; Webb, S. and B. The Preyen- 
tion of Destitutiont A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth 
of Great Britain; The Decay of Capitalist Civilization; `Nebb, S. 
and freeman, A. Great Britain After the War. London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1916. The followinc Fabian Tracts, together with the pre- 
vious references, provide a comprehensive overview of the Fabian 
position (to 1940): Webb, S. Questions for School Board CandidateR, 
Tract 25,1891; Webb, S. A Labour Policy for t, ublie Authoritie3, 
Tract 37,1891; Martin, J. Q;. State ; education at Home and Abroad, 
Tract 52,1894; Shaw, G. H. Report on Fabian Policy, Tract 70,1896; 
, ähaw, G. B. Socialism for Millionaires, Tract 107,1901; V1ebb, S. 
The Ilducation Act , __1902t 
How to slake the Best of It, Tract 114 r 1903; 
rebu, S. The London Education Act. 1903, How to Make the Best of It, 
Tract 117,1904; Bland, H. Socialism and Labour 3olicy, Tract 
127, 
1906; Dale, Mrs. Hylton. Child Labour Under Capitalis, Tract 140, 
1908; Mrs. Townsend The Case for School Nurseries, Tract 145,1909; 
Hutchins, Miss B. L. What a Health Committee Can Do, Tract 148,1909; 
Guest, L. H. The Case for School Clinics, Tract 154,1911; The Edu- 
cation Group. Vdhat an Education Committee Can Do (Elementary Schoolsj, 
Tract 156,1911; Webb, S. The Teacher in Politics, Tract 187,1919; 
Drake, Barbara. Some Problems of Education, Tract 1969 1922; Dawson, 
Lilian A. Co-operative Education, Tract 205,1923; Samuela, H. Edu- 
cation Committees, Tract 225,1928; Drake, Barbara. starvation in 
the ? Midst of Plenty, Tract 240,1933. 
29. Wells wrote several books and articles specifically on education, but 
this review of his ideas on educational processes is based on the 
whole body of his work, to which I referred in detail in ch. V. 
30. Scientific humanism, for Wella, involved an intermixture of literary, 
aesthetic and historical thought with the natural sciences. World 
Brain, p. x. 
31. Wells, H. G. First and Last Things, p. 291. wells saw education as 
a necessary prior condition of socialism: New Worlds for Old, p. 116. 
It is obvious that Wells was thinking of socialism as itself a form 
of the educated life, a very different concept from political and 
administrative socialism. 
32. As with Wells, in this discussion of Russell's educational views, 
I have used the whole range of those of his works which I drew 
upon in ch. V, with the addition of his volume, On Education. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1926. 
33" 
34" 
35" 
Peters, R. S. "What is an educational process? ", art. cit., p. 20. 
ib., p. 22. 
His reservations rested on a definition of education which dezaanded 
high standards of cognitive performance, or at least a progression 
towards them in the management of educational processes. More re- 
cently, he has accepted wider uses of the term "education"$ "Edu- 
cation and the educated man" in The Philosophy of Education Society 
of Great Britain. Proceedings of the Annual Conference, January 
1970, Pp. 5-20. 
36. Peters, R. S. "What is an educational process? ", art. cit., pp. 21-221 
Oakeshott, M. "The voice of poetry in the conversation of mankind" 
in itationalism and Politics, op. cit. See especially pp. 197-2029 
37. There are many similarities on these points between Deweys criticism 
of child-centred pro6ressivism and Peters' criticism of the Plowden 
reports Dewey, J. Experience and Education; Peters, H. S. "'A 
recognizable philosophy of education': a constructive critique" 
in L, etera, R. S. (ed. 
) 
Persoeotiyes or, Plowden. London, Routledge 
and Ker, an Paul, 1969. 
38. Ku669 H. Culture and Education in America (1931), op. cit., p. 230. 
Similar aspirations were expressed in Foundations for American Educa- 
tion (1947), op. cit., and Social Foundations of N: duoation (1955)9 
op* cit. 
39" These culture heroes, the builders of the "American philosophy of 
experience" are (to take only the first rank): Peirce, William James, 
Dewey, Veblen, Vhitman, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, jr. 
40. Clarke's published output was relatively slibht but hibhly influential. 
In addition to the items I referred to in ch. VII9 see "The conflict 
of philosophies" in Clarke, F. (ed. ) A Review of Educational Thoughts 
University of London Press and Evans Bros. , 1936; "'ire search for a 
philosophy of education". Journal of Education, 77,919, Dec. 1945, 
PP- 574-576; Essays in the Politics of Education. Cape Town, Juta 
and Co., 1923; and Freedom in The Educative Society, University of 
London Press, 1948- Unfortunately these esssya do scant justice to 
one of the most thoughtful and influential of twentieth century English 
educationists. Mitchell's appreciative biography shows the relative 
insi6nificance of Clarke's published work in his overall contribution 
to education. His shrewdness is revealed in the (unpublished) mar- 
ginal comments in several of the books now in the Clarke collection 
of the London Institute. For example, in W. ilockin's Human Nature 
and its Remaking. (New Haven LConn. j, Yale University Press, 19235, 
a book which greatly stimulated Clarke, there is the following passages 
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41. 
42. 
43- 
449 
45. 
46. 
47. 
"society needs always to be saved from the besetting vice of its 
Recommenders, that of abstraction" (p. 218). Clarke's terse mar- 
ginal comment is: "Parsons and Professors". Clarke'e concluding 
note on Hocking'e chapter "Ideals and their Reoommenders" is: 
"Recommenders to guard against 'interested' ideals and standards, and 
in their turn to be guarded against as source of abstractions. 
Rough, tumble of the conflict of institutions forcing us to a con- 
crete synthesis is the best safeguard here" (p. 222). 
Clarke, F. Education and Social Change, p. vi-. 
Clarke, F. Freedom in the Educative Society, Conclusion, et pass. 
Clarke always conceived the educative society in terms of a Christian 
consensus, and his thought was strongly influenced by Idealism, not 
only that of Hocking but also Bosanquet's. See Essays in the Politics 
of Education, p. 7 f. This book is significant for its very strong 
social emphasis, which it is sometimes mistakenly assumed Clarke did 
not develop until he read Mannheim. The principal influences in 
Clarke's thought in this respect appear to have been Plato, Bosanquet, 
Durkheim, and Dewey, ib., ohs. 1 and 11. It is interesting that this 
social emphasis should continue to be expressed in the writings of 
the present director of the London Institutes Elvin, L. "The 
positive roles of society and the teacher" in Peters, R. S. (ed. ) 
Perspectives on Plowden. Elvin was also a signatory of the Kothari 
ReUort. 
Kannheim, K. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, op. cit., p. 114. 
Frank, L. K. The School ae went for Cultural Renewal, op* cite 
ib., pp. 3. 
ib., p. 18 f. 
Stanley, 11.0. Education and Social Integration, op. cit., pp. 172-173. 
48. Raup, R. B., Axtelle, G. E., Bennet K. D. and Smith, B. O. 9 op. cit.; Benno, K. D. "Democratic ethics and human engineering". Progressive 
Education, 26,7, Liay, 1949, reprinted in Bennis, WI. G., Bennet K. D. 
and Chin, R. (eds. ), op. cit. (1961). 
49" Braiiold, T. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 523-524" 
50. Stanley, W. O., opo cit., p. 173- 
51- Brameld, T. The Climactic Decades, opo cit., pp. 183-184- 
52. Cassirer, E. The Philosophy of the Englightenment, op. cit., p. 6 f. 
Chapter XI 
1. Note Rugg's editorship of and contributions to the National Society 
for the Study of Education. The Foundations and Techniques of 
Curriculum Construction. Twenty-sixth yearbook, part 1. 
Bloomington (Ill. )q Public School Publishing Co., 1926; Smith, B. O. 9 
Stanley, Y. O. and Shores, J. H.. Fundamentals of Curriculum Develop- 
ment; Broudy, H. S., Smith, B. O. and Burnett, J. R. DemocracY and 
Excellence in American Secondary Education. Chicago, Rand McNally, 
1964. 
2. For examples of this approach, see Iiirst, P. "Liberal education and 
the nature of knowledge" in Archambault, R. (ed. ) Philosophical Ana- 
lysis and Education; and Hirst, P. and Peters, R. S. The Logic of 
Education. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970. The most 
influential modern study of strategies of subject development in 
the school curriculum is Bruner, J. S. The Process of Education. 
Cambridge (Maas. ), Harvard University Press, 1960. 
3. For example, Dewey, J. Experience and Education, op, cit.; Dearden, R. 
The Philosophy of Prima Education. London, Routledge and Kagan 
Paul, 1968; Hirst, P. and Peters, R. S., op* cit., p. 32 f. 
4" Phenix, P. Realms of Meaning, op* oit.; Broudy, H. S. et al., op. cit. 
5. Shapovalenko, S. ß. (ed. ) Po vtechnical Education in the U. S. S. R., 
op. Cites p. 11. 
6. Clayton, A. S. Religion and Schooling. A Comparative Stud_V. 
Waltham (Mass. ), Blaisdell, 1969, pp. 59-60. The task of a Christian 
education, according to Leeson, is, in the Pauline phrase, "to clothe 
the children with Christ": Leeson, Be Christian Education. London, 
Longmans, Green, 1947, P. 118. 
7. Low-Beer, Ann (ed. ) Herbert Spencer, op. cit., "Introduction"; 
Bibby, C. T. H. Huxley. Scientist, Humanist and Educator. London, 
Watts, 1959, ch" 2 "A culture adequate to the age". 
8. Webb, Be and Freeman, A. Great Britain After the War, op. cit., p. 10. 
9. ib., p. 74. Webb and Freeman referred approvingly to the radical 
educational outlook of the former Chief Inspector of the Board of 
Education, Edmond Holmes - What is and What Might Be. This book 
may be contrasted with Webb'splan for the or6anization of educational 
facilities in London; together they comprise a substantial quali- 
tative and quontitative reorientation of educational thinking in the 
early twentieth century. 
10. Webb, S. The Teacher in Politics, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
11. Webb, S. London Education, op. cit., p. 53- 
12. ib. 
13. Webb, S. and Freeman, A., op. cit., ch. XI "Can we obtain a revolu- 
tion in education? "; and Webb, S. and B. The Prevention of Desti- 
tution, op* cit., ch. 2 "How to prevent the destitution that arises 
from sickness"; ch. 4 "How to prevent the destitution arising from 
cht3d neglect". The Webbs were no less percipient in analysing the 
relationship between destitution and education than they were in 
forecasting trends in higher educations "It is clear, though the 
Socialist does not always remember it, that any such reconatruo- 
tion as he desires involves, as a condition, that we should first 
have put an end to the degradation and demoralization in which so 
large a proportion of the wage-earners are, by their destitution, 
enslaved; and that the best hope lies in securing, for the children 
of the whole population, such a standard of health, intelligence, 
and education as will enable them to take their place in the Co- 
operative Commonwealth", The Prevention of Destitution, p. 329. 
The main obstacle, they felt, was not so much lack of money as lack 
of administrative science - hence their interest in developing means 
for social research in tertiary institutions. 
14" Webb, S. London Education, op. cit., ch. III "The organization of 
commercial education", ch. IV "The organization of the polytechnics". 
15. The Webbs' dovotion to administrative reform and their generally off- 
hand treatment of the arts and the humanistic studies have perhaps 
contributed to a conception of the role of loyal and, indeed, national 
government which has identified utilitarian provision as the prin- 
cipal function of public authority. The neglect of the arts by 
the municipalities was severely criticized by W. A. Robson The 
Development of Local Government. London, Allen and Unwin, 19329 
2nd edn., pp. 221-235. ) Robson attributed this neglect to "the 
traditional legal inability of municipal bodies to foster the cul- 
tural services in the past century" (p. 232). Allowing for marked 
improvement* since 1932, this criticism is a reminder that considerably 
more than a combination of a national minimum and utilitarian studies 
are required in education to procure that enrichment of experience 
from which high aspirations proceed. 
16. Principal sources of Wells' curriculum thinking are (ohronologically)s 
Mankind in the Maki"; New Worlds for Old; The New Machiavelli; The 
World Set Free; The Undying Fire; Joan and Peter; The Salvaging of 
Civilization; Experiment in Autobiography; World Brain. 
17. World Brain, pp. 72-73. This scheme has much in common with the 
informational progtamme of general education prepared in detail by 
Rugg and sketched by Brameld. 
18. The Story of a Great Sohoolmagter, rks Atlantic 8dition, vol. XXIV. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1927 
0924)' 
"Oiu üle was not so much 
a public school as a happy and all too brief lapse of a public 
school into education" 1927 Preface). 
19. ib., p. 54. 
20. Bantock, Q. H. "Towards a theory of popular education". Times Edu- 
cational SuUplement, 2912, March 12,1971, p. 4; 2913, March 19,1971, p4" 
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21. Sequel, Mary L. The Curriculum Field. Its Formative Years. New 
York, Teachers College, Columbia University, Teachers College Prees, 
1966. 
22. It is instructive to contrast Bobbitt's job analysis approach to 
defining a socially relevant content in the U. S. A. in the 1920s 
with Pestalozzi's atomistio analysis of sense perception and his 
deduc<tionn of learning experiences therefrom. Sequel, M. L., 
op. cit., p. 67 f; Pestalozzi, H. How Gertrude Teaches Her 
Children ... An Account of the Method trans. Lucy E. Holland 
and Frances C. Turner, ed. E. Cooke). London, Swan. Sonnenschein, 
1900. "The most important means of preventing confusion, inconse- 
quence, and superficiality in human education, rests principally 
on care in making the first sense impression of things most essential 
for us to know, as clear, correct, and comprehensive as possible" 
(p. 159)- 
23e "I believe it is not possible for common popular instruction to advance 
a step, so long as formulas of instruction are not found which make 
the teacher at least in the elementary stages of knowledge, merely 
the mechanical tool of a method, the result of which springs from 
the nature of the formulas and not from the skill of the man who 
uses it. I assert definitely, that a school book is only good when 
an uninstructed schoolmaster can use it at need" (ib., p. 41)" 
There was another side to Pestalozzi's educational thinking - his 
concern for what he called "thinking love" in adult child relation- 
shipst nbhis Letters on Early Education (Pestalozzi to J. P. Greaves). 
London, Sherward, Gilbert Piper, 1827. 
24. Ratich, unfortunately, failed to satisfy his patrons and was at one 
point imprisoned by Prince Ludwig and only released on signing a 
declaration that he "had claimed and promised more than he knew or 
could bring to pass" -a salutary reminder of the proneness of educa- 
tional reformers to overreach themselves! Barnard, H. C. (ed. ) 
Memoirs of Eminent Teachers and Educators ... in Germanys Hartford (Conn. ), Brown and Gross, 1878, p. 322. 
25. Bruner, J. S. The Process of Education, op, cit. It should be added 
that in his later book, Toward a Theory of Instruction. Cambridge Nass* )p The Belknap Press, 1967, Bruner accepted a more responsible 
and creative role for classroom teachers. 
26. Maolurel J. S. Curriculum Innovation in Prabtice. Londony H. äi. S. O. t 1968p p. 10. 
27. These criticisms are to be found in many of Dewey'e works. See, par- 
ticularly, "Ethical principles underlying education", National Kerbart 
Society, Third Yearbook. Chicago, 1897 (revised and reissued as Moral Principles in Education. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1909); 
The School and Society; Progressive Education and the Science of Educattion, and ExpPrienoe and Education. 
28. See the assessment by his disciples: Childs, J. L. American Pragmatism 
and Education, opt cit., ohs. 6-9, and Kilpatrick, W. H. "The contri- 
bution of John Dewey to education" in Sohilpp, P. A. (ed. ) The PhilosooM 
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29. 
30. 
of John Dewey-, op. cit.; and Handlin, 0, John Dewey's-Challenge 
to Education. New York, Harper, 1959" 
Smith, B. O., Stanley, W. O. and Shores, H. J., op. cit., p. 477 f. 
Note also Dewey's criticism that one of the practical consequences 
of public involvement in curriculum making is the tendency for 
local communities to "keep up with the Jones's" by adopting the 
latest fade Callahan, R. E. Education and the Cult of Ffficienoy. 
Chicago University Press, 1962, p. 53 fn. 
Cited from Tyler's address to the Third International Curriculum 
Conference, Oxford, 1968, by Maelure, S., op. cit., p. 37. See also 
Tyler, R. P. Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction. 
University of Chicago Press, 1949, chs. 1-4. On "organizing 
centres" in curriculum design, see Herrick, Y. E. "The concept 
of curriculum design" in Herrick, V. E. and Tyler, R. r,. (eds. 
) 
Toward Improved Curriculum Theory. University of Chicago Press, 
1950, Supplementary Edl. Monographs, no. 71. 
31. I develop this point in discussing curriculum objectives in my paper, 
"Objectives in general studies". The Vocational Aspect, 23,54, 
April 1971, pp. 1-7. See also, Broudy, H. S. "Can define good 
teaching? " Teachers College Record, 70,7, April 1969, pp. 583-592, 
for a distinction between teaching which is directed by objectives 
and "encounter teaching", which emphasizes personal interactions be- 
tween teacher and taught. 
32. Dewey, J. 
33" 
Sources of a Science of Education. New York, Liveright, 1929. 
Rousseau used social materials for the education of Emile, in the form 
of history, literature and so forth, but the social relationship pat- 
terns he imposed were, if not exactly a tftrazy, hibhly artificial and 
restrictive. 
34" Mayhew, Katherine C. and Edwards, Anna C., op, cit.; Dewey, J. (ed. ) 
The Elementary School Record; The School and Society. Dewey brings 
out the psychological significance of these studieä by a dual use 
of the word "occupation" (to refer both to the history of work, and 
to children's activity) in Democrao and Education, p. 228 f. 
35" Dewey, J. "Challenge to liberal thought" in Problems of Men, op. cit. 
See also Childs' attack on the classical humanism of R. M. Hutchins, 
in his Education and Morals, op. cit., oh. V. 
36. "The modern trend toward vocational education in its effect upon 
the professional and non-professional studies of the university". 
Journal of Proceedings and Addresses, Association of American 
Universities, Nov. 1917. 
37" Childs, J. L. "Experimentalism and educational values" (p. 220). 
Harvard Educational Review, XXII, 4, Fall 1952, ppA. 219-228. Childs' 
attacks in this paper on Soviet communism and on "romantic" aspirations 
to create a world state in the near future may be contrasted with 
his more militant and utopian outlook in the thirties. 
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38. Dewey, J. Democracy and Educ ation, p. 225- 
39- ib., ch. X "Interest and discipline", and XIV "The nature of 
subject matter". 
40. 
41- 
42o 
43- 
44o 
45" 
46. 
Dewey, J. How We Think, ch. VII "AnaIysie of reflective thinking" 
(1932 ed. ). 
Kilpatrick, W. H. The Project Method, op. cit., p. 4. 
Kilpatrick, W. H. The Foundations of Method, ope cit., p. 148. 
ib., p. 157. 
Kilpatrick, W. H. Eduuccationfora ChanRinR Civiliza tion, ops cit., 
p. 136. 
Kilpatrick had not modified his preference for the expansive concept 
of education as "total living" in 1951, when he contrasted the old 
curriculum ("the requisite content of knowledge arranged systematically Llogioallyi for progressive acquisition") with the new ("the new 
curriculum becomes the total living of the child so far as the 
school can influence it or should take responsibility for developing 
it"). Philosophy of Education, ops sit., pp. 313314" 
Dewey, J. Democracy and Education, op, cit., pp. 269-270. 
-40 
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Chapter XII 
1. Rugg, H. and Withers, W. 9 Social Foundations of Education, pp. 
144-145- 
29 Rugg, H. Culture and Eduoation in America, ope cit., p. 230 f. 
3" 
4" 
ib, 
But when Rugg, as editor of the 1926 Yearbook of the National Society 
for the Study of Education (TheFoundation and Teohniaues of Curriculum 
Construction), had the opportunity, or so one might think to assemble 
such a design team, he passed it over. The Yearbook contributions 
are substantially by Rugg himself and by profoacional oducationiets, 
and no new "synthesis" emerged. 
5. Rugg, H. Culture and Education in America, p. 59 (italics). 
6. ib. ý p. 71- 
7* ib., p. 74. 
8. Rugg, H. and Counts, G. S. "A critical appraisal of current methods 
of curriculum-making" in Rugg, H. (ed. ), op. cit., pp. 425-427. 
9. Bruner, J. S. The Process of Eduoation, op. cit. 
10. Rugg, H. and Krueger, Louise. Man and His Changing Society, op. cit. 
Rugg was bitterly attacked by factions within the American Legion 
and business organizations (Rugg, H. That Men May Understand. 
New York, Doubleday, 1941) for reasons not difficult to appreciates [Man and His Changing Society represents] "the clearest and most 
concrete attempt on the part of any reconstruotionist in the twen- 
tieth century to change the curriculum of the schools directly along 
reoonstructionist lines". Karier, C. J. Van. Societys and Educa- 
tion., op. cit., p. 241 fn. 
11. Rugg, H. Culture and Education in America, p. 142. A similar point 
is made in his study of progressive schools. Rugg, H. and Shumaker, 
Ann. The Child entered School. An Appraisal of the New Education. 
Yonkers-on-Hudson, Now York, World Book Co., 1928. 
12. But see his posthumously published study, Ima4rination. 
13. Rugg, H. Foundations for American Education, op. cit., p. xiv. 
14. See my discussion of perspeotivism, ch. VII9 section 14- 
15o Rugg, H. and Withers, W., op. cit., p. 662 f. 
16. The main sources of Mannheim's thought on the content of school educa- 
tion are: Diagnosis of Our Time, chs. IV "Education, sociology and 
the problem of group awareness", and VII "Towards a new social 
philosophy"; and Freedom, Power end Democratic Planning, pt. III9 
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"New men and new values". 
17, ib., oh. 10 "Education as groundwork". On the need for sociological 
integration in education see Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 57 f- 
18. Central-Advisory Council for Education (chairman, Sir G. Crowther) 
15 to 18. London, H. M. S. O., 19591 see especially part five, "The 
sixth form"; Central Advisory Council for Education (chairman, J. H. 
Newsom), Half Our Future, opo cit., part two, "The teaching situation". 
19. For American and international data on this question, see: Greenatein, 
F. L. Children and Politics. New Haven, Yale University Press, 19651 
Hyman, H. H. Political Socialization. Glencoe (Ill. ), The Free 
Press, 1959; J1assialaa, B. G. Education and the Political System. 
Reading (Mans. ), Addison-Wesley, 1969. 
20. Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 116. In Ideology and Utopia, 
LÄnnheim noted the-conflict in education between the intellectualistic 
system (symbolized by the lecture, with the communication of knowledge 
as its motif) and the "Romantic" system (symbolized by the workshop, 
and creative collaboration): "But the Romantic treatment reaches its 
limit whenever systematic knowledge is an indispensable prerequisite 
of modern life", op. cit., p. 161. In education, as in politics, 
he saw a need to steer a middle course between contemplation, theo- 
reticalýapproaches, and what he called "historical immediacy" (ib., 
p. 156). I have tried to show that frequently, instead of find- 
ing a middle course, Mannheim veered towards one or other of the 
extremes. 
21. Brameld, T. "The meeting of educational and anthropological theory" 
in Spindler, G. (ed. ) Education and Anthropology* Stanford Uni- 
versity Press, 1955, reprinted in Spindler, G. ed. ) Education and 
Culture. Anthropolo jcal Approaches. New York, Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1963, p. 91. 
22. Education for the Emerging Age, op. cit., p. 184 (italics). See 
also Patterns of Educational Philosophy, op. cit., ch. 19 "A curri- 
23. 
Cuium aesign for schools of the people". 
Education for the Emerging Age, p. 153 f. "Defensible partiality" 
or the commitment by a group of inquirers to a programme of action 
did not in Brameld's judgment exclude the use of propaganda, a view 
he shared with D anheim. Brameld, T. Patterns of Educational 
Philosophy, pp. 567.568. 
24. Smith, B. O., Stanley, W , O, and Shores, J. H. Fundamentals of Curri- 
culum Development, op. cit., cha. 14-16. 
25. Frank, L. K. The School no -Agent 
for Cultural Renewal, op* cit., p. 11. 
26. Dewey, J. and Bentley, A. F. Knowing and the Known. Boston, Beacon, 
1949" 
27. The relationship is evident in Bruner's essay "After John Dewey, what? " in Archambault, R. D. (ed. ) Dewey on Education: Appraisal8, ope cit., 
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and in Toward a Theory of Instruction, op. cit. The distinction 
that Bruner draws between learning and instruction parallels Dewey's 
demarcation of his thought from mainstream progressivism. 
28. This is true of Dewey, even though in his account of the curriculum 
of the Laboratory School he grouped subject mattor into occupations, 
studies of the background of social life, and communication skills 
in reading, grammar and arithmetic, He argued that the latter 
were given too much attention and he made them subsidiary to the 
first two, whose character is very definitely social. 
29. Remmers, H. R. (ed. ) Anti-bemooratio Attitude in American Schools. 
Evanston (I11. )ß Northwestern University Preen, 1963, p. 54" 
30. Pantini, BSo and Weinstein, G. The DisadvantA edt Challenae to 
Education. New York, Harper and Row, 19 ©. 
31. Greenstein, F. L., ope cit., ch. 3 "Children's feelings about political 
authority". 
32. Remmers, H. H. (ed. ), op. cit. On relative rates of saturation in 
political teaching, see Bereday, G. Z. F. and Stretch, Bonnie B. 
"Political education in the U. S. A. and the U. 'i. S. R. ". C a-- 
tive Education Review, 7i June 1963, pp. 9.16= Kazamias, A. M. 
and Maassialas, B. ß.. Tradition and Change in Education. Now 
Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1965, chs. 8 and 91 and Iassialas, B. ß., 
op* cit. 
- 714 - 
Chapter-XIII 
I. Webb, S. London Education, op. cit., p. 4. 
2. ib. , pe vii. 
3" 
4" 
ib. passim. See also Webb, S. and Freeman, A. Great Britain 
After the 'far, oh. XI. 
The 1870 Education Act. State involvement in come form or other 
goes back considerably further than this. Armytage, N. l. G. 
Four Hundred Years of EnAlish Education. Cambrid8e University 
Press, 1964, chs. I-M. 
5. Behind this programme lay the Fabian faith in education as the 
foundation of a socialist society. This is well summarized b3" 
Jai. Martins "It is of little use getting every man and woman a 
vote, securing Labour candidates and Payment of Lembers, abolishing 
the House of Lords, or even nationalizing the land and all the means 
of production, unless we at the same time take care that each genera- 
tion of 6hildren gets the best schooling that we know how to provide, 
and can possibly afford. Universal suffrage can prosper only through 
Universal Education. Without a well-taught electorate, Socialism 
is impossible. " "State education at home and abroad", State ; du- 
cation at Home'and Abroad, op. cit., p. 2. The issue of the common 
secondary school illustrates the diverse forms that the faith has 
taken at different periods. In London Education, Sidney Webb op- 
posed the common school, and did so again in 1918 (Great Britain 
After the War). The Christian egalitarian socialist, R. H. Tawnoy, 
was still, in 1922, supporting different types of secondary school 
as an alternative to the common school: "a pedantic State-imposed 
uniformity" and more "utilitarian efficiency". (SecondaryEduca- 
tion for All ... London, The Labour Party and Allen and Unwin, 1922, 
P. 30. ) 
6. Nunn, T. Y. Education: its-Data and First Principles. London, 
Arnold, 1920. Webb envisaged a foam of teacher engagement in 
political deoision-taking, which is still in many respects remote 
from the realities of policy-making: "we nowadays look, for the 
moat'peifot democracy, to 'a higher degree of complication than 
either James dill or Karl Marx ever contemplated - to a perpetual 
interaction, in council and in administration, between the repre- 
sentatives of the community of citizens or consumers, on the one 
hand, and on the other, the representatives of each vocation or 
profession, organized as producers of commodities or services". 
The Teacher in Politics, op. cit., p. 7. 
7" luel1s, Fi. 4. TheNew blachia'velli, p. 76 f. 
8. Welle, H. G. World Brain, p. 45" 
9" For the history of the interlocking of publicly provided and denomi- 
national institutions, see Cruiokshank, Marjorie. Church and State 
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10, 
in Education, 1870 to the Present Day ... London, Macmillan, 
1963. The Webbs had a far better appreciation of the problems of 
changing this structure of interlocking institutions than had Wells. 
Wells, H. Q. 'Norks, vol. XXIV, 1927. "Preface". 
11. Well,, H. G. World Brain, p. 49. 
12. Rugg, H. The Great Technology, ops cit., p. 161 f.; Brameld, T. 
Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 616 f. 
13. Dewey, J. The School and Society, op. cit. See especially cn. LA 
"The school and the life of the child". 
14 " 
15. 
ing Civilizationt op. oit. 9 Kilpatrick, W. H. Education for a Chanp 
pp. 76-77; 125 f.; Philosophy of F. duoationg pp. 347-348 and oh. 
XXIII "Curriculum makcing". 
Bode examined the problem of relating a democratic school to the 
only partially democratic society in Democracy as a Way of Life, op. 
oit., p. 82 f. 
16. Dewey's most incisive assessment of these points is The school and 
Society* But the chans; es in society that made the redefinition of 
the role of the school imperative did not reduce the educative role 
of other institutions than the schools. He saw schools as "the 
formal agencies for producing those mental attitudes, those modes 
of feeling and thinking, which are the essence of a distinctive cul- 
ture. But they are not the ultimate formative force. Social 
institutions, the trend of occupations, the pattern of social ar- 
rangements, are the finally controlling influence in shaping minds": 
Individualism Old and New, op. cit., p. 119. For a detailed analysis 
of how economic development and formal education interacted in a 
nineteenth century rural community, see Thabaxxltg R. Education 
and Change in a Village Community (trans. P. Tregear). London, 
Routledge and Kagan Pau1,1971- 
17, Dewey, J. "Education and social change", art. cit.; Kilpatriok, W. H. (ed. ) The Educational Frontier, chs. 1,2,4 and 8; Childs, J. L. 
Education and Morals, op. cit., p. 26 f. 
18, Iiardie, C. D. Truth and Fallacy in : '. ducational Theory, op. Cites pp. 
55 and 63. . _. _.. _. _..... ýý 
19" Counts, ß. 8. The Selective Character of American Secondary Education, 
op* cit.; The Social Compositicn of Boards of Education, op. cit.; 
Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, op. cit. T. Veblen's 
critique of the influence of business on higher education is to be 
found in his Higher Learning in America. A Memorandum on the Conduct 
of Universities by B'isiness Men. New York, Huebach, 1918. For the 
impact of Veblen on Rugg, see the latter's Foundations for knerican 
Educe tion, op. cit., p. 264 f. 
20. "The school is but one formative agency among many, and certainly 
not the etrongost", Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, op. cit., 
p. 24. 
21. The divisions this provoked amongst the experimentalists, including 
Dewey, are discussed by Bowers, C. A. The Progressive Educator and 
the Depression, op. cit., p. 139 f- 
229 For an appraisal of the efficiency movement and of Dewey's opposition 
to it, see Callahan, R. E. Education and the Cult of Efficiency. 
I criticized more recent developments of efficiency thinking in 
educational administration in reviewing the 63rd yearbook, pt. 2, 
of the National Society for the Study of Education, Behavioral 
Science and Educational Administration. Illinois, Chicago University 
Press, 19643 International Review of Education, XII, 1,1966, pp. 
112-115. 
23. See Dewey, J. and Dewey, Evelyn. Schools of Tomorrow; Rugg, H. and 
Shumaker, Ann. The Child-Centered School. An Appraisal of the New 
F: duction. " In the latter, particular emphasis is given to creativity 
and the it-sce of the arts in educations ohs. XI-XX. Cremin, L. A. 
The Transformation of the School, op. cit., Ch. 8 "The changing peda- 
go4ical mainstream"; and Collings, E. An Experiment With a Project 
Curriculum. New York, Macmillan, 1923. 
24. Bode, B. Modern Educational Theories, op. cit., p. 262. 
25. The ambition to re-create communities through schooling continues to 
attract reformers. For a recent proposal to reinstate the "missing 
community" in schools, see Oliver, D. Y1, and Newmnann, F. M. "Education 
and community". Harvard Educational Review, 37,1,1967, pp. 61-106. 
In Britain, J. B. keys has been, amongst sociologists, the most active 
supporter of the view that, in poorer areas in cities, the school 
should perceive its task as including substantial efforts to improve 
the quality of community life: The School in its Social Setting. 
London, Longman, 1967. 
26. Brauner, C. J. American Educational Theory, op. cit., p. 202 f. 
27. Sae the vigorous criticisms of educational policy in Dumont, R. 
False Start in Africa. London, Deutsch, 1966. 
28.11annheim, K. Diagnosis of than Time, op. cit., p. 75- 
29. ib., ch. III "The problem of youth in modern society"; ch. IV "Educa- 
tion, sociolo63r and the problem of social awareness". 
30, ZSannheim, K. Freedom, Power and DemocraticPlann ing, op. cit., ch. 10 
"Education as groundwork"; Clarke, F. Essays in the Politics of Edu- 
ca., P"44f. 
31. This is especially the concern of Clarke's Freedom in the Educative 
Society, where education is set the practical task of determining 
"the forms of instruction and discipline which are possible and ap- 
propriate in the given state of the culture" (p. 51)- 
32, Clarke, F. Education and Social Change, op. cit., p. 47 f. 
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33- Ma. nnheim, K. Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 24. 
34" Freedom, PowAr and Democratic Planning, p. 95 f- 
35* ib., p. 247- 
36. Essays in the Politics ofý ucationg p. 27. 
37. ib., ch. V 'That is secondary education? ". 
38. Freedom in the Educative Sooi etv, ch. IV "The English tradition". 
Clarke's pluralism is evident in the distinctions he drew in thin 
book, between culture and society, and man and citizen. 
39" 
40. 
q1. 
42. 
Clarke, F. Education and Social Chan,, p. 48. See also Fnsa s 
in the Politics of Education, where Clarke tried to keep the support- 
ing and controlling roles of the state apart, while at the came time 
criticizing N`unn's individualism. 
On the abuses of "shaping" metaphors in education, see Hirst, P. 11. 
and Peters, R. S. The Logic of Education, op. cit., p. 29, and oh. 
5 "Teaching". 
Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning , p. 250. In this same chapter, 
Mannheim wrote approvingly of Counto' attempt, through education, to 
recreate the social order. 
Dr. +meld, hovrever, has been a consistent advocate of new and experi- 
mental institutions1 hence his welcome in The Climactic Decades 
of the "eountor-culture" proposals for schools and colleges radically 
different in charaoter from conventional institutions. 
43" Raup, R. B. at al. The Improvement of PraQtical 
_Into 
llif; enoeý (italics). 
44" See chapter VIII, note 29. 
p" 40 
45. Brameld, T. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 698; ch. 22 
"L'ducation for democratic power". 
46. Neill, A. S. Summerhill, op. cit., F. 45 f. 
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Chapter-XIV 
rer. ....... r 
1. The difference may be illustrated by contrasting Dewey's thought 
with the progressivism of Margaret Nauenburg. Naunburg, dirootor 
of the Walden School, was one of Dewey's severest critics, finding 
in his thought a pervasive tendency to submerge the individual 
in "group consciousness", and to suppress originality, "Much of 
the present social philosophy that wishes to sacrifice the indi- 
vidual to the good of the group is nothing but instinctive herd 
philosophy, translated into modern terms... " The Child and the 
world. New York, Harcourt Brace, 1928, p. 59. I discuss this 
criticism in Critioiams of Proftressive h: ducationg 1916-1930, un- 
published M. A. Thesis, University of Illinois, 1958, p. 253 f. 
The unfoldment theory of growth derives principally from Rousseau 
and Froebel. Dewey's assessment of Froebel reveals both his debt 
and his rejection of the latency theory. See The School and : Society, 
eh. V. and Democracy and Education, the. V and IX. 
2. Rugg, H. and Withers, W. Social Foundations of FduQation, op. oit., 
p. 691. 
3. Peters, R. S. (ed. ) Perspectives on Plowden, op. cit., pp. 16-17, 
79 f. and ch. V. Childs' summary of the thinking of the experi- 
mentalists on this matter is instructive: "they have never en- 
dorsed the movement to turn the school into a "child-centerdI" 
institution. They have been critical of those groups in the 
new education who have assumed that to make the growth of the child 
the compelling moral aim of the school necessarily implies that the 
child is competent to take over the responsibility for his own edu- 
cation ..,. For them, freedom is an achievement, not an original 
possession, and they believe that the child becomes 'free' as he 
becomes intelligent ... ", etc. American Pracatism and Education, 
op. cit., Pp. 344-345" 
4. 
5. 
The suggestions will be brief and they must perforce be made without 
reference to some of the more interesting developments in our under- 
standing of the teacher's task; for example, The Eight-Year Study 
in the U. S. A. and the Peckham Experiment in England. See Aikin, 
W. M. The Story of the Eight-Y ear Stu v. Now York, Harper, 1942; 
Pearse, Innos H. and Crocker, Lucy H. The Peckham Experiment. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1943; Williamson, G. S. and Pearce, Innes H. 
Science, Synthesis and Ste. London, Collins, 1965. See also 
Oeser, 0. od. Teacher. Pupil, and Task: Elements of Social Psy- 
cho to y Aurlied to Education. London, Tavistock, 1955, chaff ; 
and Rugg, H. Foundations for American Education, part VI "The 
educational frontier". 
Kelsall, R. K. and Kelsall, Helen M. The School Teacher in England 
and Wales. The Findings of Empirical Research. Oxford, Pergamon, 
1969; Taylor, W. (ed. ) Towards a Policy for the Education of 
Tea_chers, Proceedings of the 20th Symposium of the Colston Research 
Society ... 1968. London, Butterworth, 1969. 
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6, Nash, P. "The strange death of progressive education". Educa- 
tional Theory, XIV, 2, April 1964, pp- 65-75,82 (p. 69)- 
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8. Cp. Brauner, C. J. American Educational Theory, opo cit., p. 202 is 
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9. Cited in Callahan, R. E. Education and the Cult of Effic iecy, op* 
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10. "Introduction" to Clapp, Elsie R. The Use of Resources in Education. 
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China. Turkey. New York, New Republic Inc., 1929 (extract in 
Skilbeck, M. Derey, op. cit., pp. 125-135)- 
12, Childs, J. L. Education and Morals, op, cit., p. 185 f.; Kilpatrick, 
11411. Education for a Chan, 4nR Civilization, op. cit., p. 76 f., and 
128; and Philosophy of Education, op, cit., pp. 347-348- 
13- McClelland, D. "Changing values for progress" in Burns, H. W. (ed. ) 
Education and the Development of Nations. Syracuse, Syracuse 
University Press, 1963, p. 73. I discuss the concept of teacher 
as change agent in "Strategies of curriculum change" in Walton, J. (ed. ) Curriculum Or ization and Desi . London, Ward Lock (forthcoming 
, and "The teacher as agent of cultural change". 
Educational Theory (forthcoming). 
14. See Kelsall, R. K. and Kelsall, Helen U., op. cit. 
15. Clarke, F. Freedom in the Educative Society, p. 51 f. However, 
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cile them and Clarke paid too little attention to these difficulties. 
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17" The Undying Fireq p. 47- 
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19. 
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London, Benn, 1923, p, xi. 
Lucas, F. L. The Decline and Fall of the Romantic Ideal. Cambridge 
University Press, 1936; Berlin, I. B. B. C. Third Programme broad- 
casts, October-November 1967, "Romanticism". 
21. See note 7. 
22. See ch. XIII, section 3-1- 
23. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 631-632,748 f- 
24- Problems of Men, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 
25. Bennia, W. G. , Benne, K. D. and Chin, R. (eds. ) The Planning of Change, 
op. cit. See also note 13 above. 
26, Brameld defends this position in the light of cross-cultural studies 
of value preferences in Cultural Foundations of Education, ch. 12 
"Human freedom as a cultural goal". 
27. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 563 f. 
28. Russell, B. U.. npopular Est, p. 153. 
29. The difference between Russell and Dewey on this matter reflects 
different cultural situations and different traditions of community 
engagement in education. J. B. Mays continues the Russell tradition, 
although in a modified form, when he recommends teachers who are 
confronted by "bad" situations to find ways of preventing the major 
formative influences of peer group and family from allying with one 
another: TheSchool in its Social S©ttin. R, op. cit., p. 3 f- 
30- Education for a Changing Civilization, p. 76. 
31. Childs, J. L. Education and Morals, p. 165- 
32. See ch. XI, section 2.3.2. 
33" 
34« 
For example, the Department of Education and Science teaching practice 
survey at the Bristol University School of Education. See Cope, 
Edith. "Teachers and training, 1, School practice, the concept 
of role". Trends in Education, 16, Oct. 1969, PP. 34-38" 
Rugg, H. and Withers, W. Social Foundations of Education, p. 557" 
35" Schilpp. P. A. (ed. ) The Philosophy of John Dewey, op. cit., p. 138f, p. 544f. 
36. See The Lode of the Humanities, op. cit., p. 194 f- 
37- Dearden, R. F. "Instruction and learning by discovery" in Peters, 
R. S. (ed. ) The Concept of Education, op. cit. 
38. Rugg, H. and Withers, W. Social Foundations of Education, p. 515 f. 
Rugg elaborated his ideas on integrated cultural studies in the con- 
cluding section of this book. See also above, ch. VIII9 section 1.3. 
39, Brauner, C. J. American Educational Theory, p. 202 f. 
40. Rugg, H. and Withers, W., op. cit., p. 624. 
41. 
42. 
Clarke, F. Essays in the Politics of Education, opo oit., p. 142 f. 
See also Clarke's mature views on the subject in "The widening scope 
of the study of education" in The Advanöement of Science, VI9 239 
Oct. 1949. There are very interesting similarities between Clarke's 
views Ess in the Politics of Education, ch. VIII "The study of 
education") and Bode's tiodern Educational Theorien, oh. XV "Scientific 
method and educational theory"). Both argued for the development 
of relationships between educational science and a general philosophy 
or theory, through the study of the processes and objectives of edu- 
cation -a task for which they felt the university department was 
peculiarly well suited. I explore this relationship, in the context 
of curriculum development in "Graduate training, curriculum develop- 
ment and the U. D. E. e" Education for Teaching, No. 82, Summer 1970. 
Childs, J. L. Education and }! orals, p. 175. 
43. The principal sources of this eclectic model are Rugg, Kilpatrick 
and Bromeld. 
44" Philosophy of Education, p. 232 f. 
45" Education for the Emerging Age, ch. 19 "The coming breakthrough in 
teacher education". See also Cultural Foundations of Education, 
p. 257 f. Cp. Brameld's more modest proposals for Puerto Rican 
teacher education: The Remaking of a Culture, p. 595 f- 
46. See Brameld's criticisms of Hutchins and the St. John's College 100 
books curriculum in Patterns of Educational Philosophy, ch. 11 "The 
perennial-ist pattern of educational beliefs". 
47. Rugg, H. Foundations for American Education, ch. XVIII "Society 
centred foundations ... "; Ruig, H. and Withers, W. Social Founda- 
tions of Education, p. 523 f. 
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Chapter XT 
1. The treatment of education as a "dependent variable" performing 
roles like occupational selection and preparation illustrates 
this approach: Clark , H. R. Educating the Expert Society. 
San Francisco, Chandler, 1962. 
2. See ch. XII, section 1. Several of the major features of the 
movement are reviewed in Richmond, W. K. The_School Curriculum. 
London, Methuen, 1971, Introduction and Part I. 
30 
4" 
The rational model of behavior, which sees man in terms of his 
deliberations, choices, adoption of rules, planning, etc., does 
not deny the values to which I have alluded, but, insofar as it 
acknowledges them at all, treats them as constituents of rationality 
itself. To assimilate them in this way is to create a hierarchy 
which itself answers the question the rationalist claims to be 
asking; viz. "what sort of life is worth living! "9 Peters, R. S. 
"Mental health as an aim". Studies in Philosophy 
-and III, 2, Spring 19649 pp. 185-200. 
Lack of design models in the "child-centred" schools was one of 
their principal weaknesses, according to Dewey, Rugg and other 
reconstruotionistsi "In none of these schools has the staff, 
working as a team, designed a really integrated program of work". 
Rugg, H. and Shumaker, Ann. The Child-Centered School, ope cit., 
p. 113. 
5. Britton, J. Languaare and Learning. London, Allen Lane, The 
Penguin Press, 1970. 
6. I discuss an example of partial integration in primary school 
social studies in "Man -a broadcast series". Trends in Education, 
199 July 1970, pp. 9-15- 
7- The schemes were by no means always unworkable, as I pointed out in 
chs. X and XI in discussing Dewey's pioneering reforms at the 
Laboratory School. 
8. Fantini, M. and Weinstein, G. The Disadvantaged3 Challenge-to 
Education* New York, Harper and Row, 1968. 
9. As in the Newsom Report, Half Our Future. 
10. Be=e0 K. D. and Muntyan, B. (ode. ) Human Relations in Curriculum 
Change, op, cit., Part One, "Human relations -a neglected factor in curriculum change". 
11. This argument is underlined in Gross, N., et al. An Attempt to 
Implement e. Major Edua ational Innovation. 
12. Laski, H. The Amerrican moocraav. London, Allen and Unwin, 1949, 
pp. 390-391. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
I discuss this more limited form of institutional innovation in 
my paper "Graduate training, curriculum development and the 
U. D. E. s", art. cit. 
Scheffler, I. (Chairman) Harvard Committee The Graduate Study 
of Education. Cambridge (Mass. ), Harvard University Press, 
1966, p. 19. This passage echoes `9hitehead's conception of 
the task of the whole university: "Harvard, the future" in 
Essays in Science and Philosop v. London, Rider, 1948. 
Bruner, J. B. Toward a Theory of Instruction, opt cit. 
For critiques, see Ausubel, D. P. Educational Psycholo; u. A 
Cognitive View, op. cit.; Bruner, J. S. Toward a Theory of Instruction, op. cit.; and Dearden, R. F. "Instruction and 
learning by discovery", art. cit. 
Discussed in Bennis, Vß. ß., Benne, K. D. and Chin. R. (eds. ) 
The Planning of Change, opo cit., passim. 
-724- 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adama# J. The Herbartian Pe oholoyY Applied to Education. Boston, 
Heath, 1897. 
Adamson, J. W. English Education. 1789 1902. Cambridge University 
Press, 1930. 
Addis, L. "The individual and the Marxist philosophy of history". 
PPhhiloso of Science, 33,1966, pp. 101-117, reprinted in Brodbeok, 
Mays (ed. ), op. ait., pp. 317-335" 
Aiken, H. D. (ed. and intro. ). The Age of Ideology. New York, mentor, 
1956. 
Aikin, W. L1. The Stoa of the Eight-Year Study. New York, Harper, 1942. 
Alcberg, P. In Quest of Man. Oxford, Pergamon, 1970. 
Apter, D. E. "Introduction" to Apter, D. E. (ed. ). Idoolo, Y and Discontent. 
New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. 
Archambault, R. D. (ed) Dewey on Educations Appraisals. New York, Random 
House, 1966. 
Armytage, V. H. G. Four Hundred Years of English Education. Cambridge 
University Press, 1964. 
Arnold, M. Culture and Anarchy. Cambridge University Press, 1932. 
Aron, R. German Sociology (trans. M. and T. Bottomore). New York, The 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. 
Democracy and Totalitarianism. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1968 (1965)9 
The Industrial Society. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967. 
Progress and Disillusion. London, Pall W1 Press, 1968. 
The Elusive Revolution trans. G. Clough). London, Pall Mall Press, 
1969. 
Ausubel, D. P. Educational Psycholog. A Cognitive View. New York, IIolt, 
Rinehart and VWinston, 1968. 
Ayer, A. J. The Origins 
-of 
Pragmatism. Londonp Macmillan, 1968. 
Babbitt, I. "Humanistic versus humanitarian ideals in American education" 
in Schilpp, P. A. (ed. ). Higher Education Faces the Future. New York, 
Horace Liveright, 1930. 
On Being Creative and Other Essays. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1932. 
Baker, H. The Image of Man. New York, Harper, 1961 (1947)" 
Bantock, G. H. Education in an Industrial Society. London, Faber, 1963. 
Eliot and Education. London, Faber, 1970. 
Bantock, G. H. "Towards a theory of popular education". Times Educational 
Supplement, No. 2912, Mar, 129 1971, P. 41 No. 2913, liar. 19,1971, 
p. 4. 
Barnard, H. C. (ed. ) Memoirs of Eminent Teachers and Educators ... in 
Germany. Hartford (Conn*), Brown and Gross, 1878. 
Barzen, J. Classic, Romantic and Modern. London, Seoker and Warburg, 1962. 
Becker, C. L. The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth ConturX Philosonhers. Now raven, Yalo Univ©rsity Press, 1932" 
Beeby, C. i.. . The Quality of Education in Develo ins Countries. Cambridge 
Nass. )t Harvard University Preen, 1966. 
Bondix, i.. Max Weber: an Intellectual Portrait. London, Heinemann, 1960. 
"The a,; e of ideoloQr: persistent and changing" in Apter, D. L. (ed. ) 
Ideo1O and Discontent. Now York, The Free Press of Glenooe, 1964, 
pp. 294-327" 
Benedict, Ruth. Patterns of Culture. London, Routledge and Kagan Paul, 
19$5. 
Benne, K. D. "Democratic ethics and human engineering". Progressive 
Educcation, 26,7, FSay 19499 reprinted in Bennis, W. G., Bennet K. D., 
and Chin, H. (eds. ). The Planning of Change. Now York, Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1961. 
Benue!. K. D. and Muntyan, Be (eds. ). Human Relations in Curriculum Change. 
New York, Dryden Press, 1951. 
Bennis, . Y. G., Benne, K. D., and Chin, R. (eds. ). The Plannnin of Change. 
New York, Ilolt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969 ( 1961 lst ed. ). 
Bereday, G. Z. F. and Stretch, Bonnie, B. "Political education in the 
U. S. A. 
`and 
the U. S. S. R. ". Comparative Education Review, 7, June 
1963, pp. 9-16. 
Berger, P. and Pullberg, S. "Reification and the sociological critique 
of consciousness". History and Theory, IV9 1965, pp. 196-211. 
Bergman, G. "Ideology". Ethics, LXI, April 1951, Pp. 205-218 (reprinted 
in Brodbeck, May (ed. ) Readings in the Philosoptm of Social Science. 
New York, 2, daacniillan, 1968. 
Barkson, I. B. The Ideal and the Community. New York, Harper, 1958. 
Berlin, I. Karl Marx. London, Oxford University Press, 1963 (3rd ed. ). 
"Romanticism". H. B. C. Third Programme Broadcasts. October-November 
1967. 
Beveridge, Lord. "The London School of Economics and the University of 
London" in Cole, kargaret (ed. ) The Webbs and Their riorke London, Frederick Muller, 1950. 
"Introduction" in Cole, Margaret (ed. ) Beatrice Webb's Diaries, 1212-1924. 
Beveridge, Lord (Cont'd. ) 
London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1952. 
Bibby, C. T. A Huxley; Scientist, Humanist and Educator. London, 
watts, 1959. 
Bidney, D. Theoretical Anthropology. New York, Schocken Books, 1967, 
2nd ed. (first pub. 1953). 
Birnbaum, N. "The sociological study of ideology (1940-1960)1 a trend 
report and bibliography". Current Sociology, IX, 2,1960, pp. 91-1729 
Blake, W. "A Descriptive Catalogue &c., No. III9 Sir Jeffrey Chaucer 
and the nine and twenty Pilgrims on their journey to Canterbury" in 
Poetry and Prose of William Blake (ed. G. Keynes). London, Nonesuch 
Press, 1948. 
"The First Book of Urizen" in Poetry and Prose of William Blake 
(ed. 
G. Keynes). London, Nonesuch Press, 1948. 
"The Marriage of Heaven and Hell" in Poetry and Prose of William Blake 
(ed. G. Keynes). London, Nonesuch Press, 1948" 
"There is No Natural Religion" (Second Series) in Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake (ed. G. Keynes). London, Nonesuch Press, 1948. 
Bland, H. Socialism and Labour Policy. London, The Fabian Society, 
Tract 127,1906. 
Boas, G. The Cult of Childhood. London, Warburg Institute, 1966. 
Bode, B. H. Modern Educational Theories. New York, Macmillan, 1927. 
"The new education ten years after. 1. Apprenticeship or freedom? ". 
The New-Republic, LXIII, 809, June 4,1930, pp. 61-64- 
Democracy as a Way of Life. New York, Macmillan, 1937" 
Progressive Education at the Crossroads. New York, Newson and Co., 1938. 
Bolgar, R. R. The Classical Heritage and itn Beneficiaries. Cambridge 
University Press, 1954" 
Bowers, C. A. The 
_Pro ? ressive 
Educator and the Depression. New York, 
Random House, 1969. 
Bowman, Mary J. and Anderson, C. A. "Concerning the role of education in 
development" in Geertz, C. (ed. ). Old Societies and New States. New 
York, The Free Press p 1963. 
Brameld, T. Patterns of Educational Philosophy -a Democratic Interpretation. 
New York, World Book Co., 1950. 
Philosophical anthropology: the educational significance of Ernst 
Cawsirer". Harvard Educational Review, 26,1956, pp. 207-232. (Re- 
printed in Cultural Foundations of Education. ) 
Cultural Foundations of Education - an Interdisciplinary Exploration. New York, Harper, 1957. 
The Rem-akih3 of a Culture. Life and Education in Puerto-Rico. New 
York, Harper, 1959. 
"The meeting of educational and anthropological theory" in Spindler, G. (ed. ). Education and Anthropology, Stanford University Press, 1955; 
reprinted in Spindler, G. (ed. ). Education and Culture; Anthropological 
Approaches. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, pp. 84-114. 
- 727 - 
Education for the Emerging Age. New York, Harper and Row, 1965. 
Japan: 
_ 
Culture. Mutation and Change in Two Communities. New York, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. 
The Climactic Decades. Mandate to Education. Now York, Praegor, 1970" 
Brauner, C. J. American Educational Theory. Enjewood Cliffe (N. J. ), 
Prentice-Hall, 1974- 
Brennan, .. J. "Sidney Webb and the Technical Education Board". The 
Vocational Aspect, XI, 23; XII, 24; XIII, 27; XIV, 28,1959-1962. 
Britton, J. Lan ; uaae and Learning. London, Allen. Lane, The Penguin 
Presn, 1970. 
Broudy, U. L. "Dewey's analysis of the act of thought" in Clayton, A. S. 
(ed. ). John Dewey in Perspective. Bulletin of the School of 
Education, University of Indiana, 36,1, Jan. 1960. Bloomington, ' 
Indiana. 
"Can we define good teaching? " Teachers College Record, 70,7, 
April 1969, PP- 583-592. 
Broudy, H. S., Smith, B. O., and Burnett, J. R. Democracy and Excellenco in 
American Secondary Education. Chicago, Rand McNally, 1964. 
Brubacher-, J. W, "Why teacher militancy? ", Educational Leaderehp, 27,1, 
Oct. 1969i 30-33. 
Bruner, J. S. The Process of Education. Cambridge (Mass. )v Harvard 
University Press, 1960. 
"After John Dewey, what? " in Arahambault, R. D. (ed. ). Dewey on Educatiot 
Appraisals. New York, Random House, 1966. 
Toward a Theory of Instruction. Cambridge (Mass. ), The Belknap Press, 
1967. 
Buchdahl, G. The Image of Newton and Locke in the Age of Reason. London, 
Sherd and Ward, 1961. 
Burnett, J. R. "Changing the social orders the role of echooling". Educa- 
tional Theory, XIX, 4, Fall 1969i pp. 327-336. 
Bury, J. B. The Idea of Progress, London, Uacmillan, 1920. 
Butler, S. Erewhons or Over the-Range. London, Page, 1922.2nd ed. (1872; 
Callahan, R. E. 'Education and the Cult of Efficiency. Chicago University 
Press, 1962. 
Campbell, F. "Latin and the elite tradition in education". British 
Journal of Socioloiri, 19,1968, pp. 308-325. 
Carritt, E. F. Morals and Politics. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935. 
Cassirer, E. The PhilosoRhy of the Enli htenment. Boston, Beacon Press, 
1955 (first pub. 1932)* 
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Now Haven (Conn. ), Yale University 
Preis, 1953-1957.3 vols. 
The Logic of the Humanities (trans. C. S. Howe). New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1960. 
The Mth of the State. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961. 
Central Advisory Council for Education (Chairman Sir G. Crowther) 
1 to 18. London,. H. LL. j. O. , 1959. 
Chairman J. H. Newsom) Half Our Future. London, Hivi. S. U., 1963. 
Chairman Lady Plowden) The Children and their PrinnarySchools. 
Londou, . 1.1. S. 0. s 1966. 
Childs, J. L. ? -: ducation and the Philosophy of ixxperimentaliara. New York, 
Appleton Century, 1931. . Ten Theses on Education and American Culture. Greenwich (Conn. ), 
Edgewood School Pres; i, 1935" 
Education and Morals. Now York, Appleton Century Crofts, 1950. 
"EAperimentalism and educational values", Harvard Educational Review, 
X.. Zl, 4, Fall 1952, pp. 219-228. 
Ar. ierica, n Pragmatism and Education. New York, Henry Holt and C0.9 1956. 
Clark, B. R. Educating the Expert Society. San Francisco, Chandler, 1962. 
Clarke, F. Esfrays in the Politics of Education. Ca o Town, Juts, & Co., 1923" 
"The conflict of philosophies" in Clarke, F. (ed. 
1. 
Review of Educa- 
tional T)ought. University of London Press and Evans Bros., 1936. 
Education and Social Change. London, The Sheldon Press, 1940. 
"The search for a philosophy of education". Journal of Education, 
77,917, Dec. 1945, pp" 574-576. 
Freedom in the Educative Society. University of London Press, 1948. 
"The widening scope of the study of education" in The Advancement of 
Science, VI, 23, Oct. 1949" 
"Karl Mannheim at the Institute of Education" in Mitchell, F. W. 
Sir Fred Clarkes Master Teacher. London, Loncnans, Green, 1967. 
Clarke, Joan S. "The break up of the Poor Law" in Cole, Margaret (ed. ). 
The Webbs and Their Work, London, Frederick iiul1or, 1950. 
Clarke, M. L. Classical j; ducation in Britain, 
-1500-1900. 
Cambridge University 
Prass, 1959. 
Clayton, A. S. Religion and Sohoolin, ;A Comparative Study. Waltham (Mass. )# 
Blaisdell, 1969. 
Cobbett, W. Rural Rides. London, Dent, n. d. (1853 ca. ), 2 vole. 
Cohen, P. S. Modern Social Theory. London, Heinemann, 1968. 
Cole, Margaret (ed. ). The Vebbs and Their York. London, Frederick Muller, 
1950. 
Cole, EQargaret. "The Webbs and social theory". British Journal of 
Sociology, XII, 2, June 1961, pp. 93-101. 
Coleman, J. S. (ed. ). Education and Political Developant. Princeton (N. J. ), 
Princeton University Press, 1965. 
Collings, E,. An ftperiment Witha Project Curriculum* New Yorkp 
ý`. acrnillan, 1923. 
Committee on Public Schools (Chairman Lord Fleming). The Publio Schools 
and the General Educational SSynt m. London, 1944" 
Committee on higher Education (Chairman Lord Robbins). Nigher Education. 
London, 1963. 
Cope, Edith. "Teachers and training; 1. School practice; the concept 
of role". Trends in Education, 16, Oct. 1969, pp. 34-38" 
Corbett, V. Ideologien. London, Hutchinson, 1965. 
Coser, L. A. ". Uurkheim's conservation and its implications for his cooio- 
locical theory", in Wolff, K. H. (ed. ). Fmile Durkhoim. Columbus, 
Ohio State University Press, 1960. 
Coulton, u. (.. Medieval Panorama. London, Collins, 1961 (1938). 
Counts, O. S. "The Selective Character of American Secondary Education". 
School Review and Elementary School Journal, Supplementary Educational 
11ono6raphs, No. 19,1922. 
"The äooial Composition of Boards of Education". School Review and 
Elementary School Journal, Supplementary Educational Monographs, No. 
33,1927" 
"Introduction" to Pinkevitoh, P. The New Education in the Soviet 
Republic (trans. N. Perlmutter, ad, 0,5. Counts), flew York, John 
Day, 1929. 
A ! Ford Crosses Soviet Russia. Boston, The Stratford Co., 1930. 
Dare the School Build a New Social Order? New York, John Day Co., 1932. 
"To vitalize American tradition". Procrensive Education, Feb. 1932. 
The Prospects of American Democracy. New York, John Day Co., 1938. 
The Challenge of Soviet Education. New York, McGraw Hill, 1957. 
Counts, 0.8e and Lodge, Nucia. The Country of the Blind. The Soviet System 
of Mind Control. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1949. 
Court, E. W. "The biological basis of human sociality". American Anthro- 
ed .). pologist, 
60,1958, pp. 1049-1085. Reprinted in n. ontR6u, M. F. A. 
Cultures Man's Adaptive Dimension. New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1958. 
Coveney, i. The Image of Childhood. Harnondsworth (Middlesex), Penguin 
Books, 1967 (rev. ed. ). 
Cremin, L. A. The Transformation of the School. New York, Knopf, 1961. 
Croce, b. "Introduction" to Gentile, G. The Reform of Lducation. London, 
Benn, 1923. 
Cruickshank, Marjorie. Church and State in English H; ducationv1870 to the 
Present Duy ... London, Lfacmillan, 1963. 
Curio, A. Educational Problems of Developing Sooieties. New York, Praeger, 
1969. 
Dale, Mrs. Hylton. Child Labour Under Capitalism. London, The Fabian 
Society, Tract 140,1908. 
Dawson, Lilian A. Co-operative Education. London, The Fabian Sooiety, 
Tract 205,1923. 
Dearden, R. F. "Instruction and learning by discovery" in Peters, R. S. 
(ed. ). The Concept of Education. London, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1967. 
The Philosophy of Primary Education. London, Routledge and Kogan 
Paul, 1968. 
Delfgaauw, B. The Young Marx. London, Sheed and Ward, 1967. 
Dent, H. C. Change in English Education. University of London Press, 1952. 
Depencier, Ida B. The History of the Laboratory_School. University of 
Chicago Press, 1960. 
Dewey, J. "Interest as related to the training of the will". Second 
Supplement to the Herbart Yearbook for 1895. Bloomington (Ill. ), 
1896 (revised and republished, 1899). 
"The reflex arc concept in psychology". Contribution to PhilosoPbY, 
I, 1,1896, University of Chicago. 
"Ethical principles underlying education". National Herbart Society, 
Third Yearbook. Chicago, 1897 (revised and reissued as Moral Prin- 
ciples in Education. Boston, Houghton I ifflin, 1909). 
(ed. ). The Elementary School Record (9 monographs). University of 
Chicago Press, 1900 (reprinted in Findlay, J. J. (ed. ). The School 
and the Child. London, Blackie and Son, n. d. ). 
The Child and the Curriculum. University of Chicago Press, 1902. 
The School and Society. Chicago University Press, 1900 (rev, ed. 1915). 
How We Think. Boston, D. C. Heath & Co., 1910 (rev. ed., 1932). 
Democracy and Education. New York, Macmillan, 1916. 
Essays in Experimental Logic. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1916. 
"The modern trend toward vocational education in its effect upon the 
professional and non-professional studies of the university". Journal 
of Proceedings and Addresses. Association of American Universities, 
Nov. 1917. 
Reconstruction in PhilosoLhZo New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1920 
rev* ed., Boston, Beacon Press, 1948). 
Human Nature and Conduct. New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1922 (reprinted 
with new introduction: New York, Modern Library, 1930). 
The Public and its Problems. New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1927 (re- 
issued with new introduction, Gateway Books, 1946). 
Progressive Education and the Science of Education. Washington (D. C. ), 
Progressive Education Association, 1928. 
Experience and Nature. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1929. 
Impressions of Soviet Russia and the Revolutionary World, Mexico, China, 
Turkey. New York, New Republic Inc., 1929. 
That for Certainty. New York, Minton, Balch and Co., 1929. 
Sources of a Science of Education. New York, Liveright, 1929. 
Individualism. Old and New. New York, Minton Balch, 1930. 
Philosophy and Civilization. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1931. 
"Can education share in social reconstruction? ". The Social Frontier, 
Dewey, J. (contd. ) 
It October 1934, PP. 11412. 
"Education for a changing social order" in National Education Association, 
Addresses and Proceedings, Washington (D. C. ), 1934, pp. 744-752. 
Liberalism and Social Action. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935" 
"Education and social chance". The Social Frontier, III, May 1937, 
pp. 235-238. 
Fx, perience and Education. New York, Macmillan, 1938. 
Logic, The Theory of -Inquiry. 
New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1938" 
Creative Democracy - the task before us. (Eightieth birthday address, 
delivered before the National John Dewey Conference, New York City, 
Oct. 20,1939). Washington, National Education Association, n. d. 
"Theory of valuation". International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, 
II9 4, University of Chicago Press, 1939" 
Freedom and Culture. London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1940. 
"Does human nature change? ". The Rotarian Magazine. 52,2, Feb. 1946 
(reprinted in Nordakog¢, J. E. (ed. ), Social Change. New York, McGraw 
Hill, 1960, pp. 95-99). 
Problems of Men. New York, Philosophical Library, 1946. 
"Introduction" to Clapp, Elsie, R. The Use of Resources in Education. 
New York, Harper, 1952. 
Dewey, J. and Bentley, A. F. Knowing and the Known. Boston, Beacon, 1949" 
Dewey, J. and Childs, J. L. "The social economic situation and education" 
in Kilpatrick, W. H. (ed. ). The Educational Frontier. New York, The 
Century Co., 1933. 
Dewey, J. and Dewey, Evelyn. Schools of Tomorrow. New York, Dutton, 1913. 
Dewey, J. and Tufts, J. W. Ethics. New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1910 (rev. ed. 1933)" 
Doering, F. "The principle of acceleration: a non-dialectical theory of 
progress". Comparative Studies in Societe and History, XI, 1969, 
PP- 413-442. 
Drake, Barbara. Some Problems of Education. London, The Fabian Society, 
Tract 198,1922. 
Starvation in the Midst of Plenty. London, The Fabian Society, Tract 
240,1933" 
Dumont, R. False Start in Africa. London, Deutsch, 1966. 
Duncan, O. D. (ed. ). Ogburn on Culture and Social Change. University 
Chicago Press, 1964. 
of 
Durkheim, E. The Division of Labour in Society (trans. G. Simpson). New 
York, The Free Press, 1964 (lot ad. 1893 . The Rules of Sociolo ical Method, 8th ed. (trans. S. A. Solovay and J. H. 
Mueller)* Glencoe (Ill. ), The Free Press, 1938 (1st ed. 1895). 
"L'individualisme at les intelleotuels". Revue bleue. Series 4,1898 
(trans. by S. and J. Luken, Political Studies, XYII, 1, march 1969, 
pp. 14.30). 
"Pragmatism and Sociology" reprinted in Wolff, K. H. (ed. ). Ensile Durkheim. 
Durkheim, E. (cont'd. ) 
Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1960. (French ed. 1913-1914). 
Education and Sociolo. (trans. and introo by S. D. Fox). Now York, 
The Free Press, 1 95 1922). 
Eaglesham, E. J. R. The Foundations of Twentieth Centur3º Education in England. 
London, Routledge and Kogan Paul, 1967. 
Eastman, G. "The ideologizing of theorien: John Dewey's educational theory, 
a case in point". Educational Theory, 17,2, April 1967, pp. 103-119- 
Edell A. "Education and the concept of ideology" in Philosophy of Education, 
1968. Proc. 24th annual meeting, Philosophy of Education Sooiety, 
(Ü. 'O. A. ), pp. 70-87. 
Eisenstadt, S. N. (ed. ). Readings in Sooial Evolution and Development. 
Oxford, Perganon, 1970. 
E1-Ghannam, Mohammed A. Politics in Educational Planning. Paris, Unesco, 
International Institute for Educational Planning, 1970. Occasional 
paper No. 19. 
Eliade, M. Myth and Reality. London, Allen and Unwin, 1964. 
Eliot, T. S. Notes Towards the Definition of Culture. London, Faber, 1965 
(new ed. ). 
Elvin, L. "The positive roles of society and the teacher" in Peters, R. 3. (ed. ). Perspectives on Plowden. London, Routledge and Kagan Paul, 
1969. 
Ensor, R. C. K. "Permeation" in Cole, Margaret (ed. ). The Webbs and Their 
: fork. London, Frederick Muller, 1950. 
Erikson, E. Il. Childhood and Society. New York, W. W. Norton, 1950. 
The Fabian Society. "Motto" in Olivier, S. Capital and Land. London, The 
Fabian Society, Tract 7,1888. 
Education Group. Get an Education Committee Can Do (El ementarr 
Schools). London, The Fabian Society, Tract 151911. 
Basis of The Fabian Society, 1919. Reprinted in Fremantle, Anne. 
This Little Band of Prophets, New York, Mentor, 1959, p. 263" 
Fantini, M. and Weinstein, G. The Disadvantaged: Challenge to Education. 
New York, Harper and Row, 1968. 
Farrington, B. Francis Bacon., Philosopher of Industrial Science. New 
York, Collier Books, 1961. 
Feuer, L. S. (ed. ). Marx and Engels, Basic Writins>a on Polition and Philo- 
ao . London, Fontana, 1969. 
Fichte, J. G. Addresses to the German Nation (trans. R. F. Jones and G. H. 
Turnbull). Chicago, Open Court Pub. Co., 1922. 
Findlay, J. J. "Three theories of the curriculum: classical, modern, 
Herbartian". Journal of Education, XXIV (new aerieý, 391 and 
392, Feb. and March 1902, pp. 106-109,174-176. 
Finley, M. I. " äiyth, memory, and history". History and Theory, 4, 
1964-1965, pp. 279-302. 
Fox, R. G. "Varna schemes and ideological integration in Indian society". 
, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, XI, 1969, pp. 27-45. 
Frank, L. K. "Culture and personality - the psycho-cultural approach to a 
democratic social order" in Hook, S. (ed. ). John Dewey. Philosopher 
of Science and Freedom. New York, The Dial Press, 1950. 
Feelings and Emotions. New York, Doubleday, 1954" 
The School as Agent for Cultural Renewal. Cambridge (Mass. ), Harvard 
University Press, 1959" 
"Fragmentation in the helping professions" in Bennie, W. G., Bernie, 
K. D., and Chin, R. (s"The Planning of Change. New York, Holt, Rinehart 
and IJinston, 1962. 
Freeman, D. "Totem and Taboos a reappraisal" in Muensterberger, W. and 
Axelrod, S. (eds. ). The Psychoanalytic Study of Society.. Now 
York, International University Press, 1967. 
Fremantle, Anne. This Little Band of Prophets. Now York, Mentor, 1959. 
Freud, S. Totem and Works, ed. J. Strachey, vol. XIII. London, 
Hogarth Press, 1955 1913)" 
The Future of an Illusion. Works, ed. J. Strachey, vol. XXI. London, 
Hogarth Press, 1961 (1927). 
Civilization and its Discontents. Forks, ed. J. Strachey, vol. XXI. 
London, Hogarth Press, 1961 1929). 
Froebel, F. Autobioxrauhy (trans. E. Michealia and I. K. Moore). London, 
Swan Sonnenschein, 1908 (1827). 
Gabriel, R. H. The Course of American Democratic Thoug ht, an Intellectual 
History Since 1815. New York, Ronald Press, 1946 (reprint)* 
Gardiner, R. K. A. Speech to Commonwealth Conference on Rural Education, 
University of Ghana, 1970. Intercultural Education, 1,8, Aug. -Sept., 1970. 
Geertz, C. "The transition to humanity" in Tax, Be (ed. ). Horizons of 
Anthropolola, Y. London, G. Allen&Unwin, 1965. 
Gentilo, G. The of Education (trans. D. Bigongiari, introo by B. Croce). 
London, Benn Bros., 1923. 
Ginsberg, M. "Moral bewilderment" (1944) in On the Diversity of Morals. 
London, kieinemann, 1956. 
Ginzborg, E. (ed. ). Technolo, r and Social Change. New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1964. 
Godwin, V. An cýui= Concerning Political Justice. London, 1796,3rd ed. 
Goodman, P. Compulsory Mis-Education. New York, Horizon Press, 1964. 
Gorki, M. Autobiogra phv. New York, Collier, 1962. 
Gough, Kathleen. "'Norld revolution and the science of man" in Roazak, T. 
(ed. ). The Dissenting AcadezLy. Harmondaworth (Middlesex), Penguin 
Books, 1969. 
Graham, Patricia A. Progressive Educations from Arcady to Academe. 
York, Teachers College Press, 1967. 
Green,, ist. and Wilding, M. Cultural Policy in Great Britain. 
Unesco, 1970. 
Paria 9 
New 
Greenstein, F. L. Children and Politics. Now Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1965. 
Gregory, I. M. i* and Woods, R. G. "Indootrination" in Philosophy of Education 
Society of Great Britain. Proceedings of the Annual Conference. 
January 1970, pp. 77-105. 
Gross, N., Giacquinta, J. B., and Bernstein, U. An Attempt to Implement 
a Major Educational Innovation. Cambridge (Masse )q Harvard University, 
mimeo, 1968. 
Group of Young Kibbutz Members. The Seventh DM. Soldiers' Talk About the 
Six-Day War (Eng., ed. H. Near). London, Andre Deutsch, 1970. 
Gubser, M. M. "Anti-democratic attitudes of American educators", School and 
Comm___ unity, 54 ,4, Dec. 1967,14-16. 
Guest, L. H. The Case for School Clinics. London, The Fabian Society, 
Tract 154,1911. 
Haldane, K. B. An Autobiography. London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1929. 
Halevy, E. History of the English Peoples Epilogue. Harmondsworth 
(Middlesex )t Pelican, 1939. 
Hallowell, A. I. "Self, society, and culture in phylogenetio perspective" in 
Tax, S. (ed. ). The Evolution of Man. University of Chicago Press. (Reprinted in Montagu, M. F. A. (ed. ). Culture. Man's Adaptive Dimension. 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1968. 
Hamilton, Lary A. Sidney and Beatrice Webb. London, Simpson, Long, Marston 
and Co., 1932. 
Handling 0. John Dewey's Challenge to Education. New York, Harper, 1959" 
Hardie, C. D. Truth and Fallac in Educational Theo New York, Teachers ry. 
College Columbia University, 1962 1942 . 
Harrison, J. F. C. Robert Owen and the_Owenites in Britain and America. London, 
Routledge and Kogan Paul, 1969. 
Hayek, F. A. The Road to Serfdom. London, Routledge and Sons, 1944. 
Studies in Philosophy. Politics and Economics. London, Routledge 
and Kogan Paul, 1967. 
Heintz, P. "Education as an instrument of social integration in under- 
developed countries", International Social Science Journal, 19,3 f 
1967,378-386. 
von Herder, J. G. Reflections on the Philoso of the Histo of Mankind 
(abridged and introduced by F. E. Manuel). University of Chicago 
Press, 1968. 
Herrick, R. Ceremonies for Candlemas Eve. 
Herrick, Y. E. "The concept of curriculum design" in Herrick, Y. E. and 
Tyler, R. `W. (eds. ). Toward Improved Curriculum Theory. University 
of Chicago Press, 1950. Supplementary Ed. Monographs No. 71. 
Hirst, P. H. "Liberal education and the nature of knowledge" in Arohambault, 
8. (od. ). Philosophical Ana], vsisa and Education. London, Routledge 
and Kagan Paul, 1965. 
"The nature of educational theory" in Tibble, J. 0. (ed. ). The Study of 
Education, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966. 
"The logical and psychological aspects of teaching a subject" in Peters, 
rt. S. (ed. ). The-Concept of Education. London, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1967. 
Birst, P. H. and Peters, R. S. The-Logic-of Education. London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1970. 
Hocking, W. E. Human Nature and its Remaking. New Haven (Conn. ), Yale 
University Press, 1923. 
Hofstadter, 8. Darwinism in American Thought. Bonton, Beacon 
Press, 1955" 
Hoggart, It. The UseS of Literacy. London, Chatto and windus, 1957" 
Speaking to Each Other. London, Chatto and Windua, 1970. Vol. 1 
About Society; Vol. 2 About Literature. 
Holmes, E. V1hat is and What Might Be. London, Constable, 1911. 
loselitz, B. F. and Moore, W. E. (ode. ). Industrialization and Society. 
Paris, Unosco, 1963. 
Huizinga, J. The Waning of the Middle Ages. (A study of the forms of 
life, thou6ht and art in France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and 
)CVth centuries. ) London, Arnold, 1924. 
Hutchins, Miss B. L. What a Health Committee Can Do. London, The Fabian 
Society, Tract 148,1909. 
Hutchina, R. H. The Higher Learning in America. New Haven (Conn. ), Yale 
University Press, 1936. 
The Conflict in Education. New York, Harper and Bros., 1953. 
Huxley, A. Brave New World. London, Chatto and Windus, 1950. 
ilyman, H. H. Political Socialization. Glencoe (Iii. ), The Free Press, 1959" 
Indian Education Commission. Education and National Develo ent. Now 
Delhi, Ministry of Education, Government of India, 1966. 
Jaeger, V. V. Paideiat the Ideale of Greek Culture (trans. by G. Highet). 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1943-1945" 
Jensen, A. U. "How much can we boost I. Q. and scholastic achievement? ". 
Harvard Educational Review, 39,1, Winter 1969, pp. 1-123. 
Jones, U. N. Planned Organizational Cam. London, ; toutledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1968. 
Judges, A. Y. "The educational influence of the Webbs". BritishJournal 
of Educational Studies, XI, It Nov. 1961, pp. 33-48- 
"Educational ideas, practices, and institutions". Now Cambridfe Modern 
History. Vol. VIII. Cambridge University Press, 1965. 
Kabir, Humayun. "National integration in India" in brembeck, C. S. and 
Hansen, J. W. (eds. ). Education and the Development of f Nations. 
New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. 
Kagan, J. S. et al. "Discussion: How much can we boost Iq and scholastic 
achievement? ". Harvard Educational Review, 39,2, Spring 1969. 
Kagarlitski, J. The Life and Thought of H. G. Wella. London, Sidgwick and 
Jackson, 1966 Moscow 1966). 
Kandel, I. "American philosophy of education" in Clarke, F. (ed. ). Review 
of Educational Thought. London, University of London Institute of 
Education and Evans Bros., n. d. (c. 1936). 
Karier, C. J. Mann, Soci ty, and Education. Glenview (Iii. ), Scott Foresman, 
1967. 
Kazanias, A. M. and Massialas, B. G. Tradition and ChanZ2 in Education. New 
Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1965. 
Kecakemeti, P, "Introduction" to Mannheim, K. Eye on the Soeiolocav of 
Knowledge. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952. 
Kelsall, R. K. and Kelsall, Helen U. The School Teacher in En.:, land and Wales. 
The Findings of Empirical Research Oxford, Pergamon, 1969. 
Kilpatrick, `1. H. "The Project Method". Teachers College Records XIX, 1918 (reissued by Teachers College Press, 1921). 
Education for a Changing Civilization. New York, Macmillan, 1926. 
The Foundations of Method. New York, Macmillan, 1929. 
"The contribution of John Dewey to education" in Schilpp, P. A. (ed. ) 
Kilpatrick, W*H. (oont'd. ) 
The Philosophy of John Dewey. New York, Tudor Pub. Co., 1939 
(2nd ed. ). 
"Philosophy of education from the experimentalist outlook" in National 
Society for the Study of Education, forty-first yearbook, part 1. 
Philosophies--of-Education, Bloomington (Ill. ), Publio School 
Publishing Co., 1942. 
Philosophy of Education. New York, Macmillan, 1951. 
Kilpatrick, I. H. (ed. ). The Educational Frontier. New York, The Century 
Co., 1933" 
King, P. "An ideological fallacy" in King, P. and Parekh, D. C. (edo. ). 
Politics and Experience. Cambridgo University Press, 1968. 
Kohn, S. D. Experiment in Planning an Urban High School. The Baltimore 
Charette. New York, Educational Facilities Laboratories, 1969. 
Kraft, I. "A new man in the kibbutz? ". Teachers College Record, 68,7, 
April 1967, PP- 588-595" 
Krausz, E. Sociolo$r in Britain. A Survey of Research. London, Batsford, 
1969. 
Kroeber, A. L. and Kluckhohn, C. Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts 
and Definitions. Cambridge (Mass. ), Peabody Museum, 1952. 
Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago 
Press, 1962 1969 2nd ed. ). 
"Comment" (on Dovring, (Q. V. )). Comparative Studies in Society and History, ý11rýM ýf 
XI, 1969, PP. 426.430. 
Laski, B. J. The American Democracy. London, Allen and Unwin, 1949" 
Lawrence, D. H. Studien in Clsssic American Literature. London, Heinemann, 
1964. 
Leavis, F. R. and Thompson, D. Culture and Environment. London, Chatto and 
Windus. 1950 (1933)" 
Leese, J. Pernonalities and Power in English Education. London, Arnold, 1950. 
Leeson, 3. Christian Education. London, Longmans, Green, 1947" 
Letwin, Shirley It. The Pursuit of Certainty, David Hume Jerercy Denthern, 
John Stuart Mill, Beatrice Webb, Cambridge University Press, 1965. 
Lichtheim, a. beam. An Historical and Critical Stud-Y. London, Routledge 
and Kogan Paul, 1961. 
"The concept of ideologyº". History and Theory, IV, 1965, pp. 164-195. 
Lilge, F. "The politicizing of educational theory". Lt hies, LXITI, 3,1956, 
pp. 188--197. 
Livingotone, R. A Defence of Classical Education. London, Macmillan, 1916. 
- 738 - 
Locke, J. Some Thouphta Concerning EducFttioa. (introl and notes by R. II. 
Quick). Cambridge University Press, 1892. New ed. 
Lovejoy, A. O. A Documentary History of Primitivism and Related Ideas. 
Vol. 1. Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity, by A. O. Lovejoy 
and G. Boas. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1935" 
The Great Chain of Being. Cambridge (Mass. ), Harvard University 
Press, 193 9., 
l. ow-Beer, Ann (ad. ). Herbert Spencer. London, Collier-Macmillan, 1969. 
Lowndes, G. A. N. The Silent Social Revolution. London, Oxford University 
Press, 1937 (2nd ed., 1968 . 
Lucas, F. Z. The Decline and Fall of the Romantic Ideal. CaLnbridge 
University Press, 1936. 
Maclure, J. C. Curriculum Innovßtion in Praotice. London, H. M. 5. O., 1968. 
Mann, T. The Mutig Mountain (trans. from the German by H. T. Lowe Porter). 
New York, A. A. Knopf, 1927. 
Mannheim, K. Ideolopy and Utopia (trans. by Louis 'girth and Be Shils). 
London, Routledge and Kagan Paul, 1952 (reprint of lot Eng, ed., 1936). 
Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1940. 
Diagnosis of Our Time. London, Routledge and Kogan Paul, 1943" 
Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (ed. H. Gerth and E. Bramstedt). 
London, Routledge and Kean Paul, 1951. 
F. saays on the Sociology of Knowled.; Te. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1952. 
Foss s on the Sociolo of Culture (ed. E. Manheim in co-operation with 
P. Kecskemeti . London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956. 
Mansbridge, A.. Margaret %; cMdillan, Prophet and Pioneer: Her Life and Work. 
London, Dent, 1932. 
arek, F. Philoeo of World Revolution (trans. Daphne Simon). London, 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1969 1966, Vienna). 
Maritain, J. Education at the Crossroads. New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1960 1943 . 
Maxrou, H. I. AHisttory of Education in Antiquity. London, Sheed and Ward, 
1956. 
Martin, D. Review of F. A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politica and Economics. 
British Journal of Sociology, 19,1968, pp. 334-342. 
Martin, J. d. State Education at Rome and Abroad. London, The Fabian Society, 
Tract 52,1894. 
Marx, K. Capital (trans. from 3rd German eds by S. Moore and E. Aveling and 
ed* by F. Engels). London, Sonnenscheing 1887.2 vole. 
- 739 - 
Massialas, B. G. - Education and the Political System. Reading 
(Maas. ), 
Addison-Wesley, 1969. 
Mayhew, Katherine C. and Edwards, Anna C. The Dewey School. New York, 
D. Appleton Century Co., 1936. 
Aiays, J. B. The School in its Social Setting. London, Longmans, 1967" 
Mead, G. H. Mind, _ 
Self andý; oci_ety (intro. C. W. Morris). Univorcity of 
Chicago Presf3,1934. 
Mead, Margaret. Growing Up in 
-Nov; 
Guinea. ilarmondaworth (Lliddl©sex), 
Penguin Books, 1942. 
"The future as a basis for establishing a shared culture". Daedalus, 
94,1. Reprinted in Bennis, W. G. , Benne, K. D. , and. Chin, R. eds r. 
The Planning of Change. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969 
(2nd ed. . 
Llead, Margaret and Callas, Elena. "Child-training ideals in a post- 
revolutionary contexts Soviet Russia" in Mead, Sar6aret and Holfenstein, 
Martha (edo. ). Childhood in Contemporary Culture. University of 
Chicago Press, 1955" 
Middleton, J. S. "? ebb and the Labour Party" in Cole, Margaret (ed. ). The 
Webby and Their Work. London, Frederick ktuller, 1950. 
Mill, J. S. On Liberty ... 
(ed. with intro. by R. B. l: cCallum). Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1946. 
biller, P. The New England Mind. The Seventeenth Century. New York, 
Macmillan, 1939. 
Miller, P. (ed. ). The American Puritans. Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 
1956. 
Mitchell, F. W. Sir Fred Clarke: Master Teacher. London, Longman3, Green, 
1967. 
noddle, A. D. Brahmanioal Culture and Mod ernitl. Bombay, Asia Pub. House, 
1966. 
Montagu, M. F. A. "Brains, genes, cultural gestation" in Montagu, M. F. A. (ed. ). 
Culture, h: an's Adaptive Dimension. New York, Oxford University Press, 
1968. 
Moore, W. E. and Cook, R. ti. (eds. ). Readings on Social Cie. Englewood 
Cliffs (N. J. ), Prentice-Hall, 1967. 
Moravia, A. TwoWomen ... 
(trans. from the Italian by Angus Davidson). 
New York, Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1958. 
Morris, W. Newsfrom Nowhere: or An Epoch of Rest, Being Some Chapters 
from a Uto ian Romance. London, Reeves and Turner, 1891. 
Communism intro, by G. B. Shaw). London, The Fabian Society, Tract 115, 
1903 reprint). 
Dorris, Md. (wont' d. ) 
A Dream of John Ball. Collected Works, XVI. London, Longnans, 
Green and Co., 1912 (1888). 
Morrison, H. C. The Curriculum of the Common School. University of 
Chicago Press, 1940. 
Muenaterberter, Vi. (ad. ). an and His Culture. Psychoanalytic Antliropol2a 
After "Totem and Taboo". London, Rap and WhitinL,, 1969. 
)LcBriar, A. M. Fabian Socialism and English Political 1884-1914. Cambridge 
University Prese, 1962. 
McClelland, D. "Changing values for progress" in Burne, W. H. (ed. ). Ed uca- 
tion amend the Development-of Nations. Syracuse, Syracuse University 
Press, 1963. 
McClelland, D. C. and Winter, U. G. Motivating Economic Achievement. New 
York, The Free Press, 1969. 
McJ1i. llan, Margaret. The Life of Rachel M`zcMillan, London, Dent, 1927. 
Nash, P. "The strange death of progressive education". Educational Theory, 
XIV, 2, April 1964, pp. 65-75,82. 
Naumburg, Margaret. The Child and the World. New York, Harcourt Brace, 1928. 
Near, H. (ed. 2ngo od. ). The Seventh Day. Soldiorn' Talk About the Six-Day 
War. London, Deutsch, 1970. 
Neill, A. S. Surnmerhill. New York, Hart, 1960. 
Neyer, J. "Individualism and socialism in Durkheim" in Wolff, K. H. (ed. ). 
Etnile Durkheini. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1960. 
Nietzsche, F. the Future of Our Educational Institutions (trans. and intros 
by J. M. Kennedy)* Edinburgh, T. N. Faults, 1909. 
Nisbet, R. A. Social Change and History__As ects of the ý+iestern Theory of Development. Ne'v York, Oxford University Press, 1969. 
Norwood, C. The English Tradition of Education. London, John Murray, 1929. 
Nowell-Smith, P. H. Ethics. Harmondsworth (Middlesex), Penguin Books, 1954. 
Nozhko, K. et al. Educational PlanninK in the U S. it. Paris, Unesco, 
International Institute for Educational Planning, 1968. 
Nunn, T. 1'. Education: its Data and First Principles. London, Arnold, 1920. 
Nyerere, J. K. Education for Self Reliance. Dar Es Salaam, Government 
Printer, 1967. 
Oakeshott, M. Rationalism and Politics. London, 1iethuen, 1962. 
O'Connor, D. J. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. London, 
Routled¬e and Kegan Paul, 1957. 
Oeaer, 0. (ed. ). Teacher, pupil, and Task: Elements of Social Paycho= 
Applied to Education. London, Taviatock, 1955" 
Oliver, D. 4. and Newmann, F. M. "Education and community". Harvard Educa- 
tional Rovio , 37,1,1967, pp. 61-106. 
Owen, R. A New View of Society and Other Writings (ed. C. D. it. Cole). London, 
Dont, 1927. 
Pareto, V. Sociological Writings. Selected and introduced by 3. E. Finer. 
London, Pall i4all Press, 1966. 
Parsons, T. The Structure of Social Action. New York, The Free Press, 
1968.2 vole. 
Parsons, `., Shils, E., Naegele, K. D., and Pitta, J. R. Theorien of So ietY. 
New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. 
Passülore, J. The Perfectibility of Man. London, Duckworth, 1970. 
Pasternak, B. Dr. (trans. M. Hayward and M. Itarari). London, 
Collins-Fontana, 1961. 
Pearee, Innen H. and Crocker, Lucy H. The Peckham Experiment. London, 
Allen and Unwin, 1943 
Pease, E. R. A History y of the Fabian Society. London, A. G. Fifield, 1916. 
Pestalozzi, J. H. Letters on Early Education (Pestalozzi to J. P. Greavea). 
London, Sherward, Gilbert, Piper, 1827. 
How Gertrude Teaches Her Children ... and An Account of the Method 
trans. Lucy E. Holland and Frances C. Turner, ed. E. Cooks). London, 
Swan Sonnenschein, 1900. 
Peters, R. S. Education as Initiation. University of London Press and 
Evans Bros., 1964. 
"Mental health an an aim". Studies in Philosophy and Education, III9 
2, Spring 1964, Pp- 185-200. 
"Nhat is an educational process? " in Peters, R. S. (ed. ). The Concept 
of Education. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967- 
"A recognizable philosophy of education: a constructive critique" in 
Peters, R. S. (ed. ). Perspectives on Plowden. London, Routledge and 
Kagan Paul, 1969. 
"Education and the educated man" in The Philosophy of Education Society 
of Great Britain. Proceedin4; s of the Annual Conference. January 1970, 
pp. 5-20. 
Petere, R. S. (ea. ). Perspectives on Plowden. London, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1969. 
Phenix, P. H. "Teacher education and the unity of culture". Teachers College 
Record, 60,6, Larch 1999, pp. 331-3439 
Phenix, P. H. Rea. imo of Meaning. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964. 
Phillips, 'V_. L. Chy are the Many -Poor? 
London, The Fabian Society, Tract 1, 
1684. 
Piaget, J. ' The Moral Judgment of the Child. Glencoe (Ill. ), The Free Press 
of Glencoe, 1948. 
Six Psycholoai cal Studies (trans. Anita Tenzer, ed. D. Glkind). Uni- 
versity of London Press, 1968. 
Pinkevitch, F. The New Education in tho Soviet Re blio (trans. N. Perlmutter, 
ed. G. S. Counts Now York, John Day, 1929. , 
Plato. The Laws (trans. A. E. Taylor). London, Dent 1934. 
The i ed. with intro. and notes by R. S. Bluck). Cambridge University 
Press, 1961. 
Polanyi, Y. Personal 
-Knowledge: 
Towards a Post-critical Philosophy. 
London, Routledgo and Kogan Paul, 1958. 
Pollard, H. M. Pioneers-of-Popular Education. London, John )urray, 1956. 
Polling R. H. Education and EnRli, htenment in the Worka of William Godwin. 
Now York, Las Americas Pub. Co., 1962. 
Popper, K. The Poverty of Historicism. London, Routledge and Kagan Paul, 
1961 (1957). 
The-Open Society and its Enemies. London, Routledge and Kogan Paul, 
1962,4th ed. 2 vols. 
Punch, H. ". cote Paradia". A Short History of Dartington Hail choole 
1926-1969. Mimeo, 1970. 
Randall, J. H., jr. "Dewey's interpretation of the history of philosophy" 
in Sohilpp, P. A. (ed. ). The Philosophy of John Dewey. Evanston (Ill. ), 
Northwestern University Press, 1939, pp. 77-102. 
Ratner, J. "Dewey's conception of philosophy" in Schilpp, P. A. (ed. ). 
The Philosophy of John Dewey. Evanston (Ill. ), Northwestern 
University Press, 1939, PP. 49-73. 
R¬sup, R. B. , Axtelle, G. E. , Benne, K. D. , and Smith, B. O. The Improvement 
of Practical Intelligence. New York, Harper, 1949 (1943)- 
Raymond, I;. T. Uncensored Celebrities. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1918. 
Reich, C. A. The Greening-of America. New York, Random House, 1970. 
Reid, L. A. ti1ays of Knowledz>e and Experience. London, Allen and Unwin, 1961. 
Yhilosooohy and Education. London, Heinemann, 1962. 
Remmers, H. It. ed. ). Anti-Democratio Attitudes in American Schools. 
Evanston Iii. ), Northwestern University Press, 1963" 
Richmond, %I. Kenneth. The School Curriculum. London, Methuen, 1971. 
Rickman, H. Y. (ed. ). MMeanin in Hinto a W. Diltho 's Thou, hts on 
History and Society. London, Allen and Unwin, 1961o 
Robson, 'N. A. The Development of Local Government. London, Allen and 
IInwin, 1932 (2nd ed. ), 
Rogers, ý*Me The Diffusion of innovations. Now York, The Free Press 
of Glencoe, 1962. 
Roszak, T. The faking, of a--Counter Culture. New York, Doubleday, 1969. 
Roszak, T. (ed. ). The Dissenting Acade . UUaxmondsworth 
(Middlesex), 
Pen,;,; uin Books, 1969. 
Rousseau, J. -J. "A discourse on the arts and sciences" in Rousßeau'a Social 
Contract, Lto. (trans. G. D. R. Cole). London, Dent, 1913, pp. 125-154. 
JEmile trans. D. Foxley). London, Dent, 1911. 
Rugg, I. Culture and education in America. Now York, Harcourt Brace, 1931. 
The Great Technolorj. New York, John Day Co., 1933. 
That ken play Understand. New York, Doubleday, 1941. 
Foundations for American Education. Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York, 1947. 
Imtion. New York, Harper and Row, 1963. 
Ru6gg K. (ed. ) for National Society for the Study of Education. The Founda- 
tions and Techniques of Curriculum Construction. Twenty-sixth yearbook, 
part 1. Bloomington Iii. , Public School Publishing Co., 1926. 
Democrat and the Curriculum. New York, D. Appleton-Century, 1939 
third yearbook of the John Dewey Society). 
Rugg, H. and Counts, G. "A critical appraisal of current methods of 
Curriculum-making" in Rugg, H. (ed. ). The Foundations and Techniques 
of Curriculum Construction. National Society for the Study of Education, 
Twenty-sixth yearbook, part 1. Bloomington (Ill. ), Public School 
Publishing Co., 1926. 
Rugg, H. and Krueger, Louise. Ilan and his ChaaaLng 
and Co,. 1929.. 1940. 
Society. Boston, Ginn 
Rugg, H. and Shumaker, Ann. The Child-Centered School. An Appraisal of the 
New Education. Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York, rtiorld Book Co., 1928. 
Rugg, H. and Withers, W. Social Foundations of Education. New York, 
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1955" 
Russell, B. Principloc of Social Recon truation. London, Allen and Unwin, 1916. 
"Mysticism and logic" in Mysticism and Logic and Other F. ss ys. London, 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1916. 
On Education. London, Allen and Unwin, 1926. 
"Is science superstitious? ". Sceptical Essays. London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1928. 
"Some prospects: cheerful and otherwise". Sceptical Essayn. London, 
Allen and Unwin, 1928. 
"The recrudescence of puritanism". Sceptical Esays. London, Allen 
and Unwin, 1928. 
Russell, B. (cont'd. ) 
Education and the Social Order. London, Allen and Unwin, 1932. 
"An outline of intellectual rubbish" in Unpopular Essays. London, 
Allen and Unwin, 1950. 
"Philosophy and politics" in Unuý ar Essays. London, Allen and Unwin, 
1950. 
"The functions of a teacher". Unpopular E. nsaye. London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1950. 
"Dowey's new Logic" in Schilpp, P. A. (ed. ). The Philosophy of John Dewey. 
New York, Tudor, 1951 (2nd ed. ). 
The Impact of Science on Society. London, Allen and Unwin, 1952. 
Human Society in Ethics and Politics. London, Allen and Unwin, 1954" 
i ortraits from Memory and Other Essays. London, Allen and Unwin, 1956. 
Ryan, A. The Philosophy of the Social Sciences. London, Macmillan, 1970. 
Saiyidain, K. G. Education Culture and the Social Order. Boxbay, Asia 
Pub. LIouse, 1958 (2nd ed. ). 
Samuels, U. Uuoatt1on Committeen. London, The Fabian Society, Tract 225, 
1928. 
Santayana, G. "Dowey's naturalistic metaphysics" in Sohilpp, P. A. (ed. ). 
The Philosophy of John Dewey. Evanston (Iii. ), Northwestern University 
Press, 1939, pp. 245-261. 
Saran, A. K. "Theoretical anthropology - the cult of man". Et hico, LXVI, 3s 
1956, PP- 198-208. 
Schaff, A. "The Marxist theory of social development" in Eisenstadt, S. N. 
(ed. ). Headings in Social Evolution and Develo ent. Oxford, Pergamon, 
1970, PP. 71-94. 
Scheffler, I. The Language of Education. Springfield (Iii. ), C. C. Thomas, 
1960. 
"Lducational relevance". Journal of Philosophy, Nov. 1969. 
Scheffler, I. (Chairman) Harvard Committee: The Graduate Study of Education. 
Cambridge (mass. ), Harvard University Prese, 1966. 
Scheffler, I. (ed. ). Philosophical Analysis and Education, Boston, Allyn 
and Bacon Inc., 1958. 
Schenk, ii. G. The Mind of the European Romantics. London, Constable, 1966. 
Schilpp, l,. A. (ed. ). The Philosophy of John Dewey. t'vanston (Iii. ), 
Northwestern University Press, 1939. 
The Schools Council. Closer Links Between Teachers and Indust and Commerce. 
London, 1963 working paper No. 7,. 
Seguel, Lary L. The Curriculum Field. Its Formative Years. New York, 
Teachers College, Columbia University, Teachers College Press, 1966. 
Selleck, tt. J. wl. The New Education. 1870-1914. London, Pitman, 1968. 
Shapovalenko, S. G. (ed. ). Polytechnnical Education in the U. S. S. R. Paris, 
Unesco, 1963. 
Shaw, G. B. The Fabian Society, its Earl History. London, The Fabian 
Society, Tract 41,1892 (1914 reprint). 
Basis of the Fabian Society. London, The Fabian Society, 1896,5th ed., 
rev. 
Report on Fabian Policy. London, The Fabian Society, Tract 70,1896. 
ioeialism for Lillionaires. London, The Fabian Society, Tract 107,1901. 
"Introduction" to Morris, W. Communism. London, The Fabian Society, 
Tract 11), 190 (reprint). 
Fabianism and the Fiscal Question. London, The Fabian Society, Tract 
116,1904. 
Back to Methuselah. London, Constable, 1922. 
Saint Joan. London, Constable, 1924 (reprint). 
The Intelligentý'ioman'a Guide to Socialism and Cn. pitalism. London, 
Constable, 1928. 
The Apple Cart. London, Constable, 1930. 
"Preface", Fabian Essays. London, The Fabian Society, 1930. 
Dian and Superman. London, Constable and Co., 1931 (rev. ed., first ed. 
1903). 
Airs. ýiarren'e Professio . London, Constable and Co., 1931 
(reve ed., 
first ed. 1902). 
The YAn of Destiny. London, Constable and Co., 1931 (1896). 
, üdowers' Houses. London, Constable and Co., 1931 (rev. ed., first 
ed. 1898). 
The Dootor's Dilervna. London, Constable and Co., 1932 (rev. ed., first 
ed. 1906). 
Everybody's Political What's What. London, Constable, 1944" 
Sixteen Self Sketches. London, Constable and Co., 1949. 
Shaw, G.. 8. (ed. ). Fabian Essays in Socialism. London, Fabian Society, 1889. 
Sidgwick, H. "Theory of classical education" in Miecollaneous EsRsya and 
Addresses. New York, Macmillan, 1904. 
Simey, `l'060 "The contribution of Sidney and Beatrice 'ebb to eoeiolor', 
British Journal of Sociolor7, XII, 2, June 1961, pp. 106-123. 
Simon, Be ducation and the Labour Movement, 1870-1220. London, Lawrence 
and Ashart, 1965. 
Simons, L. Georg Kerschensteiner. London, Methuen, 1966. 
Skilbeck, i. Criticisms of Progressive Education, 1916-1930. Unpublished 
M. A. thesis, University of Illinois, 1958. 
"Review" of National Society for the Study of Lducation: Eehavioral Science 
and Educational Administration. Illinois, Chicago University Press, 
1964: International Review of Education, XII, 1,1966, pp. 112-115- 
"Graduate training, curriculum development, and the U. o.,. e". Education 
for Teaching, 82, Summer 1970, PP. 4-24. 
"lan -a broadcast series. " Trends in Education, 19, July 1970, pp. 9-15. 
"Objectives in general studies". The Vocational Ash t, 23,54, April 
1971, pp. 1-7. 
"Chan6in4; the curriculums forces and strategies" in Walton, J. (ed. ). 
Skilbdck, R. (cont'd. ) 
Innovation in Education. Oxford, Pergamon, (forthcoming). 
"Strategies of curriculum change" in Walton, J. (ed. ). Curriculum 
Organization and Design. London, Gard Look, (forthcoming,. 
"The teacher as went of cultural change". kAucaation l Theory (forth- 
coming). 
Skilbeck, Ml. (ed. ). Dewe . London, Collier-Macmillan, 1970. 
Skinner, B. F. Walden Two. New York, Macmillan, 1962. 
Sklair, L. The Sociology of Proges . London, Routledge and Kogan Pau1,1970. 
Smith, 13.0., Stanley, and Shores, J. Tl. r'undame;, tale of Curriculum 
Development. New York, Harcourt Brace and World, 1957 rev, ed. 1950)" 
sorol, G. I.. Reflections on Violence (trans. T. E. Hulme). London, Allen 
and Unwin, 1925. 
Stanley, W. O. Education and Social Integration. Now York, Teachers College, 
Columbia University, Bureau of Publications, 1953" 
Stanley, N. O. and holtznann, R. A. "Perspectivism and unitys Karl Diannheim". 
Educational Theory, 19,3, Summer 1969, pp. 271-279. 
Staude, J. Max Schelor, 1874-1928: an Intellectual Portrait. London, 
Collier-Liacmillan, 1967. 
Stewart, W. A. C. The Educational Innovators. lls Progressive Schools, 
1881-1967. London, Macmillan, 1968. 
Sumner, W. G. "Sociology" (1881) reprinted in Miller, P. (ed. ). American 
Thousht, 
_Ciyil 
Nar to World War I. New York, Rinehart and Co., 1954" 
"The absurd effort to make the world over" (1884) reprinted in lU ller, P. 
(ad*)* American Thought. Civil War to World War I. New York, Rinehart 
and Co., 1954" 
Talmon, J. L. The Originsof Totalitarian Democracy. London, Seeker and 
Warburg, 1952. 
Political Niessianism. The Romantic Phase. London, Seeker and Warburg, 
1960. 
Tawny, R. H. Secondary Education for All. London, The Labour Party and 
Allen and IInwin, 1922. 
quality. London, Allen and Unwin, 1931.2nd ed. 
The Attack and ©ther Papers. London, Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953. 
The Webbs in Persrective. University of London, The Athlone Press, 1953" 
Taylor, W. Society and the Education of Teachers. London, Faber and Faber, 
1969. 
Taylors 4.1. (ed. ). Towards aPolicy for the Education of Teachers. ' Proceed- 
ings of the 20th Symposium of the Colston Research Society ... 1968. London, Butterworth, 1969. 
Thabault, R. Education and Chan a in a Pills Coimunit (trans. P. Tregsar). 
London, itoutledge and Kegan Paul, 1971 (1945). 
Thoriby, A. K. The Romantic Movement. London, Lon6marrn, 1966. 
Townsend, tire. The Case for School Nurseries. London, The Fabian Society, 
Tract 145,1909. 
Tyler, K. '. Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction. University of 
Chicago Press, 1949. 
Veblen, T. The Higher Learning in America. A Memorandum on the Conduct of 
Universities bey Business irden. New York, Huebsch, 1918. 
Walsh, W. The Use of Imagination. 'k. ducational Thought and the Literary 
Mind. London, ehatto and Andus, 1959" 
Watkins, J. ",. N. "Methodological individualism and social tendencies" in 
Brodbeck, Vay (ed. ). Readings in the rhilosorhy of the social 13eiences. 
New York, nacMillan, 1968, pp. 269-280. 
1ebb, Beatrice. AA renticeship. London, LonGmans, Green and Co., 1926. 
Our Partnership od. Barbara Drake and Margaret Cole). London, Longmane, 
Green and Co., 1948. 
Diaries, 1912-1924 (ed. Margaret Cole). London, Lon4, xnans, Green and 
Co., 1952. 
Webb, S. "The basis of socialism, historic" in Shaw, G. B. (ed. ). Fabian 
Fsmi in Socia l3am. London, Fabian Society, 1889. 
Questions for School Board Candidates. London, The Fabian Society, 
Tract 25,1891- 
A Labour Policy for Public Authorities. London, The Fabian Society, 
Tract 37,1891. 
Socialism True and False. London, The Fabian Society, Tract 51,1894. 
The Difficulties of Individualism. London, The Fabian Society, Tract 
69,1896. 
Labour in the Lonrast Rein. London, The Fabian Society, Tract 75,1897. 
The Education Muddle and the tNay Out. London, The Fabian Society, 
Tract 106,1901. 
The Education Aot, 1902: How to the Best of It. London, The Fabian 
Society, Tract 1149 1903. 
London Education. London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1903. 
The London Education Act, 1903: How to Make the Best of It. London, The 
Fabian Society, Tract 117,1904. 
"Twentieth century political, in The Basis and Policy of Socials m. London, 
Fabian Society, A. C. Fifield, 1909 reprint of 1901 lecture), 
Grants in Aid, a Criticism and a Proposal, London, Lont. mans, Green and 
Co., 1911. 
Towards Social Democracy? A Study of Social ': volutibt During the Past 
Three quart ea Century. London, Fabian Society, 1916. 
The Teacher in Politics. London, The Fabian Society, Tract 187,1919. 
The Root of Labour Unrest. London, The Fabian Society, Tract 196 1920. 
The Labour Party on the Threshold. London, The Fabian Society, Tract 
207,1923. 
- 748 - 
Webb, S. and B. Industrial Democracy. London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1897. 
The Prevention of Destitution. London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1911. 
A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain. London, 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1920. 
The Consumers' Co-operative Movement. London, Longmana, Green and Co., 
1921. 
The Decay of Ca italist Civilization. London, Fabian Society and Go Allen 
and Unwin, 1923 Ord ed. ). 
Webb, S. and Freeman, A. Great Britain After the War. London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1916. 
Pleberg M. From Max Weber (trans. and ede by Garth, H. H. and Mills, C. w. ). 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948. 
Weinberg, I. "The problem of the convergence of industrial societies: a 
critical look at the state of a theory". Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, XI, 1969, pp. 1.15. 
Weintraub, K. J. Visions of Culture. University of Chicago Press, 1966. 
wells, H. G. The Time Machine. New York, H. Holt, 1895- 
The Wheels of Chance. Works, Atlantic Ed. # vol. VII. London, T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1925 (1896). 
The Invisible Man. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. III. London, T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1924 1897). 
Love and Mr. Lewisham. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. VII. London, T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1925 (1898)- 
The First Men on the Moon. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. VI. London, T. 
Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1900). 
Anticipations, Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. IV. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 
1924 (1901)- 
The Discovery of the Future. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. IV. London, 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1924 1902). 
Locomotion and Administration. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. IV. London, 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1924 (1902T. 
Mankind in the Making. London, Chapman and Hall, 1904 (4th ed. ). 
A Modern Utopia and Other Discussions. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol, IX. 
London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 1904 . 
Ki s. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. VIII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 
1905). 
In the Days o fthe Co_ et. London, Macmillan, 1906. 
Socialism-and-the Farm. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XVI. London, 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 
(1906). 
The Future in-Am 
- 
erics. Works, Atlantic Ed., Vol. XXVI. London, 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1927 (1906). 
New Worlds for Old. London, Archibald Constable & Co., 1908. 
The History of Mr. Poll . Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XVII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 o. 1909). 
unmy, Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 
1925 (1909)- 
Ann Veronica. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XIII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 
1925 1909-1910). 
Boon. i/orka, Atlantic Ed., vol. XIII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 
1911). 
- 749 - 
Wells, H. G. (Cont'd. ) 
Floor Games. London, Frank Palmer, 1911. 
The New Machiavelli. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XIV. London, T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1925 (1911T- 
The Passionate Friends. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XVIII. London, 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 (1913)" 
The Wife of Sir Isaac Harman. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XVI. London, 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 (1914). 
The World Set Free. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XXI. London, T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1926 (1914)- 
Mr, Britlin . Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XXII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 
1926 (1916). 
First and Last Thin. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XI. London, T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1925 (1917). 
God the Invisible King. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XI. London, 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1917). 
The Undying Fire. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XI. London, T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1925 1917). 
Democracy. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XXI. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 
1926 c. 1917). 
Joan and Peter. Works, Atlantic Ed., vols. XXIII, XXIV. London, 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1927 (1918). 
The Outline of History. London, Newnes, 1920. 
The Salvaging of Civilization. London, Cassell, 1921. 
Menw Like Gods. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XXVIII. London, T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1927 (1923). 
The Dream. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XXVIII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 
1927 1924). 
The Story of a Great Schoolmaster. Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. XXIV. 
London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1927 (1924). 
Preface, Works, Atlantic Ed., vol. VII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925. 
The World of William Clissold, 3 vols. London, Ernest Benn, 1926. 
"Preface" to Collected Works, XXIV. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1927. 
Experiment in Autobiograp y. London, Victor Gollancz and The Crossett Press, 1934" 2 vols. 
The Outline of Man's Work and Wealth. Garden City (N. Y. ), Garden City Pub. Co. c. 1936). 
World Brain. London, Methuen, 1938. 
Wells, H. G., Huxley, J. and Wells, G. P. The Science of Life. London, Cassell, 1931. 
white, J. P. "Indoctrination" in Peters, R. S. (ed. ). The Concept of Education. London, Routledge and Began Paul, 1967, pp. 177-191. 
"Reply" to Gregory and Woods, art. cit. Philosophy of Education Society 
of Great Britain. Proceedings of the Annual Conference, January 1970, 
pp. 107-120. 
Whitehead, A. N. Adventures of Ideas. Harmondsworth (Middlesex), Penguin 
Books, 1948 (1933)o 
"Harvard the future" in Essays in Science and Philosophy. London, 
Bider, 1948. 
The Aims of Education and Other Essays. London, Ernest Benn Ltd., 1959" 
Williams, B. "Democracy and ideology". Political Quarterly- 32,1961, p. 374f. 
